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Abstract: 
The “Policy Framework for Iraq’s Petroleum Industry” is a logical structure that 
establishes the rules to guide decisions and manage processes to achieve economically 
efficient outcomes within the energy sector. It divides policy applications between 
regulatory and regulated practices, and defines the governance of the public sector 
across the petroleum industry and relevant energy portfolios. 
 
In many “Rentier States” where countries depend on a single source of income such as 
oil revenues, overlapping powers of authority within the public sector between policy 
makers and operators has led to significant conflicts of interest that have resulted  in the 
mismanagement of resources and revenues, corruption, failed strategies and the ultimate 
failure of the system. Some countries have succeeded in identifying areas for 
progressive reform, whilst others failed due to various reasons discussed in this thesis. 
Iraq fits into the category of a country that has failed to implement reform and has 
become a classic case of a rentier state. 
 
The primary aim of this research is to produce a policy framework applicable to the 
local settings of Iraq’s petroleum industry, together with an implementation strategy 
that helps the country in its transition from legacy practices to sustainable policies 
compatible with the federal constitution of 2005. Such a framework would observe the 
legislative applications that appeared in the aftermath of establishing a federal regime. 
The framework will help to rationalise the decisions and processes that sustain the 
governance and business practices across the energy value chain of Iraq. 
 
The development of a policy framework exemplified by the final setting of the Federal 
Energy Council (FEC) proposed in this thesis has to take into account the existing legal 
framework, the legacy of previous policies and the governance arrangements of 
developing policy under a new federal regime. A review of federal models of major 
resource holders that may share similar attributes to Iraq is subsequently necessary to 
identify the appropriate fiscal regime which fits Iraq’s legal system. Conflicts of interest 
and how they have been reduced or eliminated in case study countries, must be 
identified to instruct the final proposed framework. 
 
This research also examines key factors that influence the petroleum sector of a 
federalized major resource holder. Furthermore, qualitative in-depth case studies have 
been conducted to investigate the research problem. This research is complemented by 
numerous interviews that took place with high profile executives, policy makers and 
senior officials, as well as a review of data relevant to Iraq from an array of historical 
literature. The findings of this thesis will comprise a proposed “policy framework for 
Iraq’s petroleum industry,” exemplified by the FEC that the federal government of Iraq 
needs to adopt to transition energy institutions from the legacy of centralised rule to a 
modern and efficient petroleum industry in a democratic setting. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
Conventional fossil fuel resources such as oil and natural gas are commodities that form 
the foundation of the global economy and energy supply. Together they make up 55% 
of world’s energy consumption,1 with 60% of those resources held by the Major 
Resource Holders (MRH) of the Middle East, a region in which 40% of the world’s 
petroleum is produced.
2
 
 
Over the past few decades, especially after the return of widespread nationalisation of 
oil and gas and later, new contractual arrangements for foreign companies in the Middle 
East, the petroleum sector has undergone significant changes as it has become more 
regulated, and as governments seized more power to control states’ assets. Since there is 
very little history of democratic institution building in the MENA region, and that in 
many cases, whoever controls the state directly runs the economy, the process of 
gradually increasing state control over the main revenue generator in resource rich 
nations has been accompanied by the problem set defined by Sachs and Warner as the 
Resource Curse.
3
 Market volatility in oil and gas is one problem, but it can arguably be 
mitigated by a carefully designed petroleum policy that maximises efficiency within a 
country’s energy value chain, helping shield the economy from market shocks.  
 
Kennedy notes that by 1976, most major oil producers had nationalised their industries.
4
 
However, external and internal political dynamics have impacted the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) as much as geology, and have subsequently given a small 
number of producers the strategic ability to have an outsize influence on various oil 
producing states, of which many are dependent on hydrocarbon revenues as a single 
source of income.  
 
With their newfound control over the hydrocarbon sector, MRH countries in the Middle 
East became increasingly aware of their growing political influence that came with so 
much supply (two thirds of global supply by 1972) and according to Rubin, “changed 
                                               
1
 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook,” (Paris, 2014) 
2
 OPEC, “World Oil Outlook,” (Paris, 2014) 
3
 Andrew M. Warner, Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5398, 1995) 
4
 Ryan Kennedy, “Nationalization of the Oil Sector: A Political Economy Perspective,” Paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference "Global Governance: 
Political Authority in Transition,”) March 16th 2011 
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the rules of the game in their favour” beginning with Libya’s increasingly assertive 
attack on concession contracts.
5
 Libya’s assertiveness culminated during the 1971 
Tehran conference, where OPEC members threatened to unilaterally raise oil prices and 
even embargo the 22 International Oil Companies (IOCs) that took part in the talks if 
they did not comply with the terms made in February that year.
6
  
 
This influence, and the downfall of the IOC monopoly of the “Seven Sisters” cartel was 
concerning enough for the United States to implement modest energy conservation 
policies such as the 55mph speed limit and the creation of a strategic petroleum reserve 
(under the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act).
7
 Such developments were no 
immediate threat to OPEC however; following the 1973 oil price shock, oil imports in 
OECD countries had fallen only 5% from their 1970 level, by 1975.
8
 Indeed, OPEC 
continued its assertiveness with IOCs, as Clifton Garvin, Exxon CEO, recounted, 
 
“After 1976] we agreed to try to operate under the arrangements...[But] they 
didn't seem to survive very long. In other words, if it was in the interests of the 
Saudi government to change, they changed.... We [also] tried to make the 
exploration arrangements work for a while, but it became obvious in a very short 
period of time that they were not going to honor what those crude oil 
arrangements had anticipated.”9 
 
OPEC also faced internal fissures as countries sought to break quotas to capture market 
share, placing severe economic pressure on smaller producers. For new entrants to the 
global energy market, OPEC’s newfound power was potentially a threat to their 
economic stability, and they sometimes sought to evade the cartel’s quotas, as Fattouh 
notes,  
 
 “Problems become more acute when the required cuts are significant as the 
small OPEC members usually find it difficult to reduce their production on a 
pro-rata basis: the usual system adopted by OPEC over the years. In these 
circumstances, market participants would doubt the credibility of OPEC’s 
decision to cut production and may decide to ignore the signal. This is 
                                               
5
 Barry Rubin, “The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture,” (New York; 
Routledge, 2012) , 127 
6
 Edmund Jan Osmańczyk, Anthony Mango, “Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International 
Agreements: Vol 4:T to Z” (London: Taylor and Francis, 2003): 2288 
7
  “The Energy Policy and Conservation Act,” William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 3 
(1976): 94-163 
8
 P Anderson, H Bernard, “Energy Shocks and the demand for energy,” (Research paper, Bank for 
International Settlements, Basle, 1991.) 
9
 Morris Adelman, “OPEC at High Noon: 1974-1981.” (Research paper, MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts, 1992.) 
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particularly true if there are deep divisions and political rivalries among member 
countries which will jeopardize the success of any coordination efforts.” 
 
Adelman quotes the New York Times to illustrate this point: 
 
"[Nigeria] thought it had an agreement with Algeria and Libya in 1977 to raise prices in 
concert. By the time they realized what was happening...they'd lost $1.5 billion in 
revenues. Between the Fall of 1977 and the Spring of 1978, Nigeria lost nearly one-
third of its sales because they were less than 2 percent out of line on prices.”10 
 
Political division and the desire to capture market share within OPEC was only one 
problem with the cartel however, as individual member states experienced internal 
instability. In 1978 for example, oil workers in Iran went on strike, taking millions of 
barrels of Iranian oil off the market and leading to the second oil price shock of 1979 as 
Iranian revolutionaries ousted the Shah, reducing Iranian oil production from a high of 6 
million bpd to just over 400,000 bpd in 1980, doubling world oil prices. 
11
  
 
While this crisis may have resulted in a revenue windfall for producers such as Saudi 
Arabia, who witnessed a spike in oil income to $113 billion in 1980-81,
12
 the longer 
term effect for all producers was more negative. Firstly, the shock of the 1979 spike 
dramatically reduced demand, which fell from 64 million bpd in 1979 to 59 million bpd 
by 1985.
13
 Likewise, faced with yet another price crisis, Europe and North America re-
orientated their strategies towards lower energy intensity, with oil consumption 
dropping 40% between 1979 and 1990.
14
 At the same time, stockpiles of oil rapidly 
built up, as Saudi Arabia ramped up production from 8.5 million bpd to over 10 million 
bpd to avert global economic crisis, since Iranian and Iraqi production had almost 
collapsed.
15
 
 
As oil demand started to fall, by 10% to 1983, stockpiles remained high. OPEC 
subsequently changed strategy to keep a floor on prices, with Saudi Arabia bearing over 
                                               
10
 Ibid. 
11
 “Iran: Another Crisis for the Shah,” Time Magazine,  Nov. 13th, 1978 
12
 René Rieger, “Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict Resolution,” (New 
York: Routledge, 2016.): Section 2.3.2. 
13
 Barry Rubin, “The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture,” (New York:  
Routledge, 2012) , 127 
14
 Morris Adelman, “OPEC at High Noon: 1974-1981.” (Research paper, MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts, 1992.) 
15
 M. S. EL-Azhary, “The Iran-Iraq War, A Historical, Economic and Political Analysis.” (New York: 
Routledge, 1984.):44 
 
4 
 
60% of production cuts. This forced importers to buy more oil from non-OPEC 
countries and further reconfigure their energy strategies.
16
 Increasingly cognizant of the 
damage to their economy caused by reducing output, Saudi Arabia then ramped up 
production in 1986 to secure market share, and with oil stockpiles at record highs, the 
effect was a glut and subsequent price collapse.
17
 This in had a destabilizing effect on 
the region. By 1990 Saddam Hussein came to see Kuwait’s continued high oil output as 
a threat to Iraq’s economic stability, and subsequently used this as justification for his 
invasion of the country that year.
18
 
 
So severe was the effect of this price collapse in oil dependent countries, that 
Shabafrouz argues it was responsible for conditions for the Algerian civil war of 1992
19
 
while others such as Gaidar
20
 have suggested it played a key role in the demise of the 
Soviet Union, with Reynolds arguing lack of investment was central to rapid production 
decline and a Soviet financial crisis.
21
 
 
The above examples of the volatility of the global energy market serve to illustrate a 
central point examined by this paper: Faced with the rising unpredictability of political 
as much as market factors influencing global supply, the need for viable policies to 
regulate complex industries is not an option but a necessity. This is particularly the case 
in a federal setting, where individual sub-states must bargain with the centre for revenue 
allocations and production and exploration rights a situation that is seen in all five 
federal states examined by this paper, the UAE, Russia, Canada, Nigeria and Iraq. 
 
Maintaining professional practices free from legal conflict and mismanagement can help 
an MRH such as Iraq to withstand unpredictable exogenous political and market factors, 
to include rival producers ramping up production to damage the energy sector of a rival 
MRH, as seen with Venezuela’s battle with Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, which 
                                               
16
 Dermot Gately, “Lessons from the 1986 oil price collapse,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 
(1986): 237-285 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 “Iraqi invasion of Kuwait-International Response.” Keesing's Record of World Events, 36 (1990): 37631 
19
 Miriam Shabafrouz, “Oil and the Eruption of the Algerian Civil War: A Context-sensitive Analysis of the 
Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance,” German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working 
Papers, 118 (2010)  
20
 Yegor Gaidar “The Soviet Collapse,” (paper presented at AEI on November 13, 2006.) 
21
 Douglas B. Reynolds, Marek Kolodzie, “Former Soviet Union Oil Production and GDP Decline: Granger 
Causality and the Multi-Cycle Hubbert Curve,”Energy Economics, 30 (2008) 271-289) 
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derailed Caracas’ production targets.22 To insulate against such turbulence, modern 
petroleum policies have proved to be instrumental in drawing the line between the 
regulators (i.e., governments) and the regulated bodies, that is, the operators, including 
national and international oil companies and private sector firms.  
 
As politics has continued to influence policies, the epidemic of conflicting interests 
within state institutions has become endemic in MRH countries that have failed to build 
checks and balances into their petroleum policies. As the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute note,  
 
“Poor governance and systemic corruption are prevalent in many resource-rich 
countries…(corrupt networks) derive huge personal benefit from their ability to 
“capture” public resources, as well as regulatory and policy-making 
processes.”23  
 
The role of regulators has overlapped with national and foreign operators, leading to 
mismanagement, corruption, hindering development and wasting of investment 
opportunities with such countries as Nigeria, Venezuela and increasingly Iraq proving 
to be egregious examples. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 
2015 ranks these countries at 138 (Nigeria) 158 (Venezuela) and 161 (Iraq.) Other 
major oil exporters fare badly, including Russia (119) Libya (161, joint position with 
Iraq) and Iran (130).
24
 However, this paper does not seek to focus on MRH countries 
that score badly on governance indicators. Canada and the UAE have been chosen as 
more successful MRH countries in an attempt to examine successful and unsuccessful 
policies.  
 
Nonetheless, some governments of oil producing states in the MENA region have 
consolidated centralisation and empowered national oil companies to further control 
petroleum exploration and production operations. These countries now face the 
challenge of changing their legal regimes (IOC investment frameworks) to attract more 
investment, despite recent IOC memories of difficult contractual terms driven by 
resource nationalism.  
                                               
22
James Bowen, “Saudi Arabia’s New Oil Strategy could backfire,” The National Interest, 8th of July 2016. 
Accessed July 16th 2016http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-bold-new-oil-strategy-could-
backfire-16515 
 
23
 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Responding to the Challenge of Corruption in Resource-Rich 
Countries,” (2015) 
24
 Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2015 
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For example, senior officials from ENI and Total have publicly remarked that their 
companies had lost “so much money” from the “buyback” contracts favoured by the 
Iranian government from the early 1990s onwards, hinting that the new Iranian model 
contract would need much better terms.
25
 Likewise, after a series of corruption scandals 
hit the senior leadership of Algerian NOC Sonatrach, the Algerians struggled to adapt 
their Joint Venture dominated model and have failed to attract significant new 
investment in their oil sector as of 2016. According to IHS, Algeria’s failed 2011 
licensing rounds were largely due to, 
 
“Years of tightening fiscal terms, red tape and decision making paralysis in the 
state-owned industry and bureaucracy. IOCs have been forced to wait for years 
on commercialisation and development licences, while they have seen their 
expected returns on expensive projects plummet.”26 
 
With challenging investment terms in countries holding a total of 361 billion bbl 
estimated reserves
27
 including Algeria (12 billion bbl) Libya (48 billion bbl) and Iran 
(158 billion bbl) and instability and political uncertainty in Iraq (143 billion bbl), many 
IOCs were left with limited options to consider under rigid regulations, vague policies, 
unwelcoming laws and challenging commercial terms, forcing them to explore for oil 
far from the Middle East.  
 
Deterred from Iraq until the 2009 licensing rounds, Major IOCs increasingly looked for 
oil opportunities in Siberia, Alaska, Canada and offshore regions such as the Atlantic 
coastline of West Africa. 
28
This scenario had very little impact on traditional oil 
producers under high oil prices, but has proved to be threatening to economies under 
low oil prices, as petroleum has become the main source of income for MENA rentier 
states. With the advent of shale oil, the centre of production growth has shifted West, 
while the growth of the Asian economies and lessening energy intensity (combined with 
economic stagnation) has shifted consumption to the East. 
                                               
25
Rania El Gamal, “Iranian officials revive ghost of oil deals disliked by majors”, Reuters 4th of July 2016. 
Accessed July 16th 2016.http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-oil-contracts-idUKKCN0ZK1RY 
26
 “Abysmal Licensing Round Result in Algeria Confirms Energy Sector Malaise,” IHS Markits 18th of 
March 2011. Accessed 16th July 2016. https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-
forecasting.html?ID=1065929211 
27
 All figures from OPEC: Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2015. 
28
 Vlado Vivoda, “The rise of state-firm bargaining in the 2000s,” in “The Political Economy of Natural 
Resources and Development: From neoliberalism to resource nationalism” eds Paul A. Haslam, Pablo 
Heidrich.(New York: Routledge, 2016), 53-59. 
 
7 
 
 
This new challenge comes at a time when MENA producers are overcoming the legacy 
of decades of state dominance in the energy sector. Between 1975 and 1990, much oil 
development in these states was limited to old technologies inherited from International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) of the pre-nationalisation era. For example, when the former 
Oasis group (Amerada Hess, Conoco and Marathon) and Occidental Petroleum returned 
to Libya on a fact finding mission Libya to after discussing the end of sanctions, they 
evaluated infrastructure they had left behind in 1986.
29
  
 
By the early 2000s, state management practices were underpinned by state-controlled 
enterprises, with no room for a market economy to evolve. For Iraq and Iran this already 
followed a challenging situation since in the 1990s the Iraq-Iran war burdened two 
major oil producers with over $100 billion dollars’ debt each. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the collapse of Soviet oil production highs, the 
MENA region had become more welcoming to Western companies, foreign investment 
and reform, gradually experimenting with market economy practices.  
 
In the mid -1990s, Iran launched its “Buyback” model contract, originally stemming 
from a 1989 modification to Iranian law that prohibited foreign company involvement 
in the energy sector, intended to give the Islamic Republic the ability to amass its own 
energy infrastructure.
30
 Saddam Hussein’s Iraq explored opportunities, with CNPC, 
Total and Lukoil for its Supergiant southern fields. Meanwhile Libya, exploring new 
relations with the West, returned to a version of its Joint Venture based Exploration 
Production-Sharing Agreements (EPSAs) for the giant fields of the Sirte Basin, altering 
a contract model initially launched in the early 1970s, but modified as the EPSA III in 
the late 1980s.
31
 
 
By 2005, there was already some IOC discontent with Libyan contract models, as 
Openoil reported on the first bidding rounds open to Western companies,  “Some IOC 
representatives considered that the limited number of bids signalled dissatisfaction with 
                                               
29
 International Business Publications “Libya Oil and Gas Exploration Laws and Regulation 
Handbook,”(Washington:  International Business Publications, 2013): 67 
30
 Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati, “A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the context of 
international petroleum contractual systems.” (Dis.2008, Durham University.) 
31
 “Libya Puts Upstream Negotiations with IOCs On Fast Track, Says Badri” 
MEES, 24th April, 2000.  
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increasingly stringent terms and operating conditions.”32 Likewise, Rigzone reported in 
March 2007 how, “oil firms complain that business talks are typically mired in 
bureaucracy and squabbling between reform-minded officials and conservatives.”33 By 
the time of the price collapse of 2009, Gaddafi was further deterring IOC investors by 
stating,  
"Oil exporting countries may move toward nationalization because of the rapidly 
declining prices. This is put on the table and is being discussed seriously. Oil 
maybe should be owned by national companies or the public sector at this point, 
in order to control the oil prices, the oil production or maybe to stop it.”34 
 
In Iran, the first Buyback negotiations took several years, with Total being the first IOC 
to sign an agreement in 1995 (Conoco previously signed a contract but then pulled out 
due to US sanctions). By 2005 however, it was apparent IOCs were struggling with the 
limited and inflexible fiscal terms of Buybacks, with Farnejad  noting, “From the 
contractor's perspective, there are major risks associated with the buyback contract in 
terms of the performance guarantees associated with production rates, development cost 
and project schedule.”35 
 
Difficult contractual terms were only one problem for IOCs in Iran however with one 
cleric condemning “those inside the oil empires who plunder millions and millions and 
send them to their own foreign bank accounts.”36 
 
As investment stagnated, the alignment of investors and host-governments’ interests 
became a necessity to sustain long-term business development, especially in the 
petroleum industry since the objectives of various stakeholders often differ quite 
significantly.  
 
For this reason, International Oil Companies demanded more clarity on regulatory 
frameworks prior to engagement in long term investment as they aimed for revenue 
                                               
32
 Openoil: Libya,2011 
33
 Sally Jones, “BP Talks with Libya on Giant Gas Acreage Falter -Officials,” Rigzone, 9th of March 2007. 
Accessed 16th of July 
2016.http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/42345/BP_Talks_with_Libya_on_Giant_Gas_Acreage_Falter
_Officials 
34
 Sue Pleming, “Gaddafi says looking at Oil firm Nationalization,” Reuters January 21st 2009. Accessed 
July 16th 2009. http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessproind-us-libya-gaddafi-oil-
idUKTRE50K61F20090121 
35
 Hooman Farnejad, How competitive are the Iranian Buyback contracts in comparison to production 
sharing fiscal systems?” (Diss. University of Dundee, 2008. 
36
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maximisation. The present study will illustrate the acute problems caused by ongoing 
regulatory uncertainty in Iraq’s energy sector. 
 
It will be argued that the objective of the petroleum regulatory framework from a host-
government’s perspective is to establish a viable and welcoming policy that aims to: 37 
 
● Attract IOCs to explore and develop potential resources; 
● Develop a well-functioning and sustainable petroleum sector; 
● Develop the country’s economy, taking into consideration a long-term and 
short-term view. 
With the growing commercial understanding of governments for fair competition, 
policy reform and fair fiscal regimes, having a viable petroleum policy framework has 
become a priority to offer a level playing field for qualified operators including national 
and international oil companies (NOCs and IOCs). This has helped newly formed Gulf 
Countries in the 1970s to maximize their oil production levels and secure a greater 
market share in consuming countries in Asia, Europe, and the United States of America. 
However, even in the Gulf States there have been challenges, as El Katiri remarks, 
 
“The Gulf states’ domestic pricing framework sets a low ceiling for investment 
returns from development projects, a particularly painful truth for international 
oil and gas companies.”38 
 
Despite this, the Gulf States have an advantage in oil extraction over rivals Iran, Libya, 
Iraq and Algeria in that they have decades of political stability in addition to low per 
barrel extraction costs, and even where extraction costs are relatively cheap (Iraq, 
Libya) requirements to invest in new energy infrastructure after wars and political 
instability have been a deterrent to investment. Of the Gulf States, Hvozdyk notes, 
 
“NOCs in a number of major oil producers – particularly where financial 
constraints are less binding or it is easy to attract private capital – ratcheted up 
plans for investment since 2005. Large companies – such as Saudi Arabia’s 
Aramco, UAE’s ADNOC, and Kuwait’s KPC, which can self-finance projects 
and were able to maintain their human and productive capital base during the 
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lean years of the 1990s – have developed ambitious capacity expansion plans at 
all levels of the production chain.”39 
 
By resolving difficult questions regarding foreign investment and ownership in their 
energy sectors as long ago as the 1970s, countries such as the UAE were eventually able 
to focus on energy subsidy reform, which has been a continuously difficult issue in 
MRH countries such as Iraq, Russia, Nigeria and Venezuela, to name a few examples. 
In the MENA region, this issue has been particularly problematic. Boersma and 
Griffiths note how up to 2 million bpd of fuel in the MENA region is burned in power 
generation at cost to the state, because of subsidies, fuel which could be exported for 
government revenue.
40
 
 
Despite these problems, moving from an exclusively state-owned and operated market 
to a market economy and cooperative partnership between IOCs and NOCs has been 
major milestone post nationalization.
41
 In some petroleum producing countries, an 
increasing number of NOCs coexist and cooperate with IOCs on national soil. This is 
the case for ADNOC in the UAE, Sonatrach in Algeria, the NOC of Libya (pre-2011), 
Petronas of Malaysia, Petrobras in Brazil, Pertamina in Indonesia, NNPC of Nigeria, the 
Qatar National Gas Company, and although strained, PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela 
SA). Other NOCs have the structure of mixed shareholding with majority shares owned 
by the state and minority shareholding for private investors such as Petrobras of Brazil 
and Statoil of Norway.
42
 
 
However, state institutions in some major oil producing countries such as Iran, Iraq and 
Kuwait have resisted change for nearly 40 years after the 1970s-nationalization wave, 
while the overlap of authority between regulator and regulated bodies has become more 
of a hindrance to petroleum development and less welcoming to foreign investors. 
According to Fadhil Chalabi, this has resulted in billions of dollars’ worth of lost 
opportunities that have gone to competing producers in the region.
43
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Since the nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in the early 1970s 
(formally owned by BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total and Partex), the oil and gas sector in 
Iraq has been performing erratically when it comes to the application of practical 
policies required for sustainable growth.
44
 After the collapse of Iraq’s Monarchy in 
1958, all subsequent polities ruling Iraq have employed a state-controlled economy 
approach while relying on oil revenues as the country’s single source of income, 
reaching 95% of national budgets.
45
 State control over Iraq’s oil revenue together with 
massive expenditure for the army to resolve internal conflicts through force has further 
divided the nation,
46
 and has led to Iraq being classified as a failed state in the 
international index.
47
  
 
Although Iraq’s National Oil Company (INOC) was formed in the early 1960s, to 
become Iraq’s main national operator with full control over nationalized assets, by the 
early 1970s this model was proving to have limitations. In 1987 the ruling party in Iraq 
decided to dissolve INOC making all national operating companies subsidiaries of the 
Ministry of Oil. Since then, the regulator of the petroleum industry in Iraq has also acted 
as an operator. The end of INOC heralded a new era of conflict of interest that now 
defines the management of Iraq’s biggest single source of income. Under Baathist rule, 
centralism and the monopoly of decision-making defined the political modus operandi, 
and the petrodollar was the main financier of consecutive wars and internal armed 
conflicts. The overlap of politics and policies was clearly making oil a dividing factor, 
not a unifying instrument, as Saddam weaponised the sector for his own ambitions. 
Newnham notes, 
 
“Oil and gas profits can also be used to win over politically important 
individuals. Saddam Hussein was widely reported to have used this tactic after 
the first Gulf War, when his regime covertly gave oil export permits to 
individuals who were helping Hussein politically and economically. Such 
permits, allowing the export of steeply discounted oil, could then be resold to oil 
dealers at a large profit.”48 
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Although nationalization aimed to secure Iraq’s sovereignty over hydrocarbon assets, 
the effect was the opposite given the lack of best-practice processes, policy applications, 
governance frameworks and viable commercial strategies to replace the state vacuum of 
the concession system, where the government’s role was consigned to taxing the profits 
of IOCs that had legal ownership of the resource.
49
  
 
Therefore, the only notable result of Iraq’s period of total state domination of the 
industry was the steady decline of Iraq’s main revenue generator, far below the 
country’s potential, coupled with the continuation of Iraq’s economy being dependent 
on oil revenue in isolation from other industries. The legacy of this era still affects 
Iraq’s economy and places it at the mercy of unsustainable oil production (reservoirs 
were damaged during the Iran-Iraq war as Iraq sought to maintain a war economy) and 
volatile oil prices.
50
  
 
With regard to market strategies, Iraq put downward pressure on global prices as it 
ramped up production in the mid-1980s (by increasing pipeline exports, since the 
southern export corridor was effectively blockaded), eventually reaching almost 3 mbpd 
by late 1989.
51
 This was an approach that it later planned to repeat with a 2010 
production target of 12mbpd.
52
  
 
While pursuing aggressive and unrealistic export targets, the Ministry of Oil continues 
to overlook critical efficiency savings in the sector. Lucrative commodities such as gas 
have continued to be flared at similar levels to those seen in the 1990s (see Basra Gas 
Company case study, chapter 5) while the petrochemical industry struggles, aging 
refining capacity suffers inefficiency due to old technology, and Iraq’s private sector 
has had no chance to complement the role of the public sector. With regard to the latter 
point, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a much needed introduction to Iraq to 
                                                                                                                                         
 
49
 Fadhil al-Chalabi, Oil Policies, Oil Myths: Analysis and Memoirs of an OPEC Insider (London, 2010), 
219 
50
 Adnan al Janabi, Luay al Khatteeb, “The need for cooperation between producers and consumers,” Iraq 
Energy Institute, 10th of August, 2012, Accessed July 16th 2016 
http://iraqenergy.org/home/articles_details.php?id=32 
51
 Iraq warning on oil exports. The New York Times.October 10
th
 1989. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/10/business/iraqi-warning-on-oil-exports.html 
52
 “Shahristani denies rumours of reduced oil target,” Iraq Business News, May 9th 2011. Accessed 16th 
of July 2016. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/05/09/shahristani-denies-rumours-of-reduced-oil-
target/ 
13 
 
sustain the wider value chain of this diverse industry, but the creation of this model in 
Iraq has been beset with bureaucratic hurdles, a legacy of the mentality of state 
control.
53
 
 
Nonetheless, the role of the Iraqi government will likely remain central for the 
foreseeable future, and requires the necessary reforms to act as an effective policy-
maker and regulator for overseeing the entire sector and companies operating within it, 
while setting the necessary policies and standards, and focusing on maximizing the 
economic rent to the Iraqi people from these operations. However, if the government 
engages in operating the sector as opposed to managing it, this will likely compromise 
its own role as an effective regulator.
54
 
 
Across the world, countries have opted for different organizational structures for their 
petroleum industries. The federal government of Iraq has the opportunity to shape its 
own oil and gas policy and resolve the regulatory problems that will undoubtedly 
determine the petroleum sector’s future. At the same time, a well-designed national 
energy strategy has the potential to mitigate the effect of volatile international energy 
markets.  
 
1.1 The Research Problem 
 
Research in the field of petroleum policy framework development is inconclusive; this 
is due to the complexity of the sector being an economic driver in virtually every sector, 
especially for rentier states where governments have a strong control over industry and 
domestic energy consumption. Unpredictable political, social and commercial dynamics 
are a major influencing factor in deciding the economic development of a state.
55
 
Subsequently, Large-N studies are prone to significant margins of error due to the 
number of factors that influence energy policy, while other case study approaches risk 
being too narrow to identify optimal approaches to resource governance.  
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A number of authors have focused their work on the low capacity of governments in 
developing countries to manage resource wealth, suggesting resource abundance is 
causally linked to low long term growth, chronic corruption, increased risk of civil war 
and autocratic governance. A term first used in the 1970s, the “resource curse” arguably 
became a popular theory in 1995 with  Sachs and Warner’s study, “Natural Resource 
Abundance and Economic Growth” which illustrated a correlation between long term 
low growth and the abundance of resources.
56
 By 2007, IImi used qualitative analysis to 
show a “statistically significant” indication that resource wealth negatively affected per 
capita incomes, noting, 
 
“In Latin America, high income inequality stemming from uneven distribution 
of resource returns has ended in failure to accumulate social and human capital, 
interfering with sustained growth and economic diversification.”57 
 
For the purpose of designing an energy policy framework, is not sufficient to note the 
existence of a large resource base in Iraq and correlate this with political instability, 
corruption and economic volatility and then diagnose a case of the resource curse. For 
example, the existence of this phenomenon has been challenged in recent years by a 
number of observers who point to nations that have escaped this trend, notably Chile 
and Botswana.
58
 
 
Ross has looked at 14 quantitative studies examining the relationship between civil war 
and resource wealth, and found no strong relationship between natural resource 
abundance and conflict.
59
  Similarly, Smith concludes that when analysing developing 
countries with and without resource wealth, there appears to be no trend that links 
resources to conflict. He notes,  
 
“By removing the barricades separating oil exporting states from other states 
(especially in the post-colonial world), we gain the capacity to put resource 
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wealth in a more normalized place in comparative inquiry, where resource 
wealth is influential but not entirely constitutive.”60 
 
Di John is more concise in his analysis, noting that,  
 
“The proposition that oil abundance induces extraordinary corruption, rent 
seeking and centralised interventionism and that these processes are necessarily 
productivity- and growth-restricting is not supported by comparative or 
historical evidence.”61 
 
Rather than seeking to justify diagnosis of the curse, a more useful way of looking at the 
research problem would be to look at what is missing in Iraq in terms of institutional 
strength and federal structure to effectively govern resources and what is present in 
federal countries that have developed strong regulations. Stevens, Lahn and Kooroshy 
note the problems with the wide scope of resource curse theory, which has informed the 
small but focused case study approach taken by this study: 
 
“The shortcomings of the resource-curse theory arise mainly from the 
reductionist quest for ‘one big explanation’ of the role of resources in 
development. The generalization that resource production harms the economy 
overlooks the complexity of economic development in different countries under 
different circumstances. Inevitably, the experience of extractives-led growth 
varies from country to country. Rather than focusing on why resource 
production harms the economy, this paper asks a more pertinent question: why 
has resource production failed to create more resilient economies?”62 
 
In the case of Iraq, a useful research question may be, “why has Iraq’s political 
reorganization since 2003 failed to create a more resilient economy, than that which 
existed under the Baath regime?” 
 
While there may be problems with the broad scope of much resource curse literature, 
the small case study approach may undoubtedly identify attributes of petroleum policy 
frameworks that could be feasibly implemented in Iraq, but no one system of resource 
governance, even if seemingly exemplary, can be transposed onto another country. 
Increasingly observers (such as Thurber, Holts and Heller,) are arguing there is no “one 
size fits all” approach, even with the much-vaunted “Norway Model.” 63 
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 In the latter case, while Norway’s strong system of checks and balances against 
political control of the sector are widely considered to have avoided the “resource 
curse”64 other nations attempting similar policies may not have the institutional strength 
or technocratic human capacity to implement the model in a similar way. Havro and 
Santiso note with regard to developing resource rich countries,  
 
“the paradox of plenty has shown that they might just as well pose increased 
difficulties, especially as many of these same countries do not have the 
institutional strength and capacity needed to avoid the curse.”65 
 
To an extent, this is discussed in this section with regards to Nigeria and Iraq, who have 
both planned but never implemented similar mechanisms for limiting political control as 
seen in the Norway Model. The challenge of implementing good governance in the 
energy sector is not only restricted to resource rich developing countries.  
 
Even advanced countries have witnessed ongoing political controversy in reviewing 
their policy frameworks and regulatory regimes, as global market and political factors 
create the necessity of change. For example, the Australian government has had to 
conduct a significant review of its petroleum regulatory system after it experienced a 
decline in resources, forcing the government to review what some saw as bureaucratic 
barriers to operations and investment.
66
 It was argued that the petroleum regulatory 
framework of Australia was outdated, encumbered with regulatory burden and failed to 
meet Australia’s petroleum policy to serve the national interest. To address this 
problem, a comparative study was conducted to assess Australia’s petroleum regulatory 
framework against similar frameworks such as that of Norway.
67
Such practice helped in 
adjusting policies to meet modern practices, passing necessary legislation to solve 
regulatory and policy problems. Likewise, analysts and scholars in Canada such as Greg 
Poelzer have frequently referenced the Norway Model, in particular with regard to 
Natural Resource Funds, which are vital for maintaining economic stability with regards 
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to unpredictable oil prices.
68
 However, as discussed later, only the UAE has succeeded 
in building an enduring natural resource wealth fund.  
 
In some cases, regulatory reform is required to fix operational problems. A comparative 
study was conducted to examine gas flaring in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria and 
Texas. The analysis focused on how Texas managed the balance between sustaining the 
oil and gas boom while reducing its gas flaring to 0.4%.
69
 Meanwhile, Nigeria has failed 
to achieve anything comparable due to the lack of effective and efficient regulations that 
govern the operations of the IOCs and NOCs.
70
 Similarly, Russia and Iraq have faced 
the same operational challenge with Iraq ranking 4
th
 in the global gas flaring index.
71
 
 
In Iraq however, the problem is unique, since a major constitutional change put into 
effect in early 2006 defined Iraq as a federal state, allowed the participation of the 
private sector and foreign investors in the petroleum industry, and offered provincial 
authorities in Iraq the right to jointly negotiate, manage and operate petroleum assets 
together with the federal government.
72
 This constitutional change has radically altered 
the rules of management and operation away from central to federal practices.  
 
Problematically, the federal Ministry of Oil together with national oil companies 
continued to pursue the centralized practices that were in place under the former regime. 
Between the “transfer of sovereignty” in 2004 and the advent of sustained unilateral 
Kurdish oil exports in 2015, the federal ministry of oil held the final decision on 
governing all processes through rigid controls.
73
 Unilateralism on the part of the 
ministry created many more conflicts of interest and as a result of the overlapping rules 
of authority, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq went its own way in formulating petroleum 
policy, which it has attempted to pursue since 2007.
74
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The resultant political conflict between the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad and the Kurdish 
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) diverted much attention in Baghdad to arguments 
over constitutional issues, played out in the Council of Representatives (parliament, or 
COR) ultimately ending in Baghdad cutting the KRI off from its 17% budget allocation, 
and diverting energy from pressing challenges.
75
 These include, but are not limited to, 
the ending of gas flaring, rebuilding refinery and export infrastructure and reassuring 
potential IOC investors to both the KRI and southern Iraq, who can provide the 
necessary capital to maintain production.
76
 Arguably, the KRI has been similarly 
focused on developing an independent export policy at the expense of an efficient 
petroleum policy that would optimise its energy value chain. 
 
As these debates and legal battles have continued, including lawsuits issued by Baghdad 
against both the KRG and potential buyers of Kurdish crude, as much as $40 billion US 
dollars per annum was being wasted as provincial and regional actors in the Iraqi oil 
industry sought to block certain contract types and projects following local or political 
interests, losses that mirror estimates of opportunity cost due to electricity outages.
77
 A 
culture of non-compliancy toward the federal authorities and the new federal 
constitution emerged, greatly slowing energy mega projects that could have saved Iraq 
billions in revenues.
78
  
 
At the heart of these conflicts is the lack of a clear distinction between the roles of the 
operating entities (national and international oil companies) as regulated bodies and the 
roles of the regulatory and supervisory bodies including federal and regional 
governments.
79
 It follows that there is an urgent need to re-focus on a ‘policy 
framework’ and ‘implementation strategy’ to guide the process of resource-management 
and operations. Successful policy will have to promote a clear and unequivocal 
separation of powers and roles between the ‘regulator’ and the ‘regulated’; otherwise, 
conflict of interest, mismanagement, and corruption will be inevitable across the 
                                               
75
 Nassir al-Hassoun “Iraqi Kurdistan economy suffers amid budget dispute with Baghdad” Al Monitor May 
16
th
 2014. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016.  
76
 See Iraq Energy Institute interview with Thamir al Ghadban for an overview of these many challenges. 
Accessed July 16th 2016. http://www.iraqenergy.org/news/?detailof=7668&content=Exclusive-Interview-
with-Al-Ghadhban-on-Iraq%27s-Oil-&-Gas-Sector 
77
 Walid Khadduri, “Electricity shortage costs Iraqi economy $40 billion a year, Al Monitor September 24th 
2013, Accessed July 16th 2016. ”http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/09/iraq-oil-energy-
crisis.html 
78
 IEA Iraq Outlook, 2012 
79
Martin Sandbu, “The Iraqi who saved Norway from its oil,” The Financial Times, August 29th 2009. 
Accessed July 16th 2009 https://www.ft.com/content/99680a04-92a0-11de-b63b-00144feabdc0 
19 
 
petroleum industry, keeping Iraq highly ranked in failed state indices. Currently, both 
Iraq and Nigeria are classed as “high alert” on the fragile states index.80   
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
Petroleum policy framework development for federal regimes is still a developing 
subject for MRH countries in the MENA region, since Iraq is the second federal state 
(2006) to emerge in the Middle East after the United Arab Emirates (founded in 1971). 
Furthermore, of the two young federal states, Gerard Butt
81
 and Boersma and Griffiths 
82
 note the relative success of the UAE’s energy strategy, highlighting rapid prosperity 
in the former case and the phasing out of subsidies for gas from 6.5% of GDP to over 
3% in just two years in the latter, while Habeeb points to gradually reducing tensions in 
the federation following their merger of armed forces in 1976 and rapidly increasing 
literacy rates.
83
  
 
Furthermore, while there was only brief and low casualty conflict in the process of the 
UAE’s transition, conflict between ethnic, sectarian and political groups in Iraq has 
been severe to the point of involving genocide, in the case of Saddam Hussein’s Anfal 
campaign against the Kurds which saw at least 100,000 people killed.
84
 Add to this the 
aftermath of the 1991 uprising in southern Iraq which saw the deaths of at least another 
100,000 people, and uprisings in Ramadi (1996) Nasiriyah (1997) and Basra (1999) and 
it is clear that the internal conflict within Iraq has had a lasting and transformational 
effect of the nation’s politics, as Rizk Khoury argues in her study, Iraq at Wartime.85 
For example, as the self-declared Islamic State terror group fall back in Iraq through 
2016, new fighting has erupted between Kurds and Shia paramilitary over disputed 
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territory, including oil rich Kirkuk, a dispute rooted in 1970s era Baath politics of ethnic 
cleansing known as “Arabization.”86 
 
By contrast, Al Ulama notes how in the UAE,  
 
“Short conflicts have occurred between members of the Union, even since 
federation, such as the conflicts between Dubai and Sharjàh (1973 and 1975); 
between Sharjah and Fujairah (1972 and 1974) in the eastern province of the 
U.A.E. where Sharjah has three enclaves: Dibba Al-Husn, Khur Fakkan and 
Kalba; and between Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah (1974).”87 
 
These may have been extremely serious due to the small size of the Emirates, but do not 
fit a popular definition of civil war, defined by Hironaka as being sustained in duration, 
high intensity and consuming much resources.
88
 Furthermore, Al Ulama notes how, 
 
“the proposal for a federation among the Gulf States was put forward to reduce 
as far as possible the tension of the boundary disputes,” before highlighting the 
endurance of the federation.”89 
 
By contrast, Iraq’s history of confrontation between the centre and provinces has 
introduced hitherto unprecedented challenges to a governance system rooted in decades 
of centralised control, in particular in the energy sector, which has experienced a degree 
of “re-Baathification,” or the re-hiring of Baath party members, in some cases in senior 
management positions.
90
  
 
In sum, while we cannot make a clear comparison between the Middle East's only two 
federations, the UAE has elements of Iraq’s problems, including subsidies that account 
for a high percentage of GDP, causing fuel inefficiency and depleting gas available for 
export, as well as unresolved territorial disputes. Furthermore, it is clear some of the 
UAE’s energy strategy has been particularly well planned, for example, an aggressive 
diversification strategy into petrochemicals, and compromise between the regions and 
the centre have had a mutually beneficial effect on all citizens, so there may be lessons 
for Iraq.  
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More importantly, since there is only 1 other federal state aside from Iraq in the Middle 
East, this study has chosen a range of federal states as comparative case studies to 
examine a range of questions including: 
 
1- Can an energy framework be established in a federal context to replace Iraq’s 
legacy institutions, in order to transition from centralism to federalism, while 
managing decentralization of authority and power sharing? 
 
2- What are the factors that influence the energy sector in Iraq and the required 
steps to decouple the regulators and regulated bodies in order to shape the final 
policy framework? 
The final outcome should provide a framework that identifies the various problems that 
need to be mitigated, steps required to implement policies, and competencies needed to 
institutionalise the effective management of a mammoth petroleum sector, which 
continues to have a significant impact on the global economy. For example, in 2015 
Iraq was the world’s second fastest growing contributor to global liquids supplies, yet 
many inefficiencies remained inbuilt in the sector. 
91
 
 
The proposed policy framework will define the final setting of the ‘Federal Oil and Gas 
Council’, a body of technocratic energy professionals tasked with far reaching 
regulatory power over the energy sector, first called for in 2007.
92
 The structure, 
executive authorities, and responsibilities of the FOGC need to be clearly defined. This 
will be coupled with set of recommendations for the implementation of a strategy that 
the federal government of Iraq needs to adopt to guarantee the smooth transition of the 
petroleum institutions from the central legacies to the new federal regime. A 
comprehensive strategy should sustain a more reliable petroleum industry that is both 
more inviting to investment and free of historic conflicts of interest, corruption, and 
mismanagement. As Marcel notes,  
 
“It is considered best practice to separate the functions of policy-making, 
regulation, and operations into three distinct bodies, as this maximizes the clarity 
of roles and allows for better accountability for the delivery of each function.”93 
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Such a framework would assist organisations in identifying their roles and to deliver 
their tasks and identify the key factors affecting the successful implementation of the 
framework mechanism. This will eventually provide policy makers and sector 
executives with effective guidance that contributes to meeting the institutional reform 
needed for the transition from a central to federal regime as well as achieving their 
business objectives.  
 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the experiences of several oil and gas rich 
exporting countries to recommend the most appropriate policy model suitable to Iraq’s 
circumstances. This framework could also serve the purpose of many hydrocarbon-
producing countries that share same geopolitical conditions in the region and impacted 
by similar crises to those affecting Iraq, such as Libya, Yemen, and Syria. For example, 
Libya, although ethnically homogenous, is tribally and politically divided and faces the 
same bifurcated energy system currently seen in Iraq, since there is a political struggle 
to merge the two competing NOCs, one based in Tobruk, the other based in Tripoli.
94
 
As in Iraq, a key issue has been the right for a state to export and market oil without 
reference to parliament, or in the case of Libya, the House of Representatives which 
competes with the Government of National Accord. Just as in Iraq, there have been 
export blockades and threats of legal action over exports, as well as conflict over 
revenues and short term deals that have no constitutional basis. 
95
 
 
As noted however, it would not be the intention of such a framework to be a precise 
blueprint for other nations but rather a set of guidelines. The final policy framework is 
intended make the sector more reliable and sustainable in compliance with the federal 
constitutional setting. The objectives of this research are as follows: 
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1. To carry out and produce an extensive ‘literature review’ focused on MRH 
countries  which have experienced similar problems to Iraq in terms of suffering 
vague constitutional language in reference to resource rights (Russia, Nigeria) 
that have led to tensions within the federation, conflict between the regions and 
the centre over rights to develop oil and gas fields (Nigeria, in the case of the 
2002 Supreme Court ruling on offshore oil revenues and provincial allocations
96
 
of onshore revenues, Canada in the case of the dispute over offshore oilfields 
leading to the 1985 Atlantic Accords)
97
 political conflict over how to disburse 
revenues (Canada in the case of Alberta’s brief 2005 oil “prosperity bonus” to 
citizens,
98
  Russia, with the 1994 dispute between Tartar and Moscow over oil 
revenues).
99
 While these countries may not share many of the characteristics to 
Iraq, it is apparent many of the same debates and conflicts have been 
experienced. Therefore, this study will critically analyse the findings that 
underpin the petroleum policy frameworks for these federal regimes; 
2. Once these countries have been examined in detail, the study will seek to 
identify key factors influencing petroleum policy frameworks in these countries. 
3. These findings will then feed into a conceptual framework for the petroleum 
sector in Iraq for the executive body. 
4. The study will conclude with an outline and implementation guideline for the 
policy framework and regulatory regime in federal Iraq. 
 
In summary, the proposed policy framework will help in shaping a legally authorised 
policy framework with a regulatory setting that supports Iraq’s constitutional 
requirements. It will clearly define the roles of regulator and regulated entities and 
eradicate the inefficient overlap of authority and conflict of interest that has hindered 
Iraq’s petroleum industry for decades.  
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1.4 Research Approach and Methodology 
 
The present study will employ research approaches and methods in policy work and 
political economy. Identifying the influencing factors that will impact the economic 
model and regulatory framework for Iraq’s federal regime is vital. In order to achieve 
the aims and objectives of this research, an in-depth literature review of modern studies 
on Iraq is required for critically examining international practices and influencing 
factors on policy.              
 
Also in the form of a literature review, there will be a qualitative analysis of four federal 
countries (Canada, Russia, UAE, Nigeria) in order to assess the federal, regional, and 
operational challenges that closely match problems in Iraq.  
 
Moreover, the method of data collection based primarily on interviews will be 
employed to gauge the insights of policy makers. 
 
The selected case studies in the following chapters will aim to inform and validate the 
conceptual model produced The formulation process involves the assessment of all 
factors identified in the literature reviews; the case studies will take into consideration 
the concept of federalisation as a remedy to energy disputes and decentralization of 
Iraq’s institutional practices as per the constitution of 2006.  
 
It may be concluded that federalism alone, or constitutional or legal clarity without 
institutional strength cannot be a remedy for Iraq’s energy disputes, as Vasquez notes, 
this has not been the case in Argentina, which he classifies as a highly decentralised 
federal system, 
 
“The nature of Argentina’s federalism creates a context in which oil and gas 
policy decisions result from political bargaining rather than from institutional 
consensus or open congressional deliberation. This serves to weaken the rule of 
law, even though the decisions per se are made within constitutionally-defined 
limits.”100 
 
Nonetheless, in the absence of an agreed upon Federal Oil and Gas Law, ongoing work 
on resolving energy disputes in Iraq is necessary to prevent unilateralism among Iraq’s 
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18 provinces and most likely, the end of any effort to develop a coherent energy 
strategy. In that respect, consultation with many stakeholders across Iraq, in the form of 
conversational unstructured interviews (ie. questions were not uniform among 
interviewees) has been undertaken to support the validation process. The opinions of 
policymakers, regulators and operators involved in engineering and shaping the new 
federal state of Iraq have been sourced for the present study.  
 
The main influencing factors that affect petroleum policy making were identified as the 
following: 
 
 Political Stability 
 Financial Stability 
 The Legal Framework 
 The Fiscal Regime 
 Production Scenarios 
 Oil Markets 
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1.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
As noted, the relevance of this research is limited to countries that share similar 
characteristics to Iraq. While a number of countries in the MENA region have suffered 
similar challenges, for example, dictatorship and/ or sudden regime change (leading to a 
rise in tribal and ethnic identities, sometimes violently asserting themselves), the 
proposed policy framework will not necessarily be relevant to all Middle East oil 
producing countries. However, given the nature of decentralization in the MENA 
region, the recommended framework could be a blueprint for other petroleum 
producers, such as Yemen, Libya and Syria, to consider as part of a post conflict 
solution. As noted, Libya is already showing signs of similar disputes to Iraq related to 
energy governance and civil war, and while Syria is thought to have only limited oil and 
gas resources, it does have a resource base of phosphate rock, used in fertilizer 
production and expected to gain value as global fertilizer stocks diminish. Therefore, the 
framework developed here could have wider implications for resource rich countries, 
not necessarily related to oil and gas. 
101
 
 
Most likely, the findings of the research conducted in the present study is also limited to 
MRH countries that have experienced transitions from central to federal systems. Some 
observers see scope for comparison between countries as seemingly different as Iraq 
and Canada.  Danilovich contends that “like in Canada, the territorial devolution of 
power and polycentric governance in Iraq can bring peace to the divided society.” He 
notes that in the 1970s, there was nearly a referendum on the secession of Quebec, a 
possibility that has been discussed several times in relation to the Kurdish Region of 
Iraq.
102
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1.6 Structure of Thesis 
 
The thesis is made up of eight chapters: 
 
Chapter one covers the nature and the intent of the research to follow, highlighting the 
need to develop a successful oil and gas policy framework under the new federal regime 
of Iraq. It defines the research problem and explains the aims and objectives of the 
study, taking into account the research contributions as well the methodology used.  
 
Chapter two presents a set of definitions relevant to policies and how a framework 
incorporates these policies with an emphasis upon the structure of petroleum policy in 
federal regimes. This chapter also further defines the “resource curse,” (defined briefly 
above regarding Sachs and Warner.  
 
Chapter three is a review of the literature on the petroleum industry of Iraq, examining 
where analysts and historians have identified critical problems, lack of strategy, as well 
as successes in the industry from the Baath era to the present day. The chapter takes a 
critical view of this literature, seeking to identify areas requiring further analysis with 
regards to designing a petroleum policy framework for Iraq. 
 
Chapter four examines the petroleum federal regimes of four major resource holders 
that share some of the characteristics to federal Iraq, highlighting key influencing 
factors on their petroleum industries and assessing how relevant they are to Iraq. 
 
Chapter five details three case studies in Iraq. It also highlights the factors that need to 
be considered in designing the framework. The case studies examined will cover the 
Federal Ministry of Oil, the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, and an operatorship model with focus on the Basra Gas Company Joint 
Venture. Current policy dimensions will be examined, considering how they can be 
incorporated into a new framework. 
 
Chapter six examines the effects of the persistent low oil price environment in Iraq in 
2014 and beyond, examining measures Iraq has taken to mitigate the effect of very low 
prices, and in turn assessing the degree of resource dependency and inefficiency in 
petroleum policy planning within Iraq. 
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Chapter seven provides an overview of some of the challenges experienced by the four 
case study countries and three Iraqi institutions examined in chapter 5, examining the 
strengths and weaknesses of their energy policies. 
 
Chapter eight is the conclusion, presenting the final policy recommendations on how 
best to implement the proposed policy framework for the petroleum sector in Iraq, 
including the proposed framework itself and a note on further research. 
 
1.7 Research Design 
 
 
Multiple case studies have been considered as a core instrument in the methodology as 
opposed to a single-case study approach to examine comparativeness queries and to 
assess influencing factors on a given case. Moreover, for the present research, a careful 
investigation was made into the various variables and factors that impacted the supplier 
side of oil and the policies employed at international, regional and national levels. 
 
The research study is funnel shaped, with a series of steps starting with a broad based 
literature review followed by local case studies leading to the development of a policy 
framework model. This inductive approach to the research design draws upon chosen 
qualitative methods in its data collection.  
 
The primary research objective is to produce a petroleum policy framework for Iraq 
with actionable and evidence based recommendations. The findings should directly 
inform the development of an intervention policy to mitigate issues faced by the federal 
government of Iraq via evaluating other policies in operation elsewhere and their 
appropriateness to the situation in Iraq. 
 
The primary audience of the findings would be the Iraq’s federal government and the 
stakeholders in the oil and gas sector. Previous studies on petroleum policy in the 
Middle East have tended to concentrate on production development rather regulatory 
structures and policy with the notable exception of Suleiman’s study The Petroleum 
Experience of Abu Dhabi (2007) and Zedalis’ The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in 
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Iraq (2009) although the latter book lacks an examination of Iraq’s wider political 
economy and energy value chain.  
 
The study’s focus is to identify the key factors that need to be considered when 
formulating a petroleum policy, to draw upon the experience of relevant oil rich 
countries with regards to these key factors and undertake case studies to investigate 
organisational structure and operating practice. 
 
It is important to note that events in Iraq during the period of research have led to many 
revisions of the component parts of the study and have changed the parameters of the 
research, in particular the rise of the self -declared Islamic State and the subsequent 
Kurdish occupation of oil fields formerly operated by the Federal North Oil Company, 
including Bai Hassan and Kirkuk.
103
 These developments have changed the importance 
of certain key factors during the period of research leading to new evaluations. 
 
1.8 Historical Research 
 
Outside of historical research in the case studies, an important basis for the present 
study is an approach that seeks to include data collection from unstructured interviews 
with the focus on international experiences and practices, evaluation of the material and 
data synthesis which often takes the form of going back and forth while reading, 
collecting and writing .
104
  
 
 
Interviews have been gathered from my experience as the Senior Advisor to the Federal 
Parliament of Iraq for energy policy and economic reform, as well as my networks of 
energy professionals from my tenure with Shell. 
 
Indeed historical accounts based on oral interviews and testimonial narratives do entail 
methodological problems in that they can be subjective, as noted by Laitin and Fearon 
highlight; moreover, ethnic bias in countries that have experienced inter-ethnic violence 
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can be “learned” suggesting those who are biased may not even be aware of this bias.105 
This is before we consider political bias, however, in areas where perceived ownership 
of subsurface resources is strongly tied to identity politics, this could be a drawback of 
relying solely on interviews.  
 
Other primary sources include the laws and policies set in place by previous Iraqi 
governments and other countries that can be evaluated to determine best policy. In this 
respect foreign experience, where problems designing petroleum frameworks can be 
deemed similar, can be instructive, validating a historical approach to case studies. 
 
Secondary sources include literature reviews that document main texts describing past 
events and the development of petroleum policies Writings on Iraq and the oil industry 
are often undertaken by individual stakeholders whose vested interests are not always 
transparent. For example, Greg Muttitt is explicitly sceptical of IOC involvement in 
host countries (see literature review), while Fadhil Chalabi is more in favour of a 
stronger IOC role. 
 
1.9 Quantitative Approach 
 
Quantitative research is a systematic empirical investigation of statistical, mathematical 
or numerical data or computational techniques. This methodology employs tables, 
charts and statistical techniques to connect the concepts of the hypothesis.
106
 As 
mentioned in the introduction, the accuracy and reliability of these secondary sources of 
numerical data needs to be carefully considered before conclusions can be drawn. 
 
For example, British Petroleum (BP) publishes the Annual Statistical Review of World 
Energy which is usually quoted when production and reserves figures are mentioned. 
The review is re- published data from the Oil and Gas Journal who get their data by 
simply asking each producing country. 
107
The replies may or may not be accurate 
especially with regards to the Middle East where oil reserve figures are often treated as 
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state secrets. Reserves are categorised as either proven or estimated ultimately 
recoverable and these definitions are often open to local interpretation.  
 
Some industry experts believe there are no reliable estimates of world oil reserves. 
Laherrere points out, “public data on reserves are atrociously unreliable. The industry 
has systematically under-reported the size of discovery for good commercial reasons, 
and several countries have exaggerated their reserves for political reasons.” . 108 
 
Iraq’s oil reserves are unknown and open to debate, as much of the country and 
especially the western region remains unexplored. In 2003 the Oil and Gas Journal 
claimed the reserves stood at 115bn barrels, the Petroleum Economist magazine claimed 
200bn barrels, the Federation of American Scientists 215bn, The James Baker III 
Institute at Rice University claimed 220bn and the Centre for Global Energy Studies 
were even higher in their estimate of 300bn barrels.
109
 Ten years on the debate remains 
unresolved, as few field surveys have been completed. Those that have increased the 
official government figures for reserves to 150bn barrels in 2013.
110
 Unofficially, the 
government estimates that with further surveying this figure may reach 214bn in the 
future, an estimate given in a speech by Iraq’s Deputy PM Hussain al-Shahrestani in 
London on April 12, 2012.
111
 
 
Production figures should be more reliable as market oil trades are recorded across the 
world. However, like reserves estimates, studies show that forecasts are usually over 
optimistic. This has been particularly notable in Iraq, with the advent of the repeatedly 
revised and widely discredited 2010 production target of 12 MBPD, but it is notable that 
IEA estimates of Iraq’s future production have also been significantly incorrect in the 
case of a 2012 estimate for 2015, which expected 4.2 million bpd when production at 
the start of 2015 was 3.1 mbpd.
112
 
 
More recently Iraqi Kurdistan has been affected by accusations of a lack of transparency 
regarding exports, after the region started shipping oil via a pipeline to Ceyhan in 
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Turkey and shipping oil to the USA, Hungary, Morocco and Mediterranean 
consumers.
113
 These exports have not  gone through the federal government’s oil 
marketing organisation (SOMO) and are largely unrecorded shipments, as are road 
shipments from Kurdistan to Turkey, which were substantial before the pipeline became 
operational.
114
 Complicating matters, southern Turkey, Kurdistan and northern Iraq 
have a long history of illicit trading in oil be it trucking oil to Turkey or sanctioned 
Iran.
115
 According to Robin Mills
116
 Stratfor
117
 and Joel Wing and other accounts 
detailed in this study, a complex network of smuggling for both crude and illegally 
refined oil has developed over a number of years and is largely ignored by all the 
relevant governments.
118
 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding oil and gas reserves and production data, the use of 
quantitative data analysis is limited within this research study and a qualitative approach 
to data analysis is preferred. 
 
1.10 Qualitative Approach 
 
Qualitative data collection methods are flexible in nature allowing a more in depth and 
detailed explanations of policy experiences. According to Choy, “qualitative methods 
typically refer to a range of data collection and analysis techniques that use purposive 
sampling and semi-structured, open-ended interviews.”119 This methodology does come 
with inherent setbacks such as time consumption, high cost and as already mentioned 
the difficulty in formulating an unbiased analysis. The drawbacks of time consumption 
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and cost have been mitigated somewhat by high level access to policy makers, 
stakeholders and business executives in the Iraqi energy sector.  
Similarly, Ahmadov writing about the relationship between oil wealth and 
authoritarianism in post-Soviet states, notes, “Because of limited context, the difficulty 
in identifying all relevant variables to be included in the analysis; the difficulty in 
generalizing the findings – the findings might be relevant only to one 
cultural/geographic region
120
 
 
Asking the question, “What specific features of democratic institutions and practices 
affect development outcomes?” Ahmadov does not that “Careful comparative 
qualitative analysis can help parse out the causal mechanisms at work in these cases.”121 
 
1.11 Case Study Approach 
 
Case studies have traditionally been the recommended methodology for evaluating 
processes and policies. In this research the “unit of analysis” is the petroleum policy 
framework, the primary objective being the identification of key factors that influence 
the petroleum policy framework that can be applied to Iraq.  
 
The case study research approach is especially appropriate in new topics areas
122
 and 
can be used for formulating a new theory. In this respect, since no petroleum policy 
framework for Iraq has been proposed since the 2011 Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law, it 
is deemed suitable to follow a case study approach to formulate a new framework. 
 
The research strategy of a case study consists of five basic components, according to 
Yin: “a study’s questions; its propositions, if any; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic 
linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the findings.”123 In 
this case, Yin’s components are instructive; firstly, regarding questions, this study will 
ask what is the main aim or features of a well-designed petroleum policy framework? 
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For example, if the main aim is to maximise government take for the longest period, 
would such contracts be sustainable arrangements with IOCs in lower price 
environments?
124
 A framework could strongly prioritise fuel subsidies to help low-
income households and state owned companies, but this may come at the expense of 
foreign investment in refining capacity. In studying Iraq and the other countries 
examined here, a vast array of possibilities arises, but questions remain as to which 
elements of country studies are best tailored to Iraq’s circumstances?  
 
An examination of exemplary petroleum policy frameworks such as that of Norway, 
and in contrast, countries that have failed to develop a coherent policy framework, such 
as Nigeria, would require specific attention to areas of overlap with Iraq to be of any 
use. Nonetheless, initial reading suggests a degree of overlap exists in debates over 
public policy regarding, for example revenue distribution and central government 
authority even in a country as seemingly different to Iraq as Canada, and that resolution 
for these issues can be instructive in different settings.  
 
Likewise, both Russia and Nigeria have seen deals made between the centre and regions 
that many argue are unconstitutional, a similar situation to Iraq (more on which in 
Chapter 4), although some argue this is due to lack of constitutional clarity. Writing on 
Russia and Nigeria, Shkaeva notes how, “as soon as oil revenues increase in a state with 
fuzzy institutional arrangements, political actors will have incentives to “capture” oil 
revenues rather than invest in other sectors.”125  
 
Arguably, political competition over oil in Iraq increased after oil prices passed $70 in 
2010 with rising Iraq exports. Previously, former Iraqi Minister of Oil Hussein al-
Shahristani had not sought to legally punish the KRI for unilateral oil exports and had 
not threatened buyers with legal action, during the price collapse of 2008. 
 
Secondly, regarding Yin’s “propositions” and the case studies related to Iraq in Chapter 
5, some propositions may seem self-evident, such as the need to rapidly install proper 
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metering across Iraq. But it is important to consider whether these propositions are only 
clear with hindsight, taking into consideration different challenges that are unique to 
Iraq regarding a task of such fundamental importance as metering. Thirdly, as identified 
here, the unit of analysis is petroleum policy frameworks. Fourthly, regarding Yin’s 
“logic linking the data to the propositions,” case studies in Chapter 5 should illustrate 
how Iraqi oil companies would benefit from operational independence from MoO. And 
fifthly, regarding Yin’s component, “criteria for interpreting the findings,” the study 
shall examine what elements define a successful framework policy.  
 
For example, in the case of Norway, the stated aim of the framework is:  
 
“the profitable production of oil and gas in the long term. The value creation 
shall benefit the Norwegian society as a whole, activities must take place within 
a sound HSE framework, and environmental concerns and coexistence with 
other industries are to be taken into account throughout the industry.”126  
 
By contrast, the 2005 Iraqi constitution expresses a broader aim to “formulate the 
necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market 
principles and encourages investment.”127 
 
The case study approach appears more suitable than a quantitative method for this 
study, because as noted, the study seeks to resolve problems related to the absence of a 
policy framework, based on other countries’ experiences, rather than use data analysis 
to identify a trend among nations. For example, a quantitative analysis of the 
performance of well-regulated NOCs such as Ecopetrol in Colombia, Statoil in Norway, 
and Staatsolie in Suriname,
128
 compared to NOCs considered poorly run, would be 
useful but potentially lacking in contextual analysis of historical developments that led 
to effective institutional evolution.   
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1.12 Interviews 
 
Unstructured interviews were seen as a useful method for developing an understanding 
of the relevant importance of key factors in shaping previous policies whilst allowing 
the interviewees time to talk on a particular factor that interested them or was relevant 
to their roles.  
 
The interviews were based on the 5 identified factors to examine the level of influence 
of each factor on federal and regional entities, feeding all gathered data to the case 
studies.  
 
The relevance / correlation of the factor to the selected entity (if any): 
 
a) The level of influence of the factor on the affected entity; 
b) The urgency to adopt a resolution as per the affecting factor: “Why, where and 
when to regulate.” 
The bodies interviewed represented both regulator and regulated bodies at both federal 
and regional bodies, including executives and legislatives: 
 
 Council of Representatives: Federal, Legislative, Regulator 
 Council of Ministers: Federal, Executive, Regulator 
 Operating Companies Executives: Federal, Operators, Regulated 
 Parliament of Kurdistan: Regional, Legislative, Regulator 
 KRG Council of Ministers: Regional, Executive, Regulator 
 KRG Operating Companies: Regional, Operators, Regulated 
 Former Officials and Key Experts: Across Iraq “leading authorities” 
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1.13 Case Studies 
 
The five factors that have been identified from the literature review, will be cross 
examined against three case studies that were conducted for investigating the 
organizational structure and practice at a policy level and operatorship: 
 
1- MoO: Iraq’s Federal Ministry of Oil as a Federal Regulator 
2- MNR: Ministry of Natural Resources in Kurdistan as a Regional Regulator 
3- JVO: Joint Venture Operator, between National and International Companies 
 
It is worth noting that the MoO’s case study was compiled of two cases reflecting on the 
overlap of federal authorities between “the regulator” (the Ministry) and “the regulated” 
(Iraq National Oil Companies, INOC) as per the merger between MoO & INOC in 
1987. As Ghadhban notes.
129
 
 
Key factors have been registered and analyzed by the data collection exercise and 
analysis techniques through a set of interviews with representatives from 3 categories 
including: 
 
1- Federal and regional policymakers, 
2- National and international operators, 
3- Industry experts and former officials. 
 
1.14 Data Collection Method 
 
Data gathered from relevant government institutions (above) will give an overall picture 
of the policy trends, implementation of strategies and preferences of policymakers and 
operators (federally and regionally). Hence, the focus of the case studies is federal and 
regional practices at both regulator and regulated institutions, in addition to the role of 
national and international operatorship.  
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1.15 Methodology Structure 
 
Following the literature review, five key factors will be identified and assessed for the 
development of the framework model, and examined in relation to the case studies in 
Chapter 4. Some factors relate to petroleum regulators and others are linked to 
operators. Moreover, all qualitative data gathered from the conducted case studies will 
be cross examined with the identified factors and analysed for the framework model. 
 
A conceptual model will then be then developed and validated by the case studies 
mentioned above, leading to the development of the final policy framework for the 
petroleum sector in Iraq coupled with set of recommendations for policymakers to 
consider during the implementation process (figure-1 below depicts the overall 
methodology structure). 
 
The left hand side of the framework below groups and outlines the identified factors 
affecting each regulatory entity (federal or regional) and the relevant regulated bodies 
(operators) linked to the affected regulator: 
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Figure-1: Methodology Structure 
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1.16 The Conceptual Model 
 
Figure 2 below depicts the conceptual framework of how a federal policy framework 
should look like. It defines the Federal Oil and Gas Council (FOGC) as the main 
representative of the state that regulates the Oil and Gas Sector with all sub-entities 
linked to it at federal and regional levels. The framework also demonstrates the key 
competencies of each local regulator and the relevant regulated bodies affiliated to it. 
 
 
Figure-2: The Initially Proposed Federal Oil & Gas Council 
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Now that we have established the aims of the thesis and an overview of the key research 
problems, including the concept of having an independent regulator clearly separated 
from the state and private energy organizations, the legacy of authoritarian control of 
the energy sector and the challenge market volatility poses to planning, we will now 
turn to key definitions. These are concepts identified as critical to designing a petroleum 
policy framework, in addition to the concept of a framework itself. Consistent with the 
analysis of energy policy in a federal context, focus on these concepts will refer back to 
state-sub state relations.  
42 
 
Chapter 2: Definitions 
2.1 Public Policy 
 
Torjman defines the aim of public policy as that which,  
 
“seeks to achieve a desired goal that is considered to be in the best interest of all 
members of society. Examples include clean air, clean water, good health, high 
employment, an innovative economy, active trade, high educational attainment, 
decent and affordable housing, minimal levels of poverty, improved literacy, 
low crime and a socially cohesive society, to name a few.”130  
 
Given the history of dictatorship and conflict in the MENA region, it may be assumed 
that Torjman’s inclusive concept of public policy is alien to Iraq and other states in 
MENA, as in May 2016, The Economist named Tunisia as the only democracy in 22 
MENA states.
131
 Furthermore, it follows that for policies that encourage “cohesive 
society” “in the best interest of all members of society,” would need to involve a 
consultation process with government that was free from coercion. Biessinger notes 
how, 
 
“Autocrats fear the challenges that “conventional” civil society organizations 
present to their hegemony and repress them; past autocratic rule usually leaves 
stunted civil society development in its wake; and formal organizations based on 
face‐to‐face relations are relatively easy for autocratic regimes to identify, 
regulate, and target for repression.”132 
 
In the public policy domain Torjman’s definition suggests the state upholds the best 
interests of the public, whereas dictatorships such as those of Saddam Hussein sought to 
exclude certain segments of society, in some cases physically moving some members of 
ethnic groups, in the cases of the relocation of Shias “of Persian origin” to Iran and the 
Arabization of Kirkuk where Kurdish Iraqis were forcibly relocated.
133
 The notion that 
dictatorships do not subscribe to Torjman’s idea of public policy loosely matches the 
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analysis of Muligan, Gil and Martin who note that while dictatorships can be responsive 
to public policy concerns, they are more likely to use violently coercive methods on 
those opposing public policy.
134
 To contrast with a democratic interpretation of public 
policy, Coleman refers to Rhiannon Vickers, who “suggests that Canada’s political 
culture has a strong tradition of public consultation in policy-making.”135 
 
Just as the continued threat of violence to implement policy contrasts with the 
approaches of the democratic ideal, Geurts describes a policy formulation process that 
involves, “activities such as proposing initiatives, practicing advocacy, mobilizing 
stakeholders, holding consultations, building opinions and taking positions. There are 
many stakeholders and participants and they vary according to the policy intention.”136  
 
This again suggests that public policy is something formulated in a democratic setting, 
and therefore, is something that is not present in the Middle East. Gunther supports this 
view that while non-democracies can formulate public policy, it is generally centrally 
driven. He uses the example of Spain’s transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 
1970s and 80s to illustrate that social spending was 10% less than the Western 
European average and driven by Franco’s interventions in particular sectors of the 
economy that he felt were necessary to maintain the regime.
137
 With regards to Iraq, 
debate over public policy in relation to oil and gas is particularly relevant, since the 
Council of Representatives represent Iraqi society, who are directly affected by issues 
such as government take, local content (use of Iraqi labour and materials) and the 
environment and how they feature in oil contracts.  
 
Despite definitions of public policy that appear exclusive to democracy, there are 
examples of the concept in the Middle East. Torjman’s definition is particularly relevant 
to the case of arbitration in the UAE, where under Federal Law public policy is defined 
as, 
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“Rules relating to personal status such as marriage, inheritance, descent, and 
rules concerning governance, freedom of commerce, trading in wealth, rules of 
personal property and provisions and foundations on which the society is based 
in a way that do not violate final decisions and major principles of Islamic 
Shari’a.”138 
 
This is particularly important in light of the UAE’s signing of the New York convention 
(on arbitration) which Iraq has not yet signed as of 2016.
139
 Under the convention, the 
domestic courts of a signatory country are restricted in their powers in cases of 
commercial arbitration, although one area where certain provisions are made is the 
violation of “public policy,” where courts can refuse foreign arbitration awards. 140 The 
fact that “freedom of commerce” and “trading in wealth” are areas of public policy in 
the UAE constitution suggests a legally mandated position on the role of the private 
sector, akin to Iraq’s constitutional language in Article 25,  
 
Article 25: “The state shall guarantee the reforming of the Iraqi economy according to 
modern economic bases, in a way that ensures complete investment of its resources, 
diversifying its sources and encouraging and developing the private sector.”141 
 
Likewise while there is no direct reference to public policy in the Constitution in Iraq, 
Scheibel notes how the 2005 Constitution provides the basis for public-policy making, 
which, he claims, “is unprecedented in the region,” contrasting with pre-Arab spring 
governments that had no external input in public policy. Scheibel points out how Article 
78 provides that,  
 
"The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the general 
policy of the State," while Article 80 states, "The Council of Ministers shall 
exercise the power to plan and execute the general policy and general plans of 
the State and oversee the work of the ministries and departments not associated 
with a ministry."
142
  
                                               
138
 “Arbitration in the UAE,” BSBG blog. 7th of July 2015. http://bsbgulf.com/blog/arbitration-in-the-uae/ 
 
139
 Craig Tevendale, “The ICSID Convention enters into force in Iraq,”Herbert Smith Freehills, 7th January. 
Accessed July 16th 2016. 2016.http://hsfnotes.com/publicinternationallaw/2016/01/07/the-icsid-
convention-enters-into-force-in-iraq/ 
 
140
“Arbitration in the UAE,” BSBG blog. 7th of July 2015. http://bsbgulf.com/blog/arbitration-in-the-uae/ 
 
141
 Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.  
142
 Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005). 
http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf 
45 
 
 
Here, Torjman’s definition is especially relevant to oil and gas, if we accept that good 
public policy protects and maximises the public’s health and financial well-being, since 
in defining terms of the “model contract” for IOCs, the Ministry of Oil has direct 
influence on environmental standards and the economic efficiency of contracts. 
Furthermore, it is clear the extent that oil and gas decisions affect existing public policy 
in Iraq, since as of 2016 numerous public policy documents have been drafted with 
some relevance to the sector. Scheibel lists 22 draft documents, which include laws on 
pollution of the Tigris River and the ozone layer (created by the Ministry of 
Environment) Desertification and groundwater issues and strengthening the industrial 
sector (created by the Ministry of Industry and Minerals.)
143
  
 
All of these policy documents are particularly relevant to oil production and revenues. 
This overlap in itself presents new challenges, as the IEA have written,  
 
“policy coordination among the numerous ministries involved, as well as 
implementation of policies, legislation and regulation, are often a challenge: 
Dozens of sub‐laws and regulatory acts need to be prepared, voted on and 
coordinated; the information needs to be made available; and implementation 
needs to be monitored and controlled, which requires human and institutional 
capacities to do so.”144  
 
This raises a number of issues in the instances of Iraq, Russia and Nigeria (discussed in 
chapter 4.) The first is that countries can be neither democracies or autocracies, but in a 
state of transition, and over time, the overall state of openness and political freedom 
within the country can fluctuate, as in the case of Nigeria, which was under military rule 
for 33 years between 1962 and 1999, with a brief period of democracy between 1979 
and 1983.
145
 However, it was not until the national elections of 2015 that an incumbent 
politician was defeated by a member of the opposition. 
146
 Freedom House, which ranks 
countries on how democratic they are by a series of metrics including political pluralism 
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and the electoral system, rated Nigeria as “partly free” in 2016.147 Iraq, despite holding 
elections deemed “free and fair” by Freedom House in 2014, was classed as “Not Free” 
by the organization
148
 in 2016.
149
 In relation to public policy formulation, restrictions 
related to what Freedom House calls “de facto ethnic and sectarian apportionment of 
key offices” affected Iraq’s rating, with the organization then noting how, “The 
powerful Kurdish president controls several key institutions without parliamentary 
oversight.”150 
 
In the case of the Kurdish Democratic Party, who have controlled the KRI presidency 
position since 2015 when the constitutional mandate of President Massoud Barzani 
expired,
151
 this would suggest a highly restricted environment for public policy making 
in the energy sector, since MNR is controlled by the KDP. In Arab Iraq, where the 
nominee of the Parliamentary bloc with the highest number of seats has to have cabinet 
nominations approved by Parliament, it is possible that there is more space for public 
policy, since in choosing the Minister of Oil, parliamentarians can be responsive to 
constituents.
152
 In practice, the Ministry of Oil has on occasion acted without reference 
to Parliament, in the most extreme case with regard to Technical Service Contracts, 
which are considered by some Iraqi lawmakers to be unconstitutional without 
parliamentary approval. In 2009, the head of Iraq’s Parliamentary Oil and Gas 
Committee expressed his view that TSCs were illegal, noting,  
 
"We will not allow the oil ministry to move ahead, ignoring parliament and signing 
contracts, since they are illegal and unconstitutional.”153 
 
In this regard Iraq perfectly fits the profile of a transitional country, since in the absence 
of new hydrocarbon legislation, much Baath era law still applies, such as the 
Preservation of Hydrocarbon Resources Law No. 84 of 1985 and  the Iraqi Companies 
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Law No. 21 of 1997, which was the legal basis for the formation of the Basra Gas 
Company Joint Venture.
154
 According to the IMF, one characteristic of a transition 
economy is the ongoing process of legal and institutional reform to move from a 
centrally planned economy to a modern market economy. The IMF note how new laws 
“are needed to redefine the role of the state (emphasis added) in these economies, 
establish the rule of law, and introduce appropriate competition policies.”155 
 
With regards to public policy formulation, “redefining the role of the state” is directly 
relevant to reforming Iraq’s history of a centrally planned energy sector. In terms of 
formulating public policy that would support this goal, Iraq’s government have avoided 
the public consultation that forms part of Torjman and Guert’s definition of public 
policy, not only with regards to the 2008 secretive formation of the Basra Gas Company 
(described in Chapter 5) but also with regards to dealing with unions. For example, in 
May 2007 former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reportedly promised to consult trade 
unions in the oil sector in southern Iraq with regards to the drafting of the 2007 oil law.  
When the consultation never occurred, the union members went on strike, shutting 
down oil operations, and the government sent in security forces to arrest union leaders, 
and unions subsequently remained in opposition to many MoO projects.
156
  
 
Lack of consultation has at times also defined public policy in Russia and Nigeria. 
Taking Robert and Clark’s definition of public policy as “steps taken by a government 
to solve problems, make decisions, allocate resources or values, implement policies and 
in general to do the things expected of them by their constituencies,” Phillip and Peter 
also suggest the concept of public policy is new to a transitional economy. Writing on 
public policy in Nigeria, they note, 
  
“In Nigeria, there is a missing-link between the government and the public and 
also the government and its agencies when it comes to policy formulation and 
implementation and that explains why policies grossly fail in Nigeria.”157 
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Likewise, Coleman describes the work of a Canadian effort to strengthen civil society in 
post-Communist Russia, noting how, 
 
“The decision to focus attention on public policy—a new term for Russians—
entailed explaining what made policy public and raised the broader question of 
the relationship between the idea of public policy in Western political practice 
and the notion of an independent public sphere and models of civil society.”158 
 
It is worth considering therefore that Iraq, which had its first democratic election in 
2005, is still highly transitional, although has already seen a strong demand for 
consultation between policy makers and the public. This has been seen in the cases of 
the conflict between Trade Unions and the Ministry of Oil, as well as between Basra 
Provincial Council and the Ministry of Oil regarding the Basra Gas Company, described 
in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2 Federalism 
 
Bader notes that while there are many definitions of federalism, “the most fundamental 
tenet of this theory is that the state and federal governments have distinct, mutually 
exclusive realms of regulatory jurisdiction -distinct and limited federal powers.”159 In 
this respect, it is arguable that Iraq’s current federal arrangement is weak due to the 
indistinct division of powers between regions and the centre. 
 
A more detailed definition, and one suggesting federalism’s role in limiting conflict and 
autocratic power comes from Elazar who notes that federalism is “the constitutional 
diffusion of power so that the constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the 
processes of common policy-making and administration by right.”160 Power sharing and 
its many problems have come to define Iraq’s post 2003 political landscape, therefore 
federalism has often been at the center of debates on the question of how to solve Iraq’s 
ongoing conflicts, since it is often referred to in the context of other resource, ethnic and 
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sect based conflicts. To this end, Erk and Anderson talk about the trend for proscribing 
federal solutions to ethnic conflict: 
 
“One particular area where federalism is increasingly prescribed is in the 
accommodation of territorial divisions and the management of ethno-linguistic 
conflict. It is especially marketed as a palliative to secessionist conflict. That is, 
federalism has come to be seen as a way to accommodate territorially based 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences in divided societies, while maintaining 
the territorial integrity of existing states.”161 
 
In contrast to the view of federalism as a solution to ethnic and religious based conflict, 
or conflict over resources, federalism has been associated with the potential breakup of 
Iraq in the view of some Iraqi nationalists, for example, according to Istrabadi the topic 
is the most controversial subject in Iraq “bar none.”162 Istrabadi notes the “principal 
drivers” of federalism in Iraq have been the Kurds, with other federalists suggesting that 
the layers of government that federalism provides mean that there are more checks and 
balances against holding absolute power and subsequently abusing it. As Istrabadi 
notes, this is undoubtedly a check against the emergence of another Saddam-like figure, 
while the risks of Iraqi politics becoming over-centralized are also outlined by 
Fitzsimmons who notes, 
 
“In Iraq, the risks of too much centralization flow from two related 
potentialities. The first is that the central government—whether under Maliki, 
another prime minister, or perhaps a military junta—successfully uses its power 
to marginalize opposition and undermine democracy. This outcome would be a 
familiar one for Iraq and for the region. The second is that the government’s 
efforts to centralize power could reignite violent resistance to the government, 
prompting a slide back into the experience of 2006 or even worse.”163 
 
Considering this danger, Weingast et al. argue that federalism leads to a more limited 
government central government that in turn restricts its capacity to act in a predatory 
manner and thus more inclined to honour political and economic rights. 
164
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Stansfield and Anderson support Weingast’s conclusion and note how an Iraq of five 
federal regions could reduce the ability of small interest groups from capturing the state. 
They note, 
 
“On several occasions, relatively minor forces have been able to effect regime 
change by establishing control over the capital city. The establishment of five 
power centers in Iraq will make this more difficult. By far the major benefit of 
this model, however, is that it is potentially more broadly acceptable to major 
political forces than any alternative. From the Kurdish perspective the major 
advantage of the regional model over all other alternatives is that it is a 
compromise position that allows the Kurds to keep the autonomy they already 
enjoy but that is also likely to prove acceptable to other Iraqi groups, particularly 
the Shia.”165 
  
Others have noted however, that federalism is not in itself a solution when communities 
face internal divisions. Le Billion draws parallels between the cases of South Sudan and 
the Kurdish region of Iraq, noting a number of similar problems. Le Billion notes, 
 
“South Sudan and the Kurdistan Region have also faced similar issues, including 
debates over federalism versus secessionism, recurrent factionalism, internecine 
conflicts and fiscal crisis related to oil independence. They both have also 
inherited a legacy of operating as resistance movements in which personal 
networks of allegiances were crucial, while a culture of transparency and 
accountability towards the public at large was not. As South Sudan sadly 
demonstrates, transition towards broad-based security and shared prosperity 
seems very arduous for a land-locked, oil-rich region seeking greater autonomy 
— not only because of external influences, including in the neighborhood, but 
also for domestic reasons.”166 
 
Le Billion’s point that groups seeking autonomy may not themselves be politically 
united (and possibly prone to internal conflict as with the Iraqi Kurdish civil war of the 
mid-1990s) underlines a general lack of consensus regarding whether federalism can 
help post-colonial states such as Iraq, Nigeria and Sudan (all formerly under British 
control, and having experienced post-colonial wars between ethnic groups and the 
center. 
 
In the case of Iraq, there has been great uncertainty as to the extent of federation, or 
even whether the country should be federal at all. While some of these are debates in 
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Baghdad over the 2005 Constitution, the debate is sometimes complicated by external 
viewpoints. Particularly controversial has been the Biden-Brownback plan to “maintain 
a unified Iraq by federalizing it and giving Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis control over their 
daily lives in their own regions.”  
 
Iraq’s model of federalism is unfortunately not uniform, containing a regional 
government that for many years enjoyed significant fiscal autonomy (Kurdistan) and 
two regional governorates with less power but globally significant natural resources, 
namely Basra with its supergiant oilfields and Anbar, with the Akkas natural gas field, 
thought to have 5.6 trillion cubic feet of gas.
167
  
 
This lack of uniformity poses a problem for the central administration as it creates what 
Zedalis calls a “bifurcated policy,” in addition to ad hoc central government laws 
intended to give more revenues and petroleum policy powers to provinces, such as Law 
21 of 2009.
168
 Some debate has focussed on devolving more power to the current 18 
provinces (as with Law 21) granting the Kurdish region independence from Baghdad or 
experimenting with a “five region approach” as described by Anderson.169 Fitzsimmons 
argues that focus on regions and the formation of regions may be less helpful than 
focusing on the rights of provinces to develop hydrocarbon resources. Fitzsimmons 
argues that, 
 
 “Provinces have two other potentially advantageous characteristics: there are a 
lot of them; and their demographics are a mixture of homogeneity and 
heterogeneity. Together, these two features have the potential to moderate the 
worst effects of ethno-sectarian conflict.”170 
 
Regardless of the model, the fundamental success of a federal government depends 
upon agreed power sharing and authority of the central and regional governing 
authorities, which takes the debate back to problems with the 2005 constitution, as Le 
Billion notes, “Reflecting a classic conundrum of federalism, the new constitution has 
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both prevented and facilitated secessionism, in part because of an imprecise text 
allowing for multiple interpretations.”’171 
 
Therefore, while the role and authority of the central government is clearly defined in 
the new constitution (Article 110) and the encouragement of decentralisation is 
enshrined in Article 115, further constitutional review is necessary and in fact 
incomplete, since it was called for in the constitution itself, which notes that oil and gas 
revenue disbursement “shall be regulated by a law,” under Article 112, First.172 Without 
a clear legislative path therefore, arrangements that may increase the powers of 
provinces could be easily undermined, as Suberu illustrates in the case of Nigeria 
(covered in more depth in Chapter 4.) Even still, constitutional amendment is in itself 
highly contentious, and may lead to further political deadlock, as Alkadiri notes, 
 
 “Battles over how far decentralization should extend have contributed to 
instability in Iraq at least as much as ethnic and sectarian disputes have since 
2003. The attempts to reclaim central power by attempting to amend the 
constitution have been more than controversial for the regional powers. The 
need to define the powers of both central and regional authorities as enshrined in 
the constitution is of paramount importance to the success or failure of a federal 
state.”173 
 
As noted, some argue that a paradox of federalism is whether it encourages separatism 
or whether it accommodates it. (Jan Erk et al.)
174
 Whether federalism can manage, 
prevent and resolve conflict within a divided Iraq is only now just being tested, but for 
this study it should be instructive to see how Nigeria has handled oil revenue 
disbursement and sub-national government rights over oil and gas, since Nigeria has 
also experienced prolonged civil war, severe corruption and growing inequality. 
Fitzsimmons noted how Nigeria’s system of revenue disbursement may be an example 
of successful federalism in a transitional economy,  
 
“While Nigeria’s federal democracy is far from a shining example of stability or 
democratic governance, its current experiment with equitable distribution of oil 
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and gas revenues across thirty-six states may offer a barometer for the 
sustainability of provincial decentralization in a multi-ethnic oil state.”175 
 
This view contrasts strongly with the work of Suberu and Diamond who note the 
“dramatic and consequential” decline of Nigerian federalism, in particular because (in 
their analysis) the government over decentralised power leading to increasingly strong 
calls for autonomy and greater revenues from various regions, which,  
 
“served to weaken the size and resource base of individual sub-federal units, to 
augment the hegemony and visibility of the central government, to increase 
administrative costs, and to provoke often violent inter-communal rivalries and 
conflicts over the administrative location, ethnic configuration, and distributive 
disposition of the new units of government.”176  
 
By 2016, Suberu’s assessment seemed justified following a wave of attacks on oil 
infrastructure in the Niger Delta, by a group seeking to “cripple Nigeria’s economy” 
unless greater revenue transfers to the region were arranged.
177
 This followed the 
breakdown of a peace agreement in 2009 which involved cash payments to rebels in the 
delta area.
178
 The Niger Delta, where most oil and gas production in Nigeria occurs, and 
its struggle with the center underscore the challenges of trying to accommodate highly 
assertive, or even aggressive calls for more revenues or autonomy, as Selassie notes, 
 
“Ethnic federalism faces yet another difficulty. Such a structure may exacerbate, 
rather than reduce, interjurisdictional disparities in wealth. Vast differences in 
human and natural resources separate ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups may be 
well endowed with oil deposits, or other mineral resources; they may have large 
populations, or may inhabit economically important regions, such as port cities. 
In contrast, other ethnic groups may lack these attributes. All ethnic groups may 
benefit by pooling together their respective resources in a federal arrangement. 
But given the tendency of ethnic governments to view themselves primarily as 
agents of their own ethnic groups, they have little or no incentive, much less any 
sense of obligation, to share any of their resources with other ethnic groups. On 
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the contrary, ownership of important resources may foster in them an attitude of 
economic self-sufficiency, and a willingness to go it alone politically.”179 
 
With regards to the disparity in the location of natural resource wealth within 
federations, illustrated well in all of the case studies examined in Chapter 4 (Nigeria, 
Russia, UAE, Canada) Anderson points out that in the vast majority of oil and gas rich 
countries, resources are concentrated one geographic area, complicating debates over 
revenue disbursement. For example, people living near oil fields may demand more jobs 
in the sector or special compensation for environmental damage, which in itself could 
exacerbate agitation from communities who are far from the resources and may feel no 
benefit from the industry.
180
 
 
Mitigating the complex challenges this presents, Anderson notes there are a great many 
types of federal regime, and levels of devolution of power “vary enormously.” This 
would suggest that there is no template for Iraq’s federal organization in relation to 
energy, as Thurber et al note, there are limitations when replicating the Norway Model 
in transitional economies.
181
 
 
Anderson, also notes that while these challenges are supposedly governed by 
constitutions, in reality unpredictable politics are more often the determinant of 
regulation and fiscal policy. Since institutions play a critical role in developing both 
legal and fiscal regimes, Anderson points out that resource governance is only as good 
as institutional strength.  
 
2.3 Policy Framework 
 
The first stage for the government is to set out its strategic objectives and then decide 
upon a policy framework that can deliver these objectives. According to the 
organization Cafcass  
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“A Policy Framework describes an overall strategic approach, describing the 
desired future and setting out what needs to be achieved in order to bring about 
change. It can often be an 'umbrella' strategy' to which a number of policies 
relate.”182  
 
Related to public policy formulation, gaining support for a policy in a democracy 
requires consulting stakeholders and political lobbying to gain a consensus of opinion to 
follow it to the statute book, and consultation of the public, a process defined by the 
OECD.
183
 This has by enlarge not been the case with energy policy in Iraq, where in 
some cases contracts between the Ministry of Oil and IOCs have been negotiated in full 
behind closed doors (as in the case of the Basra Gas Company) or altered in secret (in 
the case of BPs Technical Service Contract for Rumaila).
184
 The policy stakeholders are 
the political groups, government departments, industrial lobbyists, the community and 
its own lobbyists. The process of consulting stakeholders may take some time, and in 
the case of Canada this has been many decades before the democratic process led to a 
relatively fixed national level policy frameworks in oil and gas. For example, as late as 
2012, the government of Stephen Harper was proposing a framework for “responsible 
resource development.”185 Brownsey quotes journalist Barrie McKenna, to illustrate 
what he sees as an absence of an effective energy framework for Canada, noting, 
 
“In an August 2012 article in The Globe and Mail, these (problems) include: (a) 
the inability to complete the Northern Gateway pipeline project in British 
Columbia; (b) the apparent intent of the Chinese to acquire large parts of the 
energy sector; (c) the ongoing conflict between Que´bec and Newfoundland and 
Labrador over oil and hydro reserves; (d) Ontario’s inability to pursue its goal of 
becoming a green energy leader; (e) the unwillingness of the USA to quickly 
resolve the Keystone XL pipeline issue; and (f) the inability of Canada to tap 
into the rapidly growing Asian energy markets.”186 
 
Indirectly highlighting some of Canada’s policy framework challenges, the IEA note the 
capacity for tension within the federation, perhaps best illustrated by the legal battles 
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over offshore oil and gas rights which led to the Atlantic Accords, described in Chapter 
4.Under a section of a report entitled “Policy framework,” the IEA note, 
 
“A key feature of the Canadian context is that provinces, jurisdictions that 
receive their power and authority directly from the Constitution Act of 1867, are 
owners of their ground resources apart from those located in aboriginal lands 
and some federal lands. Provincial governments are the direct managers of most 
of Canada’s resources and have primary responsibility for shaping policies 
implemented in their jurisdictions. Policy co-ordination between the federal and 
the provincial governments takes place through formal high-level committees 
and informal contacts and consultations.”187  
 
The fact that consultation, committees and contracts between provinces and the centre 
have not yet resulted in a comprehensive policy framework, despite decades passing 
since exports increased in the 1960s, should be of concern to Iraq. Iraq’s Constitution 
explicitly calls for cooperation in the formulation of strategic policy under Article 109, 
b.
188
 
 
Perhaps inevitably, the democratic process takes substantially longer to formulate than 
the time taken in autocratic regimes, which has been the case in Iraq, when we contrast 
the relatively quick authorization of a Production Sharing Contract with CNPC under 
Saddam Hussein in 1997, compared to the long debates over contract types in post 2003 
Iraq. 
189
  
 
Nonetheless, the Southern Area Gas Project, which was constructed during the 1980s 
and was operational by the start of the 1990s, suggests a relative competency in the 
Ministry of Oil during the former regime in terms of strategic planning, allowing 
enough treated gas to be exported to Kuwait, an export achievement that the Basra Gas 
Company has struggled to match over a period of 6 years.
190
 This latter achievement 
was permanently undermined when Saddam invaded Iraq’s southern neighbour in 1990. 
Later, Saddam’s order that oil exports be halted to pressure the international community 
into easing sanctions against Iraq is indicative that there was no overarching policy 
framework, since the energy sector had become another arm of Baathist power. 
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Therefore, Iraq faces significant challenges in formulating a policy framework, even 
when the constitution calls for a cooperative approach. Canada’s experience, despite 
decades of political stability, underlines the challenge of unifying policies into an 
overarching strategy. 
 
2.4 Petroleum Policy 
  
For nations where the petroleum industry constitutes a significant portion of GDP and 
government revenue, an effective and clear policy is needed for the industry. In some 
cases, federal states with centralist tendencies can make ad hoc arrangements with sub 
central units that circumvent the constitution, in the case of Russia. In other cases, 
subsidy and revenue distribution policies can be linked to short-term assistance for 
various social groups, leaving policy open to political exploitation.  
 
Particularly relevant to subsidies in Iraq, the IEA has highlighted how Russian fuel 
subsidies have “linked” social policy to energy policy,191 but also of interest here is the 
need to create an efficient energy value chain (defined below.) Policies can also include 
the goal of increasing global market penetration or competitiveness, such as increasing 
output to a stated number, as with Nigeria’s policy in 2001 to increase output from 2.2 
million barrels per day to 3 million bpd.
192
 Petroleum policy can be divided specifically 
along the lines of upstream (exploration and production), midstream (transportation, 
storage and marketing), and downstream (refining of crude oil, and purifying and 
processing of gas). In Nigeria, a goal that is specifically related to the upstream sector is 
the encouragement of greater foreign investment for the purpose of financing 
exploration via production sharing contracts.
193
 For Norway, the overarching policy is 
to ensure the petroleum sector has “long‐term management and value creation on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) within an environmentally acceptable framework 
and in coexistence with other users of Norway waters.”194  
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Therefore, petroleum policy is closely linked with the law and legal system, not just for 
Iraq but the world over, and depends on whether best public policy is considered to be 
fuel subsidization and price controls, or more market orientated or environmentally led 
policy.  
 
2.5 The Role of Regulators 
 
Proponents of public interest theories including Baldwindefine the purpose of regulation 
to govern conduct so that publicly desired results come about in situations where the 
market alone would fail to produce these. Regulation is therefore, according to this 
theory, carried out by benevolent actors for the benefit of society.  Other theories for the 
purpose of regulation and the behaviour of regulators have been mentioned by Baldwin, 
such as the interest group theory, where regulators are driven by the concerns of interest 
groups. 
195
  
 
The ‘power of ideas’ explanation posits that regulation or deregulation occurs when a 
particular idea is prevalent, as described by Baldwin.
196
  For instance, during the 1980’s 
the Thatcher and Reagan administrations both advocated deregulation in an attempt to 
liberalise the economies of their respective countries.
197
 This is of interest to Iraq as 
views about the environment have changed with the advent of post Saddam era NGOs 
such as Nature Iraq.
198
 In future the role of IOCs may come under greater scrutiny, 
perhaps due to increasing nationalistic sentiment, calling for stricter regulations. 
 
The regulator, the body that oversees conduct, is not necessarily always a part of the 
government. The aftermath of the deregulation era of the 1990’s saw the emergence of 
semi-independent regulatory agencies, described byMark Thatcher.
199
 Thatcher also 
describes how, despite being created by legislation and being subject to controls by 
politicians they are given powers of regulation and are separate from the government. 
These agencies were given the tasks of other regulators, such as overseeing fair 
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competition, enforcing licenses, enforcing health and safety, racial and gender equality 
etc. In Iraq, the intended technocratic and independent regulator for the energy sector is 
the as yet not active Federal Oil and Gas Council, but the current regulatory 
environment is dominated by the Ministry of Oil, which has on occasion been in 
conflict with the Ministry of Environment, in particular following the 2011 Basra 
pipeline incident.
200
 The British democratic context suggests that, as in Norway, 
regulatory bodies must be separated from cabinet level control.  
 
2.6 Regulated Bodies 
 
A point of interest for this study is how regulated bodies are given the incentive to 
comply with regulation, or deterred from breaching it, as has been the subject of intense 
debate in Russia, which has gradually increased fines for IOCs that go over their 
allowance of flared gas. In that case, Government Decree No 7 “On the measures 
stimulating reduction of atmospheric pollution by products of associated petroleum gas 
flaring”, outlined fines of 20 roubles per 1000 cubic meters of associated gas flared, but 
by 2011 this had been raised to 290 roubles. 
201
 
 
In the case of Iraq, The 2009 Environmental Law (27/2009) replaces and repeals the 
1997 Environmental Law, and outlines obligations for IOCs to conduct environmental 
assessments of projects, and fines and punishments (including jail) for violations. 
Article 3 of the 2009 law outlines how, 
 
“[a] polluter of the environment [must] remove the influencing factor during the 
10 days from the date of notification warning. In the case of non-compliance, the 
minister may order the installation to cease operations or close for a term of not 
more than 30 days, which can be extended to the removal of the violation.”202 
 
In order to ensure cooperation from regulated bodies there needs to be an effective way 
of enforcing the rules of regulation, otherwise there is unlikely to be cooperation and 
compliance. Neil Gunnigham looks at enforcement and compliance strategies in detail, 
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and highlights that there are generally two methods to bringing about compliance: the 
punish and persuade approaches.
203
 Christine Parker argues for ‘responsive regulation’, 
that responds to a regulated body’s continuing defiance by increasingly punitive and 
coercive measures. Parker believes this is a superior method of regulation than simple 
deterrence.
204
   
 
George Stigler in his ‘economic theory of regulation‘writes that businesses provide a 
demand for regulation, and are willing to accept the status of a regulated body so that 
their special interests are served by the regulatory rules.  Some regulated bodies thus 
cooperate with regulators from the inception of regulation of an industry. This form of 
corrupt practice leads to compliance between the regulator and regulated body, leading 
to what is now often called “regulatory capture.”205 In Iraq, model oil and gas contract 
stabilization clauses (see below) have been referred to as “pre-emptive regulatory 
capture clauses” to the potential for IOCs to override future regulatory change. 206 
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2.7 Petroleum Policy Making 
 
Despite not having an agreed petroleum policy, the Iraqi government has been 
successful in increasing its oil and gas output in the face of multiple infrastructure 
challenges and political roadblocks, raising production to 3.2 mbpd in July 2016.
207
  
 
Any coherent petroleum policy for Iraq now needs to clarify governing rules over 
investment, contracts, revenue sharing between the IOCs and the government, and more 
importantly for many Iraqis, the revenue sharing between the provinces. Failure to agree 
upon and pass an oil law to provide a common framework for the industry has led to 
uncertainty, inefficiency and unsustainability, a similar set of circumstances seen in 
Nigeria in the absence of a national level policy framework, and to a lesser extent in 
Russia, where government unilateralism has dominated, as Locatelli and Rossiaud note, 
 
“The increasing share of state-owned companies in oil production has been 
accompanied by tougher conditions for access to the country’s hydrocarbon 
resources, or at the very least by tight control over access to resources by the 
authorities. These tougher conditions for access firstly affected the regions. The 
various amendments to the subsoil law put an end to the principle of joint 
allocation by state and regions of exploration and development licences, with the 
state taking full control.”208 
 
This is incoherent policy, since it contradicts Russian constitution’s Article 5, which 
allocates equal rights between regions and the centre.
209
 
 
Without an agreed petroleum policy the Iraqi government has encouraged the oil 
producing regions to pursue their own interests thereby encouraging unilateralist and 
even separatist agendas, not only in the Kurdish region but also in Basra and to a lesser 
extent, Salahaddin and Wasit provinces in 2012, who entered into short lived 
negotiations with IOCs.
210
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Leaving contracts aside, it is arguably inevitable that the oil producing provinces would 
seek to claim a higher proportion of the revenues whilst other areas are left neglected, in 
the absence of an agreed petroleum policy. In 2009 for example, producing provinces 
were promised up to $5 extra per barrel of oil produced in the province;
211
 this was not 
fully implemented however, Basra Provincial Council still demands this level of 
revenue. Had the proposal been fully implemented, the fixed $5 per barrel would have 
meant that Basra consumed a substantial percentage of oil revenues as oil prices 
collapsed under $30 per barrel in 2016, a sum that might have been sustainable under 
much higher oil prices.  
 
Regardless of the political model, a national petroleum policy should seek to develop 
the oil and gas resources in an environmentally friendly way whilst seeking to maximize 
the returns to Iraq and ensuring equitable benefits to the people of Iraq, now and in the 
future. This would match the aims of Canadian and Norwegian energy policy 
statements.  
 
If Iraq is to develop its energy sector efficiently, the legal framework and institutional 
oversight needs to be established. Appropriate laws and regulations must be put in place 
with a regulatory body to oversee their implementation and to police the industry, and in 
Nigeria such a body even has powers of arrest, although this appears to have had 
minimal impact on corruption.
212
 The authority of Iraq’s ministry or body has to be 
established and be transparent, and an independent regulator may be required to monitor 
the NOC and compliance in the industry. The relationship between the State and the 
NOC needs to be clearly defined. According to Marcel:
213
 
 
“There are three main models for the assignment of powers to regulate and 
oversee the sector:  
 
● Separation-of-powers model (also referred to as the ‘Norwegian model’): an 
independent technocratic agency has regulatory powers.  
                                               
211
 Rudaw, “Iraqi Ministers Approve 2014 Budget Despite Kurdish Boycott.” 15
th
 January 2014. Accessed 
July 16
th
 2016. http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/150120142 
212
 Oil and Gas Regulation in Nigeria: Overview. Practical Law, 1st of May, 2014. 
http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-523-4794?q=*&qp=&qo=&qe= 
213
 Valerie Marcel, “Guidelines for good governance in emerging oil and gas producers,” Chatham House 
(2013) 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20an
d%20Development/0913pp_marcel.pdf 
63 
 
● •‘Ministry-dominated model’: the petroleum ministry or an equivalent executive 
body is charged with regulation and oversight.  
● ‘NOC-dominated model’: the NOC has de jure or de facto responsibility for 
day-to-day regulation, sometimes including the power to award 
exploration/production licenses.  
 
Regardless of whether there is to be an NOC dominated model or a Norway style 
separation of powers, the NOC’s mandate over commercial and operational activities 
needs to be determined. The principles under which licensing and contracting take place 
need to be established so that auctions of exclusive rights are transparent and fair. The 
nature of production sharing contracts, production tax rates and joint venture contracts 
also need to be established. The role of IOCs and other foreign investors needs to 
clearly be established as do the incentives for them to enter the industry. 
Given the finite nature of resources, the objective of maximum recovery needs to be 
paramount to operational work programmes so as to maximize returns to the Iraqi 
people. Likewise, environmental considerations and protection need to be embedded in 
the policy. 
 
The petroleum policy has to establish the fiscal regime (defined below) associated with 
development aiming to maintain robust incentives for reliable and responsible investors, 
whilst providing a fair and equitable return to the people of Iraq. The fiscal regime 
needs to be progressive and flexible so as to give the state an increasing share of profits 
as the profitability of the projects rises whilst giving some protection to investors as oil 
and gas prices fluctuate.
214
  
 
As shall be discussed, current contracts in Iraq have failed to do this. The inclusion of 
fiscal instruments to hedge against changing circumstances needs to be embedded to 
avoid constant revisions to the regime. Therefore, the predictability of the fiscal regime 
needs to be clear for both the government and investors. 
 
The policy may determine local content (e.g., how many Iraqi employees are hired, how 
much material is sourced within Iraq) the role of government agencies, the contribution 
made by local companies, the use of local labour and supplies, and the provision of 
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training and career development opportunities for local citizens (capacity building, as 
distinct from local content). The objective should be to ensure the transfer of 
knowledge, management and technology whilst investing in the building of local supply 
chains. 
 
The industry’s infrastructure from exploration to production, refining and distribution 
has to be coherently planned, currently not the case in Iraq which suffers serious 
inefficiencies related to subsidies, which have suppressed investment in new refining 
capacity. Major customers have to be fed by pipelines or export terminals, an issue 
which has seen political conflict in Iraq regarding use of export infrastructure through 
the Kurdish region.
215
 All of this requires agreed planning at local, regional and national 
levels, as current problems in Canada regarding pipeline construction illustrate, despite 
the presence of a national level regulator, the National Energy Board.  
 
According to the Chatham House Report on Good Governance of the National 
Petroleum Sector project (2007) there are:  
 
“five universal principles of good governance which transcend national 
boundaries: clarity of goals, roles and responsibilities; sustainable development 
for future generations; enablement to carry out the role assigned; accountability 
of decision-making and performance and transparency and accuracy of 
information.”216 
 
However, as the report admits there are many different models of governance in 
existence: 
 
“Case studies contributed by participants demonstrated how much countries 
differed in their governance processes. These may involve, in different ways and 
with different weight, the executive government, the national central bank, a 
petroleum advisory council, official regulators, local authorities and the legal 
institutions. Parliament, trade unions, the media, civil society groupings etc. may 
represent people and different elements in society. The investor/operator 
grouping includes the national oil company, local private-sector companies, 
international oil companies and financial institutions. An NOC can be more of a 
government agency than an operating company. In some countries trade unions 
may exercise a strong role in the state legislature and have representation on the 
Board of the NOC. Identifying and understanding the national context is 
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therefore a first step in developing strategies for improvement of governance in 
the petroleum sector.”217 
 
Taking these points into consideration, a successful petroleum policy would consider 
the following elements: 
 
● The national context 
● The assignment of goals, roles and responsibilities 
● The location of responsibility for regulation 
● The purpose of the NOC 
● The relationship be between NOC and state 
● The role of the IOCs  
● Sustainability 
 
The success of a national petroleum policy depends heavily upon the capacity of the 
state to effectively legislate and monitor the sector’s activities and performance, to 
collect taxes, share and invest revenues.  Taking the above factors into account, case 
studies focusing on the Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Natural Resources will consider 
how effective the current Iraqi Federal Government is in achieving its legislative 
objectives.  
 
2.8 The Resource Curse 
  
The idea that mineral wealth could lead to a number of problematic experiences in a 
major resource holding country, chiefly long term low economic growth, was debated 
as long ago as the 1950s, but arguably did not gain widespread popularity until Richard 
Auty used the term “resource curse” in his 1993 essay, Sustaining Development in 
Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis.
218
 Since then, the thesis has evolved 
into what Rosser defines as three strands of literature dealing with three main ideas, 
firstly that resource rich nations have a higher likelihood of civil war, secondly that 
resource rich nations have a higher likelihood of lower economic growth and finally that 
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they are more predisposed to authoritarian regimes.
219
 Wing notes that all of these 
symptoms of the resource curse are present in various forms in Iraq.
220
  
 
In economic development, much concern has been focused on what is known as “Dutch 
disease” whereby a surge in resource income leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, damaging other sectors in the economy, as described byCorden and 
Neary
221
 More recently Sachs notes that the risk of the condition has been exaggerated 
if a MRH properly invests revenue windfalls in non-oil sectors, or if there is minimal 
non-oil industry in the first place. 
222
 
 
Secondly, with regard to economics, a number of analysts have pointed to the problem 
of the “rentier state.” This is where large revenue inflows from a single export to the 
government form the basis of what is known as “unearned income” which then becomes 
disposed of haphazardly in the form of social welfare programs, which are politically 
attractive to the government but may produce inefficient economic outcomes or 
heighten corruption, where weak institutions are predominant. Rosser notes that rentier 
states tend to have large state owned enterprises sectors, particularly relevant to the case 
of Iraq.
223
 
 
Politically, it has been widely argued that the concentration of “rent” in a centralised 
political system also entrenches governments with authoritarian tendencies which are 
able to “capture the state” and use rents to bolster pro-government armed forces or 
“buy” support or opposition groups, as noted byLam and Wantchekon224 Jensen and 
Wantchekon
225
 Beblawi and Luciani.
226
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Finally, it has been found by Auty that resource rich countries are more likely to 
experience civil war, however particularly relevant in the case of Iraq is the finding of 
Collier and Hoeffler that while civil wars are likely in an MRH, secessionist wars are 
three times more likely than conflicts driven by other political factors.
227
 This raises 
significant questions regarding Iraq where resources are spread unevenly across the 
country and various groups have fought political, and at times violent battles for control 
of land and resources. The resource curse will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4, 
international case studies.  
 
2.9 Petroleum Fiscal Regimes 
 
Petroleum fiscal regimes encompass the laws, regulations and agreements that dictate 
the interactions between national oil companies, international oil companies and 
national and subnational governments in exploration, development and production of oil 
and gas resources.
228
 Relevant here are types of licensing systems common in countries 
such as Iraq, where the state owns the rights to the subsurface resource. The licensing 
systems described below have all at one point either existed in Iraq, or are currently in 
use in the Kurdish Regional of Iraq or Arab Iraq.  
 
2.10 Production Sharing Agreements 
 
Production Sharing Agreements are a common form of oil contract whereby the host 
country contracts an IOC to explore for and develop hydrocarbon resources.
229
 PSAs 
became increasingly popular following the first wave of nationalisation in the 1960s and 
‘70s where MRH countries wanted to retain a degree of sovereign control over sub-
surface resources, but recognised the need for foreign private enterprise to fully exploit 
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resources. Therefore, the state, represented in the form of a National Oil Company, 
contracts the IOC who retain a share of production as payment for extracting the 
resource. With the exception of this share however, the state owns the rest of the oil 
extracted, in contrast to a concession agreement, and the state will also levy a tax on the 
“profit oil.”  Under these contracts, the government owns oil installations and the IOC 
take all of the risk, in the sense that if no oil is found there is no compensation. Also 
typical to most PSAs, the IOC will pay a royalty on gross production to the government, 
and then the government will agree to a share of cost recovery to the IOC, leaving the 
rest of the oil as “profit oil” which is divided between the government and the IOC at an 
agreed share.
230
 
 
PSAs have been the preferred contract type for the Kurdish Regional Government 
Ministry of Natural Resources, and initially proved attractive due to the offsetting of 
initial costs to future profits, although this arrangement has proved difficult for the KRI 
under low oil prices. As discussed later in this chapter, PSAs have been particularly 
controversial in Iraq.  
 
2.11 Production Service Contracts 
 
Production service contracts are widely regarded as having been adopted by host 
countries for similar reasons to PSA adoption, namely the retention of sovereign rights 
to subsurface and exported liquids. Service contracts are typically long term (at least 20 
years) and, as with PSAs the IOC is contracted to explore and develop oil and gas fields 
in return for a contractually agreed fixed fee, normally per barrel. Unlike in a PSA, 
where IOCs receive a share of extracted oil or gas, under the PSC the IOC will not have 
any right to extracted or sub-surface oil and gas, although in the case of Iraq problems 
with paying IOCs has led to MoO deciding to pay IOCs in oil. In the PSC, the IOC 
carries a degree of risk in that it normally fronts capital expenditure and brings in 
technology, although this has been mitigated somewhat in the case of Iraq by a rapid 
cost recovery mechanism within the contract.
231
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PSCs have drawn controversy in Iraq due to nationalist sentiment that opposes the IOC 
having what amounts to a fixed percentage of exported oil, but have come under more 
detailed scrutiny from Ghandi and Lin who view them as producing long term economic 
inefficiency due to an inability to optimise production rates,
232
 and Wells who argues 
along similar lines that the high production plateaus for fields do not coincide with 
forecast world oil demand or expected Iraqi infrastructure capacity.
233
 This will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
2.12 Joint Venture 
 
The Joint Venture has long been the preferred private investment model across multiple 
sectors in Iraq however only the Basra Gas Company (BGC) exists as a JV in the 
energy sector. According to Radon JVs are a particularly challenging type of contract, 
because if all potential possibilities are not considered prior to the signing of the 
contract, legal disputes can be likely. The example of Nigeria is given whereby JVs for 
oil and gas broke down in the 1970s when the government was unable to meet financial 
terms in the contracts. JVs are a typically 50-50 ventures, where an NOC owns half of 
the project, approximately the case with the Basra Gas Company.
234
 
 
2.13 Concession Agreements 
 
Many analysts, such as Zebari, Anaz, and Cohoon,
235
regard concession agreements 
(also known as royalty tax systems) as the contract model of the colonial era, being both 
very long term and offering low royalties for extracted oil in return for full control over 
subsurface and extracted oil. Johnston notes that royalties could often be round 10%, 
entitling the IOC to legal and physical possession of 90% of the “lifted” oil, however in 
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some cases if the IOC paid the host government from another source, nullifying the 
royalty, entitlement could be 100% to the IOC. 
 
Radon does however note that while most concessions were replaced in the 1960s (most 
famously by the first PSA in Indonesia in 1966 which replaced Dutch colonial era laws) 
concessions can in some cases have advantages in certain situations. Radon suggests 
that this model may be of use in countries as a “license agreement” where there is little 
reliable legal infrastructure or judiciary that could be able to interpret “complex 
agreements.” By this logic, commercial terms can be focused on without the need to fill 
in gaps in existing law by building clauses into contracts. Johnston notes that while 
many concession contracts were bad for host governments, government take could in 
fact be very high over the cycle of the field (from initial production through to decline 
and abandonment) if high taxes were levied, in addition to a 10% royalty. 
 
2.14 Government Take 
 
According to Radon government ownership of the resource entitles it to a majority share 
of the revenues from its extraction.  This percentage of royalty, other revenue, tax or 
payment of oil to the government is known as “government take” and will vary across 
contract models and on the ground conditions. For example, particular areas may come 
with high levels of geological, security or political risk, and these factors affect the 
remuneration and cost recovery structure of contracts, with IOCs typically asking for 
greater compensation, meaning a smaller government take.  
 
Exogenous factors also influence government take, including the wider global oil 
market both at the time the contract is negotiated and forecast demand. In some cases, 
government take can rise as international oil prices rise in such as way as to not affect 
the commercial viability of a project for IOCs, but Radon notes that tax systems often 
do not adjust the rate of return under different scenarios to provide optimum conditions 
for the host government.
236
 According to the IMF, in Iraq “TSCs were lucrative for the 
government when oil prices were high, but they became less attractive with falling oil 
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prices as revenues from oil exports plummeted and payment obligations to the IOCs 
remained high.”237 
 
According to Ernst and Young, by 2011 the Iraqi Parliament and later, Ministry of 
Finance had attempted to mitigate this situation by imposing taxes on oil and oil field 
service operations: 
 
“In 2010, the Iraqi parliament ratified a tax law for foreign oil and gas companies. As 
per this 2010 oil and gas income tax law, the income tax rate applicable to income 
earned in Iraq from contracts undertaken by foreign oil and gas companies and by 
contractors working in the fields of production and extraction of oil and gas and related 
industries is 35 percent. Companies, branches or offices of oil and gas companies and 
service companies, and subcontractors working in fields of production and extraction of 
oil and gas and related industries are all subject to the law.”238 
2.15 Booking Barrels 
 
According to Johnston booking barrels is “the practice of counting oil among the assets 
of a company,”239 however, the number of barrels a company can book varies across 
contracts, since they can only book oil they are entitled to. Therefore, in the case of a 
royalty tax contract, this could be total estimated recoverable oil minus the royalty, 
while in the case of a PSC, the entitlement available to book can increase as the price of 
oil falls (and the IOC percentage share becomes more valuable) and decrease as the 
price of oil rises. According to Johnston in the US booking barrels is based on 
reasonable certainty of proved reserves, a point of particular relevance to Iraq and the 
KRI where Iraq’s southern fields are widely considered to be well mapped out 
compared to fields in the KRI. 
240
 An IOC’s ability to book barrels will have a direct 
impact on its share price, since stock analysts follow the “reserve replacement ratio.” 241 
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2.16 Energy Value Chain 
 
According to a 2009 report by the World Bank Group, this term refers to the overall 
efficiency of the hydrocarbons sector from policy creation and regulation to exploration 
and extraction (upstream) transportation (midstream) and refining (downstream) 
operations. Decisions made at the ministry level, or made by an NOC can decrease or 
increase efficiency, or “value” in the chain. For example if a country decides to create a 
number of small refineries when an expert suggests improving existing larger facilities 
may be more cost effective, the country is reducing value in the entire chain.
242
  
 
This situation would become even more inefficient if a large portion of refined liquid 
from the smaller refineries is intended for domestic use. In this case, absence of 
economy of scale in the chain, through increased transportation costs, the time it has 
taken to get the new refineries online (rather than upgrade existing ones) or issues with 
the yield of refined fuel, all decrease value. This could be particularly damaging if the 
government decides to allocate a portion of refined fuel to state owned companies or 
give Heavy Fuel Oil (a by-product of refining) to power stations, which can damage 
turbines. Both of these latter situations have occurred in the refining sector in the KRI 
and southern Iraq as examples of inefficient energy value chains.
243
 
 
Now that these key concepts have been examined, attention will be turned to the 
academic discussions on Iraqi energy policy after 2003, which involves many of the 
ideas outlined above. Fiscal regimes, contractual terms, political control over the energy 
sector and the energy value chain have been the subject of prolonged debate among 
energy analysts and industry professionals focused on Iraq. Arguments made in research 
papers, books and journals however only present pieces of analysis that, when examined 
together, help give a broader understanding of the barriers Iraq has faced in designing a 
strong energy strategy.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review on the Iraqi Petroleum Industry 
 
A review of the scholarly literature related to Iraq’s oil and a gas sector reveals a broad 
picture of “tactics without strategy” which, as Sun Tzu is thought by some to have 
noted, “is the noise before defeat.”244 Conversely, this quotation also notes that tactics 
were vital albeit not essential as long as there was strategy in place. In the context of 
Iraq’s energy sector, “strategy” refers to the design of a petroleum policy framework 
that would fulfil the constitutional objective of the maximum economic return to the 
Iraqi people, as Article 112, Second notes, to “formulate the necessary strategic 
(emphasis added) policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people.” 245 
 
The majority of literature on Iraq’s post 2003 energy sector reconstruction has focused 
on significant “tactical” questions, namely contract types and their expected economic 
performance or constitutionality, or questions of whether fields were “present” 
(producing) or “future.” Many experts (including Zedalis, Gunter) have often noted an 
absence of strategy or a legal framework that might provide the basis for a coherent 
petroleum policy, but pay little attention on what an optimum strategy might look 
like.
246
 Others focus on very specific problems such as whether PSAs are an IOC 
attempt to reap profits at the expense of Iraq or whether Iraq should “avoid the resource 
curse” by diverting a proportion of its oil revenues into a fund and then directly 
distribute the dividend to the population. This idea follows the style of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, and was proposed by West, Looney, Birdsall and Subramanian,
247
 as 
well as being written into the 2012 draft budget, but never implemented. 
 
Some experts such as Michael Knights and Tim Arango 
248
 endorse short term deals and 
echo the tactical approach taken by the Iraqi government to the problem of Iraq’s 
mismanaged energy sector, focusing on individual problems rather than an integrated 
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strategic approach.
249
 By focusing attention to individual “tactical” projects such as 
developing particular fields, changing terms of refinery investment or specific 
infrastructure projects, Iraq appears to have achieved massive export growth, while 
incurring serious inefficiency in the absence of national level master planning and 
coordination between government agencies. Limited success has been, as a study by 
OpenOil highlights, against the odds of a legacy of sanctions, war and insurgency that 
saw Iraqi production fall to a low of 1.3 million bpd in 2003, rising to 2.8 million bpd in 
2011with considerable foreign participation.
250
  
 
No observers suggest this increased production represents Iraq’s full potential. Several 
experts reference aspects of the “resource curse” that they see as prevailing in Iraq, 
leading to a series of inefficiencies which have undermined investment in the sector as 
Iraq eventually faced financial crisis in 2014. West notes that following the oil price 
collapse of 2009, “Iraq fell prey to one of the classic syndromes of oil producing 
countries: growing dependency on oil rents combined with severe income volatility.”251 
Gunter notes how this dependency persisted through 2012, noting how it enabled the 
GOI to become “employer of first choice” and that, if oil prices remain high as Iraq’s 
exports surge, this scenario would likely bring “an explosion of corruption” and divert 
efforts to “diversify Iraq’s economy.”252 Wing identifies four manifestations of the 
resource curse, noting that Iraq has signs of all, including Dutch Disease, the Rentier 
Thesis, the Repression Thesis, and the Rent Seeking Thesis.
253
 In the case of Iraq, Wing 
notes how public expenditure is closely linked to oil revenues, and that high oil 
revenues have led to overspending, failure to implement tax policies and a subsequent 
lack of social contract between the government and the people. To justify the presence 
of repression thesis in Iraq, he notes how oil revenues are used to build up large armed 
forces to defend the government, certainly the case under Saddam and, according to 
Dodge Nouri al- Maliki.
254
 Regarding Dutch Disease, Wing notes how a GOI fixation 
with using oil revenues to prop up SOEs, rather than diversify a private sector economy, 
has crowded out growth of the private non-oil sector.  To remedy the growing 
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symptoms of the “resource curse” in Iraq, Wing suggests that Iraq’s involvement in the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), combined with an aggressive 
investment in economic diversification and even direct distribution of revenues could be 
initial strategies, but offers no further detail on the matter and does not reference 
petroleum policy frameworks.
255
 
 
This is similar to the assessments of some experts who note the problem of an absence 
of strategy, without venturing proposals on what could be done, as Jaffe notes, “Without 
a well-defined national political framework for oil and gas development, Iraq runs the 
risk that conflict over resource rights and benefits could become a destabilizing factor in 
the country’s long-term stability and unity.”256 
 
Jaffe’s work points to a fundamental energy sector tension that has caused vast waste in 
Iraq. This is the conflict between the Ministry of Electricity and the Ministry of Oil over 
fuel allocations for power stations and power for oil projects; power station turbines 
break down from heavy fuel oil use (when Iraq’s abundant gas could be used) causing 
recriminations between ministries and likewise oil projects compete with the 
government for electricity and clash over the flaring and reinjection of gas that could be 
used for power stations. 
 
Jaffe notes that following the demonstrations over electrical outages in 2011,  
 
“Political leaders promised that electricity services to the residential sector 
would take precedence, creating new problems for industry’s ability to mobilize 
the electricity services needed for the water injection program. Power generation 
is needed both to pump seawater north to the southern oil fields as well as to fuel 
desalination plants that will be required to convert seawater into usable water for 
injection purposes.”257 
 
Likewise, Jaffe notes the conflict over gas allocations “foreign investors are also 
unhappy about turning natural gas production over to Shell, and may lobby for the 
opportunity to compete for the right to utilize the gas from their own projects.” Chapter 
5 will evaluate whether Iraq may have had a stronger position regarding IOC demands 
through closer coordination between the Ministry of Electricity and Ministry of Oil, 
                                               
255
  Joel Wing, “Does Iraq suffer from the resource curse?” December 11th 2012. Accessed July 16th  
256
 Jareer Elass, Amy Myers Jaffe, “Iraq Oi Potential and Implications for global oil markets and OPEC 
politics,” James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2011.  
257
 Ibid. 
76 
 
since MoO had the majority stake in the Basra Gas Project which is intended to 
prioritise Iraq’s National Grid before exports. 
 
Nonetheless, Jaff does not outline how government agencies could coordinate better, 
instead referring back to the absence of national strategy. Jaffe does note however, that 
the level of bureaucracy in Iraq’s energy sector and related ministries that have 
involvement in petroleum logistics and security (Ministries of Transport and Interior) 
has produced problems for IOCs, “given the multitude of official agencies at the local 
and provincial levels.” Jaffe could perhaps also highlight another problem of 
coordination which goes beyond MoO and MoE, as Gandhi and Lin note,  
 
“in implementing the Rumaila TSC, misaligned responsibilities among different 
Iraqi government entities involved in the contract may lead to an implicit cost 
ceiling being imposed on the IOC. The Iraqi government entity awarding the 
contracts is different from the one making cost decisions, which is different from 
the one receiving the revenue. The Ministry of Oil and its Petroleum Contracts 
and Licensing Directorate, which awards the contract, follow a policy of 
maximizing revenue with an emphasis on garnering a higher plateau production 
target in the bidding process. However, the state-owned South Oil Company, 
which oversees the Rumaila operation and has to approve the IOC’s work plans 
and capital expenditures, is primarily concerned with cost. The revenue goes 
through the Ministry of Oil’s Treasury department. The South Oil Company 
therefore decides on the cost without seeing the revenue.”258 
 
Gunter has also highlighted the problems between oil and electricity ministries, writing,  
 
“there are continuing difficulties coordinating the actions of the Ministry of Oil 
and Electricity. The Ministry of Electricity argues that inadequate fuel quality 
and quantity reduce electrical generation while the Ministry of Oil states that 
inadequate electrical quality (frequency drops) and quantity reduce refinery 
production.”259  
 
While Muttitt, Jiyad, Chalabi, Zedalis (as described below) and those who focus on 
direct distribution (Subramanian et al)
260
 look at specific issues, much analysis focuses 
on general challenges to Iraq’s energy sector, with the possible exception of Gunter, 
who looks at Iraq’s linked industries but mentions little in relation to the Federal Oil and 
                                               
258 Abbas Ghandi, Cynthia Lyn,  “An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of Oil Contracts: A Dynamic 
Model of the Rumaila Oil Field in Iraq.” Institute of transportation studies, University of California (2014) 
 
259
 Frank R. Gunter, “The Political Economy of Iraq: Restoring Balance in a Post-Conflict Society,” 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 93. 
260
 Todd Moss, “The Governor’s Solution: How Alaska’s Oil Dividend Could Work in Iraq and Other Oil-
Rich Countries,” Center for Global Development, (Washington DC, 2013) 
77 
 
Gas Law, except to note that it did not enter into effect.
261
 Jaffe also looks at 
infrastructure challenges, a lack of human capacity leading to difficulties to “approve 
and tender and award contracts for management and equipment for major oil projects,” 
which relates to the the possible over-scrutiny of capital expenditure by South Oil 
Company referred to by Ghandi and Lin. Jaffe also notes, how “entrenched interests 
weigh in to block key projects, such as oil trucking services whose employees have 
much riding against the successful completion of new oil pipeline expansions.”262 The 
massive problem of water supply for injection to maintain pressure in Iraq’s 6 giant 
southern fields is mentioned, as are other infrastructure bottlenecks that threaten Iraq’s 
plans to expand production.  
 
In a joint paper, Jareer Elas and Amy Myers Jaffe differ from other observers such as 
Muttitt, Jiyad and Failat who worry that Iraq has contract types that do not optimise 
economic gains, by noting how contracts awarded for Rumaila, West Qurna-1, West 
Qurna-2, Majnoon, Zubair and Halfaya have such tough remuneration terms that they 
may not be profitable for IOCs. Singling out the West Qurna-2 deal for Lukoil and 
Statoil, she notes the estimated profit for the contract amounts to 56 cents a barrel 
because of a 35 percent tax on the remuneration fee and the 25% stake of SOC.
263
 
 
It is noted however, that BP and CNPC later negotiated cost recovery terms that made 
their contract more viable. Regarding gas flaring and Shell’s gas capture project, Jaffe 
forecasts that if the BP consortium hit a target of 2.85 million bpd for Rumaila, more 
than 2 bcf a day (bcf/d) and nearly 300,000 b/d of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). 
However, no analysis of Iraq’s Gas Master Plan is ventured, which shall be discussed in 
depth in Chapter 5. This is a considerable oversight, since the Gas Master Plan has been 
a cornerstone of Iraq’s plan to reduce oil consumption for electricity generation. 
 
Attention is also given to then Minister of Oil Shahristani’s 2010 announcement that 
Iraq’s reserves would be upgraded following revised recovery rates, which was 
followed by Iran and then Saudi Arabia announcing similarly large reserve upgrade 
estimates. By highlighting these points, Jaffe echoes the fears of Chalabi (outlined 
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below) that suggest Iraq risks a confrontation with OPEC. Jaffe suggests this could be 
extremely unwise, given Saudi Arabia’s previous ability to undercut rival producers 
aiming to rapidly expand production, which happened in the case of Venezuela in the 
late 90s, and to many observers is happening today with the battle between Saudi 
production and Iranian and Russian production, and Shale oil.
264
  
 
Thus, a number of factors are examined before the conclusion that Iraq lacks an 
overarching policy, a point they reference with regard to exports, noting that under “a 
Saddam era law” only SOMO can export Iraq’s oil.265  
 
Megan O’Sullivan is similarly broad in her analysis, but also turns to exogenous market 
factors, noting how resumption of global demand in 2010 following the 2009 oil price 
crash “reminds us that spare capacity is finite.”266 Like Chalabi, she notes that key 
factors in Iraq’s oil revenues and marketability rest on Iran’s potential return to the 
market following (what was then) a possible lifting of sanctions and Chinese demand. 
Most relevant to this study, she describes how increased political strain within 
government will lead to “more short term thinking” and how “politics in Iraq is driven 
by a sense of urgency rather than strategy.”267 
 
As an example of poor strategic planning, she notes the risk that Iraq could induce a 
price collapse by rapidly expanding exports over 6 mbpd, a problem highlighted by 
Gunter, Failat and Chalabi. Returning to political analysis, she briefly describes the 
short lived proposal for the National Council for Strategic Policies (NCSP), which was 
to be given a special role in approving energy projects (among other tasks) but appears 
to have been born out of an attempt to produce political compromise following the 
deadlocked 2010 elections, rather than created as a genuine check on government 
power.  
 
She notes the NCSP would have made little progress, since it required 80% approval for 
binding decisions. Turning focus to controversy over IOC contracts, O’Sullivan 
describes how nationalists such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Iyad Allawi opposed the post-
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2009 contracts with IOCs (with Sadr flatly opposed to foreign oil involvement) and 
points out that Parliamentary Oil and Gas Committee head Adnan al-Janabi called for 
all IOC contracts to be reviewed, including KRI contracts. 
268
 
 
Regarding these contracts, O’ Sullivan suggests that constitutional ambiguity was not a 
mistake (as Zedalis, Jiyad and others argue) but actually vital and intentional for 
Baghdad and Erbil to reach compromise. She then goes on to note “positive” deals 
between then KRI Prime Minister Barham Saleh and former Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki 
on Kurdish exports through the Federal System, suggesting Maliki and then Oil 
Minister Abdul Karim al-Luabi may have backed down on Kurdish oil contracts, in 
particular controversial PSAs, because Kurdish geology was more challenging. Again, 
this general approach, touching on a number of challenges, eschews any commitment to 
suggesting which path Iraq could follow to formulate a coherent petroleum policy 
framework. 
 
Following a more political line of analysis, Al-Kadiri notes that ethnic tensions over oil 
in Iraq, while important, are not the main issue to overcome and that intra ethnic and 
intra sect tension also warrant appraisal. He does note however that Kirkuk has long 
been seen by Kurds as a potential gateway to independence that could vastly upgrade oil 
resources at the disposal of the KRI, a fact that remains a source of ongoing tensions 
with Sunni Arabs in the wake of Saddam’s Arabization campaign in the region.  
 
Al-Kadiri reminds us, however, of the tension between Nouri al-Maliki’s centrist Dawa 
party and the regional gambit of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq in 2009 (Dawa, 
were “centrist” in the sense that they neither portrayed themselves as revolutionary, like 
the Sadrist Trend, or as secular, like Ayad Allawi’s Al-Wataniya coalition.269 ISCI’s 
then policy position to create a Shi’a majority oil rich region in the south was quickly 
abandoned after the Iraqi public showed little interest in the idea. He also notes, in 
relation to the July 2007 revisions to the Draft Oil and Gas Law (DOGL--see analysis of 
Zedalis, below) that ISCI joined the Kurds in rejecting the draft on the grounds that it 
gave far too much power to Baghdad.  
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With regards to the proposed Revenue Sharing Law, he suggests that it gives so much 
power to regions over fiscal policy that Baghdad would be reduced to little more than a 
“cash machine.”270 He concludes that the bundle of laws that Iraqi Parliament has failed 
to pass--the basic oil and gas framework law, the revenue sharing law and the law 
reorganizing the Oil Company (INOC) are all less important than resolving the 
fundamental constitutional questions over regional, provincial and central power. Until 
this happens, he argues, “policy disputes will be a constant drag on energy strategy.”271 
Again, this falls into the realm of correctly identifying the absence of strategy but not 
venturing what a strategy may entail. 
 
Istrabadi arguably follows a politicised approach in his analysis, explicitly supporting a 
united Iraq while focusing on the fundamental tension between Iraq emerging as a 
federal state with strong unitary tendencies, although the 2005 Constitution recognises 
Iraq as federal - a situation he calls “unprecedented in the Middle East.” This is highly 
problematic he notes since a 2004 poll of Iraqis suggested that while Kurds favoured 
their new federal status, over 60% of people in Arab Iraq wanted the country to remain 
as a unitary state.
272
 Likewise, in Basra, less than 10% of the registered voters required 
to have a referendum on the province’s federal status wanted the province to become a 
region in 2009. 
273
 
 
Therefore, Istrabadi concludes that the constitution is seen by nationalists as a de facto 
partition of Iraq and recalls that members of Iraq’s initial Interim Governing Council 
debated for hours how to handle and disperse Iraq’s oil revenues. Acknowledging his 
position as an Iraqi Nationalist, by noting, “The Nationalists (including this author) 
feared too great a weakening of the new federal structures,”274 Istrabadi ventures that 
since the KRI is landlocked it is better for them to remain within Iraq and use Iraq’s 
export infrastructure for their oil rather than rely on historically difficult neighbours 
who have had difficult relations with Kurds.  
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He also describes how strong Kurdish demands for autonomy over oil exports provoked 
similar sentiments among some Shi’a leaders with Adil Abdul Mahdi saying, “whatever 
the Kurds get, the Shi’a should get,” a position that contrasted to that of the Fadilah 
Party and Dawa, who favoured a strong center, while Sadrists and the Kurds were left to 
what Istrabadi calls “maximalist” demands.275 Therefore, Istrabadi portrays widespread 
political deadlock, without going into analysis on how this distracted the Iraqi state 
from developing an energy strategy, delaying mega projects or tackling massive waste 
through petroleum theft, smuggling and refinery inefficiency, among many other 
problems. On balance, however, Istrabadi writes before many of these developments, 
such as Iraq’s removal of Exxon over the seawater injection project. While political 
analysis is essential, it cannot be taken in isolation to understand Iraq’s failure to create 
a national level energy policy.   
 
Failat is arguably more explicitly nationalist than Istrabadi, because while Istrabadi 
declares himself a nationalist, he also notes that the Transitional Administrative Law 
(Iraq’s legal governing structure prior to the ratification of the 2005 constitution) is right 
to support the Kurdish autonomous status, noting, “the foundations of a modus vivendi 
were laid in the TAL.” Failat, meanwhile, argues along similar lines to Muttitt and Anaz 
that Kurdish PSAs are illegal under the Iraq constitution and that the KRI, “interprets 
the constitutional provisions in a selective and unilateral manner.”276 His basis for this 
illegality is the citing of Article 110 of the Iraqi constitution which gives the Federal 
government authority over trade policy, a view rejected by Zedalis. Of the 2011 FOGL, 
Failat notes that, “It has failed to consider art.110 of the Constitution, which explicitly 
stipulates the exclusive powers of the Federal Government.”277  
 
Furthermore, he suggests that since OPEC production ceilings are negotiated by 
Baghdad, independent Kurdish policy on oil production must defer to the federal 
government. He goes on to attack Kurdish PSAs noting that they prioritise maximum 
production, which could rapidly increase depletion rates of fields to the detriment of the 
federal government and that subsequently PSAs are not constitutional in that they do not 
offer the maximum benefit promised to the Iraqi people under the constitution. 
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Continuing his critique of PSAs, he suggests that stabilization clauses and clauses for 
foreign commercial arbitration limit Iraq’s sovereign power to alter contracts if 
circumstances change and that foreign arbitration, occurring on a purely commercial 
basis, does not consider the rights of Iraqi civil society. This viewpoint is particularly 
similar to that of Gregg Muttitt, but while these points are important to consider it is 
hard to imagine a situation where IOCs would invest billions in Iraq without guarantee 
of a modern, advanced commercial arbitration process existing within the country.  
 
Also with a strong focus on investment terms is Robin Mills, although he looks 
exclusively at the experience of the KRG. Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and 
Regional Politics is perhaps the most comprehensive and up to date study (as of 2016) 
on the KRI’s use of unilateral energy sector development to fund a drive for greater 
autonomy. Expanding on Zedalis’ postulations on the possible breakup of Iraq, Mills 
points out that in the view of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) this is with the goal 
of independence from Iraq. Under the Mountains therefore provides an overview of the 
mounting political risks that have shaped the KRI’s energy strategy, but also highlights 
how this has led both Ministries of Oil (Natural Resources in the case of the KRG) to 
undertake somewhat self-defeating moves in the struggle to influence IOC involvement 
in their respective fields. This is particularly the case with Baghdad’s expulsion of 
Exxon from the Common Seawater Supply project, which is intended to maintain 
reservoir pressure in the supergiant southern fields. Baghdad removed Exxon from the 
project following its deal with MNR in 2010, which Exxon initially tried to keep secret. 
This had a deterrent effect on other Oil Majors and the KRI was subsequently forced to 
continue signing PSAs with smaller IOCs, who lacked expertise to exploit fields in 
challenging geological conditions. 
 
Mills opens by charting the history of the energy sector in the KRI, from initial drilling 
at Kirkuk to the beginning of the area's regional autonomy in 1970 under the Baath 
regime, and the subsequent breakdown of this arrangement in 1974, after which a long 
period of armed hostilities resumed with Baghdad.
278
 Like Istrabadi, Mills notes this 
difficult period for the Kurds has shaped their view of oil resources, particularly in 
Kirkuk, as being a potential gateway to financial and political independence. Kurdish 
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faith in the political reliability of Baghdad has been marred by the genocide campaign 
launched by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds in the 1980s.  
 
Prior to this period, Mills notes how Baghdad was reluctant to explore for oil in an area 
considered semi-hostile and geologically difficult, although an oil field was discovered 
but not developed at Taq Taq in 1978, which later became a flagship field for the region 
after being developed by Turkish-British consortium Genel Energy and the Swiss 
Addax Petroleum from 2007 onwards.
279
  
 
The chaos of Saddam’s 1980s Anfal campaign against the Kurds was followed by what 
Mills calls “de facto independence” after Baathist forces were driven from the region 
following the 1991 uprising, which led to the KRI holding an election, resulting in a 
contested division of power between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK). This resulted in a war, initially over the division of “customs” revenues from 
Iraqi oil trucked over the border with Turkey, as Iraq sought to circumvent sanctions. 
Importantly, Mills goes to some length to illustrate how this struggle over the energy 
sector was effectively won by the KDP, who prioritised energy sector development in 
the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk (that fall under their control) and monopolised 
independent oil revenues. Mills concludes that this political monopoly has led the semi-
autonomous region to develop many characteristics of a rentier state.
280
 
 
Following the expulsion of the regime from the KRI, ongoing violence resulted in a 
short-lived alliance between the KDP and Saddam Hussein in the mid-1990s. This scene 
setting, along with a description of the Kurd’s difficult and often violent relations with 
neighbouring states where they are also a minority, underscores one of Mills’ central 
points: the Kurds’ energy strategy is in large part based on ending this long period of 
turmoil and using Turkish and Iranian demand for its natural resources to build 
pragmatic relations with its neighbours, and in this respect, Mills concludes there has 
been much success, but success hinging on vulnerable export infrastructure, uncertain 
regional relations and mounting political risk.
281
 
 
Mills notes that this risk has defined many of the problems and successes of the region’s 
energy strategy, but these same political problems have meant that only small to 
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medium size IOCs were willing to enter the KRI. Determined to pursue a separatist 
agenda, the KDP gained control of the energy portfolio, having a head start over the 
new government in Baghdad by signing a Production Sharing Agreement with (then 
wholly Turkish) Genel Energi in 2002.  
 
Early agreements, including the deal with Norway’s DNO struck immediately before 
the Coalition’s “transfer of sovereignty” in the summer of 2004, were a deliberate 
attempt by the KDP and IOCs to circumvent any constitutional clauses that might have 
prevented such deals.  
Here Mills highlights constitutional Articles not touched upon by many observers, who 
focus heavily on interpretation of Articles 108, 109, 112 and 114. Firstly, he notes that 
IOCs argued that contracts before the 2005 Constitution were legal, and secondly he 
points to Articles 126(4) and 142 which the KRG considers as giving it veto powers 
over federal decisions that may affect its interests as a region. 
 
Aided by Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami, who had experience working 
with BP in the 1970s as well as experience with INOC, the Kurds had an experienced 
figure to pursue this agenda, a contrast Mills notes, to then Iraqi Energy Minister 
Hussein al-Shahristani who had no prior involvement in oil and gas. Mills does note 
however, that Hawrami took on a “confrontational” approach with Baghdad, although 
he does not describe how this provoked an aggressive stance on independent exports 
from the Baghdad side, except to note the series of legal actions against Kurdish oil 
shipments and legal threats to potential buyers made after November 2013 Kurdish 
exports through their new pipeline. Of particular interest here would be the question of 
why Baghdad did not take more assertive action following the signing of Hunt Oil’s 
PSA for Ain Sifni, the first field the KRG has exploited in disputed territory, in 2007 or 
take legal action against the trucking of oil from Taq Taq and Tawke, following 
Baghdad’s refusal to let the KRG use the federal Kirkuk pipeline.282  
 
Importantly, the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline treaty of 1973 is referenced, with its subsequent 
updates, the last being in 2010, as Baghdad’s main legal defence against Kurdish oil 
shipments from the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This highlights yet another example of how 
Baghdad has fallen back on pre-2003 laws in the absence of an approved Federal Oil 
and Gas Law. Conveniently for Baghdad in this case, pre-2003 legislation only 
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authorises SOMO to oversee oil exports, which is paradoxically a potential problem that 
has given centrists grounds to reject contracts for southern fields. In this respect, Mills 
effectively summarises how unclear and tangled the legal framework for oil and gas 
exploitation in Iraq has become in the absence of agreed upon legislation.
283
 
 
Nonetheless, the KRG proceeded with independent exports and the study notes that by 
disguising cargoes and building semi-covert ties with nations willing to buy Kurdish oil, 
10 nations were buyers by 2015, according to Hawrami. However, Mills notes that 
Baghdad held the strongest cards in the conflict between the two oil ministries, firstly 
because major IOCs did not want to isolate their access to southern Iraq’s supergiant oil 
fields, that were well explored, had a theoretically very low per barrel extraction cost 
and had immense “booking” value, constituting over 80% of Iraq’s oil. Certainly, most 
IOCs heeded Baghdad’s warning, with the notable exceptions of Gazprom and Exxon. 
In the latter case, Exxon forfeited involvement in the $10 billion common seawater 
supply facility for water injection in southern Iraq, which will soon result in significant 
drops in pressure in the southern fields, derailing Baghdad’s hoped for production 
targets.
284
 This is one of at least three self-defeating moves on the part of both sides. 
The second major error, on the part of the Kurds, has been to pursue a risky unilateral 
energy strategies in the absence of secure export infrastructure and legal guarantees, 
which as Mills notes, succeeded in deterring a host of the world’s biggest and most 
technologically experienced IOCs from entering the KRI, including Shell, BP, CNPC, 
ENI, Petronas, CNOOC, Gazprom Neft, Total and Occidental.  
 
Finally, Mills notes what he calls a “tactical error” on the part of Baghdad when bids 
made by Shell, Sinopec, and Turkey’s TPAO were made for the Kirkuk field, which 
according to Mills would have “cemented” central government control of a field 
producing light oil with a 34–35° API.285  
 
The absence of large scale IOC operations with their attendant resources was greatly 
problematic for the Kurds, since difficult geology, mountainous terrain and a landlocked 
export infrastructure pushed up field development costs, an unwelcome challenge for 
smaller IOCs and the KRG, who had to reimburse some of those costs. Subsequently, 
some of the smaller and more daring IOCs to venture into the region did not have the 
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expertise or technology required to either find oil or effectively develop fields. Mills 
notes how,  
“Fractured reservoirs present variable productivity across structures and 
complicate reservoir management, with some companies having to make heavy 
reserves write-downs – for example Afren at its Barda Rash field in January 
2015 and MOL of its Akri Bijeel field in September 2015.”286 
 
After Mills’ paper was published, KRI flagship field Taq Taq, producing light sweet 
crude with a high API, had its reserves downgraded by more than half, slashing the 
share price of Genel Energy by 42%.
287
  
 
Not discussed by Mills is a possible scenario where the Kurdish MNR may have 
pursued a more conciliatory approach with Baghdad and may have been able to attract 
Oil Majors to the region, with an attendant increase in oil and gas production and 
development. Unfortunately, this has been one side effect of political, rather than 
technocratic neutral oversight of the industry in both Baghdad and Erbil, where 
decisions to control resources have sometimes come at the expense of maximising 
production and optimising the energy value chain.
288
 Following the ISIS offensive of 
June 2014 however, such possibilities look increasingly unlikely following the Kurd’s 
annexation of Kirkuk, the contested city which is supposed to have final status 
determined in a referendum, which multiple parties concerned have blocked.  
 
In the summer of 2014, relations between Baghdad and Erbil declined significantly with 
Mills pointing out that after Iraqi forces were routed by ISIS, Kurdish Peshmerga forces 
seized the oilfields at Kirkuk, Bai Hassan, and Jambur, drawing immediate 
condemnation from Baghdad. Furthermore, the KRG has also connected the Avanah 
Dome of the Kirkuk field, which is linked by pipeline to Bai Hassan, to the Khurmala 
oilfield, putting oil previously managed by the federal North Oil Company through 
Kurdish oil infrastructure. This will likely have the effect of making a compromise 
between Baghdad and Erbil, similar to the short lived November 2014 exports and 
revenues agreement, increasingly unlikely.
289
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While describing this damaging dispute over exports and revenues, that saw Baghdad 
cut the KRI’s budget payment in January 2014, Mills does describe a number of points 
that could be considered relatively advantageous to the KRI from their unilateral 
approach. Firstly, he notes the KRG’s aggressive strategy to utilise natural gas from the 
Khor Mor gas field for power generation at the Erbil and Bazian power plants, a move 
that puts the region several years ahead of Baghdad in terms of integrating an energy 
strategy. Secondly, and he notes how the KRG has been able to pursue its own 
refineries strategy, commissioning an extra 150,000 bpd of capacity, although he notes 
that plans for smaller refineries may be less efficient than bolstering two larger existing 
refineries.
290
 
 
Finally, he suggests that in pursuing its own contract model, a rather standard version of 
the PSA used in countries such as Qatar and Algeria, the KRG has been able to gain 
limited investor confidence from IOCs, which Mills argues would not have existed if 
the region had followed Baghdad’s Technical Service Contract model, for reasons 
described earlier, including challenging geology, logistical difficulties and political risk.  
Mills concludes that these contracts are marginally better for the KRI under low oil 
price scenarios, but that government take is still not nearly enough to pay IOCs on time, 
and that the KRG faced a debt burden of $17bn by the end of 2015.  
 
One of Mills’ conclusions differs from a widespread perception of effective private 
sector development in the KRI post 2003, noting that the KDP led energy strategy, in 
conjunction with federal transfers from Baghdad and a large degree of fiscal autonomy 
has led to a bloated public sector, where over $750 million was spent on government 
wages, pensions and subsidies every month through 2013. The KRI notes Mills has 
“developed a political economy showing many of the features of the classic ‘rentier 
state’ – a lack of domestic taxation, heavy subsidies to the populace, a high degree of 
state employment (much of it non-productive), the prevalence of patronage and 
corruption, and an authoritarian government albeit with democratic elements”.291 
 
We may be able to conclude therefore, that while the KDP has sought to develop a more 
efficient energy strategy than Baghdad by trying to offer more attractive terms to IOCs, 
an overall lack of strategy has led to the region suffering many of the same ailments 
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experienced in Arab Iraq, including many symptoms of the resource curse outlined by 
Wing at the start of this section.  
 
While Mills’ study is one of the most comprehensive works on energy in the KRI, 
further research would be useful to examine how a federally led, or decentralised energy 
strategy based on legally codified compromise rather than political confrontation, could 
have maximised the energy value chain for the Kurds and led to more stable 
development.  
 
Aside from papers listed above written on Iraq’s energy sector, more in-depth studies to 
date are Rex Zedalis’ The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq, and Ghanim 
Anaz’s Iraq Oil and Gas in the 20th Century, of which the former is more relevant to 
this study, since it focuses on the as yet to be passed legislation formulated after 2003.  
 
Zedalis’ book opens with an overview of the history of oil and gas in Iraq from the 
discovery of Kirkuk oilfield in 1927 until regime change, going over problems 
experienced by federal states in this study, such as oil reserves being overwhelmingly in 
one region (70-80% of Iraq’s proven reserves are found in the south east292 and covering 
long running tensions between the national oil company and IOCs, underpinned by 
arguments of national ownership over resources, as experienced by Canada and Nigeria 
in the 1970s and Russia in the 1990s and early 00s, as discussed in Chapter 4 
Evaluation of International Petroleum Regimes. 
 
The book then discusses the first relevant legislation prior to the 2005 Constitution. 
Zedalis notes how the first post-2003 legislation on Iraq’s energy sector was UN 
resolution 1483 of May 2003, which (among other things) “spoke directly to the matter 
of Iraqi legal power over its hydrocarbon resources by stressing the right of the Iraqi 
people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural 
resources.”293 Zedalis makes this point to outline how neither the US led Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) which legislated against private sector involvement in the 
energy sector with CPA Order 39, or the UN, displaced or modified the (imperfectly 
executed) notion that Iraqis owned their natural resources, a principle that existed under 
the Baath regime.  
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Putting aside issues of energy infrastructure rebuilding attempts such as the Halliburton 
led Operation Restore Iraqi Oil
294
 or the CPA’s Order 39 which essentially continued 
public ownership of the energy sector, Zedalis moves to the relevant parts of the 2005 
Iraqi Constitution, noting in detail how even as it was being drafted, the Kurdish 
Regional Government were in talks with IOCs for exploration and production contracts.  
 
Chapter 5 details KRI deals up to 2007, beginning with DNO’s 2006 announcement that 
they had signed a deal to produce 50,000 bpd from Tawke, and Genel and Addax’s 
announcement that they were in the process of renegotiating an exploration and 
production contract, originally struck in 2004, as well as Dana Gas’ talks with the KRI 
in early 2007. Zedalis notes that these deals led to “frustration in Baghdad” and the 
KRG’s subsequent indication that it was proceeding with what it interpreted as a 
constitutional right to develop hydrocarbon resources.
295
 This outlines one of Zedalis’ 
main conclusions which is that Iraq was heading to a “bifurcated” system with two legal 
regimes. In July 2007, Zedalis notes the KRI’s announcement that it was aiming for 1 
million bpd from 200,000 bpd within a 5 year time frame and was considering offering 
up to 40 oilfields for development.
296
  
 
After outlining the magnitude of the KRG’s plans, main constitutional points relevant to 
energy are outlined with an overview of Articles 109 to 115 which describe the powers 
of the federal government. While Article 110 covers issues such as national security 
with the federal government having exclusive power, it also allocates jurisdiction over 
commercial matters involving the crossing of regional or governorate boundaries, which 
Zedalis notes is seen by supporters of the federal government as effectively giving 
Baghdad control over international oil and gas sales.
297
 Directly concerned with oil and 
gas are Articles 111 and 112, with Zedalis quoting Article 111’s now famous “oil and 
gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”  
 
Article 112, First, Zedalis argues, “drives home the importance of revenue 
disbursement” by attaching a proviso to its grant of authority to the federal government, 
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which is to manage oil and gas from “present fields.”298 That proviso is that this right 
rests on the federal government’s obligation to distribute revenues in a fair manner 
which takes into account population distribution and regions that suffered particular 
damage by the Baath regime, in addition to allowing for balanced development across 
Iraq. This latter point arguably echoes the spirit of the Canadian arrangement of 
Equalization, as discussed in Chapter 4. The details of revenue disbursement were to be 
regulated “by a law,” which is of course the long awaited hydrocarbons law. Also of 
great importance, Article 112, Second, notes that the federal government, in cooperation 
with the regions and governorates, shall formulate long term strategic policies in a way 
which brings “maximum benefit” to the Iraqi people.299 
 
Also relevant to the distribution of revenues is Article 121, which stipulates that 
allocations should not only take into account population, but also needs of different 
areas. Zedalis’ main conclusion in this section is the ambiguity of language in Articles 
121, which he notes, “leaves the door open for interpretive abuse” with regard to the 
Article’s call for allocations considering areas “unjustly deprived” by the former 
regime, as well as what constitutes “balanced development.”300 Secondly, he notes how 
Article 121 outlines the standard for the distribution of “national revenue” which could 
be interpreted as multiple revenue streams, in contrast to revenue referred to in Article 
112, which could refer only to oil and gas.  
 
Lastly, Zedalis briefly examines the claim that Article 110 vests the federal government 
with control over oil and gas contracting because it leaves fiscal, economic and trade 
policy formulation with Baghdad. Zedalis argues that the policy formation powers 
referred to in Article 110 are distinct from negotiating oil and gas agreements, since 
“policy formulation or regulation imply the identification of general and specific goals 
or objectives” and “the applicable strategies for their implementation.” 301 
 
By contrast, contracts or agreements related to oil and gas development cover “more 
mundane, technical and tailored task of crafting a formal legal instrument that might 
seek to effectuate or reflect the goals of and objectives of formulated policies or 
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promulgated regulations.”302 Zedalis goes on to note how some have made arguments 
over central or subcentral power over energy in reference to Articles 114 (which covers 
the powers of planning) and Article 115 (which stipulates that regional governments 
have priority in a dispute concerning shared powers between Baghdad and regions) but 
suggests that these arguments are weakened by the fact that these Articles do not 
specifically mention oil and gas. 
 
Zedalis does conclude however, that the constitution limits federal powers to control 
over oil extracted from “present fields” and strategic policy (albeit in cooperation with 
regions) and that although not specific, the collaborative language of Article 112, which 
states that policy is formulated by the central government “with” the regions, is 
reinforced by Articles 115 and 121 which explicitly give sub central units powers that 
are not vested in the central government.  
 
Zedalis’ work therefore focuses on legal interpretation of the Iraqi constitution and the 
subsequent Draft Oil and Gas Law of February 2007, and an amended July 2007 version 
which was intended to clarify language in Articles 112 and 111, as well as going into 
detail on issues such as revenue distribution and specifying exactly which fields are 
considered “present.” He concludes that the failure to pass clearly written legislation 
exacerbated disputes over constitutional interpretation, leading to Iraq’s “bifurcated 
system.”303  
 
Importantly, Zedalis never suggests any detailed plan of how new legislation, 
reorganization of ministries or INOC, or constitutional revisions, would clarify matters 
in a way that would help the development of a coherent Iraqi national energy strategy. 
Likewise, he does not venture deeply into the history and context of Iraqi oil and gas, 
for example, there is little to no coverage of infrastructure damage in 2003, no mention 
of the Halliburton led Operation Restore Iraqi Oil, little to no political analysis and little 
analysis of political economy. This is not to say Zedalis’ work is limited, and he 
acknowledges the intentionally narrow scope of the study, which is (as mentioned) vital 
for its unmatched detail on the legal dimension. Nonetheless, greater historical and 
political context is required for a fuller understanding of why Iraq has not developed a 
coherent energy strategy. Therefore, this study will examine some of the specific 
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infrastructure issues related to Iraq’s energy redevelopment and their interplay with 
political issues, both largely missing from Zedalis’ work.  
 
Arguably Zedalis’ most significant conclusion from his analysis of Iraq’s constitution is 
that KRG oil and gas deals are in accordance with the constitution, specifically that IOC 
contracts “have every reason to be considered constitutionally authorised.” His 
reasoning for this is that Article 112’s stipulation that the federal government acts, 
“with the regions and governments” is indicative of shared power and that this is 
supported by the language of Article 115 that places final authority with the regional 
government in the advent of a dispute over “shared powers.” 304As such he asks why if 
the federal government has absolute power over oil and gas, there is even the need for 
the mention of regional government in Article 112, suggesting that the collaborative 
language would not be there if Baghdad had absolute control. He does however contend 
that if there were to be a dispute between the federal govt. and a sub central unit over 
long-range strategic policy, and then the central government would have final 
authority.
305
 
 
After asserting his position on the constitution, Zedalis goes on to examine the draft 
Federal Oil and Gas Framework Law, and some of the immediate controversies 
following its public release in February 2007. Firstly, most significant specifications of 
the law are outlined, including the naming of “present” and “future fields,” more 
specifically known and producing fields, and discovered but undeveloped fields both 
under INOC control and outside of INOC. Notably, Zedalis describes how the new draft 
elevates the role of the federal government, under Article 5F, something that proved 
particularly controversial in for the KRG.
306
 
 
Article 5F changes the power of sub-central units to be able to make “preparations to 
propose oil and gas activities and plans” and “provide licensing of petroleum operations 
under federal standards,” for Annex 3 fields, which are discovered but undeveloped 
fields not under INOC control. Zedalis calls this new KRI authority “paltry” in 
comparison to what is outlined in the 2005 constitution before noting how sub central 
units are also “authorised to collaborate with federal entities in providing compliance 
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oversight regarding oil and gas activities.” 307 Regarding regulatory bodies, he notes 
how the law proposes 5 federal agencies with extensive responsibilities, perhaps in an 
effort to mimic the Norway Model but likely leading to the potential for inter-agency 
conflict and overlap and subsequent inefficiency. Other aspects of the law are covered 
that will be discussed in this study, such as Article 25 of the law that says gas flaring 
must be eliminated. Zedalis notes how even as the law limited regional power over 
Annex 3 fields, the remaining fields in Annexes 1 and 2 constituted an estimated 90% 
of Iraq’s oil and gas reserves.  
 
Later, Zedalis outlines the FOGC review process by which the council had 3 months to 
review proposed contracts, but notes that here there is some new vagueness, for 
example, Article 5b of the law states that the Council of Ministers “shall be responsible 
for recommending proposed legislation” while Article 5D states that the Oil Ministry is 
the competent body for this task.
308
 In Articles 5C and 5D, more concerning overlap and 
contradiction between MoO and FOGC is identified. Article 5D, notes Zedalis, says 
nothing of MoO’s authority regarding exploration, development and production, 
although the purpose of this article is to outline MoO’s powers and responsibilities. 
Article 5D, 8th, limits MoO’s authority to “Oil and Gas supply services other than those 
covered by Exploration and Development contracts,” presumably limiting these 
contracts to the Annex 1 and 2 fields. In contradiction to this limiting of authority, 
articles 9 and 10 suggest that MoO does in fact have authority over exploration and 
production contracts. Two particularly obvious areas of overlap are also spotted, 
whereby Article 5C indicates that FOGC has oversight of “Federal Petroleum policies, 
Exploration plans, Development of fields and main pipeline plans,” while Article 5D 
authorises MoO, in consultation with regions and producing governorates the power to 
draw up and propose “Federal policies and plans on Exploration, Development and 
Production.” The second major overlap is identified as Article 5B outlining COM’s 
power to “recommend proposed legislation” while Article 5 D suggests the oil ministry 
is the “competent authority for proposing Federal Policy, laws and plans.”309 
 
Later in his study, Zedalis describes an issue that has caused less controversy than 
revenue sharing or export agreements between Baghdad and Erbil, the law to 
reconstitute INOC, called for and described in Articles 6 and 7 and 5D and 5E of 
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DOGL. These laws appear to be an attempt to at least capture the spirit of the 
Norwegian Model, albeit lacking in enough detail to fully define the roles of INOC and 
MoO. The main points here are that INOC was to be reconstituted as an autonomous but 
Iraqi owned commercial entity, operating on a commercial basis rather than one of state 
control. However, INOC, and “wholly owned subsidiaries,” each intended to earn 
profit, were to have direct authority over Annex 1 (producing fields) and the authority to 
participate in the development of Annex 2 fields (discovered but not producing) and 
would only have access to Annex 3 and 4 fields (discovered but undeveloped) on a 
purely competitive basis. Until MoO is reorganized, INOC would have authority to 
manage, own and operate the pipeline network and ports, before FOGC would allocate 
this responsibility to another govt. entity.
310
  
 
Meanwhile, MoO was to create a new department focused on the “planning, developing 
and following up on the process of contractors obtaining from the ministry rights” 
relative to petroleum operations.” Interestingly and related to information examined on 
MoO training in Chapter 5, DOGL called for special training for MoO staff in bidding 
processes, contracts and negotiations with oil companies. A vital layer of separation is 
outlined in Article 7B which calls for “devices and mechanisms that will ensure a wall 
of separation between, on the one hand, the Ministry, related companies (such as INOC 
and its subsidiaries) and regulators and monitors, and on the other hand, the oil and gas 
companies doing business in Iraq and subject to regulatory oversight and control” and 
also, “full separation between production and oil services companies and on the other 
hand, regulatory, monitoring and supervisory departments in the Ministry.” But as 
Zedalis later notes there is no method outlined that would guarantee this full separation, 
although he suggests Article 5D of DOGL would at least limit MoO’s power to 
formulating exploration, production and development policies as only “suggestions” to 
be approved by FOGC. 
311
 
 
Equally problematic regarding the lack of detail on splitting INOC from MoO is 
Zedalis’ identification of the conflict between the KRG’s 2007 Oil and Gas Law and the 
2007 draft, which notes under Article 40B that FOGC will review prior contracts and 
that their decision, within 90 days will be “binding” while the equivalent body in the 
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KRG, as described in Article 54 of the KRG law, has “final” decision on reviewing 
contracts.
312
  
 
In summary, Zedalis’ main focus is on interpretation, but he makes some tentative 
conclusions in the final section of the book based on 5 main observations. Firstly, he 
notes that the KRI and Baghdad are engaged in a “tug of war” over centralisation and 
decentralisation policies. Secondly, he notes the “Dubai annexes” of the 2007 draft law 
constitute overwhelming INOC control over Iraq’s resources, while thirdly he notes 
how the 2007 KRG Oil and Gas Law has a different view of which are current and 
future fields. Lastly, Zedalis concludes there has not been enough detail on revenue 
sharing from oil and gas activities, which has led to ongoing dispute, and as his fifth 
conclusion he notes ongoing disputes over the acceptability of PSCs.
313
  
 
In the final chapter, he describes a scenario where the bifurcated system of oil and gas 
management leads to the “balkanization” of Iraq and posits that were this to happen a 
major reason would be the vagueness of the constitution and the 2007 draft law. The 
constitution, he notes, has “such generality that it is impossible to draw inferences 
regarding the assignment within the central government of authority over oil and gas 
activities.”314 Regarding the 2007 draft law, he quotes the law in requiring MoO to 
“create important institutional and methodology changes to reflect its new 
responsibilities” which then fails to describe out exactly how this should be done, 
calling instead for a new department with “planning, development and following up on 
obtaining rights.”315 With regards to the Norway Model, he quotes the article’s call for 
“full separation between production and service companies and the regulators, monitors 
and supervisors who oversee them,” but again, there is no description of how this 
separation should be achieved.
316
 
 
The book finishes by postulating that in the event of the KRI breaking away from Iraq, 
there is no reason to suggest a significant departure from its Oil and Gas Law of 2007 or 
preference for PSCs, although Arab Iraq would face the same challenges with regards to 
the constitution. In the event of this, Zedalis considers the draft Oil and Gas Law to be a 
                                               
312
 Ibid p181 
313
 Ibid p295 
314
 Ibid p305 
315
 Ibid p179 
316
 Ibid p305 
96 
 
helpful document that would nonetheless need to be “fleshed out.”317 This section of the 
book is less relevant to this study since it involves discussing speculative scenarios 
regarding the breakup of Iraq. In summary, Zedalis covers many shortcomings of 
existing and proposed energy sector legislation in Iraq but his recommendations for 
clarity are few, and taken together, do not amount to an analysis of how Iraq might 
develop a coherent and efficient petroleum policy framework. This is, as he mentions, 
not the point of his work, which is to give a comprehensive analysis of the legal 
environment. 
 
Closest to Zedalis’ technical approach is the more substantial work by Ghanim Anaz’s 
Iraq: Oil and Gas in the Twentieth Century. The study has a wide scope and, for 
example, individually details almost all of Iraq’s 85 known oilfields, explaining the 
history of the industry from the Babylonian era onwards, going as far as descriptions of 
living quarters for INOC employees during the Baath era. Therefore, only limited parts 
are of direct relevance to this study, beginning with a description of the politicization of 
oil operations under Saddam, with senior MoO officials being rounded up at the 
beginning of his presidency, seeing two former Iraqi Company for Oil Operations 
directors Ghanim Abdul Jalil and Ismail al-Najjar arrested in an alleged plot against 
Saddam Hussain.  
 
Another ICOO director, Majid al-Hamdani was dismissed.
318
 However, Anaz does not 
go as far as to venture what effect the threat of death penalty might have had on MoO’s 
performance or the effect of Saddam’s absolute power over the industry. Instead, he 
briefly describes the 1976 and 1987 reorganization of MoO and his assessment of the 
latter is particularly interesting with regard to separation of regulator and regulated 
bodies, which shall be referred to in the case studies.  Of the 1987 dissolving of INOC, 
Anaz suggests the reasoning was that INOC had too many responsibilities and 
subsequently, departments with overlapping authority, and in addition to the three 
operators, this had produced  
 
“a mammoth, cumbersome and very difficult to manage company. Furthermore, 
there was no clear line of responsibilities in many spheres of its activities 
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resulting in confusion and overlapping layers of authority between it and the 
Ministry of Oil.”319  
 
Anaz does not detail whether the break up of INOC produced any tangible benefit for 
Iraq’s energy sector, or whether it produced different problems. What follows is a brief 
history of INOC during the 1970s and its relationships with foreign service providers, 
such as the Russian Machinoexport, Italy’s ENI, Japan’s Mitsubishi and Brazil’s 
Petrobras, who worked on Majnoon oilfield. During this section, Anaz explains the 
rapid increases in production that occurred in this period, noting how the agreement 
between INOC and French state oil company ERAP was “a complete triumph, since it 
will be the first time in the history of the oil industry in Iraq that the country had full 
control with a foreign company acting under a service contract only.”320 Relevant to the 
analysis of Iraq’s energy sector after 2003, Anaz later turns his attention to the debate 
over optimal contract types for Iraq during the 2009 licensing rounds and beyond, 
describing the difference between PSCs and PSAs, before venturing views of his own. 
Here he notes that PSAs are considered “illegal” by Baghdad and have been the subject 
of bitter dispute between the KRI and Baghdad, and outlines the constitutional dispute 
briefly. Unlike Muttitt (described below) he does not venture whether the KRG has a 
strong legal claim to enter into oil and gas contracts of its choosing with IOCs. 
However, it may be inferred that he believes KRG contracts to be illegal, because of his 
previously expressed opposition to PSAs. Nonetheless, Anaz’s apparent opposition to 
KRG PSAs does not appear to reflect support for politicians in Baghdad, whom he notes 
are following “short sighted agendas.”321 No views are ventured on the Hydrocarbons 
Law, except that it had suffered “never ending delays.”322  
 
These views do not mean Anaz sees the TSCs that Iraq used with the giant southern 
fields in a positive light. He notes that it is “regretful” that only Kirkuk remains under 
full MoO control while the southern fields have been “auctioned like a heap of scrap 
metal and awarded to IOCs through the controversial and much debated Production 
Service Contracts.” He does note however, that “the terms of these contracts are much 
better for Iraq than those of the Production Sharing Agreements which were preferred 
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and fiercely lobbied for by the oil companies and were as a result adopted by the 
Ministry of Oil.”323 
 
Despite these assertive views, much of the book remains purely technical analysis, 
much of which is extremely relevant here. For example, the history of Iraq’s pipelines 
are covered, extremely relevant in the case of the Iraq--Turkey pipeline and the Iraq-
Turkey Pipeline treaty, which later formed part of the legal basis for Baghdad’s 
objection to the KRG attempting to sell oil in the United States from the port of Ceyhan, 
discussed in Chapter 5. This is also useful background reading for assessing Iraq’s 
export infrastructure needs under different export scenarios. Elsewhere, Iraq’s gas 
infrastructure for gathering and processing gas is covered in great detail, hugely relevant 
to Iraq’s status as the fourth biggest flarer of gas globally and the Gas Master Plan of 
2005, as well as Article 25 of the 2007 Draft Oil and Gas Law, which calls for the end 
of flaring.
324
 
 
Anaz’s views on IOC interaction with MoO after 2003 echo those expressed by Gregg 
Muttitt in his book Fuel on the Fire, another main text that is far more subjective in 
comparison to Anaz’s technical work or the legal focus of Zedalis. As with all main 
texts on oil and gas in Iraq, the book opens with an overview of the history of the sector 
from the time of the British mandate to the 2003 invasion, but uses the early history of 
Iraq to set up the thesis, which is that the colonial interest in Iraq’s oil reserves of the 
British Empire has been replaced with neo-colonialism following the 2003 invasion, in 
the form of regime change and enforced privatization. To this end, Muttitt quotes 
Foreign Office cables, including the remarks of British Foreign Office Middle East 
Director Edward Chaplin, who noted, 
  
“At any rate, we were determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a 
post Saddam Iraq.” 325 Muttitt elaborates on why he thinks the US and UK waged war 
against Saddam to control Iraq’s resources, and specifically, to get them out of public 
ownership and prioritise IOC access to Iraqi fields, again quoting a declassified UK 
FCO cable, the implication being that the UK was involved in a secret plan for Iraq:  
 
“To meet our objectives the principal challenge for Iraq’s oil industry will be to 
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institute the necessary structural, fiscal and regulatory reform needed to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector.”326 
 
Muttitt subsequently asserts that the UK was acting in collusion with the United States, 
and that US law firm BearingPoint was hired to draft Iraq’s Oil Law, in order to 
enshrine key legal precepts such as “stabilization clauses” and international arbitration 
with the New York Convention as standard, to the benefit of Western IOCs such as BP, 
Shell and Chevron.  
 
Nonetheless, he also notes how Norway’s DNO were early entrants in the KRI, quoting 
DNO Director Helge Eide, who remarked that the company needed to finalise the deal 
“before the Interim Government came in.”327 
 
Arguing that this attitude of circumventing Iraqi sovereignty was a main goal of 
(specifically British and American) IOCs, Muttitt later outlines how international 
arbitration could diminish Iraq’s sovereign control of its oil industry, leading to the risk 
of asset seizure and the sidelining of public interest groups and Iraqi stakeholders, such 
as trade unions .
328
He asserts that this is a form of economic control over Iraq, arguing 
that the Iraqi oil industry would have been able to raise production levels with little to 
no foreign IOC involvement, and would have been able to borrow the $25 billion 
estimated required funds to achieve 5 million bpd production, an early government 
target.  
 
Instead of being given this option, the book asserts that the Coalition deliberately 
underfunded the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, allowing infrastructure and capacity to degrade, 
so that at a later date foreign expertise would be required, something he likens to a 
colonialist model of domination. Instead, Muttitt suggests Iraq’s energy sector would 
benefit from little to no IOC involvement, and refers to the views of former DG of MoO 
Faleh al Chayat, who was in the position from 1995-2003. Muttitt quotes al-Chayat 
saying, “State companies have characteristics that no foreign company can have.”329 
Paraphrasing al-Chayat, Muttitt explains that IOCs need too many guarantees, unlike 
state owned ventures which (according to al Chayat) will continue to focus on 
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production in spite of war and instability, and not declare force majeure. 
330
Later, 
Muttitt quotes al-Chayat, warning that eventually there will be so much private sector 
involvement in Iraq’s energy industry that Iraq will not have the human technical 
capacity to implement simple projects.
331
 
 
Therefore, the book asserts that Iraq had the inherent capacity to reconstruct the energy 
sector without foreign involvement and US efforts were an attempt at domination. As an 
example, Muttitt suggests that IOCs had an alternative agenda when bringing in foreign 
experts to advise or “snuggle up to” the Iraqi government by way of MOUs, such as the 
2004 Chevron agreement to provide technical advice to MoO, and Shell’s 2004 
agreement to work on Iraq’s Gas Master Plan, discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Muttitt argues these MOUs were a diversion and their real role was to push for 
investment conditions that would heavily favour IOCs, pressuring the Iraqi government 
to accept controversial PSAs.  This aim, according to Muttitt, dovetailed with the 
constitutional language favouring modern methods and standards, and was accentuated 
by the 2007 Oil Law, which he claims was heavily influenced by US policy.
332
 Dispute 
this assertion, he later remarks on his surprise that BearingPoint had no say on the final 
draft, which was finalised by Thamir al-Ghadban and Farouk al-Khasim, the Norwegian 
Iraqi credited with being the father of the Norwegian Model. Muttitt then details 
growing Iraqi opposition to the Draft Oil Law, noting how PSAs were a major source of 
tension and united multiple Iraqi parties against the law, including Shi’a religious 
parties Fadila and the Sadrist current, while the secular parties National Dialogue Front 
of Sunni politician Saleh al-Mutlak and Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi National List also opposed 
the law.
333
 Mainstream Sunni parties Tawafuq and the Iraqi National Accord also 
opposed the law, explicitly on the grounds of PSAs and their perceived threat to Iraqi 
sovereignty. These developments, Muttitt notes, were a victory for Iraqi democracy and 
successfully stalled the passing of the law, which he suggests united Iraqis across 
sectarian lines.
334
 
 
Overall, Muttitt articulates a deep concern that investment terms highly favourable to  
IOCs will become a part of the Oil Law, in contrast to Zedalis’ more technical rather 
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than political analysis, including interpretations the 2005 constitution, the content of the 
oil law and what it might mean for management of the sector. Muttitt meanwhile asserts 
that there was little need for an oil law in the first place with regards to revenue sharing, 
since revenues were already being distributed equitably.  
 
Furthermore, Muttitt frequently expresses concern with the way the oil law was drafted, 
out of the public eye, citing a poll in 2006 which found that two thirds of Iraqis wanted 
to keep public ownership of the energy sector and that only 4% felt adequately informed 
about the content of the proposed law.
335
 Public engagement is certainly of relevance to 
any future changes to hydrocarbon legislation, since as the Basra Gas Company case 
study will illustrate, secrecy had the effect of heightening political opposition to the 
plan. Muttitt’s concern with Iraq’s apparent loss of sovereignty, had the oil law been 
passed, is interesting in light of the content of the law, which placed the vast majority of 
Iraq’s oil fields, all except “Annex 3” fields, under the control of Baghdad. 
 
Also of particular relevance is Muttitt’s analysis of Ministry of Oil involvement in 
disputes with unions, which he pays close attention to, to illustrate his assertion that 
IOCs colluded with the Iraqi government to sideline civil society groups. This is 
particularly interesting in light of the draft oil law’s call for separation of powers, 
reducing the MoO role to one of a regulator that would not have day-to-day influence 
over oilfield operations, by IOCs or INOC. While Muttitt does not highlight the need 
for such a separation, his descriptions of MoO micromanagement and conflict with the 
South Oil Company illustrate the potential for conflict when organisations have 
overlapping powers. For example, he describes in detail two episodes where Hussein al-
Shahristani personally intervened in a union dispute by re-assigning union leaders to 
different parts of the country in an attempt to weaken the union. 
336
While this is not 
strictly MoO intervention in oilfield operations, it was no doubt another unwelcome 
political quarrel slowing more pressing issues such a installation of adequate metering, 
that may have benefitted from strong politically independent oversight. Furthermore, 
according to Muttitt, Shahristani was able to replace SOC head Fayadh Nima with a 
Dawa Party loyalist, most probably because of conflict over whether trade unions would 
be allowed to continue.
337
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Regarding allegedly inefficient MoO involvement in operations, the book quotes former 
SOC head (also removed by Shahristani) Jabbar al-Luaibi who claims that MoO took 
months to approve equipment purchases, in one case delaying a tender for new storage 
tanks at Buzurgan.
338
 While Muttitt does not mention separation of power between 
regulator and regulated, the concern over its absence is inferred with reference to the 
second draft of the Oil Law, which changed the role and composition of the FOGC. 
Here Muttitt quotes Tariq Shafiq who describes how FOGC was initially proposed as a 
small group of technocrats in the first draft, while in the second draft it had been 
changed to include politicians, including four ministers.
339
 
 
Diverging from Muttitt’s claims of a neocolonial attempt at seizing Iraq’s oil and 
shaping Iraqi oil policy, Fadhil J. Chalabi’s Oil Policy’s, Oil Myths: Observations of an 
OPEC Insider follows a similar first person style, journalistic narrative but is rooted in 
Chalabi’s experience as Deputy Secretary General of OPEC between 1978 and 1988, as 
well as his brief advisory role in Iraq’s post 2003 energy policy. In his book on OPEC, 
Chalabi dedicates a chapter to Iraq in relation to the organization, opening briefly with 
the view that the United States played almost no role in guiding Iraqi energy policy 
towards favouring US IOCs or allowing Iraq to ramp up production to keep more 
supply on the global market, which he argues, would be counter to the objectives of 
developing higher cost energy (eg. shale) in the US, and subsequently hurt US national 
interests.  
 
Chalabi then moves to topics of more relevance to OPEC, noting how Iraq reached 14% 
of OPEC production prior to the Iran-Iraq war but due to infrastructure damage incurred 
in that conflict and the degrading effect of sanctions, Iraq lost 19.4 bn/B of oil, which 
would have been produced if the late 1970s rates of production had continued.
340
 
 
Therefore, Chalabi argues this lost income must be taken into account “in the context of 
OPEC and its quota system, bearing in mind Iraq’s production remained outside the 
system ever since Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait.”341 
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Because of the damage caused by the wars of the Baath era, Chalabi argues for a rapid 
injection of foreign investment into the industry to rejuvenate Iraq’s exports and aid 
reconstruction. Despite this challenge, he notes that the greatest problem Iraq faced after 
2003 in the energy sector was the passing of the Oil Law, which he calls the Petroleum 
and Gas Law, which he suggests has been delayed by “irreconcilable divergence of 
opinion.”342  
 
As is commonly agreed by Muttitt, Anaz and Zedalis, one of the main reasons for this 
delay and disagreement was concern that PSAs initially favoured by MoO would give 
too many rights to IOCs in an echo of what Chalabi calls the “concession system of the 
colonial past.” The Baghdad--Erbil dispute is also briefly covered, with Chalabi broadly 
agreeing with Anaz that the 2005 constitution is too ambiguous, “bedevilled by a 
contradiction”343 before he returns to controversy over PSAs. Here he gives tentative 
support for the PSA contract type, noting Iraqi Parliamentary opposition may have been 
too severe, and that IOCs can only “book” a part of the reserves with a PSA, while he 
claims TSC negotiation was too drawn out and not transparent enough. Overall, he 
concludes that the long debate over central and sub central powers and the subsequent 
deadlock it produced “wasted” at least 7 years of potential energy sector progress in 
Iraq. 
 
Refocusing on OPEC, he then discusses the 2010 MoO production target of 12 mbpd. 
Aside from challenges including high capital outlay, plateau sustainability and 
infrastructure shortcomings, Chalabi outlines how OPEC had a shut in capacity of 
6mbpd at the time of the announced target, leading to a total OPEC spare capacity of 
14mbpd. This would, he surmises, drive down oil prices to an unsustainably low 
level.
344
 Chalabi’s longer term analysis points to persistent bearishness in the oil market 
around the time when Iraq’s production would be aiming towards 10mbpd. He justifies 
this view by pointing to long term energy efficiency trends pushed by Europe and North 
America following the 1970s oil shocks, decreasing “energy intensity” with OECD 
consumption falling by 4mbpd between 2004 and 2009 and Chinese consumption 
dropping 10% in the first decade of the 21st century.
345
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Secondly, he points to a US drive to reduce reliance on MENA region oil, and the 
subsequent focus on non-conventional energy and thirdly, he points to mounting 
concern over climate change as another driver of energy efficiency. But aside from 
technical concern over Iraq’s production ambitions and the difficulty of marketing this 
oil, Chalabi notes that if Iraq reached even 5mbpd before 2020 it would be exceeding its 
OPEC quota with a vast capital outlay but simultaneously a market with weakening 
demand, which he says, would lead to “vast economic problems” for Iraq and “a 
damaging battle with OPEC.”346 
 
Frank Gunter is also cautious about Iraq’s production targets in The Political Economy 
of Iraq drawing similar conclusions to Chalabi. Of the 2010 production plan of 12 
mbpd, Gunter notes this would have been be a 360% increase within 6 years, but then 
examines the revised 2011 proposal of 10 mbpd by 2017.
347
 He notes that this target, if 
achieved, would theoretically mean per capita GDP would reach over $10,000 from a 
2011 range of $3000-$6000. Problematically, he notes that this assumes $100 per barrel 
in 2017 and that, “it is contrary to assume Iraq will be able to substantially increase the 
world’s supply of oil without putting downward pressure on prices.”348 Gunter goes on 
to note that Iraq is waiting on “four major pieces of petroleum legislation since 2007” 
listing them as 1) The basic oil and gas framework law, 2) the revenue sharing law, 3) 
the law reorganizing the Oil Company (INOC) but then refers the reader to see Zedalis 
for more details, concluding that the passing of the oil and gas framework law would 
not end controversy.  
 
Instead, Gunter predicts that regional, national and provincial governments would 
continue to come into conflict over different interpretations of the law that would 
eventually need to be resolved judicially or by compromise.
349
 Gunter then turns 
attention to the issue of Iraq’s refining sector, noting how oil not exported is taken by 
truck or pipeline to domestic refineries or power stations, and that refining capacity fell 
from 0.6 MBPD in 2001 to 0.4 MBPD in 2009. Gunter notes the diversion of oil to the 
black market “makes it almost impossible to reconcile physical flows of crude and 
processed oil with the resulting financial transactions” with much oil smuggled into 
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Turkey or Iran, or appearing on the black market within Iraq.
350
 Gunter then describes a 
vicious circle where smuggling is exacerbated by fuel shortages, which were curtailed 
slightly between 2007 and 2009 when the government reduced subsidies and increased 
the price, only to backtrack following public protest.  
 
As other accounts in this study note, a major problem is that meters have been missing 
from pipelines or deliberately calibrated inaccurately to facilitate smuggling, although 
Gunter notes the Baghdad-Kirkuk and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline had proper metering 
by the end of 2010. Completing the vicious circle, Gunter describes refinery 
inefficiency where refineries produce excessive amounts of heavy fuel oil (HFO) which 
in some cases has been sent to power plants, causing problems with turbines because it 
is of such low quality, a point noted earlier by Jaffe. Gunter concludes by asking if such 
an inefficient system is worth the effort for Iraq, citing a 2008 study which suggested 
that while Iraq earned $37 for every barrel exported, the net earning for a barrel refined 
and sent to an SOE was only $2, therefore it may be more cost effective for Iraq to 
simply export all oil and import fuel.
351
 He notes a counter view that as more oil 
revenue comes into the Iraqi state, it may be possible to build enough efficient refining 
capacity to change this situation. Gunter concludes his chapter on Iraq’s energy sector 
by warning that Iraq is too dependent on oil and that a drop in the oil price below $50 is 
possible, which would leave Iraq as an oil economy in a world of low price oil.
352
 
 
Ahmed Mousa Jiyad’s chapter on Iraq in Globe Law and Business’ Upstream Law and 
Regulation is more akin to Zedalis’ analysis, being focused on legal and contractual 
aspects of Iraq’s dealings with IOCs. Jiyad opens by emphasising the vast oil and gas 
potential for Iraq but noting that long-range predictions of success or failure “seldom 
coincide with expectations.”353 Jiyad also points out that  
 
“the upstream petroleum sector constitutes the main pillar of the Iraqi economy. 
The national development plans, state budgets, the balance of payments and 
trade balance depend largely on oil production and consequent export 
revenues.”354 
 
Jiyad points out that the estimate of 143 billion barrels reserves only applies to 28% of 
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Iraq’s oil in place, covering (by his estimate) 66 of Iraq’s known fields and that Iraq had 
a National Exploration Plan to identify a further 10 billion barrels of oil and hold a 
fourth bid round, which occurred in 2012.
355
  
 
During this round MoO announced a fifth round for 60 exploration blocks. Jiyad notes 
that Minister Shahristani asked MoO to “sweeten the terms of the model contracts for 
IOCs” but provides no further political analysis as to why.356 The chapter then briefly 
covers the scope of the 3 bid rounds in June 2009 and October 2010, noting how a 
previous contract (the first post 2003 PSC) with CNPC for Alahdab in November 2008 
was a revised PSA originally drawn up in 1997. Here he suggests that if plateaus were 
reached for all 14 oilfields, over 12 MBPD would be reached, but doing so would 
require an expansion of export facilities with 8.5 MBPD through the Persian Gulf, 1.6 
MBPD through Turkey, 4.5 MBPD through Syria and 1 MBPD through Jordan. 
357
 
 
Attention then turns to legal matters, where Jiyad describes the legal framework for 
petroleum operations in Iraq as a many-layered pyramid. At the top of this pyramid is 
the constitution, which outlines basic principles followed by “instruments specific to the 
upstream and midstream sectors” with 3 broad categories of laws. These laws constitute 
laws that were valid prior to the constitution, such as Law 22 on Public Companies. 
Interestingly, Jiyad does not mention here Law 21 of 1997 under which the Basra Gas 
Company was formed.
358
 The second category Jiyad mentions are the laws not yet 
passed from 2007, including the Draft Oil and Gas Law, the Iraqi National Oil 
Company Law, the Ministry of Oil Law, the Revenue Sharing Law and the Public 
Commission to Audit and Appropriate Federal Revenues Law. In the third category, 
Jiyad places “laws which could have direct and indirect implications for petroleum 
related projects” in which he includes Law 13 of 2006 on Investment, Law 64 of 2007 
on Private Investment in Oil Refining and the Provincial Powers Law number 21 of 
2008.  
 
Jiyad notes that this complex arrangement has led to “daunting uncertainties” and 
“serious rifts between the legislative and executive branches with regard to their 
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respective roles in the development of the upstream petroleum sector.”359Jiyad then 
touches on a matter at the heart of petroleum policy in Iraq, which is the conflict 
between the Council of Ministers and MoO on one side and the Council of 
Representatives (COR-parliament) on the other as to who has the legal authority to enter 
into contracts with IOCs. Jiyad then refers to a statement made through the Iraq Energy 
Institute on June 4th 2009 by three Iraqi lawyers, who expressed their support for the 
legal authority of COR. Turning attention to regulatory matters, Jiyad notes that legal 
instruments are proposed by the executive to be approved by the legislature and as such 
both COM and COR have a regulatory role.
360
  
 
In essence, the regulatory function of COM stems from MoO proposing laws to be 
approved by COM’s Energy Committee and then referred to COR. Authority is vague 
however, and here Jiyad notes Article 60 of the Iraqi constitution, which confusingly 
stipulates that once COM has proposed draft legislation, ten members of COR must 
approve it, or a committee must approve it related to COR. This blurred responsibility 
led to two different versions of the Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law being submitted in 
2011, by two competing bodies, one from MoO and the other by parliament’s Oil, Gas 
and Natural Resources Committee.
361
 
 
Jiyad then describes the bidding process for the first licensing rounds, noting how bids 
were awarded on the basis of what MoO decides to be an acceptably low remuneration 
fee per barrel, and if competing bidders “tie” on a fee accepted by MoO, the license is 
granted to the company that offers additional service, such as an increased plateau 
target. The example given here is the “tie” between the Lukoil-ConocoPhillips 
consortium and the Exxon-Shell consortium who both were eventually knocked down to 
accepting $1.90 per barrel in June 2009, but the latter consortium won the bid for West 
Qurna 1 after agreeing a higher production target. Relating to the overall power of MoO 
to shape IOC entry into Iraq, Jiyad notes the ministry’s Petroleum Contracts and 
Licensing Department criteria for IOCs to qualify for bidding, a point based assessment 
on technical, financial, legal, health safety and environment and training. 
362
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Minimum work programs and expenditures are then given an overview, noting that each 
contract has its own specifications in this regard, as well as Local Content requirements 
(see MoO and Basra Gas Company case studies) and HSE requirements. HSE 
requirements refer back to the Constitution, where Article 33 requires the state to 
protect the environment and biodiversity, while Article 114 notes that federal and 
regional authorities must “formulate environmental policy to ensure the protection of 
the environment from pollution and preserve its cleanliness in cooperation with the 
regions and governorates.”363 Further underscoring the “pyramid” of legislation, Jiyad 
also notes the 2009 Law for Protection and Improvement of the Environment, Law 27 
and also Law 21, which requires an environmental impact assessment for any project in 
any sector.  Finally, Jiyad here notes that the model service contract stipulates that 
companies must adhere to “best international business practices” and that two 
environmental impact assessments must be carried out before each project.
364
 
 
Related to Muttitt’s concern over international arbitration, Jiyad merely notes that 
dispute resolution shall be settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce with the court venue being Paris, but no comment is given on 
the political acceptability of this contractual feature in Iraq. 
 
Jiyad goes on to describe the fiscal terms of the model contracts, before concluding “the 
fiscal terms of these contracts indicate Iraq has, undoubtedly, made good deals. 
However, if cost control is not properly monitored and professionally audited, costs 
could escalate to unprecedented levels.”365 His solution for this possible problem is for 
the Ministry of Oil to embark on a series of “crash course” capacity building projects 
with a special new unit in the Ministry for this purpose, a suggestion very similar to a 
capacity building initiative laid out in the February 2007 Draft Oil and Gas Law. This 
concern, over increased costs, does not address the scenario of price collapse, and the 
fiscal burden a fixed renumueration fee would place on Iraq. 
 
In summary, since Jiyad’s focus is overwhelmingly legal, his chapter in Upstream Oil 
and Gas is limited to presenting a technical analysis, one that is useful in that respect 
but fails to outline (beyond his suggested capacity building initiative) how Iraq’s energy 
sector could become better organized and more efficient. 
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Literature review: Concluding remarks 
 
Having reviewed the key texts on oil and gas in Iraq, chiefly with a focus on the Baath 
era and the transition after 2003, a number of themes emerge. Ghanim Anaz and Fadhil 
Chalabi lament the overall lack of long term planning after 2003, with Anaz suggesting 
Iraq’s auctions for technical service contracts in the massive southern fields between 
2009-2011 were too generous, leaving the supergiants “auctioned off like scrap metal.” 
Likewise, Chalabi is critical of an overly ambitious ministry with massive production 
targets, a critique echoed by Frank Gunter—both analysts note that the ministry’s 
targets were both unrealistic and potentially disastrous had they been successful, 
remarking how 10 million bpd production could crush global prices. In light of the 2014 
price collapse, it would appear this assessment is correct. Most authors do not advocate 
heavy restrictions on the private sector in Iraq and, like Meghan O’Sullivan, Ahmed 
Mousa Jiyad and Amy Myers Jaffe, advocate a balanced government approach to the 
private sector, with the exception of Gregg Muttitt and perhaps Ghanhim Anaz, who 
both have an optimistic view of state dominance. No authors outline how they see the 
relationship between the public and private sectors could be defined by legislation, to 
include Rex Zedalis, who outlines problems with Iraq’s Draft Oil and Gas Law without 
going into detail as to how new legislation or arrangements in the sector could be 
significantly improved. Here there is scope in the concluding sections of this thesis, to 
go into detail regarding how Iraq’s energy sector could be re-organized. This is 
particularly important in light of Robin Mills and Feisal Istrabadi’s analysis, which 
describe the problems of constitutional vagueness and lack of clear legislation.  
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Chapter 4: International Case Studies and Influencing Factors 
 
The performance of the Iraq petroleum industry will determine the country’s rate of 
economic growth, the development of other industrial sectors such as agriculture, 
industry, SMEs and services such as health and education, a point made by Gunter 
when he outlines different oil production scenarios and prices, and how they could 
affect per capita income and living quality in Iraq.
366
  
 
The price and the production of oil will determine government revenue, its 
reconstruction programme and its ability to stimulate economic growth. Therefore the 
organisation of the petroleum industry in the new federal state of Iraq is crucially 
important to Iraq’s future.367 However, in order to maximise the economic benefits of 
the newly re-organized petroleum industry, a number of factors must be examined, 
primarily the political independence (or lack of) of petroleum institutions, the political 
setting of these organizations and an understanding of powerful global market forces is 
required. A re-organized Iraqi National Oil Company or Ministry of Oil must be 
designed to withstand internal political pressures and be aware of market forces, to 
attract investment and win market share. 
 
Key to this development is institutional strength, which Robinson and Acemoglu have 
made the focus of their research, arguing that institutional development is more 
important than a country’s natural resource base. In particular, they note that economic 
and political institutions must be inclusive, which relates to Iraq regarding the 
importance of engaging a wide array of stakeholders from diverse communities in 
energy policy.
368
 
 
Regarding institutions, a World Bank report in 2013 noted how,  
 
“Weak public and private institutions, coupled with a predominantly statist 
approach, hinder Iraq’s emergence as a modern, vibrant economy,  
 
before going on to note how,  
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“fiscal institutions need to embed practices of good economic management and 
long-term fiscal planning, and strong regulatory institutions free of entrenched 
networks of patronage will be vital.”369  
 
The implication is that, even in the presence of significant revenue inflows from oil and 
gas, weak institutions will not be able to sustain growth. Acemoglu and Robinson note 
how building institutional capacity is an extremely long term project, taking hundreds of 
years in Europe and decades in transitional economies such as South Korea and 
Chile.
370
 Since energy is the key driver of revenue to the Iraqi state, it is fair to assume a 
priority must be the reconstruction and development of the industry, to maximise 
revenue for planned reconstruction projects. There are three approaches this 
development could take, identified by Birdsall and Subramanian as the prevailing 
schools of development between the 1970s and present day, “hardware, Washington 
Consensus” and “Software.”371 Hardware is defined by Birdsall and Subramanian the 
construction of roads, dams and other key infrastructure, so in the case of Iraq’s oil, 
ensuring pipelines are upgraded, terminals are built to increase exports and refineries 
are built or repaired.  
 
The “Washington Consensus,” prevailing in the 1980s, places emphasis on liberalising 
markets and letting the economics of free trade optimise conditions for investment. In 
the case of Iraq, this approach has been tried with limited success in the case of the early 
privatisations in the non-oil economy under the CPA, but as Chapter 2 illustrated, 
privatisation was rejected for political reasons in the case of oil, until Iraq decided on 
licensing rounds in 2009.
372
 Finally, “software” refers to “the institutions, customs, 
laws, and social cohesion that help to create and sustain markets.” If the World Bank’s 
2013 assessment is correct, then the “software” (institutional) approach is of prime 
importance for Iraq. In the case studies below, only countries that invested in the human 
capacity and the creation of pro-investment legal frameworks and institutions (Canada 
and the UAE) in their energy sectors have achieved the conditions for sustainable 
growth and low political risk, even under sustained low oil prices.   
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For example, the EIA forecast Canada’s oil production to rise through 2016 despite a 
punitively high per barrel extraction cost,
373
 and while the scale of Canada’s tar sands 
boom was met with a skills and equipment shortage, attractive investment terms for 
IOCs were able to mitigate this problem by bringing in enough experienced foreign 
workers.
374
 
 
Russia and Nigeria on the other hand, have built systems which managed to invest 
heavily on “hardware” with impressive infrastructure gains, only to see relative decline 
in both cases as their respective energy sectors became politicised in the absence of 
clear separation of powers and the decoupling of foreign policy and political power 
away from energy. Such a decoupling is essential for Iraq.
375
These problems are 
described in more detail in this chapter.  
 
To a large extent, Iraq has also seen the impact of heavy political control over its energy 
sector, most prominently under the rule of Saddam Hussein, who appointed a party 
loyalist, Hussein Kamal, as Minister of Oil in the early 1990s.
376
 With Hussein Kamal 
in charge, Saddam Hussein was able to use the MoO as a foreign policy tool, allocating 
specific oil deals with friendly governments and imposing a secret “surcharge” per 
barrel on certain shipments of oil, as detailed in the Volcker report.
377 
 
 
After Saddam had developed direct control over the oil industry as a part of Iraq’s war 
effort during the long Iran-Iraq war
378
 oil became a mechanism of international 
influence during the sanctions era, and on two occasions Iraq briefly halted production, 
in an attempt to use this as a bargaining chip. 
379 
In a similar way, Vladimir Putin was 
able to use his control of the gas sector to cut the Ukraine’s gas supply in 2009.380In 
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Iraq, due to the levying of the Oil for Food surcharge, corruption also flourished in the 
ministry, which developed habits of hiding costs, as Faleh Khawaji, former head of 
contracting in MoO remarked,  
 
''We'd accept the low bid and say to the supplier, 'Give us another 10 percent,’ so 
that was added to the contract. If the bid was for $1 million, for example, we 
would tell the supplier to make it $1.1 million.''
381
 
 
Illegal practices continued at the Ministry after 2003, in some cases involving the same 
companies and likely, the same officials. For example, in 2010 it was revealed that 
Indonesian petrochemicals firm Innospec, which illegally benefited from Oil for Food, 
had paid bribes between 2000 and 2007 to the value of at least $6 million to officials in 
the Ministry of Oil to export tetra ethyl lead (TEL) to Iraq, which was banned in most 
countries in the world (Iraq has now phased it out.) 
382
 The fact that this scheme 
continued through the regime change suggests the same individuals in Iraq may have 
been involved, or at least the legacy of this practice from the Baath era continued.  
 
Therefore, reforming and restructuring institutions to de-politicise them, enforce 
transparency and effect change in nations that have seen decades of authoritarian rule is 
not something that can happen quickly, as Alston and Melo note, “to create a truly open 
society takes decades.”383 
 
Also relating to timelines, a 2014 Chatham House report noted that,  
 
“The time available may be insufficient for the government to develop the 
institutional capacity required to enforce the regulation of the new sector, which 
may be strict, or to provide the necessary governance and mechanisms to handle 
the new revenue flow.”384  
 
As the case studies below demonstrate, effective management of the energy sector 
evolves over a period of many years, even in politically stable countries such as Canada. 
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Furthermore, progress towards stable governance of the sector is often threatened by 
price shocks, as seen in Canada when the 1973 price spike caused greater federal 
intervention in the energy sector and a prolonged political battle between provinces and 
the center, as Brownsey notes.
385
 In Nigeria, moderate progress capturing gas has been 
offset by a chronic lack of investment in the energy sector following the price collapse 
of 2014, and the government has been unable to intervene after draining its currency 
reserves, a situation made worse by the absence of an oil law which has prolonged 
investor uncertainty.
386
 Severe political instability continues to threaten the energy 
sector, a situation that is likely in Iraq, in the continued absence of effective revenue 
management and energy strategy. 
 
Of the factors analysed here, political stability may be the most critical. Scholars of the 
resource curse have suggested that oil rich regimes are more likely to be corrupt and 
more likely to be involved in civil war and wars with neighbours. Iraq under Saddam 
Hussain clearly fits these criteria. An analysis by Paul Collier suggests that for any 
given five-year period, the chance of a civil war in an African country varies from less 
than 1% in countries without resource wealth to nearly 25% in those with such riches
387
.  
However, more recent research by Brunnschweiler and Bulte shows that  
“Resource wealth, via an income effect, lowers the probability of conflict, and 
especially of the onset of a major conflict. Moreover, we find no evidence of an 
across-the-board link running from resource dependence to civil war.”388  
It is quite possible that Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s assessment of high resource wealth 
lowering the chance of civil war applies to Iraq. While it is widely agreed that the 2005-
2008 Sunni insurgency against the government constituted civil war, a number of 
experts on the Iraq war such as Fanar Haddad, Toby Dodge and Reidar Visser would 
argue that oil was not a major factor in the violence, favouring explanations involving 
complex tribal and political identity, even over sectarian identify in some cases. 
Furthermore, while there have been clashes between Kurds and Iraqi government forces 
over disputed oil fields, these clashes do not yet constitute civil war, and it would be 
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possible to argue Baghdad’s control of revenues prevents, rather than exacerbates, 
centrifugal forces. Nonetheless, we shall focus here on resource curse literature that 
suggests conflict in resource rich countries is likely, since Iraq fits many criteria for 
resource curse affliction, as identified in Chapter 2.  
While it is difficult to clearly delineate different factors that influence the formulation of 
efficient national level petroleum policies, a number have been identified which need to 
be explored in relation to the chosen federal case study countries, Canada, UAE, Russia 
and Nigeria: 
 
1. Political Stability 
2. Financial Stability 
3. Legal Frameworks 
4. Fiscal Regimes 
5. Production Scenarios 
6. Oil Markets 
 
4.1 Political Stability  
 
4.1.1 Nigeria 
 
Of the countries reviewed in this case study section, the most similar to Iraq regarding 
political stability is Nigeria, which shares a similarly low ranking on the Corruption 
Perception Index, a high ranking on the fragile states index and has experienced at times 
comparable levels of violence.
389
 A number of experts have also made comparisons 
between the two countries with Danilovic noting that the two countries have 
constitutions that highlight cooperative federalism while in reality the federal 
government is dominant. 
390
 Writing on Iraq, Lockhart defines Nigeria as a “failed” 
federation, noting how it is “an excellent case study for a model of government in the 
postcolonial world that has failed to remain resilient and democratic in governance.”391 
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Just as Lockhart refers to Nigeria as “over-centralised,” the country is what Visser refers 
to as an “asymmetrical” federal arrangement,392 defined by Anderson as a country is 
nominally federal, implying that all regions and provinces have equal powers, but in 
reality particular provinces have been granted more power for the sake of political 
stability.  
 
In Iraq, the Kurdish region has an asymmetrical degree of authority compared to any of 
the remaining 15 provinces. As in Iraq, a review of the literature on Nigeria shows that 
granting some areas higher revenue allocations or specific decision making powers in a 
way that circumvents the constitution, has not led to political stability, but in some cases 
has led to conflict over interpretation of the constitution. In other words, simply giving 
more revenue to provinces does not necessarily result in development if there is little 
capacity to spend it effectively and little accountability, as Thurber et al note, the notion 
that, 
 
 “an increase in the percentage of oil revenue that is allocated to state and local 
governments through the so-called “derivation formula”—will resolve the 
problems in the Niger Delta seems highly suspect. Spending by sub-national 
governments already accounts for almost half of consolidated government 
spending in Nigeria, and the accountability mechanisms at state and local levels 
are virtually non-existent. There is no evidence that existing allocations to states 
and localities have been effectively translated into development.”393 
 
Furthermore, Ikein and Diepreye note how corruption has been “systemic” and 
“institutionalised, heightening the inefficiency of revenue distribution and energy 
governance.”394 In Nigeria’s case, the country has in fact become more unstable despite 
increased revenue allocations for specific regions, resulting in knocking oil production 
off line through insurgent attacks, leading to attempts to “buy off” opposition, as Jensen 
and Wantchekon note, “regional and ethnic competitions for oil revenues have 
contributed to Nigeria’s political system of institutionalized patronage”395 Much of this 
instability has also been traced to high unemployment and high levels of poverty, as in 
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Iraq where unemployment has fuelled violence in southern Iraq
396
 and also insurgency 
(across Iraq) where Carpenter suggests poverty plays a more important role than 
unemployment.
397
 Likewise, Nigeria has experienced insurgency and terrorism in both 
the north and south of the country, in the form of Boko Haram in the Muslim majority 
north and the a variety of militias in the Niger Delta largely animist south.
398
 Rogers 
notes, that aside from a self -declared religious motivation,  
 
“Boko Haram’s support also stems from three specific aspects of the Nigerian 
situation: the relative economic neglect of the Moslem north, a country-wide 
issue of very serious divisions of wealth and poverty (in spite of the oil wealth of 
the Delta), and an endemic problem of corruption, especially within the political 
system.”399 
 
Regarding oil revenue, Rotberg notes that under the 1963 constitution the “derivation” 
principle allowed for 50% of oil revenues from a producing state to be returned to that 
locality, but was gradually reversed until the federal share of revenues reached over 
55%. 
400
 Abuja has therefore retained a high degree of control over revenues and their 
disbursement, centralising corruption and institutional weakness, as Romanus notes,  
 
“The problems emanating from proper application of true federalism include 
total neglect of areas where mineral resources are exploited; criticism on the 
mode of determining equitable and acceptable revenue sharing formula; neglect 
of tax bases of various states and local government and the agitation for resource 
control. These factors have accounted for lack of rapid economic development 
of the country.”401 
 
Despite these problems, Nigerian political leadership, divided over tribal and religious 
lines, has attempted to separate the national regulator of the energy sector and regulated 
bodies. But autocratic leadership from the has circumvented this arrangement, 
“capturing” the key energy institutions, leading to massive corruption.  
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This has squandered what Durotoye writing on the “MINT” economies, identified as 
strong future potential. He describes the challenges Nigeria must overcome to fully 
exploit its hydrocarbon wealth, including lack of infrastructure, corruption and weak 
institutional capacity.
402
 Comparable to Iraq, Nigeria has also had to contend with the 
legacy of colonialism and a redrawing of boundaries, which has led to civil war and 
contested rights to subsurface resources. Nigeria’s struggle may be more complex than 
Iraq’s, with over 350 ethnic groups dispersed over 30 provinces, compared to 
approximately 7 ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, including Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shia 
Arabs, Yezidis, Christians Turkmen and Mandeans. 
403
  
 
Emerging as a nation in 1914 while still a British colony, Nigeria had been under 
British control in the form of three protectorates, the Crown Colony of Lagos and the 
Northern and Southern Protectorates. Stepan
404
 makes an important distinction relevant 
to understanding Nigerian federalism, between “coming together” and “holding 
together” federations, with the US, UAE and Australia being examples of the former, 
while  Hiltermann
405
 suggests India, Belgium and Spain are examples of the latter.  
 
Critically, Hiltermann outlines a problem with “holding together” arrangements such as 
Nigeria and Iraq, whereby fiscal relations between governments are controlled and 
defined by the centre, whereas in “coming together” arrangements, the federal states 
define the terms of the union for mutually beneficial goals. Even the latter case, as seen 
during the formation of Canada, is far from perfect in creating sustainable energy 
federalist arrangements, and often needs frequent revisions, as the Atlantic Accords case 
demonstrates, which will be examined in this chapter.  
 
Disputes over control of revenues and licensing appear significantly more problematic 
in cases such as Nigeria, where unlike Canada or Belgium, institutions have not had 
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time to evolve, and are subsequently weak and lack transparency
406
 This is another 
parallel to post 2003 Iraq. 
 
Rotberg notes how hindered institutional development is especially severe if the 
federation has already experienced armed conflict with secessionist movements, as 
Nigeria has experienced in the delta region and now with the Boko Haram insurgency/ 
terror group in the north.
407
 Again, Iraq has had this challenge with armed clashes with 
separatist Kurdish groups from the 1960s to early 70s, and later during the Anfal 
Campaign in the 1980s.
408
 
 
As with Iraq, terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria have not ended central governance, 
investment, NGO work and infrastructure construction, but have led to a series of 
serious humanitarian problems and have made some areas ungovernable, perhaps 
putting both countries on the path to state failure, as defined by Rotberg, as a rapid 
erosion of public services and living standards as crises mount.
409
 In Nigeria, centrifugal 
forces were reduced with the advent of prolonged civilian rule in 1999, and a 
democratic forum for political debate (rather than force and coercion) defined new fiscal 
transfer arrangements, which have nonetheless been politically contested. For example, 
in 2000, the new democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo changed the derivation 
formula from a 13% revenue allocation to producing provinces (which had been 
reduced from 50% in 1994) to 24% of revenues to states and 20% to local 
government.
410
 Problematically, confusion over the constitution endured, causing, “a 
continuing debate over which tier of government, federal or state, is best equipped to 
deal with various areas of policy.”411 Arguments over revenue allocations ensued.412 
 
Likewise Ganu and Egwu argue that higher allocations did not usher in a new era of 
decentralisation and that Nigeria still belonged to the category of a “holding together” 
arrangement. This is despite their claim that initially, the goal of the 1960 constitution 
was a “coming together” federal entity, but regressed into a military dominated nation 
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with strong unitary characteristics.
413
 Ganu and Egwu argue that this has important 
implications for the country’s energy federalism, because at the heart of the 
constitutional arrangement is a paradox whereby the centre has long had overwhelming 
control over the nation’s primary resource and export, leading to a politically 
adversarial arrangement between the non-producing 22 regions and the producing 9, 
with all regions at various times having been in conflict with the federal govt. 
414
 This is 
comparable to Iraq, where the producing provinces of Basra, Wasit and Salahaddin have 
had political clashes with Baghdad, as much as non-producing provinces with little to 
no oil (eg. Anbar) have also fought politically for control over rights to develop fields, 
in the case of the Akkas gas field. In the latter case, an argument between the local 
government in Anbar and Baghdad over exports from the Akkas field delayed 
implementation of work in the area.
415
 
 
Furthermore, despite the constitutional revisions of 1999, the 1960 Nigerian constitution 
remains largely unchanged
416
 and an effort to introduce fairer and more transparent 
transfers to the regions, the “derivation” system, has shifted inequality, moving larger 
transfers from the non-oil producing regions to the producing regions (which had 
previously been exploited by the govt.)  
 
Therefore, almost no region, producing or otherwise, has seen a net benefit. This 
underscores the difficulty Iraq may face in designing a revenue sharing law that tries to 
balance development in regions and provinces. If greater transfers are sent to Basra, a 
largely urban province which has seen extreme poverty since 2003, this raises the 
question of what happens to provinces with high rural populations, such as Maysan, 
which also have high levels of poverty? In 2014, an amendment to the Provincial 
Powers Law 21 of 2009 proposed additional oil revenue for southern provinces, but has 
faced stiff political opposition in Baghdad, underscoring how Iraq is only nominally 
federal. 
417
 
 
                                               
413
 Aaron Tsado Gana, Samuel G. Egwu, Federalism in Africa: Framing the national question, Volume 1 
(Asmara: Africa World Press, 2003) :26  
414
 Ibid. 
415
 Energypedia, “Iraq to sign Akkas gas field deal with KOGAS and KazMunaiGaz this week,” February 
22nd 2011. Accessed July 16th 2016. http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/iraq/iraq-to-sign-akkas-gas-field-
deal-with-kogas-and-kazmunaigaz-this-week 
416
 Wumi Iledare, Rotimi Suberu, “Nigeria” from “Oil and  gas in federal systems,” ed. George Anderson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
417
 Saleem al-Wazzan, “Basra’s mighty petrodollar,” Niqash, 13th March 2014. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/economy/3398/ 
121 
 
Despite Nigeria’s small constitutional changes, the 1999 Nigerian constitution still 
upholds the centralising principle that the federal government enjoys “control of all 
minerals, mineral oils under or upon and land in Nigeria, its territorial waters, and 
exclusive economic zone.” (418 As in Canada, some Nigerian states on the Atlantic 
seaboard have successfully challenged government ownership of offshore oil and gas.  
 
A number of laws passed under military rule further entrenched govt. control of 
resources, allowing Gen. Abacha to dominate resource wealth during his rule, moving 
substantial sums out of the country at the expense of producing regions in the Niger 
delta and the rest of the nation.
419
 The situation has been somewhat different in Iraq, 
where new legislation has been mixed after 2003, with the 2007 Draft Oil and Gas Law 
centralising federal control
420
 and the 2009 Provincial Powers Law number 21 allowing 
for greater decentralisation, although it has been opposed.
421
 
 
Nigeria’s presidential corruption followed legislation passed under military rule in the 
late 60s and 70s which included the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 
1976, granting the govt. total control of any land it chooses with minimal provisions for 
compensation following seizure 
422
 Watts suggests such highly centralised government 
control over land use has exacerbated insurgency in the Niger Delta, and it is likely that 
similar government powers in Iraq could face armed resistance.
423
  
 
Nonetheless, while the Iraqi experience has attempted to allow for some regional and 
provincial control over hydrocarbons, such as allowing for local oil and gas companies 
such as the Dhi Qar Oil Company, legislation exists at the federal level which allows for 
abuse of oil revenues.
424
 Namely, this is Article 136 B of the Criminal Code, which is 
now defunct but as Logan notes, allowed Ministries to terminate investigations into 
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their departments, and was heavily used by the Ministry of Oil. 
425
 For example, a 2007 
US State Department report in on the ability of the Ministry’s Inspector General to stop 
corruption found that of 138 investigations, 14 went to court, 5 involved the use of 136 
b to successfully plead immunity, and only two led to arrests, with the report citing 
intimidation of the Inspector General as the reason for the low prosecution rate.
426
  
 
Comparable to Iraq, Thurber et al argue that no military or civilian government in 
Nigeria has displayed competent handling of surging revenues, and corruption has 
critically hindered every administration, greatly rewarding anyone close to 
government.
427
 According to Watts this mishandling of revenues triggered a number of 
localized conflicts within the country, the most serious being the Biafra war (also 
known as the Nigerian civil war) in which as many as a million people were killed. The 
nearest experience in Iraq to date would be the Kurdish civil war, which was in part 
fought over control of oil smuggling revenues, but it was far smaller than the Biafran 
conflict. Some Iraq observers
428
 have argued that the presence of large contested oil 
revenues in Iraq could lead to future conflict.  
 
Aside from the Biafran war and the Niger Delta struggle, other smaller religion and 
resource related conflicts have persisted. Unlike the Biafra conflict, which involved 
large military formations, the current problems in the north and south of the country 
currently resemble insurgency. Nonetheless, they have had serious implications for 
Nigeria’s oil output, as Watts has noted, disruptions of over 500,000 bpd in a single 
incident. Again, this is comparable to Iraq, where mismanagement of revenues (rather 
than arguments over their distribution) has seen prolonged high unemployment, 
exacerbating insurgency, which has in turn destroyed key infrastructure such as the 
300,000 bpd Baiji refinery. 
 
In Nigeria, political conflicts are complicated by the presence of multiple ethno-
confessional groups—primarily Muslims in the north and Christians and Yoruba people 
in the south, divided over tribal lines and ethnicities. Competition between the Hausa, 
Ibo and Yoruba majorities and the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo minorities (as well as up to 
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250 smaller groups
429
), has led to an at times violent struggle over the final shape of the 
Nigerian geographic-political entity. Similarly, complex ethno-sectarian division over 
Kirkuk has the potential to see renewed violence, and has defied international and 
central government efforts at resolution, with the city sometimes referred to as a 
“powder keg” of potential ethnic conflict430 
 
One possible solution to these localised grievances in Iraq has been to create new semi-
autonomous regions, although as noted, appetite for this in some parts of Iraq has met 
nationalist resistance. In Nigeria, Iledare and Suberu describe how, at the beginning of 
the 1960s there were 3, then four regions of the federation. By the late 1970s this had 
grown to 19, and is now 36.
431
 While this proliferation of sub states had the intention of 
strengthening the federation and reassuring local grievances, according to Mustapha it 
had the effect of reinforcing ethnic identity and claims to greater shares of resources, 
heightening prospects for conflict.
432
 Likewise, Iledare and Suberu also claim the 
centralization of state power set off centrifugal forces in the federation. This echoes the 
concerns of Natali that further decentralisation may not solve the root cause of Iraq’s 
problems, and still leaves room for intra-ethnic conflict, but also points to how 
unilateral centralization of power can heighten secessionist sentiment.
433
 
  
Equally problematic in Nigeria, according to Obi
434
 is the convergence of the main 
majorities into 3 dominant political regional entities, often at the expense of Nigeria’s 
many minorities, has led to a competition over resources characterised by Lergo as 
“chaos” which has “stifled Nigeria’s social evolution.”435Instead of negotiation, the use 
of fiscal transfers, threats of secession and armed action have been the main methods 
through which subnational governments have pressured each other into finding an 
amicable agreement, or face breaking away from the federation.  
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The latter scenario occurred in Biafra following the 1967-1970 war of the native Igbo 
people to gain independence, and control over locally extracted oil, which led to major 
battles over oil infrastructure, including BP and Shell installations at Bonny Island.
436
 A 
similar conflict in Iraq, perhaps between secessionist Kurds and pro-government forces, 
would likely see a targeting of oil infrastructure, to the detriment of all Iraqis. 
 
By 1970, the Biafrans had been defeated, but as noted, the issue of oil revenues and 
ownership in the Niger Delta has been continuously problematic. This has fed into the 
idea of Nigeria as being acutely affected by the resource curse as the phenomenon is 
often linked not only to endemic corruption, but likelihood of enduring civil conflict.
437
  
 
According to Rotberg  almost every post WW2 conflict in Nigeria can be traced to 
resource control, although this includes minerals and water, not only oil and gas.
438
 
More recently, Lergo outlines the role of religion with the advent of the Boko Haram 
terror movement, which followed religious unrest in the Muslim majority Kano 
province in 1980.
439
 
 
Lergo also notes that resource allocation is still a driving factor of the radical Islamist 
movement. The latter assertion is by Chiegeonu Aga who notes that the rebellious 
province of Kana received the largest fiscal transfers during the 1990s at 10.9% of 
allocations, compared to 3.2 to 3.5% allocations for Abuja and Lagos.
440
 This is relevant 
to the case of Anbar, the centre of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency against the government; at no 
point were transfers withheld from Anbar, yet the level of political grievance, as in 
Kana, remained high. After sustained violence in Anbar in 2006, the Iraqi government 
increased Anbar’s budget allocation by $70 million, but these allocations, amounting to 
$500 million in 2014, up from $177 million in 2007, did not stop renewed insurgency 
action.
441
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This would suggest that poor resource allocation was not a driver of the Boko Haram 
insurgency/ terror movement, suggesting that greater allocations to regions in Iraq 
would not necessarily prevent violence. This perhaps because in these cases, as in the 
case of Boko Haram, a major cause of insurgent violence is a radical interpretation of 
Islam, and that in the presence of corruption and inefficiency, transfers may not solve 
chronic poverty, another cause of violence. However, given Nigeria’s acutely opaque 
revenue monitoring during the period, it is difficult to say how accurate Chiegeonu 
Aga’s statistics are. What is certain is that while sub states have been accused of 
severely mismanaging the resources allocated to them there remained an acute disparity 
in the amount of fiscal transfers given to sub states.
442
  
 
4.1.2 Russia 
 
In Russia, revenue distribution has been less controversial than overall control of 
exploration, development, export and taxation of hydrocarbon resources. Nonetheless, 
the post-Soviet political arrangement resembles federal “asymmetry,” Anderson’s term 
for Iraq’s current situation, as described at the start of this chapter. As with Iraq and 
Nigeria, the asymmetrical arrangement is partly due to constitutional vagueness or 
“fuzziness as Shkaeva calls it, leading to rows over interpretation.443 
 
Distinct from Iraq’s entirely new post 2003 document, the Russian constitution of 1993 
was re-written from the former Soviet constitution of 1977, and came about following 
the collapse of the USSR and the advent of parliamentary democracy in Russia, creating 
conditions for a distinct divergence from Soviet era principles regarding private 
ownership.
444
 However this was not a rapidly created new document but as with Iraq, 
there had been a dramatic change in regime, and a new precedent for private investment, 
which would have to be politically accepted. 
Yeates et al assert that over 200 changes to the Russian constitution between the onset 
of Gorbachov’s “perestroika” reforms in 1985 and the post-Soviet version in 1993 have 
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contributed to a “self-contradictory” document, and that this has contributed to 
confusion regarding federal and sub-state government oil and gas ownership. 
445
 
As an example, Yeates et al note articles 35 and 36, which outline commitment to the 
right of private ownership. This is contravened (according to an EU ruling) by the 
Yukos expropriation case in 2004.
446
 Writing in 1993, prior to the Yukos expropriation, 
they note that it is too early to tell if the Russian Constitution will enable rights “for the 
energy industry investor, the important rights to own, freely use, and dispose of private 
property.” 
Likewise Vazquez, Boez contend that division of power in the 1993 constitution is 
vaguely defined, essentially undecided, as outlined in articles 71-72.
447
Problematically, 
they argue that the regions’ ability to make bilateral oil and gas arrangements with the 
federal government circumvents the constitution. Hahn notes that the Moscow treaty 
with Tartasan, which granted the federal subject control over oil and gas exploitation, 
contravened article 71.2a of the constitution, which stipulates “joint” ownership.448 
 
Meanwhile, Pascal describes the treaty between Samara and Moscow in 1997, which 
granted the region significant influence on a number of local issues, including 100% of 
payment for the rights to extract oil and gas, and 50% of excise taxes, 100% of which 
had normally gone to the federal govt.
449
 These arrangements echo the ad hoc 
arrangements, circumventing the constitution, that Baghdad made with the KRI, 
described in Chapter 3’s review of literature on Iraq. 
 
Pascal notes that similar bilateral deals had been signed with Tartarsan and Sverdlovsk. 
By 2000, Pascal notes how Putin was determined to put a stop to such ad hoc 
decentralisation and re-invigorate Russian nationalism. Regarding the Samara 
agreement, Pascal notes that while the Oblast (federal subject) was not a major oil 
producer, it originally received a significant percentage of tax on oil operations from 
Yukos, until the oil giant was acquired by Menatep in 1996, who re-directed these taxes 
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to Moscow, and bought up many small, local oil and gas companies.
450
 Federal 
intervention in this case, was therefore a sign of what would happen later with the 
Yukos expropriation.  
 
But until Putin’s premiership in 2000, these constitutional violations went both ways. In 
an echo of the KRI’s move to draft its own constitution and oil law, the republics of 
Alta¡, Adygei, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Komi, and North Osetia-Alania all wrote their 
own constitutions claiming control over resources.
451
 By the turn of the century, some 
13 subjects of the Russian Federation had all received “presidential warnings.”452 
 
In the case of Adygei, Goode notes that the republic was weak and its demands 
overturned in relation to mineral (and oil) rights. 
453
 This was the case in Iraq with 
demands made by Wasit and Salahaddin to exploit oil and gas within their provinces.
454
 
It is notable that many of the battles over the constitution outlined by Goode, Boez et al 
are over multiple issues of federal or regional jurisdiction, only one of them being oil 
and gas. In Iraq, oil has dominated political disputes between Erbil and Baghdad and to 
a lesser extent, Basra and Baghdad.  
 
Hahn suggests that behind some of the Kremlin’s efforts to prevent further violations of 
the constitution was the example of Chechnya, whose secessionist movement was 
defeated in a conflict which claimed the lives of as many as 160,000 people and ruined 
the capital city.
455
 To make this point, Hahn quotes Putin who asserted in 2001, 
following the second Chechen war: 
 
"We managed to make significant progress forward in strengthening Russian 
statehood. Remember the kind of state we were living in only recently? One-
fourth of regional laws were unconstitutional or contradicted federal legislation. 
Two-thirds of those regional laws have now been brought into compliance with 
the constitution.”456 
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The implied threat of violence to ensure compliance with federal demands is 
reminiscent of the Baath era in Iraq, although a comparison of Sasoon
457
 writing on Iraq 
and Lucas
458
 writing on Russia, suggests political violence in the Putin era has been far 
less intense. As well as pressuring regional administrations to comply with federal law, 
Putin also sought to pressure the energy sector into reform, putting an end to tax 
avoidance that had arisen from deals between oil companies (affiliated with LUKoil and 
Sibneft) and the offshore tax haven of Baikonur, Kazakhstan.  
 
Claiming that $500 million in federal payments had been lost in 2001 alone, the 
Ministry of Taxation put an end to these schemes when the Constitutional Court 
declared them illegal, in 2005.
459
 Notably, Yukos may have saved $1 billion through an 
offshore tax scheme, and tax avoidance was the main argument used by the federal govt. 
to expropriate of the company. Chebankova argues that Yukos was made an example of 
as a deterrent to further exploitation of the transfer price system, because “a broad range 
of tax optimisation methods” were still in existence in Russia following the 2004 
closing of internal offshore havens.
460
  
 
Putin also asserted federal power by cooperating with heads of major industries 
operating in strategic regions, to use combined federal and industrial influence to 
appoint suitable regional leaders, putting an end to regional elections.
461
 Chebankova 
attributes this move to growing political—business ties within regions that risked 
undermining federal authority. A notable example of such an appointment is the 
nomination of Alexandr Filpenko to head the major oil producing autonomous Okrug of 
Khanti Mansi. According to Chebankova, this process involved negotiations between 
Putin and TNK-BP, LUKoil and Rosneft, among others.
462
 
 
Chebankova also notes that Putin would later remove uncooperative governors, 
including the governor of Sakhalin, Ivan Malakhov, who had poor relations with state 
owned Rosneft, who were operating in the region (note, some reports suggest this 
                                               
457
 Joseph Sassoon, “Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
458
 Edward Lucus, “The New Cold War, (London: Bloomsbury, 2009) 
459
 Elena Chebankova, “Russia’s Federal Relations: Putin's Reforms and Management of the Regions”  
(New York: Routledge, 2010), :128 
460
 Ibid. 
461
 Ibid. 
462
 Ibid. 
129 
 
appointment was also related to a slow response to an earthquake.
463
) Therefore, it is 
logical to conclude that Putin has to a large extent re-asserted federal control of the 
energy sector in comparison to the Yeltsin era, and that this is to an extent a re-assertion 
of federal influence, as per the 1993 constitution. 
 
What is the meaning of this re-centralisation regarding political stability for investment? 
To Ferguson and Henderson the outlook is poor, with increased political control leading 
to “a non-linear and opaque” business environment. Furthermore they note,   
 
“In the past decade, Russia has not changed dramatically. Institutions in the 
country remain weak, hollowed out and often dominated by elites. Laws and 
regulations are unreliable and the business outlook remains short-term.”464 
 
Equally unpromising is Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool. Following 
Russia’s military action in Crimea and Ukraine, and the subsequent Western sanctions 
which have in part targeted Russian energy projects, a combination of these sanctions 
and low oil prices have constrained the much needed development to maintain 
production at current levels of over 10 million bpd beyond 2017.
465
 With this in mind, 
Russia has turned to projects with Indian and Chinese state owned companies, but long 
term, Putin’s aggressive re-centralisation of the energy sector will likely alter political 
risk calculations of western IOCs. 
466
 
 
4.1.3 Canada 
 
While  difficult political risk calculations may be expected to continue in Iraq, Russia 
and Nigeria for many years, if not decades, a cursory glance at the relative success of 
the Canadian oil industry would suggest that political risk and stability is not a problem. 
While tensions in a country that has been a democracy for over 150 years would be 
unlikely to turn violent, they still have the capability to cause decades long disputes 
over rights to oil and gas and can increase investor uncertainty, which could be 
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particularly problematic in a time of prolonged low oil prices.
467
  Nonetheless, Canada’s 
constitution is quite clear on oil and gas ownership rights, unlike in Russia, Iraq and 
Nigeria. In Canada, disputes have occurred over oil pipelines, the environment and 
offshore oil ownership. As with Iraq, Russia and Nigeria, oil reserves are very unevenly 
spread across the federation, which has been problematic. 
 
In theory, oil and gas ownership rights in Canada enjoy a spirit of federalism, placing 
natural resources under the jurisdiction of the province, a development that dates back 
to 1867 with the advent of the Constitution, which outlines separation of federal and 
provincial powers in sections 91 and 92.
468
  
Federal jurisdiction in the energy sector exists in matters affecting more than one 
province (such as pipeline construction, oil spills) offshore discoveries and uninhabited 
land outside of the provinces, the “territories.” In this case, the arrangement is similar to 
Iraq where federal export infrastructure runs through the semi- autonomous Kurdish 
region, and environmental issues related to oil and gas are supposed to be managed at 
the federal level, although the KRG has its own environmental rules within its 2007 Oil 
Law.
469
 
However, a number of observers (including Plourde, Gattinger) have documented a 
more complex reality than what is outlined in the 1867 constitution, in particular the 
advent of the Atlantic Accords, signed between the federal govt. and the Atlantic 
provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador, and Nova Scotia in 1986 and 1987 
respectively.
470
  
The Accords followed a 20 year legal battle between these provinces and the govt. over 
offshore oil reserves, leaving significant control over offshore development with the 
Atlantic provinces, an arrangement Leslie notes had “no constitutional basis.” 471 
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Even after the Accords were signed however, a study by the University of Texas’ 
Center for Energy Economics noted ongoing problems with the tax arrangement for 
offshore oil,  
“The problem is that for every dollar that flows to governments, the federal 
government is set to gain more than 80 cents. Nova Scotia on the other hand is 
set to gain less than 20. The result is that Nova Scotia is not the primary 
beneficiary of offshore development. There are difficulties in trying to effect 
change. For example, the Canada Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board 
(CNSOPB) is governed by two statutes these statutes, one federal and one 
provincial are “mirror legislation.” Any change would need to be endorsed by 
both levels of government. However, the federal government would have a 
complementary interest in legislation effecting Newfoundland where they 
essentially have the same “mirror legislation” with the Newfoundland Offshore 
Petroleum Board (CNOPB). The fact that there are two offshore boards in Nova 
Scotia and in Newfoundland is a reflection of the fact that there is a significant 
jurisdictional debate.”472 
Plourde outlines the historical development of the Canadian state in relation to 
resources, noting that the two provinces which host most hydrocarbon activity in 
Canada (Saskatchewan and Alberta) were not created until 1905, with mineral rights 
being granted in 1930. As such, Plourde highlights that the federal govt. would have 
been unaware of the forthcoming energy sector growth, which would expand 
significantly after 1945, beginning with the discovery of the Leduc field in southern 
Alberta in 1947. Therefore, Plourde asserts that Canadian oil policy had to work around 
the constitution, a document which did not envisage the energy boom. 
Fossum describes how the unequal geographic distribution of oil and gas reserves has 
raised difficult questions regarding the constitutional goal of “fiscal equalization,” the 
policy of ensuring that public services and taxes remain relatively consistent across the 
country.
473
 This is interesting when considering whether an “Equalization” style system 
could be replicated in Iraq, since it has been controversial in Canada. 
 
Equalization, established as a principal in Canada in 1957, was not formalised in the 
constitution until 1982 with the Constitution Act—from which point, 100% of 
provincial oil revenues were to go into the equalization system, and the constitution 
                                               
472
 “North Atlantic Canada: Local Content” Requirements” (University of Texas, 2002) Accessed July 16th 
2016. http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/new-era/case_studies/North_Atlantic_Canada.pdf 
473
 John Erik Fossum, “Oil, the State, and Federalism: The Rise and Demise of Petro-Canada as a statist 
impulse,” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997): 43 
132 
 
asserts that these resources must be used to deliver relatively equal public services 
across the “have” (resource endowed) and “have not” provinces.474  
 
The equalization system has faced a number of political problems and many 
adjustments over the years. Milke notes that, following the 1982 act that stipulated 
100% of resource revenues should go into the equalization system, this amount was 
reduced to 50%, with “have not” provinces often campaigning for a return to 100%. 
Later, in 2009, Ontario, which had been classed as a “have” province, suffered slower 
economic growth and therefore fell below the “10 province average” of fiscal capacity, 
meaning that it qualified for equalization payments. Milke argues this distorted the 
entire system, with the percentage of the population covered by equalization payments 
jumping from 32% to 68% of the population.
475
 Only two years later, Ontario had a 
marginally higher per capita income than two of the “have” provinces, British Colombia 
and Newfoundland and Labrador.
476
  
 
Equalization came under further scrutiny in 2015, when Ontario lost its status as a “have 
not” province, but even as Alberta struggled with the oil price collapse, the province 
was still paying into the system as a “have” province even though technically it no 
longer qualified for this status. Analyst Don Drummond subsequently pointed out that 
the equalization system was slow to respond to changes in commodity prices, a similar 
problem that has been discussed in relation to the proposed $5 per barrel allocation for 
Iraqi producing provinces.
477
 Mendelsohn also points out a similar problem with 
commodity price fluctuations, and notes that the equalization is constantly at risk of 
political struggle. Mendelsohn recommends the creation of an independent organization 
to monitor transfers to provinces and payments into the federal system: 
 
“Many have an interest in concealing the true nature of inter-regional 
redistribution in Canada. An independent, disinterested body could report on 
fiscal capacity and net redistribution and related issues. Much like the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information does for health care, a new Fiscal Transfers 
Council could similarly improve transparency and governance in Canada’s fiscal 
arrangements.”478 
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Another difficulty has been managing export infrastructure over a vast area between the 
“have” and “have not” provinces. Plourde explains that once early logistical problems 
of the oil industry in Canada were overcome (mainly transporting oil and gas from the 
producing West to the importing East) “policy related tensions” within the federation 
began to emerge as production and exploration expanded and revenues climbed. 
Tensions over a trans-Canada pipeline (and whether it would pass through the US or be 
entirely on Canadian soil) led to the creation of a “National Energy Board” to oversee 
energy matters which cut across provincial boundaries.
479
  
The National Energy Board is the main federal regulatory organization in Canada and 
was created in 1959, following the findings of the Bordon Royal Commission, which 
recommended a coordinating body for national energy policy, which was previously 
executed "piecemeal” by a number of agencies. 480This led to the National Energy 
Board Act, which led to the body of the same name.  
The NEB has “regulatory responsibilities for interprovincial and international natural 
gas, oil and commodity pipelines pursuant to the National Energy Board Act” and also 
has environmental impact oversight regarding the construction and operation of 
interprovincial pipelines.
481
 According to the NEB Act, these projects must be in the 
public’s best interests.482 In 1961, the NEB added oil to its remit, which formerly 
included electricity and gas. Between 1960 and 1965, Canadian oil exports to the US 
doubled, and doubled again between 1970 and ’73.483 Perhaps the equivalent institution 
in Iraq would be the as of yet not constitutionally authorised Federal Oil and Gas 
Council. If the FOGC comes into existence, it would probably increase overall 
efficiency in the energy sector to add electricity to its remit, as in Canada. However, the 
NEB could not stop an increase in political controversy as Canada’s exports rose. 
Given that so much new oil production in Canada was centred in the West, the potential 
for new political disputes grew throughout the volatile oil market years of the 1970s and 
                                               
479
 James A. Desveaux, “Designing Bureaucracies: Institutional Capacity and Large-scale Problem 
Solving,” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) :59 
480
 Ibid. 
 
481
 National Energy Board website. https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/bts/ctrg/mmrndm/2013trnsprtcnd-eng.html 
482
  Ibid. 
483
 Carolyn Tuohy, “Policy Politics Canada,” (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) :264 
134 
 
80s, and these disputes continue to this day, as Feehan highlights, detailing much 
controversy over changes to the equalization formula during the 00’s.484 
In particular, Fossum notes how the 1973 oil embargo sparked a “constitutional crisis” 
centred on the question of who would deal with problems resulting from surging prices: 
Ottawa or the producing provinces. The resultant failure to address this question, and 
disappointment over changes to the equalization formula, led to the erosion of the 
constitution, according to Fossum.
485
 
 
The political outcome of post 1973 oil price environment was that the government 
continued its interventionist federal control of oil sales, while provinces fought to retain 
control over the production and development of oil and gas.
486
 This echoes the Iraq 
experience, where the oil price collapse heightened tension over the giant oilfields at 
Kirkuk, which are contested between Baghdad and Erbil. Nonetheless, federal—
provincial tension over oil and gas revenues has not been the only political tension 
related to energy in Canada. 
 
Notably, the constitution does not mention the environment, and Plourde notes that 
environmental issues within provinces related to the energy sector are largely the 
jurisdiction of the province. However, the federal government dictates environmental 
policy in relation to international treaties, such as the Kyoto agreement, and national 
level pollution such as air and water pollution.
487
  
 
Subsequent tensions emerged at the 2009 Copenhagen summit on Greenhouse 
emissions, when four Canadian provinces set out separate environmental targets 
different from federal govt. policy, while governors of Alberta and Ottawa publicly 
argued over the impact of oil sands development.
488
 Currently, Iraq is not a signatory to 
any carbon emissions agreements, but if it was to sign a treaty in future, perhaps after 
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reduction of flaring, this would raise the problem of Kurdish emissions, or emissions of 
provinces within the federation, were they to formulate independent energy policies. 
489
  
 
Would the creation of the FOGC remedy such potential problems? The experience of 
the NEB between its creation and the present day suggest it would not be without 
challenges. Desveux outlines a number of critiques regarding the NEB, in particular the 
concern that the NEB would have more authority than Cabinet to set policy. This was 
largely because the NEB came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce, therefore, it was seen to prioritise trade in oil and gas, for example, exports 
to the US were a priority area.  
 
Further criticism emerged following the 1973 oil crisis, due to the NEB’s ability to 
make its own decisions on oil and petroleum exports, because of the short term nature 
of oil export contracts. Fisher argues that public interest groups (eg. environmental 
groups) will not be able to intervene in board decisions, since only private interests 
would have the ability to raise the funds for making a detailed case in a lengthy 
hearing.
490
 Fisher also felt that the board's decisions lacked transparency, so that it was 
difficult to assess whether it was acting in the public interest.  
 
Toner, Pal and Prince also note that, in the case of a series of 2004 MOUs with the US 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, there was a “lack of transparency” regarding 
the agreement, in breach of the NEB Act’s pledge to serve the public interest.491At the 
time of writing, there have also been a number of accusations that the NEB has been 
subject to “regulatory capture”—federal or private sector undue influence, due to the 
overlap of its members with the energy sector, although there are currently no academic 
reviews of this accusation.
492
  
 
Finally, and relevant to the political risk calculations of IOCs regarding the prospect of 
changing regulations, PWC reported in May 2016 that IOCs were once again 
considering heightened political risk in Canada. The report refers to a planned banning 
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of tanker traffic by the federal govt. off the northern coast of British Columbia, which 
would jeopardise a planned export terminal, and the regulatory risk posed by changing 
environmental laws on energy mega projects. The report notes how, “These 
developments signal a deteriorating political and social environment towards pipelines 
that threatens producers’ ability to address their top priority of resolving the market 
access issue and finding alternative export markets.”493 
 
4.1.4 UAE 
 
Of the four countries reviewed, the UAE demonstrates that even a country with a small 
population and an abundance of natural resources has still struggled with some of the 
regulatory and legal problems outlined here, which briefly threatened the stability of the 
Emirates. The UAE has the 7th largest proven reserves of both crude oil and gas in the 
world, some 6.1 trillion cubic metres of gas and 97.8 billion barrels of oil. 
494
As in all of 
the countries surveyed, these resources have been concentrated in one area but rather 
than this becoming a centrifugal force as provinces and regions clashed with the center 
over revenues and resource rights, the vast wealth of Abu Dhabi has for the most part 
cemented the UAE together. Over 85% of the Emirates’ resource wealth is in Abu 
Dhabi.
495
 To a lesser extent, a separation of the regulator The Supreme Petroleum 
Council from the national oil company ADNOC, is also seen as a favourable 
comparison to Norway, although the extent to which this has eliminated conflict of 
interest is contested.  
 
Only a minority of analysts present an alternative view, which will be examined here, 
suggesting that while the UAE has effectively regulated its industry and managed oil 
revenues, some problems have emerged which could yet cause difficulties in a 
persistent low price environment. Soto and Haouas contend that the UAE may not have 
escaped the resource curse.
496
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First, it is worth examining the view that the UAE has been an exemplary federation in 
managing its oil boom. Aartun asserts that a key reason for the federation’s remarkable 
political stability is a small population (only 1.2 million of the 9 million residents are 
indigenous Emiratis) meaning that even when oil prices fell in the 1980s, a generous 
“cradle to grave” welfare system497 and substantial revenues (to the equivalent of 
$65,000 per capita in 2014) (IMF)
498
 ensured a level of dependency on Dubai (and later 
Abu Dhabi when Dubai exhausted its oil fields) as the “breadwinners” of the federation. 
Emirates without substantial resource wealth have also depended on Abu Dhabi for 
generous subsidies on health, education and fuel—a point which Peterson suggests has 
led Abu Dhabi to tighten its grip on the federation.
499
 
 
Peterson therefore supports the theory that oil revenues have helped hold the UAE 
together, rather than being a source of ethnic, tribal or political violence. Peterson does 
however note that there were problems since some constituent states hoped that they 
would discover oil and gas and rival Abu Dhabi’s power.500  
 
This in turn exacerbated border disputes, in the case of Umm al Qaywayn and Sharjah, 
who disputed an offshore discovery in the late 1970s, and Sharjah and Dubai, who 
disputed ownership of an oasis, in 1972. In the latter case, a UAE force intervened after 
the dispute became violent, exemplifying the power of Abu Dhabi to resolve disputes, 
influence that Peterson suggests is underwritten by oil revenues.
501
  
 
Furthermore, the UAE has enshrined ownership of mineral rights in its constitution, 
which also states that Emirates must make a contribution of revenues (from all sources) 
to the federal budget, which will be re-distributed to Emirates as needed. In reality this 
means that Abu Dhabi is the “breadwinner” for the country. Article 23 of the 
constitution notes, “The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be 
considered the public property of that Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the 
protection and proper exploitation of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit 
of the national economy.”502 
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4.1.5 Political stability: Implications for Iraq 
 
All of the countries here offer different lessons for Iraq, although a detailed examination 
of why some have been more prone to conflict and endemic corruption than others is 
perhaps more suited to the analysis of political science.  
 
However, since we cannot separate the political economy of oil and gas from political 
science, some lessons are nonetheless important. In the case of Nigeria, decentralisation 
and the need for an even distribution of oil revenues appears to be more important than 
the right of people to form regions, which does not seem to have lessened the chance of 
conflict or decreased corruption. In other words, provinces, particularly in the Niger 
Delta, have wanted far more say over oil and gas management. But when the 
government have created new regions, it has not solved problems of corruption and 
mismanagement. Problematically, constant changes to the “derivation system” of 
revenue sharing have been a source of argument. This is similar to the situation in 
Canada: both countries have a constitutional article on revenue sharing, but the method 
for distribution has been constantly altered, leading to a series of political rows. In Iraq, 
it is constitutionally fixed on a per capita basis, meaning that changes in the oil price 
will be reflected fairly in distribution of revenue. This seems more logical. The lesson 
here may be that, once ratified, constitutional articles must be followed strictly, 
otherwise political deals between the state and sub-state governments may face constant 
legal challenges. The UAE has avoided this problem by adhering to its constitution on 
energy matters.  
 
In the case of the UAE, the concentration of oil and gas resources in one emirate has not 
been a challenge to peace and security, and has actually been a force for holding the 
federation together. But the potentially positive force of oil revenue in terms of 
increasing political stability is boosted by clear constitutional language outlining the 
rights of Emirates to control of oil and gas and their rights to resources.  
 
Arguably, the idea of oil revenue helping federations “hold together” is interesting 
regarding Iraq, because although the UAE is far smaller, more homogenous and far 
richer than Iraq, the Kurdish Region of Iraq has not broken away despite numerous 
threats of unilateral independence, while Sunni majority Anbar has politically rejected 
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calls to form a region. In other words, it may be speculated that reasons for this include 
these areas having lesser oil and gas wealth than the south—as in the UAE, sub-states 
have a dependency on the centre. This is not in itself reason for the centre to simply 
transfer funds to regions and provinces and dispense with any administrative duty 
towards the populations there, because high oil prices, and oil itself, is not an endless 
certainty and in any case, southern oil needs the option of a northern export route for 
marketing options, due to the chance of conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
 
In Russia, it is hard to separate political and financial stability. For example, the energy 
sector has been both a tool of political policy, in the case of cutting gas supplies to 
Ukraine, and also a target of foreign policy action, as in the case of energy sector 
sanctions which have damaged much needed investment in ageing fields. This offers no 
lesson for oil and gas management, except that strong political control is in itself a risk. 
Furthermore, political control over the domestic use of energy in terms of subsidies has 
been damaging, and distorted the role of Gazprom, which has fallen victim to state 
corruption and the economic inefficiency associated with generous subsidies.  
 
As in Nigeria and Iraq, the general population, and those on low incomes, pay the price 
for this, as funds are spent on meeting domestic seasonal demand, at greatly reduced 
prices, cutting into the state’s investment budget which could be used on (for example) 
higher education to help diversify the economy away from oil. Unlike the foreign policy 
dimension of oil and gas, this does offer a lesson, which will be elaborated on in the 
concluding chapters: ideally, ministries must closely coordinate through one 
technocratic body, to provide checks and balances on how oil, gas and refined fuels can 
be used domestically. If done correctly, this should be a factor in reducing political risk 
in Iraq. 
4.2 Financial Stability 
 
Of the countries surveyed, the UAE and Canada are best placed to weather sustained 
low oil prices, because in the case of Canada oil accounts for 7% of GDP and was as 
low as 3% by 2015)
503
 while in the case of the UAE, a sovereign wealth fund has been 
amassed worth over $792 billion for a population equivalent a medium sized city, 
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equating to $840,000 per capita.
504
 However, the price collapse of late 2014 shows how 
even Russia, with a GDP in 2014 of $1860 billion, has been severely affected by the 
price collapse.
505
 For Nigeria and Iraq therefore, the consequences have been extremely 
severe. With 90% of government revenue coming from oil revenues Iraq’s budget is 
highly vulnerable both to the risk of sabotage of oil production and also to fluctuations 
in the world market price of oil.  
4.2.1 Russia 
 
Ovcharova notes how Russian conventional production is in a period of decline, and 
according to the 2009 Russian Energy Strategy to 2030 national policy document, $600 
billion of investment will be needed to reach a production goal over 11 million BPD.
506
 
This need for more investment will likely re-orientate what has been a journey in Russia 
from strong state control under the Soviet period, accompanied by high oil production, 
to rapid and somewhat chaotic privatisation after 1991. Yeltsin’s rapid privatization 
drive was followed by the restoration of a degree of state control under Putin, although 
attempts to attract more IOC investment to develop new fields and maintain output in 
mature fields will require the end of sanctions, imposed in 2014. The state’s reliance on 
oil revenues has jeopardised the work of National Oil Companies to carry out vital 
energy projects, with one think tank predicting as much as 3 million bpd of Russian 
production could be lost by 2025 due to a combination of sanctions and low oil 
prices.
507
 However, in terms of creating sustainable investment policies for the energy 
sector, commentators differ on what approaches would have been best for the people of 
Russia. 
According to Joseph Stiglitz, The Yeltsin era of rapid privatisation of the energy sector 
was seen as particularly damaging. Stiglitz notes that the state lost control of the only 
hard currency revenue stream available, leading to “fiscal destabilization.”508 It was the 
policy of rapid privatization, according to Stiglitz, that reinforced public opposition to 
private sector involvement in energy during the Yeltsin era.Bohme contrasts the Yeltsin 
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and Putin eras, praising Putin’s reforms as helping lead to a rapid and sustained growth 
in GDP, in marked contrast to Hahn, who argues that the energy sector driven growth is 
evidence of the resource curse. Following the oil price collapse of late 2014, Hahn may 
be correct, as Russia’s economy has gone into sustained decline and will need to attract 
immense foreign investment to sustain output in difficult conditions. This may not 
however, significantly affect political stability in Russia, since Putin continues to enjoy 
high approval ratings. 
509
 
Zubarevich notes how some of this high approval may stem from using oil and gas 
wealth to increases social spending, particularly under the Presidency of Medvedev, 
however this was curtailed under Vladimir Putin. Zubarevic notes, 
“Due to fear of social instability, the federal government increased financial 
transfers to the regions by one third in 2009. The federal share of the regional 
budgets increased from 19 to 27 percent. However, rather than strategically 
targeting those regions who were most affected by the crisis, additional transfers 
were evenly spread across the country. Moreover, most of the money was 
distributed in a non-transparent way, thus further strengthening Moscow’s 
‘manual control’ (ручное управление) over the regions during Medvedev’s 
presidency.”510 
 
Another significant financial pressure on Russia has come in the form of fuel and 
electricity subsidies, which have long been a contentious issue and were opposed by 
Alexei Miller, who as head of Gazprom in 2000, wanted to cut subsidies and increase 
profits, according to Robert Orttung. Orttung notes how, 
 
“Gazprom cannot be understood in “strictly conventional economic terms” since 
the Russian government uses the company’s vast resources to subsidize the 
energy needs of Russian households and factories.”511 
 
The IEA estimated that Russian energy subsides cost the country over $30 billion in 
2009, since Moscow had decided upon a policy of selling gas and electricity at prices 
well below international prices. Subsidies in 2009 were estimated to cost $19 billion for 
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gas and $15 billion for electricity, which according to Laan equated to $238 per capita. 
Laan also notes that people were paying 77% of market prices.
512
 
 
Russian officials have defended the subsidies, noting that they are necessary for areas 
where winter temperatures fall well below zero, however Cohen writes, 
 
 “Russian officials are also quick to point out that cheap energy is essential to 
the survival of millions living in the far north and Siberia. One problem is that 
these subsidies are also extended to a range of companies in a particularly non-
transparent fashion, and Russia's trade partners see this as constituting a hidden 
subsidy. This has become a critical sticking point in Russia's negotiations for 
WTO accession. These subsidies, moreover, do little to encourage conservation 
and have real costs in terms of foregone foreign exchange earnings.”513 
 
Related to this waste, Laan points out a number of problems, while noting that Russia 
raised gas prices in 2014 to the rate charged to European buyers, while electricity prices 
were raised in 2011. 
 
However, Laan notes that if subsidies had been completely removed, tens of billions of 
dollars that are saved could be better spent, “through the tax system, social payments, 
cash transfers, or increased social spending.” In addition to this, Lahn highlights that 
30% of subsidies go to SOEs, therefore this still represents a large outlay, and that 
Russia is catching up on new investment in infrastructure due to the artificially low 
prices for so many years, which reduced investment.
514
 
 
Despite reducing social spending overall following the 2008 oil price collapse, Vladimir 
Putin appears to have targeted spending on key projects in certain regions, such as the 
Sochi Winter Olympic Games, however as of 2016 it is unclear how sustainable large 
transfers to the regions will remain, given that the Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, the 
“Reserve Fund” was expected to deplete by more than half, projected to lost over $40 
billion through 2016.
515
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This has resulted in a financial crisis for Russia and undermines the Russian 
government’s attempts to save oil revenue in sovereign wealth funds, which had 
previously been relatively successful. Aslund examines Russian international reserves, 
looking at the different components of Russia’s financial safety net, including gold. He 
notes the declared aim of the Weatlh Fund, which, 
 
“is a part of federal budget assets. NWF is dedicated to support [the] pension 
system of the Russian Federation to guarantee long-term sound functioning of 
the system. [The] Fund's primary assignments are to cofinance voluntary 
pension savings of Russian citizens and to balance [the] budget of Pension Fund 
of the Russian Federation.”516 
 
Aslund also notes that much of these funds are committed to investment in 
infrastructure, including Rosneft’s planned purchase of $49 billion worth of assets of 
TNK-BP which Aslund describes as “wasteful,” although the money was never 
transferred. Alsund notes the mission statement of the reserve fund, while writing that 
much of the fund is deposited in state banks and difficult to withdraw in an 
emergency.
517
  
 
“The Reserve Fund is a part of the federal budget assets. The Reserve Fund is 
dedicated to ensure financing of the federal budget expenses and maintaining 
federal budget balance in case oil and gas budget revenues decline.”518  
 
Despite this, during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, withdrawals from the Reserve 
Fund increased, although the Welfare Fund managed to increase in value, reaching $83 
billion in 2014.
519
 
 
However, one of the fiscal problems Russia has experienced, as with Iraq and Nigeria, 
is an optimistic outlook on oil prices. Under relatively high global prices, Russia 
enacted a “budget rule” in 2013, intended to amass greater sovereign wealth, which 
assumed long term average $80 oil prices. This rule was abandoned in 2015, as Russia 
planned a 2016 budget based on an average price of $50 oil, which was still too 
                                               
516
 Anders Aslund, “Are Russia’s reserves running dangerously low?” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. November 20
th
 2014. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-
issues-watch/are-russias-usable-reserves-running-dangerously-low 
517
 Ibid. 
518
 Ibid, Aslund. 
519
 Carol Matlack “Russia Set Aside $83 Billion for Pensioners. Putin Is Using It to Aid Russia Inc.” 
Bloomberg. 9.10.2014. Accessed July 16
th
 2016.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-08/russia-dips-into-its-pension-fund 
144 
 
optimistic, since prices have averaged under $45.
520
 Russia’s international reserves had 
shrunk by one fifth in the year ending December 2014.
521
 
 
Aslund suggests Russia was heading for financial crisis in late 2014 since the measure 
of minimum reserves is usually the sum amounting to 3 months’ worth of imports, 
which would have totalled $85 billion in 2013, therefore he calculates that by late 2015, 
unless there was a sudden rise in the oil price or an end to foreign sanctions, Russia 
would have over $90 billion left of reserves, enough for four months of imports. 
522
 The 
reality was more serious however, as by October 2015, the fund had fallen to over $70 
billion.
523
 
 
4.2.2 Canada 
 
Canadian provinces, with a high level of autonomy over resource wealth, enshrined by 
the constitution, have had less success than Russia in building SWFs, and Canada has 
also experienced a number of disputed between provinces and the centre over oil 
revenues. Despite having a formula to “equalize” payments into the federal coffers and 
transfers back to provinces, Canada has not escaped the effects of price volatility, but 
challenges are more geological than political. Much of the country’s reserves are found 
in the “tar sands” (also called Athabasca sands) and as such, estimates of their 
recoverability vary significantly, due to logistical challenges, environmental constraints 
and price volatility.
524
 As such, they have relied on high oil prices to be profitable. This 
has led some observers to characterise this unconventional oil boom as a “gold rush”525 
while others have framed it in more cautious terms as a potential “resource curse.”526  
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Currently, tar sands production is facing extreme financial pressure in the post June 
2014 low price environment (IEEFA, 2014.)
527
 This is of significant concern for 
Alberta, a province which holds some 168 billion barrels of proven reserves in tar sands 
528or 95% of Canada’s oil sands reserves.529 As noted,  oil and gas revenues account for 
around 3% of Canada’s GDP, as of 2015.  
Therefore, while low oil prices have been a serious development for Alberta, where the 
majority of Canadian oil and gas extraction is based, the country as a whole has 
managed to endure sustained low prices with little political instability. Despite this, 
some provinces have examined the failure to build large sovereign wealth funds which 
may have provided emergency finance following the price collapse, or potentially 
funded economic diversification.  
In 2013, a report by the University of Saskatchewan suggested that the province should 
launch its own SWF, following on from a failed attempt in the 1970s. The 
Saskatatchewan Heritage Fund (SHF) was launched in 1978 but abandoned in 1992. 
The report underlines the importance of a futures fund having permanence, rather than 
being a “rainy day fund” or a fund for financing projects when capital is not 
available.
530
 
 
The report outlines the importance of the SHF, which aimed to  
 
“1) protect and preserve resource revenues for future generations, 2) provide 
greater fiscal stability year to year by stabilizing the flow of resource revenues 
into the government’s general revenues fund, 3) enhance legislative control over 
non-renewable resource revenue by making fund investments and expenditures 
subject to approval by the legislative assembly.” 
 
Originally, the Fund was to take in 100% of resource revenues, including taxes and 
royalties on non-renewable resources, as well as revenue from investments made by the 
fund.  
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However, the report notes that controls on fund withdrawals were “informal” and by the 
late 70s’ and early 80s, much of the fund money was allocated to Crown Corporation 
loans. Expenditure gradually overtook replenishment of the fund, until its abolishment 
in 1992. (Crown Corporations are Canadian public bodies with a high level of 
autonomy from the government, designed to invest in public services, energy and 
infrastructure for the public good, where private finance is not available.) 
 
Prior to the establishment of the SHF, Alberta established its “Heritage Fund” in 1976, 
which had broader goals of financial savings and improving the quality of life for 
Albertans. The fund was initially to source 30% of resource revenues from the province, 
which was later reduced to 15%, with the rest coming from other provincial government 
revenue. In 1987, Alberta Premier Don Getty halted transfers into the fund.
531
  
 
A study later found that from 1977 to 2004, only 8.6% of funds put into the AHF were 
actually saved, with the rest being spent on projects or used to pay off provincial 
debt.
532
 Funds passing through the account in the same period totalled $122.9 billion.
533
  
 
In 2012, Conservative Provincial political party the Wildrose Party made it their 
election campaign pledge to rebuild the fund by adding 50% of every budget surplus to 
the account.
534
 By 2015, the fund was valued at over $15 billion, generating around $1.5 
billion per year, although much of the investment revenue was taken as government 
revenue, saving only $200 million per year.
535
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4.2.3 Nigeria 
 
Of the four countries covered here, Nigeria has been most affected by oil price 
volatility. In 2013, Nigeria relied on oil for 90% of export revenues and 70% 
government income, or 10% of GDP.
536
 According to PWC, Nigeria has been in a 
vicious circle where mismanagement of revenues has slowed economic growth, 
increasing political violence and reliance on fuel subsidies, with the subsequent effect of 
lessening output at a time when the country needs to export to secure market share.
537
 
As with Iraq and Russia, Nigeria has been forced to draw down limited currency 
reserves as revenues collapsed, with a budgetary break even price over $120 per barrel 
in November 2015.
538
 This Central Bank policy, perhaps executed with no other option, 
has been highly problematic with currency reserves dropping to just $20 billion by mid-
2016 from $43 billion two years previously.
539
The effect of this has been currency 
devaluation and further predictions of recession. Feeding into a vicious cycle, this will 
hamper any government attempt to increase revenue allocations for the unstable Niger 
Delta. As mentioned, this area has seen continued insurgency, which by 2016 succeeded 
in destroying pipeline infrastructure and pushing exports to 20 year lows, with a new 
insurgent group, the Niger Delta Avengers saying that one of the reasons they are 
attacking oil infrastructure is for a greater share of revenues.
540
 A sovereign wealth fund 
with strong legal restrictions on withdrawals, well managed revenue disbursement and 
policies that may have strengthened human capacity in government bureaucracy may 
have mitigated the crisis situation that has developed in Nigeria, but the creation of an 
SWF only occurred in 2014 and the first deposit into the fund did not happen until 
2015.
541
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4.2.4 UAE 
 
In contrast to the three other countries, the UAE have set an exemplary standard with 
their use of oil revenues. High oil revenues have been used to promote rapid 
development from a very low base, for example high illiteracy during the early 1970s 
led to a situation where, according to Gray the Emirates “instituted deliberate, 
meticulous strategies of economic diversification and development” that included 
significant investment in education and new business opportunities. Speaking of Gulf 
States in general, Gray notes, “It would be crude to describe SWFs as state retirement 
funds, but they do at least in some measure act as such.”542 
Haouas and Soto disagree somewhat regarding investment in education but nonetheless 
contend that the UAE has followed a number of Norway’s critical strategies for 
escaping the resource curse, namely wage controls, the sovereign wealth fund and 
strategic protection of key industry until it is ready to compete globally. It would seem 
logical therefore, that inter-state tensions within the federation could be exacerbated to 
critical levels in the advent of price collapses, but the sheer size of the sovereign wealth 
fund, as high as $875 bn, has mitigated this problem as of 2016 (Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute, 2014.)
543
  
 
4.2.5 Financial stability: Implications for Iraq 
 
If sanctions and low oil prices continue in Russia, there is speculation that the country 
may see a decline in production measured in the millions of barrels up to 2030, and if 
the state had not had to rely heavily on drawing down sovereign reserves, the funds may 
have been available to boost investment required to maintain state-run production. This 
lack of funds is a result of dependency on revenues, but also a result of the inefficiency 
of generous fuel subsidies, as described. As with Nigeria, Russia has also shown a 
record of over estimating the oil price, at one point setting an $80 long term average 
estimate. This is undoubtedly very unhelpful for economic planning and serves as 
another warning to Iraq to not repeat past behaviour, and instead perhaps to assume 
lower average prices as a rule. 
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In contrast, the UAE seemingly serves as a strong model for Iraq, until the emirates’ 
very small population is considered. Evidently, the UAE have been fortunate to have a 
tightly controlled political system which strongly considered the interests of its people 
and where possible, invested funds to diversify the economy and put funds aside for the 
nearly $800 billion SWF. Iraq’s experience with authoritarian governance however, and 
the size of Iraq, suggests this is far from a good option.  
 
Russia, being considerably larger than Iraq, is an interesting case since the country 
managed to amass significant sums across three funds, only to see these rapidly deplete 
during the oil price collapse, in part due to the large population of the country. Canada 
and Nigeria, as mentioned, created but failed to sustain SWFs.  The lesson here for Iraq 
is a difficult one to assess, since few countries have had success with SWFs. This 
perhaps places more importance on efficiency (better planning) in the petroleum value 
chain, a strong focus of the UAE and a critically weak point in Russian and Nigerian 
energy strategy. This is not to say that Iraq should avoid replenishing currency 
reserves—Russia shows how the funds have been a vital buffer under low prices, but in 
the absence of a diversified economy, they will only last so long. 
 
4.3 Legal framework 
 
4.3.1 Nigeria 
 
One of the problems Nigeria has experienced is the lack of a strong legal system that 
can prevent regulatory capture, despite an early effort to separate regulator and 
regulated bodies. During the 1960s, a period of rapid expansion in the Nigerian energy 
sector, the main organization with oversight of hydrocarbons was the Ministry of Mines 
and Power.
544
 By 1970, exploration and licensing had expanded to the extent that a new 
organization was called for, and personnel were taken from the MMP to form the 
Department of Petroleum Resources.
545
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The following year, Nigeria joined OPEC, and the organization stipulated that all 
members must have a national oil company to have greater control over the 
hydrocarbon sector and therefore be more responsive to OPEC policy. The Nigerian 
National Oil Company was subsequently formed, to manage crude oil marketing, 
facilities construction and exploration—an increasingly important task now that, due to 
another OPEC directive, member governments were to acquire 35% equity participation 
in IOC activity. In 1977 NNOC was replaced with the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Company, tasked with representing the interests of the federal govt. Since the beginning 
of significant IOC activity in Nigeria in the late 1950s, the govt’s role had been purely 
regulatory, overseeing price controls on refined product for the domestic market, 
collecting fees from exploration licenses and leases, taxes and royalty payments.
546
  
 
According to Thurber and Nwokeji, Nigeria pioneered the separation of regulator and 
NOC, one year before Norway’s pioneering “Ten Oil Commandments” White Paper 
with the separation of NNOC and DPR, but this did not prevent opportunities for 
corruption. Quoting Gillies Iledare and Suberu note how, until 1988, the DPR had 
existed as “a unit inside the NNPC” which was “an untenable situation” in terms of 
undue influence.
547
 
 
Political influence in the energy sector has at times involved the president, as Iledare 
and Suberu note, the role has overriding authority over hydrocarbon activity, a more 
negative influence during the country’s periods of military dictatorship. Nwokeji 
highlights how a loyalist to the military dictator, President Yakubu Gowan was 
appointed to head NNOC, Phillip Asiodu, who had no oil experience and was able to 
overrule regulatory decisions by the DPR, and technical advice from NNOC staff, in 
collusion with the Ministry of Mines and Power.This nullified any benefits of a 
separated system similar to Norway, as Victor, Holts and Thurbernote, 
548
 
 
“while DPR is the formal regulatory body, NNPC often plays the role of de facto 
regulator through its interactions with IOCs. Conflicts of interest are inevitable. 
For example, NNPC both regulates local content and in theory can supply it. 
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Also, NNPC is responsible for cost regulation in the joint ventures while 
simultaneously serving as the majority partner in these ventures.”549 
 
Currently, the way the Nigerian system is organized still encourages mismanagement 
because the Department of Petroleum Resources and Ministry of Oil are closely 
politically linked and controlled by the government. Agboade and Abebe explain how 
under the Petroleum Act, the Federal Govt. has the ownership of petroleum resources in 
Nigeria, and under the act, all activities ranging from exploration to production and 
distribution of crude oil and natural gas may only be done with the consent of Minister 
of Petroleum Resources, via the Dept. of Petroleum Resources. 
 
The DPR issues licenses and permits. According to Agboade and Abebe, the act also 
vests in the Minister regulatory powers deemed “necessary” for these functions. 
Nonetheless, there has been an ongoing attempt in Nigeria to create a strong legal 
framework for the industry. Iledare and Suberu note that it was not until 2007 that 
Nigeria attempted to formulate a long-term energy policy, due in large part to political 
instability under the previous military dictatorships. However, the Obasanjo 
administration set in motion a reorganization of the energy sector, following the 
recommendations of Nigeria’s first Nigerian Extraction Industry Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI) report, in 2006.
550
 
 
Attempting to enforce transparency, Nigeria has also struggled against corruption. Such 
a strategy, while vital, may ultimately save less than a comprehensive law on petroleum 
(which as noted has stalled in parliament) and has cost the country tens of billions in 
lost investment and caused the near collapse of NNPC through politicised 
mismanagement. The new law is supposed to partly privatise the NOC and introduce a 
new Nigeria Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NPRC) to oversee license bid rounds 
and fuel prices. The NPRC would have an investigation unit with the power to make 
arrests, an improvement on the current situation where multiple bodies have an ill 
defined regulatory function, leading to conflicts of interest and regulatory power within 
the NNPC. 
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Re-organization would see the passing of a Petroleum Industry Bill which would allow 
for the creation of a new organization, the National Petroleum Directorate, which would 
come into existence in the place of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.
552
 Three new 
regulators, the Nigerian Petroleum Inspectorate, the National Midstream Regulatory 
Agency, and the Petroleum Products Regulatory Authority, would come into existence, 
in addition to a new and completely re-structured NOC.
553
 
Due to political disputes over the Petroleum Industry Bill, as of 2016 it has not yet 
passed into law.
554
 Despite this disappointment for the NEITI, Iledare and Suberu 
describe a slow but consistent success of Nigerian administrations from the 1980s 
onwards, namely the use of incentives and fines to reduce gas flaring, from 100% in 
1970, to 90% in 1980, to 77% in 1990, to 50% in 2000 and 26% in 2008.
555
 These 
figures are disputable however, since the World Bank noted Nigeria was still flaring 13 
bcm a year in 2012, the second biggest flarer in the world. 
556
 
4.3.2 UAE 
 
As already highlighted, each Emirate has jurisdiction of natural resources within its 
boundaries, although the Supreme Petroleum Council regulates oil and gas law across 
the Emirates. Main Garcia highlights how contracts are awarded to state owned oil 
companies by way of concession, and IOC participation is limited to minority 
ownership interests in the state company. The state companies grant Technical Service 
Contracts to their IOC partners.
557
 
 
These concessions convey the right to explore, develop and produce petroleum; 
however there is no comprehensive law governing exploration and development 
concessions, but rather a series of laws, such as the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Resources 
Conservation Law and the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Law.
558
 This suggests that, 
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provided all sub-state entities respect legislation, having hydrocarbon law in a single 
document may not be essential, however, as noted, the UAE is much smaller and 
ethnically homogenous, compared to Iraq. 
 
Within Abu Dhabi, ADNOC manages upstream, midstream and downstream oil and gas 
operations on behalf of the government of Abu Dhabi. Article 4 of the Abu Dhabi Gas 
Ownership Law affords ADNOC the right to exploit and use all gas discovered or to be 
discovered within Abu Dhabi and to claim all rights derived from agreements concluded 
by the govt. of Abu Dhabi, which are related to gas discovered or produced, or the 
facilities of production and extraction of gas. ADNOC reports directly to the SPC.
559
 
 
In Sharjah, the Sharjah Petroleum Council is responsible for regulating policy regarding 
the development of oil and natural gas in that emirate. The council also submits 
recommendations to the ruler for concessions and concluding such agreements, and 
represents the Sharjah govt. in companies which participate in oil and gas investments.  
 
The Federal Ministry of Energy’s influence is limited by the constitutional powers of 
the Emirates, although a Federal Ministry of Environment and Water has oversight on 
those issues, in conjunction with environmental departments in the emirates, and has 
some power over approving oil and gas projects, to enforce the Federal Environment 
Law. This illustrates a functioning collaborative approach that the Iraqi constitution 
aimed for, which did not work in practice. Again, a likely reason for this success is the 
UAE’s small size and ethno-sectarian homogeneity when compared to Iraq.  
 
4.3.3 Russia 
 
The structure of the Federal Executive Bodies in charge of the Oil and Gas sector was 
created by the Presidential Decree 724 on Question of the System and Structure of the 
Federal Executive Bodies, in May 2008. The main regulatory bodies influencing oil and 
gas contracts are:  
 
● The Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation. 
● The Federal Agency for Subsoil use (Rosnedra),  
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● The Federal Supervisory natural Resource Management Service 
(Rosprirodnadzor)  
 
According to Ovcharova the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian 
Federation has control over Rosnedra and Rosprirodnadzor.
560
 It is also supervises and 
controls The Federal Forestry Agency and the Federal Water Resources Agency. The 
Ministry has federal executive authority with responsibilities for public policy making 
and industry regulation, with priorities for renewal and conservation of natural resources 
of forests, bodies of water, fauna and many other duties to ensure environmental 
continuity.
561
  
 
Specific to hydrocarbons, the Ministry of Natural Resources is responsible for 
monitoring pollution, policy making, implementation, and statutory regulation, 
encompassing issues relating to production and consumption and waste management. 
562
 
 
Kesselman, Krieger and Joseph note how until 2000, there was a separate organization 
for environmental oversight, the State Committee for Environmental Protection, which 
was abolished with the creation of the MNR. They suggest that the abolishment of a 
dedicated environmental regulatory body is indicative of a low level of concern for the 
environment in Russia. 
563
  
 
Rosnedra, reporting to the Ministry of Natural Resources, manages federal property in 
the context of petroleum extraction. It is the acting owner of federal lands and works as 
the main body guiding the tender process for concession licenses and awarding PSA’s 
through committee decisions in accordance to the procedure laid down by law. Socor 
notes how Rosnedra recently warned Hungarian—Russian joint enterprise ZMB, who 
were operating in Khansi-Mansi, to capture rather than flare or re-inject associated 
gas.
564
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The compliance of licenses issued by Rosnedra are monitored by The Federal 
Supervisory natural Resource Management Service (Rosprirodnadzor). This institution 
is in charge of the Ministry of Natural Resources. It has the authority to monitor 
exploration and production activities and to issue fines and/or other negative legal 
consequences.  For example, Krysiek gives the example of Rosprirodnadzor being 
asked by the MNR to investigate the conduct of Total in allegedly failing to meet terms 
of a PSA for the Kharyaga project.
565
 
 
According to this allegation, Total had only managed to produce 20,000 bpd of the 
65,000 bpd quota outlined in the PSA, had failed to introduce the best technology 
available for the project, and had flared most of the associated gas, contrary to the 
wishes of the MNR.
566
 
 
Rosprirodnadzor was asked to investigate what had gone wrong with the Kharyaga 
project, and decided that Total would have to pay a small fine of over $1000 for its 
mismanagement, something Krysiek suggests is indicative of an “incoherent” energy 
policy, following aggressive Russian interventions in the Kovytka (TNK-BP) case. 
567
 
Despite these challenges, Russia managed to use 76% of associated gas by 2012.
568
 
 
However, Russia’s attempts to eliminate flaring have been restricted by the price 
collapse, as investment in oil output has been prioritised over investment on the 
infrastructure required to process the gas, a situation made more challenging by 
sanctions against Russia, and the fact that associated gas increases with oil 
production.
569
  
 
Regarding regulation and punishment of companies for flaring, if the discrepancy 
regarding how Russia treated TNK-BP and the low fine for Total over flaring suggests 
incoherent policy, then the same can certainly be said of Iraq, since (as one example) if 
an IOC caused an oil spillage in the KRI which then contaminated a waterway leading 
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into Arab Iraq, there is potentially a difficult question as to whom would impose 
penalties on the IOC and under which law would this fall, the KRI Oil Law or 
Baghdad’s 2009 environmental legislation, which outlines punishment for 
environmental damage. In the KRI, Article 31 of the Kurdish oil law says that IOCs 
must,  
 
“Report to the competent entity within the government on the amounts of 
operational and accidental discharge, leakage and waste resulting from 
Petroleum Operations.”570 
 
The question of how Baghdad would deal with such a situation involving a 
transboundary waterway suggests this may not simply be an issue for the KRI. 
 
Therefore, while the relationship between the regulator and the operator needs to be 
legally formalised, this becomes more complex in a federation if the regulating body 
does not have clearly defined powers. Decisions over why, when, and where to regulate 
the industry need to be established and clarified within a legal framework. For example, 
Iraq’s Ministry of Oil clashed with the Ministry of Environment over a 2013 oil spill 
that nearly saw 2200 tons of crude oil contaminate the city of Basra’s water supply. In 
the end, the spill was cleared up by CNPC before any fines were imposed, but had this 
become a legal battle the question over which ministry had the legal authority to deal 
with the issue could have become a protracted struggle.
571
  
 
4.3.4 Canada 
 
The case of Canada suggests how problematic it could be for a transitional nation such 
as Iraq to formulate a legal framework, since Ottawa has already struggled with 
provinces over environmental law on a national and international level. As noted, even 
in Canada the National Energy Board has been accused of lacking transparency and 
“regulatory capture.”572 Cases examined here in Nigeria, Canada and Russia all 
demonstrate the damage that can be done not only through regulatory uncertainty, but 
also through poorly defined legal frameworks.  
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Despite some controversy, Radon notes how Canada automatically benefits from an 
advanced legal system, which has influenced its choice of fiscal regime, the licensing 
agreement, noting,  
“With a well-developed legal system, as in most industrialized countries such as 
the UK, Norway, and Canada, a license or concession agreement can focus on 
the commercial terms without the burden of devising contractual provisions to 
fill in gaps in the legal system of the host country.”573 
 
4.3.5 Legal framework: Implications for Iraq 
 
Nigeria is awaiting the passing of the Petroleum Industries Bill, which would see the 
creation of three new regulators and a Nigerian Petroleum Directorate, which would 
regulate a re-structured NOC, which would also be partly privatised. This is a similar 
situation to the legal gridlock in Iraq. In the UAE, the Supreme Petroleum Council is in 
theory the independent regulator of the Federal Ministry of Energy and has oversight 
over the award of contracts, while some observers have noted political influence in its 
composition. Any damaging effect of this appears to be mitigated somewhat by the 
powers of the emirates themselves, which are enshrined in the constitution and give the 
right to enter into contracts, choosing contract types to suit local conditions, reducing 
the over-centralisation of power which has affected Iraq, Russia and Nigeria.  
 
This appears to be an effectively federated model that Iraq learn from, in addition to the 
UAE’s merging of ministries, which improves overall energy sector coordination. In 
Iraq, this would have to be legislated for however. Furthermore, Iraq’s experience with 
IOCs on major projects is relatively recent regarding the post 2003 transition and an 
important point has been made regarding Canada’s legal framework, which is that well 
developed economies do not have to “fill in the gaps” in their legal systems by creating 
contractual clauses. Iraq has some way to go before reaching such a situation, where 
contracting with IOCs can focus more on commercial terms. This is a matter for Iraq’s 
overall development of capacity to deal with international companies regarding 
international business standards. 
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4.4 Fiscal Regimes 
 
4.4.1 Nigeria 
 
Early contracts with IOCs in Nigeria took the form of JVs (Joint Ventures) however, 
due to the inability of the Nigerian govt. to fund their share of capital and operating 
expenditures, JVs were no longer seen as preferable agreements although 7 joint venture 
contracts still exist in Nigeria.
574
 
Subsequently, PSCs were introduced, with the first being signed in 1973 with Ashland 
oil, and by 2006, there were 25 PSCs in operation, accounting for 20% of production. 
575
Under the petroleum sector reforms of the Obasanjo govt. Service Contracts were 
introduced in 2000, which according to Nwokeji bore some resemblance to JVs, in the 
sense that NNPC subsidiaries are partnered with the IOC, as in the case of the Service 
Contract between NNPC’s E&P subsidiary and Italian IOC Agip. Nigerian PSCs 
contain clauses which demand technology transfer, local suppliers and capacity 
building, as per the Local Content Act and Petroleum Act, but they also include firm 
protective stabilization clauses. 
576
 Despite the stabilization clauses however, Nigerian 
law calls for arbitration in Nigeria in accordance with the country’s Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act. Therefore, while Nigeria has clearly tried to strike a balance between 
national sovereignty and attracting IOC investment, the absence of separation of powers 
has led to inbuilt inefficiencies in the petroleum policy framework, as described above.  
4.4.2 Russia 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hill and Fee describe the advent of PSAs in 
Russia, arising from the needs of an industry that was “reserve rich but cash starved” 
and that PSAs seemed to provide a model which could attract rapid IOC investment and 
experience. 
577
 PSA applications involve a combination of civil law (mainly the Federal 
Law on Production Sharing Agreements) and administrative procedures. The first PSA 
in Russia was the Sakhalin 2 agreement in 1994, between the Sakhalin Energy 
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Investment Company (SEIC), a consortium consisting of Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, 
and the Russian Federation.
578
  
 
Krysiek describes what was considered by Rutledge to be an exceptionally generous 
PSA compared to preceding PSAs around the world. Rutledge calls this a “non-sharing 
agreement.”579 Signed in 1994, the Sakhalin II agreement was atypical of a PSA in that 
risk was not shared by the state and the consortium, but carried almost entirely by the 
Russian govt. Rutledge outlines several key reasons for what he sees as a failure of this 
PSA, and the eventual govt. intervention in PSA agreements under Putin. 
 
Firstly, much of the exploratory work had been executed prior to the signing of the 
PSA, effectively eliminating risk for the consortium. Secondly, the consortium inserted 
into the contractual terms provisions for greater Russian cost sharing in the event of 
overspending and adverse price conditions. 
580
 Krysiek subsequently outlines how initial 
political opposition to PSAs in Russia created the conditions for Putin to diminish their 
attractiveness and reassert NOC control. Putin passed new legislation that restricted the 
number of fields that could be operated under PSA contracts, and in 2003 changed the 
federal tax code to make the agreements less attractive to IOCs. While this may have 
satisfied concerns about Russian sovereign control of resources, it may not prove an 
instructive lesson for Iraq, since great need for capital intensive enhanced oil recovery 
project requires favourable terms for investors. Currently, as we see in Chapter 5, Iraq’s 
oil contracts are poorly balanced being neither favourable to the government or IOCs 
under low oil prices.  
 
While existing PSAs at Kharyaga, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhlin-2 were unaffected by 
changes to tax codes, Putin’s government moved to significantly increase state owned 
participation in the projects, as previously discussed, although the current level of IOC 
involvement under Putin is contested by Treisman, as noted above, who states that the 
state’s share of the Sakhalin 2 project was no more than 42% in 2002.581 However, 
Ovcharova summarises the views of many analysts when she notes that in order to 
attract more foreign investment for ventures on the continental shelf, the Russian govt. 
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will have to “stabilise the business climate” and “make the Russian legal framework 
friendlier for subsoil users and investors.”582  
 
4.4.3 UAE 
 
The experience of the UAE can be characterised as a transition away from Concessions 
to PSAs and TSCAs, because low extraction costs remain attractive to IOCs in 
comparison to the many logistical, political and climatic challenges of working in 
Russia. As mentioned, each emirate oversees concessions for development, exploration 
and production of natural resources. State owned enterprises, such as ADNOC issue 
concessions to IOCs, who have minority ownership interests in the SOE.
583
 
 
Subsequently, each Emirate sets the terms for these concessions, and gains benefit 
through corporate tax and equity participation through the project companies.
584
 As a 
result of this arrangement, Abu Dhabi is the main contributor to the federal budget, and 
now prefers PSAs with majority ADNOC involvement to recently expired (or about to 
expire) concessions. For example, IOCs under the old ADCO concession (which 
expired in January 2014) received only $1 per barrel produced. Under new 40 year 
offshore concessions, Japan’s Inpex and Total received 10 and 5% interest in fields 
offering $3 per barrel.
585
 
 
Underlining the UAE’s loose federal arrangement, the contractual arrangement in Dubai 
and Sharjah is somewhat different, and service contracts are used to gain the most from 
mature fields, while the other (smaller) emirates use PSAs.
586
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4.4.4 Canada 
 
Bankes outlines how Alberta’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Tenure Regulation (under 
the authority of the mines and minerals act) outlines two forms of tenure: a petroleum 
and natural gas license and a petroleum and natural gas lease. 
587
 
This a concession system, as described by Deholis and Cuschieri,  
“The oil and gas regime in Canada is concession-based and the Crown does not 
normally co-own or directly participate in oil and gas projects. The owner of the 
mineral rights, whether the Crown or the owners of freehold estates, will 
typically grant a company a lease that gives the lessee the right to explore and 
drill for, remove and dispose of minerals for a set term in exchange for a certain 
amount of consideration, rental fees and royalty interests on recovered 
minerals.”588 
What is particularly interesting here is that the concession system in Canada has proven 
so controversial historically in Iraq and Nigeria, and yet has been so readily accepted in 
Canada, which enjoys a high degree of public support for the oil and gas industry. 
Nonetheless, this issue has still been politically contested. Highly privatised production 
in Alberta drew scrutiny in 2012 with a report that noted more than two thirds of 
production of oil sands is owned by foreign private enterprise, while defenders of IOC 
investment in Alberta point to the Canadian Energy Research Institute study which 
notes that around 100,000 direct and indirect jobs are created by the sector. 
589
  
4.4.5 Fiscal regimes: Implications for Iraq 
 
Nigeria has transitioned away from JVs, in large part due to the government’s failure to 
pay its share of investment in projects, a situation similar to that experienced with Iraq’s 
TSCs, which are rooted in the JV approach. Notably, Iraq’s mounting debt to IOCs 
during the oil price collapse has not catastrophically impacted projects, but has led the 
state to take on growing debt to keep energy projects moving and maintain production 
levels.  
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Nigeria has also seen similar problems maintaining IOC investment, and despite an 
attempt to phase out JVs, only 20% of contracts were PSCs by 2006, as noted. A 
potential lesson here is that an oil ministry under strong political control may be 
unwilling to relinquish control of the sector to the extent of abandoning the JV approach 
and that in the long term, this may increase the risk of political mismanagement, 
heightening political risk in the sector. For Iraq, this is further evidence of the need to 
have a strong independent regulator.  
 
In contrast, Russia’s lesson may be a warning the other way, with overly generous 
PSAs, or “product non-sharing agreements” as they were called by one analyst, leading 
to a backlash against IOCs and burdensome taxes on the sector, a situation which has 
largely been reversed in response to the price collapse. While Iraq rejected PSAs, there 
is a risk that new contract models for new fields could diverge too sharply from state 
participation and place the burden of risk with the Iraqi state.  
 
Going forward, the lesson Russia provides is that there must be a balance between IOC 
and state interests in contracts, where risk is shared as prices rise and fall, but at the 
same time the IOC participation is not so great as to provoke a damaging political 
backlash, as seen following Russia’s Sakhalin PSA contracts. The UAE is perhaps 
exemplary regarding fiscal regimes, which generally award IOCs small participation in 
fields (following quite generous concessions in previous years) which is offset by low 
extraction costs and long contractual terms. Most importantly, the fiscal regime is 
different depending on the circumstance of the field, an arrangement which has been 
followed unofficially in Iraq, where it has led to a dispute (as noted, the MNR has 
chosen PSAs due to more challenging geological conditions.) 
 
On the other hand, Canada’s licensing and leasing system favoured by the provinces has 
attracted and largely sustained foreign investment even during the price collapse which 
has placed huge pressure on the tar sands industry. Based on controversy surrounding 
PSAs in Iraq, such an approach would likely prove politically impossible, at least in the 
short term.  
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4.5 Production Scenarios 
 
4.5.1 UAE 
 
As in Russia, Canada and Nigeria, the question of how much state involvement in the 
UAE’s energy sector has been a determining factor in output, although interestingly, the 
UAE have managed to sustain high oil output despite fairly low profit margins for 
IOCs, aided by a per barrel extraction cost of around $7 in 2009.
590
 In the absence of 
complex geological, political and logistical risk, IOC participation has been high, 
helping the country maintain high output even as other countries have seen collapsing 
capital expenditure. However, low oil prices have delayed plans to raise oil production, 
9.2% of the OPEC total 
591
 ADNOC originally planned to increase output to 3.5 million 
bpd by 2018 from 2.8 million bpd, but according to Anthony Dipaola, delayed the 
project until the oil price showed signs of recovering, since the Emirate was under no 
financial pressure to keep pumping oil. 
592
 
 
4.5.2 Canada 
 
In Canada, a liberal licensing arrangement has brought about a surge in investment, with 
tar sands alone showing an increase from 2.9 million BPD in 2007 to 3.7 million BPD 
in 2013.
593
 In the case of Alberta, the aim of attracting as much foreign IOC investment 
as possible is to create the optimum expenditure on recovery that has cost as high as 
$39.67 dollars per barrel, as of January 2016, when the oil price reached a low of $28 
dollars for lighter oil. Being heavier oil (and thus discounted due to higher refining cost) 
this was a disaster for Albertan production. 
594
 This caused a temporary slump in oil 
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sands production, particularly oil extracted through the more expensive Steam Assisted 
Gravity Drainage method.
595
 
Despite this, heavy foreign investment has helped build up in human capital and in 
many cases allowed production to keep going, even at a considerable loss. Canada was 
the fifth largest producer of oil in the world in 2013 supplying 4.7% of the world’s 
demand, and retained that position in 2015.
596
 Its latest proven oil reserves as of 2013 
stand at 174.3 Billion bbls, 10.3% of the global total. This makes Canada the third 
largest holder of oil beneath its soil. With this potential, a mid-2016 report on Canadian 
oil production to 2025 predicted an increase of over 1 million bpd, provided oil stayed 
above a $50 breakeven price. This forecast increase is less than previous forecast 
increases, due to the oil price collapse of late 2014. 
597
One reason for this increase, 
albeit revised down, is the size of investments in oil sands projects, which have caused 
investors to keep operations going, rather than terminate work or shut in production, 
which can damage oil sands reservoirs. 
598
 Therefore, it can be said that even in the 
presence of expensive production costs and high distance to market, Alberta’s oil 
production has benefitted from liberal investment policies, which have kept IOC interest 
even in very adverse market conditions.  
4.5.3 Nigeria 
 
Nigeria has been much less fortunate, although it remains Africa’s largest oil producer, 
accounting for approximately 26% of Africa’s oil production (IETI, 2014) and 
approximately 2.7% of world production (BP, 2014)
599
 in addition to having some 37 bn 
barrels of proven oil reserves (EIA,2015.)  
This status may be under threat for a number of reasons. Nigeria initially attracted IOCs 
to new contract models in the mid-1990s, leading to an increase in production, before 
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seeing a period of contractual uncertainty which damaged investor confidence.
600
 These 
investment conditions returned following the 2014 price collapse, as the government 
considered renegotiating contracts with IOCs for more revenue, as insurgent attacks 
crippled production. Nigeria also faces a natural decline in some of its older fields, 
heightening urgency to diversify the economy.
601
 Iledare points out that new production 
will also be contingent on discovering new fields. Adding further challenges, Iledare 
notes that “estimated projected annual funding requirement for JV operations alone 
ranges between $11 and $13 billion from 2007-2011.”602 This has been strained 
following the price collapse, a problem which may have been mitigated (as noted in 
“Financial Stability” above) by a larger share of revenues being put aside in a sovereign 
wealth fund.  
As in Iraq, the price collapse has put strain on the relationship between the government 
and the IOCs, as a similar situation has arisen to the 1970s, when the government failed 
to pay its share of JV costs. By 2016, the NNPC was $6 billion in debt to IOCs, and as 
in Iraq, struggled to make these payments, owing shipments of oil to fulfil PSA contract 
terms.
603
 This crisis comes at a particularly difficult time for the country’s exports, 
which were thought to be as low as 1 million barrels per day by mid-2016, and has 
fallen 800,000 bpd through infrastructure attacks alone.
604
  
A final challenge, as noted, is Nigeria’s delayed oil law, which has been stalled in 
parliament for a number of years as of 2016. The law’s delay has heightened investor 
uncertainty, with Oil Producers Trade Section of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce 
warning that this has already cost the country $50 billion in lost investment in the latter 
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half of the ‘00s, and that output may decline 25% without significant foreign capital 
attracted to the sector. 
605
 
4.5.4 Russia 
 
Russia has faced similar problems attracting enough investment to increase oil output in 
line with its Energy Strategy 2030 targets. Firstly, the main Russian natural decline in 
the giant Western Siberian fields poses a major challenge, which should offset other 
increases in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea and Eastern Siberia, with Western 
Siberia losing as much as 1 million bpd by the mid-2020s.
606
 By mid-2016, oil 
production in Russia had stabilized, having risen 10% from 9.75 to 10.75 mbpd before 
falling through 2016 and then rising again, with IOC efforts benefitting from a strong 
dollar.
607
 
Sergei Brezitsky, Vice President of TNK-BP, has noted the challenges operating in East 
Siberia, including infrastructure problems as well as complex geology, saying that 
without “tax incentive possibilities” there production increases would be constrained. 
Likewise, in 2010  Peter O’Brien, Vice President of Rosneft, noted how,  
“Uncertainty about the tax regime in East Siberia could slow investments that 
are essential if the oil industry, and the ESPO, are to flourish...We can’t proceed 
with investment decisions without more clarity.”608 
 
The oil price collapse has added further challenges, with Lukoil Chief Executive Vagit 
Alekperov noting in mid-2016 that “We will have to limit our spending and that will 
lead to a fall in production.”609 Problematically, and as with the case of Nigeria, the 
government have considered changing the fiscal regime to make up for collapsing 
government revenues. This has led Russian officials to acknowledge that production 
could decline further as new investment slumps. Lack of new FDI in the sector has been 
                                               
605
 Elisha Bala Gbogo, “Nigeria Oil contracts review adds to industry uncertainty,” Bloomberg October 8th 
2015. Acessed July 16th 2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-08/nigeria-offshore-
contracts-review-adds-to-industry-uncertainty 
606
 James Henderson, “The Strategic Implications of Russia’s Eastern Oil Resources,” Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies WPM 41  (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011)   
607
 Gabriel Collins, “Don’t expect Russia to cut oil production voluntarily. “ Forbes. October 19
th
 2016. 
Accessed November 2
nd
 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2016/10/19/dont-expect-
russia-to-cut-oil-production-voluntarily/#65294a77381f 
608
  Ibid. 
609
 Nick Cunningham, “Is A Russian, OPEC Production Cut In The Making? January 25th 2016, accessed 
July 16th 2016. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Is-A-Russian-OPEC-Production-Cut-In-The-
Making.html 
167 
 
exacerbated by the post 2014 sanctions which have led to Russia increasingly turning to 
Chinese IOCs to help boost production (China has not observed Western imposed 
sanctions) which has occurred with some success at Imilor.
610
 Taken together, these 
challenges amount to a forecast of ongoing production decline in the former USSR, 
according to IEA estimates. 
611
 
Only a regional basis, this was reflected in a fall in production at Khanty Mansiyisk 
(which comprises half of Russian production) of 2.8% in 2015, and a fall of 6% in the 
first nine months of 2015 at Rosneft’s West Siberian operations.612 Despite these 
challenges, the potential of Russian reserves still attracts a high level of IOC interest 
with BP-Rosneft investing $300 million in Eastern Siberian development and 
exploration in the summer of 2016.
613
 
 
4.5.5 Production scenarios: Implications for Iraq 
 
With the exception of the UAE, which as noted has benefitted from an exceptionally 
low per barrel extraction cost and a stable business environment for IOCs, and Russia, 
which has been forced to radically revise fiscal regimes (mainly cutting Mineral 
Extraction Tax) all countries in the study have struggled to hold off production declines 
following the price collapse. As noted, Russia is seeing risk of collapsing production, 
but analysts are generally divided as to how soon this may occur. 
 
However, a couple of lessons may be relevant to Iraq in the coming years. Firstly, in the 
case of Canada, the liberal investment climate has helped IOCs invest in new extraction 
methods and has helped provinces attract the most highly skilled workers, which may 
have offset some of the effects of the price collapse, by focusing knowledge on 
efficiency gains. As noted, Canada may yet see an increase in production if global 
prices remain above $50.  
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For Iraq, this means that it is important for future contracts to harness IOC investment 
in Iraqi capability and local content. Existing contracts have these provisions, but it may 
be worthwhile for Iraq to explore ways of increasing IOC investment in local human 
capital. This may involve leaning towards more investor friendly contracts that allow 
higher remuneration for IOCs under high price scenarios, while allocating a higher 
percentage of these funds to developing Iraqi oil sector personnel. At the same time, 
government take would need to be sustainable under low prices. 
 
In terms of collapsing production, Nigeria offers a warning to Iraq, which is again one 
of over-centralisation and strong political interference in the sector, mismanaging 
everything from revenues to abusing local content clauses for corrupt purposes. As will 
be discussed in the concluding chapters, the over-arching lesson here is depoliticization 
of the sector through strong independent regulation that allows for as much 
transparency as IOCs will allow (without compromising company secrets.) Russia’s 
lesson, if any, is that Iraq must be flexible with contractual terms as the global oil 
market changes and possibly enters a new era of volatility. 
4.6 Oil Markets 
4.6.1 Canada 
 
Canada’s reaction to conditions in the global market has in many ways shaped the 
current private sector dominance of the sector, after failed government intervention in 
the wake of the 1973 price spike, in the form of the National Oil Policy. According to 
Brownsey, Gattinger and Doern, Diefenbaker’s govt. implemented the NOP primarily to 
protect Western Canadian production from US quotas, which resulted in the price wall 
across Canada along the Ottawa valley.
614
 Canadians in the West could purchase only 
Canadian petroleum products, while Canadian private citizens, industry and the 
downstream sector in the East would rely on imports from Venezuela and the Middle 
East.
615
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Additionally, the NOP was partly the result of Canadian oil companies lobbying the 
federal govt. for protection against cheap foreign imports
616
 As such, Brownsey, 
Gattinger and Doern view the NOP as insulation against the threat of OPEC, formed a 
year previously. This policy had the consequence of placing consumers and the 
downstream sector in Western Canada at a disadvantage, paying more for oil (closer to 
US prices) compared to their Eastern counterparts.
617
   
However, a multi authored IPB report disputes the claim that the East—West pricing 
difference was significant for consumers, and claims that in reality Alberta producers 
were “capable of meeting the price of international oil at Montreal.”618 The IPB authors 
also claim that IOCs importing to refiners in Eastern Canada were selling at prices that 
did not fully reflect the cheaper production costs in Venezuela and the MENA region, 
negating some of the saving for Western Canadian consumers.
619
  
The situation for major producers Alberta and Saskatchewan turned in their favour in 
1973 with the advent of the Arab oil embargo and a fourfold increase in prices. It is 
generally accepted that the Eastern provinces were now suffering higher prices (see 
Gattinger, Doern) although Feehan notes that under high price scenarios, equalization 
payments made from the “have” provinces may have offset a lot of the revenue gains.620 
This spurred the producing provinces to counter with the creation of their own 
provincially controlled companies, in part a reaction to the detrimental NOP policies 
.
621
Pratt points out that a further interventionist govt. response to the 1973 crisis was to 
tax conventional oil production in Alberta, and use the proceeds of this tax to invest in 
unconventional oil development and finally, to create Petro Canada, essentially a 
company created to cement Canadian influence in the energy sector and limit the effect 
of IOCs gaining from windfall profits.
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According to Fossum the creation of Petro Canada had a number of national objectives, 
besides appeasing nationalist concern about foreign IOC dominance.
623
 These 
objectives, stated in a 1973 Energy, Minerals and Resources department (EMR) report 
on the creation of an NOC, included increasing federal govt. understanding of the oil 
and gas industry (they had not had much previous access to all IOC data) increasing 
supply security and revenues to the federal govt. and increasing Canadian ownership.
624
  
Desveux notes that this report, An energy strategy for Canada: Phase 1 argues that the 
strategic objectives of an NOC are worthwhile, but the high cost to the taxpayer, in 
addition to the likely inefficiency of a state owned enterprise, were significant risks. 
625
 
Nonetheless, either through strategic necessity or nationalism, Canadian political 
consensus after the 1973 embargo enabled further state intervention in the energy 
sector, outlined in a “national energy strategy for self-reliance,” in 1976.626 That report, 
An energy strategy for Canada: policies for self-reliance, envisioned the objective to 
reduce foreign imports to one third of oil supplies by 1985, with a final objective of 
total self-reliance for natural gas. Subsequently, the EMR raised difficult questions 
regarding the initial costs of such a plan. 
627
 With increasing state intervention, Canada 
was approaching what is widely seen by several analysts reviewed here as its most 
controversial energy policy. The failed National Energy Program of 1980-1985 aimed 
to increase Canadian ownership in the oil and gas industry by 50% by 1990.
628
 The NEP 
was abandoned after estimates placed losses in revenues for Alberta as high as $100 
billion, as well as recession in Alberta, with IOCs leaving or halving investments due to 
the federal oil export tax. 
629
 Furthermore, NEP was opposed by Albertans, according to 
one poll, by a ratio of 5 opposed to one in favour. In 1984, a new Conservative 
government formally ended the NOP.
630
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Privatisation of the industry has not insulated the sector from the effect of the 2014 
price collapse. In Canada the slump has caused capex to fall 40% compared to 2015.
631
 
However, Canada’s economy is far more diversified than any of the nations covered 
here, with oil and gas accounting for only 3% of GDP, as noted. However, due to the 
concentration of oil and gas in Alberta, the province faced a deficit of over $10 billion 
in 2016, with Canadian energy company Encana cutting its workforce by over half the 
level before the 2014 price collapse, the worst contraction since the 1982 oil slump.
632
  
 From 1994 to 2014, Alberta’s GDP grew by an average of 3.5 per cent a year, 
accounting for 25 per cent of net new jobs for the entire country over the same period. 
This has been particularly problematic for the province which relies on oil for over 30% 
of its GDP,
633
 leading to speculation as to whether the province had the resource curse . 
Freeman notes,  
 “Revenues from Alberta flowed into federal coffers, boosting overall growth 
and, along with a well-cultivated housing bubble, allowing Canada to avoid the 
worst of the Great Recession of 2008-09. Furthermore, Alberta provided a huge 
safety valve for surplus labour from other parts of the country. Thousands of 
skilled and not-so-skilled workers from the Atlantic provinces, Quebec and 
Ontario flocked to Fort McMurray for the high wages, sending money home like 
immigrants providing remittances to their families abroad.”634 
Freeman also suggests that this reliance on hydrocarbons has deferred sensible 
economic planning. Morton and Mcdonald note however that Alberta has had some 
limited success diversifying its economy, pointing to petrochemical growth with the 
industry accounting for half of Canada’s petrochemical industry and almost 10,000 
jobs.
635
 However, they note that diversification efforts made by Alberta Premiers Peter 
Lougheed and Don Getty in the 1980s had largely failed, arguing that this confirms 
Mathias’ “forced growth” theory, whereby the government lacks the expertise to 
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effectively allocate loans and grants to stimulate different economic sectors, and that 
these allocations can fall prey to cronyism. This would certainly be relevant in the case 
of Iraq, where many observers including Gunter, Bowen andDodge refer to rampant 
cronyism in politics.  
They note that private sector projects require “high quality, independent, professional 
assessment of the proposed project’s long-term economic viability,” something lacking 
in the capacity of most governments. 
636
 Finally, and also relevant to Iraq, they note that 
while Alberta set up an SWF, or “Sustainability Fund” in the case of the province, the 
Klein government of Alberta repeatedly changed regulations governing withdrawals, 
and regulation became “soft and vague.”  
4.6.2 Nigeria 
 
Canada’s problems with unexpected market conditions have been small in comparison 
to Nigeria, which faces national level crisis on a number of indicators in the face of the 
oil price collapse. According to the World Bank, oil accounts for close to 90% of 
Nigeria’s exports and roughly 75% of the country’s budget, with a budgetary breakeven 
price of $120 at the time of the 2014 price collapse.
637
 This has forced Nigeria into the 
position of discounting its main export crude, Qua Iboe, through 2016, as well as 
focusing on internal market efficiencies.
638
 
One of the initial problems this crisis has caused will likely lead to a vicious cycle; 
funds will be needed to both help communities in the Niger Delta where unemployment 
has worsened an anti-government insurgency, which in turn has taken hundreds of 
thousands of barrels of oil off line, erasing funds needed to help rebuild areas destroyed 
by the war against militant group Boko Haram.  
However, with the price collapse, Nigeria will struggle with both the defence 
expenditure and reconstruction funds required to alleviate these problems, possibly 
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leading to more violence and greater strain on the budget.
639
 This is comparable to Iraq, 
where defence spending consumed a substantial portion of GDP in the war against ISIS, 
a problem made worse by the group's destruction of refining infrastructure in northern 
Iraq.  
In order to respond to this problem, the government has attempted to abolish fuel 
subsidies, so that as of 2016 fuel prices would rise from $0.43 a litre to $0.73.
640
 Fuel 
subsidies had previously thought to cost the country $2.7 million per day. According to 
Verisk Maplecroft, resistance to subsidy abolition may have been weakened, having 
previously caused riots in 2012, because black market prices arising from fuel shortages 
have often been much more than the subsidized price. 
641
 The move to abolish the 
subsidy came after an IMF advisory effort, but comes too late to change the 
fundamental reality in the country, that dependency on oil revenue has been 
excessive.
642
 
4.6.3 Russia 
 
Of the countries covered, Russia has faced a mixture of challenges, in part outlined 
above in “production scenarios,” forcing the country to pursue a strategic energy 
alliance with China, cooperating with Chinese IOCs in exchange for oil import 
contracts, which successfully saw Russia win greater market share than Saudi Arabia in 
early 2016.
643
 
Despite this, the challenges are far less immediate than in Iraq and Nigeria, but much 
worse than those faced by Canada and the UAE. Firstly, Russia’s GDP contracted 3.7% 
in 2015, while the Rouble lost 127% of its value, according to the World Bank. Most 
problematically, oil and gas account for around half of Russia’s government revenue, 
meaning that budgets and planning are severely affected, with the 2016 budget 
assuming $50, a similar problem faced by Nigeria and Iraq, where both governments 
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were too optimistic about the extent of the price collapse, possibly delaying emergency 
measures. 
644
 
This has forced the government to launch 
 an aggressive austerity strategy, widening the percentage of Russians who live in 
poverty even as industry has contracted 3.5%.
645
 As of 2016, this crisis has only 
prompted calls for greater economic diversification, with President Dmitri Medvedev 
noting that, “The current situation on the global oil market shows how the modern 
structure of the economy is necessary [for] sustainable economic growth with an 
emphasis not on the market of raw materials.”646 As noted in “production scenarios” 
one of the main Russian approaches to this challenge has been to engage more heavily 
with Chinese IOCs to boost production, since sanctions have restricted much Western 
IOC involvement, and to tie this involvement with greater attempts to secure market 
share in Asia, overtaking Saudi Arabia as China’s largest supplier. Such aggressive 
marketing has however, helped drive down the oil price, so may prove self-defeating. 
647
 
4.6.4 UAE 
 
The UAE’s apparent lack of urgency to increase high levels of production (the Emirates 
agreed to freeze production in the spring of 2016) stems in part from more modest 
budgetary requirements than Nigeria, Russia and Iraq. In 2015, as it appeared that the 
price collapse would be long in duration, the UAE’s fiscal breakeven price was 
estimated at $73. 
648
For some oil dependent countries this would be a disaster, but as 
noted, the UAE took national level strategic steps in the 1970s to aggressively diversify 
the economy. Aiming to capture as much associ-ated gas as possible, the government 
decided petrochemicals would be a pillar of its new economy, and as of 2016, 11.9 
million tonnes of petrochemicals are produced per year (Gulf Petrochemicals and 
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Chemicals Association.)
649
 Logistics, shipping and aluminium soon added to the 
economic mix, but due to the severity of the price collapse, the wider economy has not 
been without problems, as companies froze hiring through 2016
650
 and lending slowed 
down.
651
 One of the main measures the UAE has taken to counter these problems is to 
try and maintain market share in Asia, selling crude below Saudi Arabian prices.
652
  
4.6.5 Oil markets: Implications for Iraq 
 
Russia and Canada both have interesting lessons for Iraq regarding government 
intervention in the face of rapidly changing global oil markets. In the case of Canada, an 
attempt at strong state involvement through the failed National Energy Program during 
the 1980s which sought to maximise state participation through PetroCanada and apply 
burdensome taxes on IOCs, was (as noted) widely thought to have sent the industry into 
recession. Canada’s response to this failure was widespread privatisation, leading to 
some concern that IOCs are too dominant and counter arguments that the industry’s 
growth has had a knock-on effect of non-oil job creation, due to oil services money in 
local economies.  
 
If there is a lesson here for Iraq, it is that the private sector is more responsive to the 
volatility of global markets than the state. Russia’s case is more complex and involves 
the shift from widespread PSAs to growing state control and finally, a flexible tax 
system which has seen companies invest in the upstream sector despite the price 
collapse. This points to the importance of flexible and sustainable contracts which help 
both the state and the government, and suggests that Iraq should move away from TSCs.  
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Domestically however, Russia and Nigeria have both had to take radical steps to reduce 
fuel subsidies and discount oil exports to compete for market share, an experience of 
many other MRH countries, but extremely serious in the case of both of these nations, 
risking a public backlash. Likewise, in the case of Iraq, austerity and reform of the 
business environment have been features of the economy during the oil price collapse, 
but it may be too early to say how successful these measures are.  
 
This leads to a possible conclusion when governments plan around oil market 
uncertainty, which is that the caution of persistent low price forecasts by IOCs and some 
governments after 2014 is justified. For example, a number of Russian IOCs operated 
after 2014 on the basis of long term low prices. 
 
Having examined key factors relevant to local dynamics in federal MRH countries, 
attention can be turned to the focus of this study, which is the federal setting of Iraq and 
the energy institutions after 2003 at the federal and regional level. The next chapter will 
take into consideration some of the arguments discussed in the literature review of 
analysis on Iraq.  
4.7 Conclusion and implications for Iraq 
 
It is difficult to draw coherent lessons for Iraq from an array of different scenarios, 
however a number of points appear to stand out. For example, Nigeria’s favored JVs 
have shown a proven path of decline while Russian NOCs have been beset by political 
interference and inefficiency. The lesson here is that, as much as the state may want to 
give NOCs primacy in the sector, overbearing government intervention is risky and 
potentially damaging.  
 
In Iraq, Minister Ghadban wanted to rely on EPCs to massively increase production. 
This would probably not have happened, even with optimum security, based on the 
many problems MoO experienced with capacity and budget execution, even after 2010, 
when security conditions had massively improved in the south.  
 
Quite possibly, Nigeria shows how lack of investor confidence, combined with severe 
attacks on infrastructure, has decimated output, again suggesting that when security 
conditions are potentially adverse, attractive investment terms may be able to offset 
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some of the infrastructure loss through conflict. In the case of Iraq, this would mean 
strong foreign investment in the refining sector, which might have offset the destruction 
of Baiji refinery in 2014. 
 
Elsewhere, too many organizations with lack of oversight under the MoO has led to a 
culture of low transparency, smuggling and corruption, a case similar to what has 
happened in Nigeria. In Nigeria, as in Iraq, a lack of refining capacity has necessitated 
large scale state run distribution of fuel products, which has opened the door to criminal 
enterprise. This in turn is linked to subsidies, since the state is spending so much money 
on cheap fuel that it simply cannot invest in the required refining infrastructure, creating 
a vicious circle where foreign IOCs will not build new refineries, because returns on 
fuel to the domestic market are so low.  
 
Nigeria also serves as a warning in the fight to create more transparency in the oil sector 
and reduce the number of state interests and overlapping organizations; in Nigeria for 
example, the Petroleum Industries Bill would re-organize and part privatise the NOC, 
but it has been stuck in parliament, likely due to strong vested interests in maintaining 
the status quo. Similarly, some of the best provisions of DOGL have been opposed by 
individuals accused of trying to control oil revenues and having a personal interest in 
IOC contracts, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Re-organizing MoO and creating a new, partly privatised INOC with a clear separation 
of power between the two entities, could reduce some of the conflicts of interest in Iraq 
but also, could potentially increase the institutional capacity of each side of the sector 
by allowing for defined roles. Furthermore, without such separation, regulators can be 
caught up in the political interference in the sector, as was the case in Russia where 
environmental regulations were used against some IOCs, allegedly as a way of getting 
better terms from the companies after generous PSAs were found to have been dis-
satisfactory.  
 
This point relates to the importance of having contracts that are satisfactory to both the 
IOC and the government, as just as in the Russian case of aggressive regulation, Iraq 
has seen IOCs fight back against low per barrel remuneration, by demanding rapid cost 
recovery. This has been very problematic for Iraq under low prices and again points 
towards more balanced contracts. 
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Furthermore, the warnings from foreign organizations of urgency to reform, seen 
repeatedly in Nigeria, when met with repeated delays in progress, can have disastrous 
consequences if left unheeded. Reforms, when advised as (for example) the radical re-
organization of a sector beset with corruption and inefficiency must be followed 
decisively. For example, Nigeria began the EITI process in 2005 to much fanfare, but 
no substantive change has happened in the absence of the Petroleum Industries Bill. 
 
Likewise, both Russia and Nigeria have suffered from a series of ad hoc political 
arrangements regarding extraction tax arrangements, revenues and provincial rights to 
develop oilfields, a situation made possible by vague constitutional language, but 
ultimately arising from heavily centralised control of the energy sector. The losses to 
these economies, estimated in the tens of billions, serve as yet another warning to Iraq 
to finalise overarching legislation for state-sub state energy relations, which currently 
rely upon a mixture of legacy legislation and a disputed 2005 constitution. Furthermore, 
any agreement, once legally ratified, needs to not only be clear but transparently 
managed in perpetuity, not only to defeat corruption but to maintain trust between 
governorates and the centre.  
 
These issues will be examined again in relation to three of Iraq’s institutions, two 
federal and one regional, in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Iraq Case Studies 
 
This chapter covers three case studies to briefly explain the main features of the 
petroleum industry in Iraq and the assessment of each case from policy perspective. 
In the first case, a federal institution that acts as the executive arm of the industry is 
exemplified by the Federal Ministry of Oil (MoO). This entity is a cabinet portfolio of 
the Iraqi federal government.  
 
The second case study is a regional institution, and for this purpose, the Ministry of 
Natural Resources of the Kurdish Region (MNR) was selected. This entity is a member 
of the Kurdistan Regional Government, acting as the executive arm of the KRG. 
 
The third case study provides an example of a joint venture operator between foreign 
and national companies. For this case, the Basra Gas Company (BGC) was identified as 
a prominent example to examine its framework. 
 
All three cases will be profiled and assessed from a policy perspective to analyze their 
impact on the overall petroleum framework in Iraq. The policy analysis will mainly 
focus on the relevance of some of the key factors identified in the thesis such as the 
commercial and legal conditions of the fiscal model adopted by the examined 
institutions at federal, regional and operatorship level. 
 
5.1 Case Study 1: Federal Iraqi Institutions 
 
Iraq in 2003 had the capacity to add significant production to international oil markets, 
causing widespread speculation about how transition could impact its energy sector and 
global markets.
653
 The 2003 IMF World Economic Outlook for example, cited the 
prospect of Iraq’s oil export recovery having a “sharp impact” on prices.654 Reserve 
estimates further raised questions as to how a post Ba’ath Ministry of Oil would interact 
with the private sector, with some estimates putting exploration at covering only 10% of 
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Iraq with high and variable reserve estimates.
655
 The US Department of Energy (DOE) 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimated 112 billion barrels (bbl) reserves in 
Iraq while the Center for Global Energy Studies and Petrolog & Associates estimated 
reserves as high as 300 bbl. 
656
 Prior to the invasion, Paul Wolfowitz foresaw Iraqi oil 
revenues in the region of $50-$100 billion in the first two to three years, which would 
fund Iraqi reconstruction.
657
 
 
Post-Baath evaluation and planning for the sector would have to compete with rapid 
change in Iraqi society. Oil and refined product consumption in Iraq rose by an annual 
average of 7% from 2004 to 2013 following the end of economic sanctions.
658
 Demand 
rapidly outpaced refining capacity; in 2004 Iraq consumed 20 million litres of refined 
product a day with a refining capacity of 8 million litres a day
659
 from 8 refineries. Two 
years later, capacity was still less than 50% of requirements.
660
 This has placed long 
term strain on the Iraqi economy.  
 
In 2005 the EIA reported that refined product imports were costing Iraq at least $60 
million per month, before the losses from subsidizing pump prices at 10-cent-per-
gallon, while the US Department of Energy estimated an $8 billion a year cost.
661
 In 
contrast, the country which was widely seen as capable of 6 million bpd production and 
exports exported only 1.367 bpd average in January 2005 bringing in $1.49 billion in 
revenues for the month, in large part due to poor security and corruption hampering the 
sector.
662
 This was down from 2.5 million bpd in early 2004.
663
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5.1.1 Ministry of Oil Profile 
 
Iraq began the post Baath era facing a multiplicity of challenges to its energy sector, the 
first being the interruption caused by war and the subsequent wave of looting across the 
country, which caused further damage to infrastructure. As a result of this disruption, 
output was 5% of its pre-war peak in the spring of 2003 and refining output was at 30% 
of nameplate capacity.
664
 However, only 7 oil wells had been set fire out of an estimated 
1500 as a part of the Baathist “scorched earth” policy during the invasion, and the 
Ministry of Oil had been protected from looters by U.S. troops.
665
 Some foreign 
observers of the industry were confident of the potential for reviving exports, and one 
estimate of per barrel extraction cost was $1
666
 while another estimate envisaged 
investment of only $3 billion a year to rapidly raise exports.
667
 This climate of optimism 
persisted in the Iraqi energy sector for the remainder of the decade, as predictions of 
output in excess of 12 million bpd in 2010 demonstrate. Despite this, Iraq faced many 
other challenges and initial funding for the sector was far lower. Official Coalition 
documents noted in June 2003, 
 
“The restoration of the Iraqi oil infrastructure is critical to the overall success of 
the Coalition’s mission. The oil infrastructure provides for the generation of 
significant revenue. In June 2003, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil and the Ministry 
of Oil completed a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) for the restoration of the 
Iraqi oil infrastructure and initiated a funding request.”668 
 
The report outlined over 220 projects including increasing export capacity in the 
Upstream sector, the development of new oil and gas fields, with a target of an 
additional 250 kbpd production, the development of gas fields to meet electricity 
generation requirements, to reduce HFO use and diesel oil use. Gas processing was 
expected to reach 200 million scfd for the domestic market, in theory a very achievable 
aim considering the existing infrastructure.
669
 In the Downstream sector, a new refinery 
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was planned with a 70 kbpd capacity, while existing refineries were to have new units. 
Storage capacity for gas and oil was also planned to increase, allowing for more flexible 
response to changing seasonal demand.
670
 
 
Regarding the environment, the RIO hoped that better refining could reduce sulphur 
content in diesel products and reduce the need for toxic TEL in petrol.
671
 By September 
2003, Oil Minister Thamir al-Ghadban envisaged a return to pre-war oil production by 
spring 2004, speaking at a conference in Dubai. Ghadban outlined how Iraq, while not 
privatising the energy sector, would award EPC contracts to IOCs, raising production as 
high as 6 million bpd by 2015. Ghadban also suggested that, were Iraq to reach the 
short-term target of 3.5 million bpd, OPEC would not impose a quota due to lost 
production during the 1990s. At the time of the conference, oil infrastructure across Iraq 
was suffering from a lack of electric power generation capacity for gas oil separation 
plants and refineries, among other challenges.
672
 
 
Supporting this aim, on the 13th of July 2003, CPA head Paul Bremer appointed 
Ibrahim Bahr-Ulloum as head of the Ministry of Oil in the Interim Governing Council. 
Bahr-Ulloum later announced that subject to general political approval, he would not 
oppose production sharing contracts with IOCs.
673
 Following this transitional period, 
Ghadban took over the Ministry in June 2004 and, in conjunction with directives from 
PM Allawi, outlined how Iraq’s 17 producing fields would continue to be developed by 
the Iraqi National Oil Company, while the remaining 63 discovered but not producing 
fields would be open to IOC investment.
674
 
 
This would be subject to political oversight following the writing of the new democratic 
constitution. Until then, MoO engaged in discussions with IOCs. In January 2004, Iraq's 
State Company for Oil Projects (SCOP) issued tenders for development of the 
Khurmala dome with the goal of increasing production at Kirkuk and invited bidding 
for the Hamrin field, to bring 60,000 bbl/d on line.
675
 Rapid security deterioration made 
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this work next to impossible, although some production was initially restored at 
Rumaila through RIO. By February 2004 however, Minister of Trade Ali Allawi noted 
that foreign participation in the sector would have to happen when Iraq became 
sovereign and not before.
676
 
 
With the elections of 2005, Ibrahim Bahr Ulloum was re-appointed Minister of Oil, and 
a new body was established, the Energy Council, which would have oversight over 
issues of the same name, including the drafting of a Petroleum Law governing the sector 
(later known as the Hydrocarbon law and sometimes simply the Oil Law.
677
 As these 
issues were worked on, security in Iraq had deteriorated with insurgents and terror 
groups attacking energy infrastructure, with output through 2005 falling to between 1.9 
and 2.4 mbd, with exports averaging less than 1.6 million bpd for the year (some 
estimates show an even lower average of 1.4 mbpd, bringing in $26 billion in revenues, 
while estimated investment to restore pre-2003 production was $30 billion.
678
 Both 
Persian Gulf export infrastructure, as well as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, suffered 
attacks.
679
 
 
Of the $26 billion in oil revenues in 2005, around $4 billion was then spent on 
importing refined products, in part due to delays implementing RIO plans for refining 
capacity, while up to 20% of refined product was lost due to smuggling.
680
 A U.S. State 
Department report noted this was in part due to a disorganized sector, blaming, 
 
“The participation of several oil organizations in the control of warehouses (Oil 
Products Distribution Company, Oil Pipelines Company, Gas Filling Company), 
in addition to overlapping responsibilities among these organizations. This is 
especially the case because these warehouses are distributed across the various 
Iraqi governorates, leading thus to the loss of administrative and technical 
control over those warehouses. For instance, the domestic gas stations in the 
governorate of Missan receive large quantities of gas oil that are neither 
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controlled by the Shaaybe warehouse, which belongs to the Pipelines Company 
in Basra, nor by the Missan’s warehouse which is located in the governorate of 
Missan. To a large extent this leads to smuggling activities in the southern 
regions.”681 
 
Amid this situation, May 2006 saw the appointment of Hussein al-Shahristani as 
Minister of Oil, who prioritized continued work on the Oil Law, also called the 
Hydrocarbon Law, which would govern investment in the sector. However, no draft of 
this law was shown to Parliament in 2006. That year, Iraq was envisaging 6.5 million 
bpd production by 2015, with IOC assistance, 4 million bpd from a national oil 
company and over 2 million bpd from IOCs.
682
 
 
By 2007, four new pieces of legislation were awaiting government approval, which 
would be vital to the sector, the Financial Resources Law, the Hydrocarbon Law, the 
Law for the Reorganization of MoO and the establishment of INOC, while additionally, 
a constitutional review committee was to finalize the 2005 constitution.
683
 Parliament 
would have to authorise the Hydrocarbon Law, while the Council of Ministers would 
review the Law to Reorganise the Ministry of Oil, and a sub-committee would review 
the Law to re-establish INOC.
684
 
 
The Hydrocarbon framework law outlined the responsibilities for the Ministry of Oil 
and INOC, and (according to a report for Congress) planned “to ensure proper 
oversight, accountability, and separation of powers between the two entities.”685 The 
Law to Reconstitute INOC described in Articles 6 and 7 and 5D and 5E of the Draft Oil 
and Gas Law (DOGL) envisioned an autonomous but Iraqi owned commercial entity 
that was largely insulated from political interference, along with “wholly owned 
subsidiaries,” which could profit from oversight of Annex 1 (producing fields) and the 
authority to participate in the development of Annex 2 fields (discovered but not 
producing) and would only have access to Annex 3 and 4 fields (discovered but 
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undeveloped) on a competitive basis.
686
 Prior to the reorganization of MoO, INOC 
would have authority to manage, own and operate the pipeline network and ports, 
before the establishment of a Federal Oil and Gas Council, (FOGC) which would give 
this responsibility to another government organization.
687
  
 
At the same time, MoO would create a new organization for “planning, developing and 
following up on the process of contractors obtaining from the ministry rights relative to 
petroleum operations.”688 DOGL also called for special training for MoO staff in 
bidding processes, contracts and negotiations with oil companies. This would have 
supplemented a major capacity building effort led by the U.S. State Department and 
supplemented by foreign aid, such as $4 million donated by Norway for MoO staff 
training by November 2007.
689
 At the time, a U.S. State Department report noted how 
“high-level MoO officials have expressed a deep respect for Norway's state-owned 
company and have a keen interest to implement most of Norway's methods in Iraq.”690 
 
Capacity was a problem at the time of the DOGL in 2007, as the U.S. Department of 
Defence report noted, “the Iraqi government’s failure to execute several billion dollars 
of its own funds in oil sector development” had delayed recovery of the sector.691 Left 
to operate independently in the absence of governing legislation, MoO failed to benefit 
significantly from any large scale partnerships with IOCs, since companies were wary 
of the investment environment; by June 2008, MoO had spent only half of its $2.2 
billion capital expenditure budget.
692
  
 
Nonetheless, DOGL had outlined a plan for a more efficient and accountable sector in 
Article 7B which suggests, 
 
“mechanisms that will ensure a wall of separation between, on the one hand, the 
Ministry, related companies (such as INOC and its subsidiaries) and regulators 
and monitors, and on the other hand, the oil and gas companies doing business 
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in Iraq and subject to regulatory oversight and control” and also, “full separation 
between production and oil services companies and on the other hand, 
regulatory, monitoring and supervisory departments in the Ministry.”693 
 
Due to political opposition to DOGL, MoO went ahead with talks with IOCs in the 
absence of parliamentary consensus. In Q1 2008, after Iraq announced reserves of 115 
billion barrels, 
694
MoO  conducted a pre-qualification process involving 100 IOCs, 35 
of which were chosen by the Ministry’s Petroleum Contracts and Licensing 
Directorate.
695
 Licensing rounds were launched in Summer 2008, with six producing 
fields operated by the South Oil Company, North and South Rumaila, West Qurna 
Phase 1 and Zubair, and North Oil Company’s Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, in addition to 
two gas fields, including Akkas in Anbar.
696
 22 of the 35 pre-qualified companies made 
15 bids for $16bn-worth of technical service contracts, with terms broadly allowing a 
25% share and stake in the fields and the remaining stake to be the Iraqi partner 
company, in most cases the South Oil Company, with IOCs fronting development costs, 
remunerated at a fixed fee per barrel once a production target had been reached, 
including $4 per barrel for Bai Hassan and $1.90 for West Qurna.
697
  
 
A consortium of BP and CNPC beat the bid from Exxon and Petronas for the supergiant 
Rumaila, the only field awarded during the first bid round. The consortium accepted a 
lower $2 a barrel remuneration (after recovering investment) which was a reduction 
from their initial bid, over a 20 year contract, although bilateral negotiations over terms 
continued until November 2009.
698
 This was Iraq’s first Technical Service Contract, and 
involved a $500 million signature bonus, which the IOCs would recoup from 2011 
onwards.
699
  
The first bid round was widely seen as a disappointment for Iraq, due to there being 
only one contract awarded, while IOCs also felt deterred after a sustained period of 
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interest and engagement with Iraq, including the aforementioned training for MoO staff. 
More problematically, the bid round was also politically controversial, coming after 
secretive MoO plans for short term no-bid contracts with a number of IOCs to revive 
the sector as (according to MoO) a “stop gap” measure until the Hydrocarbon Law was 
passed.
700
 One analyst noted that the no bid contracts were not service contracts, as they 
had been described by MoO, but “were designed to circumvent the legislative stalemate 
and bring Western companies with experience managing large projects into Iraq before 
the passage of the oil law.”701 Equally problematic was the secretive nature of talks with 
Shell over the Basra Gas Company, which according to a company spokesman, 
amounted to, 
 
“A conceptual proposal to the Iraqi authorities to minimize current and future 
gas flaring in the south through gas gathering and utilization. The contents of the 
proposal are confidential.”702 
 
MoO was demonstrating a willingness to act without parliamentary oversight. In March 
2008 Hussein al-Shahristani informed the US State Department that the February 2007 
DOGL was opposed by the KRG as being unconstitutional, but that a compromise may 
be reached if MNR cancelled post February 2007 Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) and that if the KRG did so, DOGL would go to the Council of Representatives 
for approval.
703
 Shahristani noted that MoO would not wait for the KRG’s approval for 
TSCs before bid rounds.
704
 As noted in chapter 5, the KRG opposed TSCs on the 
grounds that they were economically damaging to the best interests of the Iraqi people 
and therefore unconstitutional, a similar view expressed by MoO of MNR’s contracts. 
In the same communication with the US State Department, Shahristani stated that MoO 
would hopefully reach 6 million bpd with or without parliamentary approval of a 
hydrocarbon law, and that plans were underway to build another Single Point Mooring 
System (SPM) for Basra.
705
 
While Shahristani focused on plans regardless of the passage of the hydrocarbon law 
and negotiations between MoO and the BP-CNPC consortium for Rumaila continued, a 
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second round of bidding was announced for 2009 with 41 pre-qualified IOCs.
706
 The 
auctions held in June 2009 covered “brownfield” sites that were previously being 
operated prior to the onset of conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war, in some cases still 
littered with unexploded bombs, such as the Majnoon field. In total, these fields 
amounted to 80% of existing output, while “greenfield” sites (again, largely explored 
and with a high degree of geological certainty) were allocated for a December 
auction.
707
 These bidding rounds again created much controversy, generating enough 
concern in Parliament to have Shahristani called for questioning twice, facing a vote of 
no confidence, while oil worker unions and the South Oil Company voiced opposition 
to the contracts.
708
 The bid rounds themselves were hampered by the low per barrel 
remuneration fees offered by Iraq, which were lower than what all IOCs were 
expecting, in at least one case 10 times lower.
709
 
 
The second bidding round saw the Cabinet authorise the Rumaila contract, which was 
then called for review by a group of MPs in Parliament, while concurrently, DOGL 
looked unlikely to be passed into law at least until elections in 2010. Shahristani 
attempted to assuage some of the concerns in parliament by claiming that IOCs would 
only earn around $16 billion from the contracts, while Iraq’s potential revenue would be 
$1.7 trillion.
710
 This figure is equivalent to the estimated value of the global oil industry 
in October 2016, but was lower than some projections of Iraq’s oil earnings which were 
higher up to 2035.
711
 
During the course of 2009, operational funds for MoO increased 800% to $950 million, 
while investment stayed at just over $2 billion, below the minimum figures discussed in 
2003 to raise production.
712
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The finalization of the TSCs rapidly changed this situation. By 2011, ExxonMobil, 
Shell, CNPC, Petronas, CNOOC, ENI, Total, Gazprom Neft, BP and Occidental had all 
signed contracts with MoO.
713
 The following year, total foreign investment in Iraq was 
$55 billion, much of it in the energy sector.
714
  However, in 2012 the IEA projected that 
the projected increase in investment “could be at risk if the government’s efforts to 
modernize and reform Iraq’s legal framework and institutions are delayed or frustrated, 
or if fluctuations in prices and oil revenue feed through into irregular capital 
spending.”715 
 
5.1.2 Ministry of Oil Policy Analysis 
 
Iraq has reached a production capacity of over 4 million b/d controlled by the federal 
Ministry of Oil, which continues to face a number of challenges that, if unresolved, will 
continue to inflict significant financial damage on the sector. This target has been 
attained 12 years after the hoped for 4 million bpd target by spring 2004, and is a 
fraction of the hoped-for targets of 12 million bpd in 2009. While much delay to 
achieving, this target has been because of poor security, other damage has been self-
inflicted. Initially, renegotiation of TSCs to reduce development plateau’s, following 
delays to infrastructure projects, has taken considerable time and distracted from the 
task of providing a comprehensive legal framework, which has in turn damaged investor 
confidence. This has occurred regardless of the security situation, which improved 
dramatically in southern Iraq after 2009.
716
 
 
As of 2016, repeated efforts to attract investment in the refining sector have not 
translated into significant extra capacity, putting Iraq back to its position in the 2003--
2006 period when poor security delayed efforts to increase capacity; consumption in 
2016 was 800,000 bpd in all of Iraq, a major problem in the KRI and northern Iraq 
which depended on the 200,000 bpd Baiji refinery to supply fuel.
717
 Replacing this 
capacity is an urgent priority due to Iraq’s growing population and refined product 
demand. The energy sector as a whole has suffered from the delay to the Hydrocarbon 
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law, meaning that pre-2003 legislation remains in effect, as per Constitutional Article 
130. This states that all legacy laws stay valid until repealed by a new federal law, such 
as the Preservation of Hydrocarbon Resources Law No. 84 of 1985 and the Iraqi 
Companies Law No. 21 of 1997.
718
 
 
This has not only been a problem for investors, who have had to contend with 
competing interpretations of the constitution as well as navigate legacy laws. The failure 
to ratify a federal Hydrocarbon law has led to a political and legal vacuum, further 
damaging trust with IOCs which have also had to deal with difficult contract 
negotiations and delayed payments. The latter situation has also affected Iraq and the 
Kurdish region, however, both Erbil and Baghdad may have mitigated this situation 
even in the absence of contract renegotiation, had they not implemented sustainable 
fiscal policies. Modernising their respective regional and national energy sectors under a 
clear constitutional framework and a separation of powers may have yielded efficiency 
gains. These in turn would have reduced many of the difficulties caused by the post 
2014 price collapse.  
 
Political deals between the federal government of Iraq and the KRG have proven a 
recipe for failure. In the absence of federal parliamentary backing, unconstitutional 
agreements have been difficult to implement given a pervading lack of transparency and 
trust. Unrealistic federal budgets and parameters within agreement terms that relate to 
oil prices and production rates have encountered problems with the reality of 
infrastructural bottlenecks, accounting mechanisms and volatile prices, among other 
problems.  
 
A possible way forward may be to revive the hydrocarbon, revenue sharing and INOC 
draft laws that were initiated by parliament in mid-2011. This could be a sensible 
starting point for mitigating the legal and political conflict between the MoO and MNR 
over oil contracts, export rights and financial allocations. 
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5.2 Case Study 2: Regional Institution 
5.2.1 Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources 
 
In late 2014 the MNR announced that the Kurdish Region of Iraq possessed 60 billion 
barrels of oil reserves, an increase of 15 billion barrels on their previous estimate. 
According to the IEA, this figure had not been verified and in 2016 the agency reported 
the KRI’s proved reserves at 4 billion.719 The higher estimates were likely based on the 
US Geological Survey from the year 2000, which put estimated reserves in the Zagros 
fold belt in Iraq (most of which lies in the KRI) at between 40 and 45 billion barrels.
720
 
In 2012, Richmond Energy Partners estimated that recoverable oil stood at a much 
lower 8 billion barrels.
721
 Prior to 2014, the MNR estimated recoverable reserves to be 
11 billion barrels. 
722
 
 
Earlier estimates drew the interest of IOCs prior to the Iraq invasion, since the KRI was 
semi-autonomous following the first Gulf War and the implementation of a “no fly 
zone” over northern Iraq. The first IOC to enter the region was Genel Enerji, who 
signed a PSC for Taq-Taq field in July 2002, amending the agreement in January 2004. 
723
 
 
In 2003, IOC interest was growing in the Kurdish Region of Iraq, which as noted had 
not seen exploration efforts since the 1970s due to internal conflict in the region and 
war with the central government.
724
 However, IOC focus was firmly on the south after 
2003, due to less complex geology and much available data on exploration. Therefore, 
despite some concerns over reservoir damage in the south and at Kirkuk, this was minor 
compared to the exploration risk in the KRI, which was seen as relatively unknown in 
comparison to fields such as Majnoon, which had been explored since the early 
1970s.
725
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To cater for this interest, the KRG established a Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) 
in 2006, as the oil ministry of their semi-autonomous region, but essentially a ministry 
in a bifurcated political system, with a regional oil law passed by the KRG in 2007.
726
 
Politically the KRI’s status was still in question however, since the 2005 Constitution 
was still being reviewed and subsequently, MNR did not establish a national oil 
company, leaving the ministry with every responsibility over the sector. These duties 
included management of revenues, strategic planning and awarding licenses, with a 
regulatory function.
727
 MNR also has shares in all fields with IOC operators, having a 
management role since there is no NOC to act as a partner.
728
 
 
The KDP (having aspirations for an independent Kurdish region) have made plans for 
an NOC in the form of the Kurdistan Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO) 
with a marketing arm, the Kurdistan Oil Marketing Organization (KOMO), with only 
the latter actually functioning, having been established in 2007 under the KRG oil law, 
which notes, 
 
“KOMO may market or regulate the marketing of the production from Petroleum 
Operations, and may, with the agreement of a Contractor to a Production Sharing 
Contract, market the Contractor’s share of Petroleum.”729 
 
KOMO directly marketed oil through a Kurdish built pipeline to Ceyhan in January 
2014. 
730
To license IOC activity, MNR divided the region into 48 exploration blocks, 
loosely based on geological formations, a strategy overseen by the newly appointed 
Minister for Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami, who took the position in 2006.
731
 
Hawrami, who had previously worked both for INOC and BP, personally dealt with 
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IOCs in allocating exploration blocks, pursuing Production Sharing Agreements as the 
contract model, with the aim of overcoming investor concerns.
732
 
 
MNR moved to attract investment ahead of any finalisation of the Iraqi Constitution, as 
noted signing a PSC with Genel in 2002, which later became the first company to work 
in the KRI, beginning work with Addax Petroleum in 2005 at Taq Taq, which came on 
line in 2008.
733
 This was followed by Norway’s DNO, who intentionally finalised a 
PSC for immediately prior to Iraq’s Transfer of Sovereignty in 2004.734 DNO 
discovered the Tawke field in 2006, which came on line in 2007, beginning exports in 
2009. As DNO were beginning work at Tawke, Canada’s Western Oil Sands entered the 
KRI through the Western Zagros Resources company, having signed a PSC for Kalar-
Bawanoor in 2006.
735
 By this time, different interpretations over oil and gas rights were 
already being drawn from the Iraqi Constitution, with the Kurds referencing Article 114 
that suggested contracts were legal prior to the ratification of the document.
736
 As noted, 
Minister of Oil Hussein al-Shahristani saw February 2007 as the cut off point for PSCs 
in the KRI that were acceptable to Baghdad.  
 
Later that year, a consortium of UAE based Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum signed a 
service contract for Chemchemal and Khor Mor gas fields, with the intention of using 
gas from the latter for the electric grid.
737
 
738
In 2009, OMV and MOL joined the 
consortium (Pearl Petroleum) taking LPG and condensate as payment for their work. 
Khurmala in the Kirkuk formation was then transferred from the North Oil Company to 
the Erbil based KAR Group.
739
 By early 2009, these companies had been joined by 
Korea National Oil Company, Reliance Industries (India) Alfa-Access-Renova (Russia) 
Talisman (Canada) and Hunt Oil (US) which signed a contract for Ain Sifni, a field in a 
disputed area of Ninewa.
740
 All of these companies took considerable political risk in 
the absence of any firm agreement between Baghdad and Erbil. In late 2009, Gulf 
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Keystone began work at the Shaikan oilfield, which came on line in 2010; Shaikan is 
one of the larger fields in the KRI with 639 million barrels of reserves as of 2015.
741
 
 
In late 2011, MNR signed six PSCs with ExxonMobil, including in disputed territories 
although at the time they were also operating West Qurna- 1 in southern Iraq. The 
public announcement of this news, which MNR proclaimed as legal, was met with 
immediate condemnation from Baghdad and a threat to MNR, with a statement noting,  
 
“The signing of any contract with the KRG without the approval and the 
knowledge of the Iraqi central government and the oil ministry will be 
considered illegal. ExxonMobil could face disqualification and the termination 
of its contract.”742 
 
The following year, Gazprom Neft, Total, Chevron and TAQA (UAE) also signed 
contracts with MNR, which covered the entire area open to licensing, with the exception 
of some mountainous terrain.
743
 Many of the smaller IOCs were calculating that with 
enough momentum in the area and continued exploration, more majors would enter the 
region and buy up their operations.
744
  
 
Aside from the deterrent of political risk, another major constraint on MNR’s ambitions 
was export infrastructure, which became an ongoing source of contention between MoO 
and MNR. In 2011, MNR made an arrangement with the federal government which 
allowed the use of the federal pipeline system in addition to half the revenues of oil 
transiting the border, totaling $514 million per month over 14 months, allowing for 
payments to IOC contractors working on the PSCs.
745
 As part of the arrangement, the 
KRG was required to raise exports to 200,000 BPD.
746
 In April 2012 the KRG 
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terminated oil exports, alleging that the federal government had delayed payments of 
US $1.5 billion, while noting that two of the $514 million payments had been sent.
747
  
 
The federal government alleged that the MNR was selling crude oil unilaterally and was 
not sending payments for these sales back to the Baghdad, as had been agreed. A new 
agreement was negotiated in September 13th 2012 after the MNR re-started exports 
through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.
748
 In early 2013, it was alleged that the MNR was 
selling oil trucked from the oil field at Taq Taq to the Turkish port of Mersin.
749
 
Baghdad viewed this as a violation of the September agreement, stating that only 
SOMO had the authority to export and market this oil.  
 
Negotiations between Turkey and the MNR continued through 2013 leading to a 
December 2013 agreement to use the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) to send up to 350,000 
BPD from Taq Taq, through Khurmala to storage tanks at Ceyhan, Turkey.
750
 MNR 
announced plans to export up to 1 million BPD through this pipeline. In response to this 
deal, the federal government of Iraq inserted a provision into the draft 2014 budget 
which stipulated that the MNR must send 400,000 BPD to the federal export system in 
order for the KRG to receive their 17% budget share. 
751
 
 
Legal threats had been issued through 2014 from Baghdad. In January 2014, Deputy 
Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al Shahristani stated that the federal 
government will take legal and fiscal action against the KRG for ongoing independent 
Oil and Gas exports through Turkey, since the Oil was “property of the Iraqi people.” 
On January 17th Minister of Oil Abdul Karim Luaibi announced that the federal 
government was preparing legal action against Turkey, while the KRG’s budget 
payments were halted.
752
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On March 20th, the MNR released a statement offering 100,000 BPD as a “goodwill 
gesture” to the federal export system.753 This offer was rejected by Prime Minister 
Nouri al Maliki.
754
 
 
On May 23rd, a statement from the MNR announced that “A tanker loaded with over 
one million barrels of crude oil departed last night from Ceyhan towards Europe. This is 
the first of many such sales of oil exported through the newly constructed pipeline in the 
Kurdistan Region. The revenue from the sales will be deposited in a KRG-controlled 
account in Halkbank in Turkey.” The federal government of Iraq subsequently filed an 
arbitration case against the Federal Republic of Turkey and Botaş, Turkey’s state owned 
pipeline and trading company.
755
 
 
On June 9th, the Ministry of Oil published the following statement in response to the 
shipment of oil by the KRG:  
 
“The Ministry of Oil ensures for the next time that the marketing of the Iraqi oil 
from Kurdistan Province without gaining the government's approval is a 
constitutional violation and federal authority override. The Ministry of Oil have 
the legal right to prosecute all the parties who are involved with transporting oil 
illegally without gaining the approval from the Federal Government.”756 
 
The federal government also released a statement on the Ministry of Oil website, noting 
that Turkey was in violation of the 1976 Iraq-Turkey Pipeline agreement. The statement 
noted that,  
 
“By transporting and storing crude oil from Kurdistan, and by loading that crude 
oil onto a tanker in Ceyhan, all without the authorization of the Iraqi Ministry of 
Oil, Turkey and BOTAŞ have breached their obligations under the Iraq-Turkey 
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Pipeline Agreement. This agreement governs the operation of two pipelines that 
run from Kirkuk, Iraq, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, 
as well as crude oil storage and loading facilities at Ceyhan. It was signed in 
1973 and amended several times, most recently in 2010. Under the agreement, 
Turkey and BOTAŞ committed to reserve the entire pipeline, storage and 
loading system for the exclusive use of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and to handle 
and load crude oil coming from Iraq exclusively in accordance with instructions 
given by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.”757 
 
MoO then successfully mounted legal action against one of the Kurdish tanker 
shipments from Ceyhan, the United Kalvytra, and MNR subsequently sought to 
withhold data on who was buying the oil (following a legal threat to buyers from 
Baghdad).
758
 MNR also shipped oil from Ashkelon in Israel, which would not recognise 
a legal threat from Baghdad due to the fact that the two nations had no formal relations. 
MNR also moved oil between tankers at sea to confuse those who were tracking 
shipments, successfully selling oil to MOL in Hungary and (according to MNR) finding 
10 buyers by late 2015.
759
 
 
Despite this, MNR’s strategy of unilateral oil sales did not alleviate the KRG’s acute 
financial problems, brought on by the halting of budget transfers from Baghdad and the 
oil price collapse.  
 
5.2.2 MNR Policy Analysis 
 
Despite the collapse in oil revenues, Ashti Hawrami decided to pursue independent 
exports to finance independence, suggesting the KRI could export 1 million bpd of oil 
by 2017, arising from some of the 50 PSAs which are unrecognized by Baghdad.
760
This 
target is reminiscent of MoO’s inflated production targets, and possibly points to an 
over optimistic view of the sector, as with the 2014 inflation of KRI oil reserves by 15 
billion barrels, which was unverified. Since then, the KRI has suffered a major setback 
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with the downgrading of Taq Taq and Barda Rash oilfields, bankrupting Afren and 
severely hurting the financial position of Genel. This came on top of prolonged delays 
paying IOCs, which also pushed Gulf Keystone to near bankruptcy, after the long legal 
battle between MNR and Dana Gas, which further damaged investor confidence. In 
some respects, the financial losses to the MoO and MNR may have been mitigated by a 
comprehensive framework whereby the role of IOCs would have been approved at the 
federal level. Instead, MNR and MoO engaged in a series of legal battles with each 
other, and IOCs, for example MoO’s punishment of Exxon over PSAs in the KRI and 
the ensuing heightened political risk in the KRI, which deterred investment. This 
stemmed from the unilateral operations of the MNR. 
 
Despite this situation, MNR initially developed something close to an energy strategy 
after 2006. Following the unification of both Kurdish administrations governed by the 
KDP and PUK in 2006, the KRG emulated successful practices around the world by 
fast-tracking investment and attempting to limit bureaucracy, which initially attracted a 
similar level of IOC interest as Baghdad. The initial success in the KRG’s policy 
implementation contributed to the development of the upstream sector, turning the KRI 
into an oil and gas producer, feeding local industries and the power sector with the 
necessary feedstock that helped create the economic boom witnessed until end of 2012. 
Fast track gas development of Khor Mor field through the Pearl Consortium also 
allowed for the rapid restoration of almost 24 hour electricity in the KRI through gas 
fired plants, in contrast to the slow effort in capturing and processing associated gas in 
southern Iraq. As noted however, MNR’s unilateral strategy on exports succeeded in 
provoking MoO and creating a confrontational environment, something that conflicts 
with the Iraqi federal constitution, which emphasizes cooperation between regions and 
the center.  
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5.3 Case Study 3: Operator 
5.3.1 Basra Gas Company Joint Venture 
 
Natural gas has been playing an increasingly significant role in the energy mix of the 
Middle East and North Africa region over the last decade. Middle Eastern energy 
consumption is steadily growing—beyond 10 percent per annum in some cases—driven 
by economic and population growth.
761
Gas is also becoming the main feedstock for 
power generation in the MENA region, meeting 67 percent of the regional demand for 
electricity.
762
 Among the current and potential regional gas producers, Iraq is better 
positioned than many countries that recently experienced the “Arab Spring” and its 
troubling dynamics. The country also benefits from being located in the middle of a gas-
thirsty region—a potential gas market that comes with its own challenges as a heavy 
consumer and as a critical transit territory. Political events since January 2011 have 
greatly influenced plans for strategic gas pipelines.  
 
Before the Arab Spring, Iraq was expecting to play a pivotal role in the planned 
Nabucco Pipeline from the northern corridor of Iraq and the Arab Gas Pipeline linking 
the western part of Iraq to regional and European markets. Yet due to the rising local 
demand in the MENA region and to the current political uncertainties, European gas 
markets are now putting their plans for countries such as Iraq on the back burner while 
exploring more sustainable suppliers. Even if Iraq’s regional plans have been called into 
question, Iraq’s local demand for gas has grown beyond the forecasts of the initial 
master plans adopted by the various Iraqi administrations that governed Iraq after 
Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003. Iraqi policymakers now believe that Iraqi gas, if 
developed, can serve as a unique economic multiplier and enable the much-needed 
reconstruction of Iraq’s ravaged economy and devastated infrastructure.763 Estimates of 
Iraq’s proven gas reserves vary. Some independent agencies rank the country at number 
13 for world gas reserve-holders, while others rank it 11th.
764
 Even without additional 
targeted efforts to find more Iraqi gas, output is set to rise considerably, as over 80 
percent of Iraqi gas is in associated form, and the country is in the midst of an effort to 
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increase current oil production.
765
 As much of Iraq’s gas is associated and will be a by-
product of oil production— unlike other Middle Eastern countries—its production could 
be cost effective and competitive to regional markets; the development cost of gas is 
linked to capturing, processing, and transportation, with no cost required for exploration 
and production. However, due to the lack of infrastructure facilities, 55 percent of 
current gas production is flared, although estimates vary, leaving very little to feed the 
deprived national grid and industry.
766
 
 
5.3.2 Basra Gas Company Profile 
 
Due to the problem of low gas utilization, the Joint Venture (JV) Basra Gas Company 
(BGC) was outlined in a Heads of Agreement in September 2008 and approved by 
Cabinet in November 2011 (beginning operations in May 2013) to capture all of 
southern Iraq’s associated gas and use it for industry and municipal use by 2015, before 
exporting the surplus once domestic demand was met.
767
 The contract for this operation 
was a Concession, but reliant upon upstream and downstream operations governed by 
Technical Service Contracts that were finalised with IOCs following the bidding rounds 
of 2009 and beyond.  
 
Iraq was to become self-sufficient in LGP and export LNG, once a plant for this was 
constructed. Export of LNG was enabled by the upgrading of the Umm Qasr port by 
Saipem.
768
 Based on an initial capital expenditure estimate of $17 billion, the LNG plant 
was costed at $4.4 billion, with a further $12 billion slated for investment in gas 
infrastructure. In 2011, when the project was still being planned, MoO had announced 
its high production targets of over 12 million bpd by 2020 meaning that the successful 
installation and upgrading of infrastructure to process this would have been able to 
exploit over 8 bcf of gas. According to data produced by Wood Mackenzie in 2015, 
output by 2035 would be equivalent to 99,000 bpd of LPG and over 13,000 bpd of 
condensate, but processing below the 2 bcfd target due to delays in critical oil 
infrastructure projects.
769
 Shorter term targets in 2011, when the BGC draft contract was 
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signed envisaged an increase from less than 0.5 bcfd to 2 bcfd within 5-7 years, 
although a planned offshore LPG terminal designed by Saipem and intended to be built 
by Shell was delayed following the oil price collapse.
770
 
 
The total capacity for gas capture and processing is theoretically 56.6 mcm per day 
when the project is due to be completed in the early 2020s, a volume which stood at 14 
mcm at the start of 2016.
771
 Gas is captured from the super-giant Rumaila, West Qurna 
and Zubair fields.  
 
Understanding the potential and the challenges of the BGC, part of the South Gas 
Utilization Project, requires a brief overview of Iraq’s gas industry. Initial challenges, 
including the legacy of war, sanctions and poor security, have been given as reasons by 
representatives of the Basra Gas Company to account for a series of delays in the 
project. 
 
Flaring of associated gas increased after 2003 from around 30% of gas produced (USGS 
estimate) to over 70% by 2013, according to Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA.) At the same time, natural gas production in Iraq rose from 81 bcf in 2003
772
 to 
771 bcf in 2014.  
 
In 2014, Iraq lagged behind Nigeria in reducing flared gas, with the West African 
country flaring 379 bcf that year,
773
 compared to an OPEC estimate for Iraq of 454 bcf 
for 2014.
774
 This latter figure may be conservative, since one estimate in 2015 put 
flaring in Iraq at over 600 bcf.
775
 
 
Before the onset of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had enough functioning infrastructure to 
export 400 million scf/d to a processing facility in Ahmadi, Kuwait, from the giant oil 
field at Rumaila. Over 200 kilometers of pipeline carried this gas, while other gas was 
utilized for a fertilizer plant at Khor al Zubeir. The Khor al Zubeir plant had been 
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constructed by Mitsubishi in the 1970s.
776
 Processing capacity at the South Gas 
processing plant alone was 1.26 bcfd, taking gas from Zubeir and Rumaila. For 
nameplate capacity, this could have produced 960 mmcfd of dry gas, 4000 bpd of LPG 
and 1700 bpd of condensate, although wars and sanctions disrupted production.
777
 
Following the onset of sanctions, flaring of associated gas began to rise to over 20% of 
produced gas, eventually putting Iraq in the global top 5 flaring countries by the turn of 
the century
778
. The nine gas gathering stations established in the 1980s by the South 
Area Gas Project, with a capacity of 1.5 bcm, fell into disrepair. These facilities 
included the Khor al Zubair processing plant which was considered state of the art when 
it came online in 1983. By the time the Basra Gas Company took over at Khor al Zubair 
in 2011, the facility was operating far below peak capacity. Work to improve facilities 
had begun in 2008, although not by BGC.
779
Elsewhere, the North Rumaila gas 
processing facility was processing only a third of its original 680 million scf/d 
capacity.
780
 
 
By 2004 gas processing was as low as 500m scf/d from an estimated pre-war peak as 
high as 2.08 bcf. In 2005, Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership reported Iraq as 
among the world’s major flaring nations, competing with Nigeria in terms of volumes 
of gas flaring increasing substantially between 2005 and 2009.
781
 
 
Iraq needed to utilise this gas quickly and efficiently, as one estimate put the volumes 
flared as being enough to supply 4 million homes,
782
 theoretically generating 5.9 GW of 
electricity. Problematically, the provision of electricity in Iraq rapidly became a 
contentious political issue, and there have been several riots over poor supply in 
southern Iraq since 2003.
783
  
 
The Iraqi government has  long known the potential of utilizing gas for local industry, 
such as the Khor al Zubair fertilizer plant, a critical local factory and one of many State 
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Owned Enterprises (SOE) in southern Iraq.
784
 Fertilizer, cement, steel and 
petrochemicals are all industries that were priorities for Iraq to rebuild and would 
benefit from captured associated gas, a fact pointed out by the 2013 Integrated National 
Energy Strategy and a 2015 study by Japan International Cooperation Agency.
785
 The 
JICA study and the INES note that cheap and plentiful gas could even give these 
industries an advantage over competitors in the long term. INES notes that if Iraq were 
to expand fertilizer production to over 6000 tons a year by 2030 (as planned) this target 
would require over 260 million scf/d. 
786
 
 
Elsewhere, the electricity sector has been forced to rely on burning Heavy Fuel Oil 
(HFO) to generate electricity, instead of using gas for industrial and municipal power, 
which creates more pollution (a problem in southern Iraq from the “black flares” of 
burning off gas) and costs Iraq money.  Problematically Iraq already faces a high outlay 
for fuel imports, lacking enough refining capacity to meet domestic supply. One Iraqi 
official noted that when locally produced HFO was insufficient for power stations, 5 
million litres of gasoil was imported from Iran. Iraq’s oil fired power stations were also 
prone to breaking down without regular maintenance. 
787
 A further effect of importing 
fuel oil was to exacerbate the problem of the black market, which caused price spikes 
and shortages, since imports were not properly monitored or accounted for.  
 
Despite these problems, it was not until 2008 that the State Company for Oil Projects 
awarded contracts to repair the North Rumaila and Khor al Zubair facilities, with 
contracts going to GE to renovate gas compressors. 
788
 At the time, Iraq had been in 
talks with Shell since 2004 to implement the Iraq Gas Master Plan.
789
 Shell had been 
early entrants to the Iraq market after 2003, hosting meetings with Iraqi oil officials in 
Amman in preparation for expected energy sector privatization, or part privatization. 
790
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In 2005, Shell and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil finalised the first stage of the plan to eliminate 
flaring in Iraq and commercialize associated and nonassociated gas. Jabbar al Luaibi, 
head of the South Gas Company estimated that $100 million of investment was needed 
to repair Iraq’s gas capturing and processing infrastructure. 791  
 
By 2005, the waste of flared gas had caused financial losses to Iraq’s economic 
development, with around $5 million dollars’ worth a day being wasted in the mid part 
of the last decade, and up to $12 million being lost per day by 2010.
792
 Adding the cost 
of using HFO or importing lighter fuel for the power plants, as well as the “opportunity 
cost” represented by what Iraq could have gained (by investing these funds) the losses 
could be significantly higher. By 2016, it was thought that flaring was costing at a 
minimum $4 billion a year, much of it from the southern fields. Figure 15 illustrates that 
the percentage of flared gas has increased and that while utilized gas has increased by 
volume, it is more than 50% short of the 2 bcf target envisioned for 2016 when the 
project was planned in 2011.  
 
However, as an example of the difficulty calculating Iraq’s economic losses, INES 
estimated in 2013 that power losses through blackouts could cost Iraq as much as $40 
billion per year.
793
 Therefore, Iraq’s domestic and industrial gas and electric demand 
was a primary reason for the Iraq Gas Master plan to move forward, following 
successive summers of blackouts and protests over electricity.  
 
A number of delays ensued however. Three years after the Gas Master Plan was first 
announced, Shell were reportedly still in difficult negotiations involving the Ministry of 
Oil. According to a US State Department cable, in 2008 Tony Nieman of Shell Iraq met 
with Qasim Ali Qadim, Technical Manager of South Oil Refinery, to discuss the end of 
flaring, among other issues. 
 
Nieman estimated that Iraq in 2008 was losing 800 mscf of gas a day through flaring, at 
an estimated market value of $1.5 billion a year, while also noting that flaring in Iraq 
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was a serious pollutant.
794
 The Shell Vice Manager for Iraq also remarked that he hoped 
negotiations to finalise Shell’s role in the gas capture plan would take little over a year 
and he was unconcerned by arguments he had witnessed between officials from Iraq’s 
South Gas Company, South Oil Company and Ministry of Oil.
795
  
 
Several months later, in September 2008, the Heads of Agreement (HOA) was finalised 
for what would become the Basra Gas Company, with Shell’s ownership set at 49% and 
the remaining ownership by the South Gas Company, a sub-entity of the Ministry of 
Oil. The agreement outlined that access to non-associated gas would be an important 
part of the project.
796
The HOA suggested that gas would be purchased from producers 
who would be paid a “fixed percentage of the revenues received by the Joint Venture 
for selling products."
797
 A number of critics noted that the HOA gave Shell a 25-year 
monopoly, also stipulating that for 12 months MoO was forbidden from negotiating 
with any other IOC on the gas project, although Shell would have that privilege. Shell 
subsequently began talks with other energy providers, and an agreement with 
Mitsubishi was finalised in February 2009. 
798
 
 
A year after the HOA was signed, the project encountered political opposition. In 2009, 
Deputy Oil Minister Ahmed al-Shamma announced that nothing would be finalised 
until after the January 16 elections in 2010. Al Shamma released a statement, clarifying 
that this was the result of internal politics, rather than the decision of the Ministry: 
 
"In the current climate, signing the deal and making a decision is very difficult. 
There is strong opposition, used by politicians for other reasons not related to 
gas and investment in gas for political objectives. This is my personal 
expectation. It is not related to the desires of the ministry or the government.”799 
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Concerns that Shell’s approach to relationship building with Iraqi government officials 
(since the company pursued a strategy of technical assistance to the MoO since 2003) 
had led to further accusations of monopoly. Issam al-Chalabi, Iraq's former Minister of 
Oil between 1987 and 1990, complained that this was the case, and suggested that the 
Basra Gas Company’s proposed $4 billion investment was a fraction of what the total 
value of the gas would be after 20 years of the contract had passed, which he estimated 
at $40 billion. 
800
 Chalabi also complained that no other companies were offering bids 
on such an important strategic project, which increased opposition in the Iraqi 
parliament. 
 
Another opponent of the BGC in 2009 was Jabir Khalifa Jabir, secretary of the Iraqi 
Parliament’s Oil and Gas committee. Jabir argued that the deal was illegal, because it 
contravened Law 97, which stipulates that deals with IOCs should be passed by 
parliament. 
801
 In Basra itself, the proposed deal also encountered opposition from the 
Fadhila party, who ran the governorate at the time.
802
 
 
Despite opposition to the deal, Shell Gas and Power Vice President Mounir  Bouaziz 
reported to the US State Department that meetings with local stakeholders in Basra were 
constructive. Bouaziz detailed the efforts of Shell to build strong relations with MoO 
officials in a State Department cable, 
 
“Shell had provided laptops and software to several mid-level MOO executives 
to introduce to them -- for the first time -- concepts such as net present value and 
internal rate of return, and to assess the financial impact of differing terms and 
pricing.”803 
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Highlighting the close relationship Shell fostered with the Ministry of Oil, the cable 
reports that Minister of Oil Shahristani later asked to have the basic training himself. 
804
 
This relationship building continued through the spring and summer of 2010 as the 
Shell-South Gas Company-Mistubishi plan went to Cabinet for final approval. 
Problematically it was reported that Rumaila, West Qurna 1 and Zubair oilfield 
operators were not committed to deal with associated gas under the plan, according to a 
statement by Sabah al-Sa'idi, legal director of the Oil Ministry’s Petroleum Contracts 
and Licensing Directorate. Another problem with negotiations involved disagreements 
over the level of capital expenditure committed by the government and the consortium, 
amid rumours the government of Iraq would not be able to finance its share of the 
project.  
 
An additional challenge was the Iraqi government’s claim that IOCs were not following 
their contractual obligations to supply gas, leading to more delays in finalizing plans as 
the Iraqi government was forced to negotiate with IOCs individually. 
805
 This was 
problematic, as BGC Chairman Ali Khudier noted how IOCs wanted low gas pressure 
at the North Rumaila de-gassing station for oil extraction, in other words there was not 
enough pressure to utilise the gas.
806
  
 
Despite these difficulties, Shell and the South Gas Company pressed continued to 
develop some gas gathering facilities, resulting in the capture of 135 mmcfd or 20% of 
the government estimate of flared gas in 2010 (note, Iraqi Ministry of Oil estimates of 
flared gas differ from other estimates, for example INES estimates 40% of associated 
gas was flared in 2013, while JICA estimate flaring at 70%.) 
807
 Despite this modest 
gain, drawn out negotiations over government financing for the project suffered another 
delay with the long government formation process following Iraq’s 2010 general 
elections. 
 
Negotiations over the scope and financing of the continued until the following Autumn 
of 2011, when a draft copy of the agreement was leaked. Defining the geographic scope 
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of the project, the new terms reaffirmed that IOCs operating Zubair, West Qurna and 
Rumaila would have to supply all associated gas not used for re-injection to the BGC 
Joint Venture, as opposed to the South Gas Company, as Technical Service Contracts 
stipulated.
808
 
 
The new contract outlined how, 
 
“SGC shall procure that all raw gas produced from the dedicated fields (other 
than utilized gas but including all NGLs) ... shall, on and from commencement 
of operations, be dedicated solely to the venture. The Ministry shall ensure that 
SGC fulfils its obligation to supply and make available to BGC all committed 
volumes and planned volumes of raw gas, including by making available deficit 
volumes as needed.”809 
 
The deal also specified that SGC would not permit other entities to utilise associated 
gas, potentially giving Shell control of at least 2,000 bcf/d of raw gas. This figure would 
likely be more if Iraq’s oil production hit any of the proposed targets up to 2020, with 
the possible plateau of 7 mbpd. Of the exact volumes produced, some 85% would be 
supplied from SGC to BGC. The draft also noted that once Iraq’s gas needs were met, 
BGC would be supplied with 600 mmcfd of feedstock gas for an LNG plant, which 
Shell could then process and sell on the global market for 20 years.
810
 
 
By November 2011, with new oil minister Abdul Kareem Al-Luaibi in charge, the 25 
year deal was finalised in a signing Luaibi called “a historic change in the Iraqi oil 
industry.” Initial investment from BGC would be as high as $7 billion, which included 
the LNG plant (itself estimated to require $4 billion) and the overall estimated 
investment to eliminate flaring was put as high as $17 billion.
811
 The initial target of the 
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project was to capture and process 700 mmcf of gas from Rumaila, Zubair and West 
Qurna.
812
 
 
As mentioned in the draft agreement, the target for eliminating flaring was 2018, and 
80% of workers hired to complete the project were to be Iraqi.
813
 2018 was a more 
reasonable target than the Iraqi Integrated National Energy Strategy of 2013, which 
envisioned the capturing of all associated gas by 2015.
814
 
 
Because of the many delays in finalising the deal and the accompanying shortage of gas 
for power stations, Baghdad began talks with Tehran to build a pipeline from Abadan to 
Basra, which would follow on from already agreed Iranian gas imports to power 
stations in Baghdad and Diyala.
815
 These imports would be well under way by 2017, 
with one report in 2016 suggesting the value of these exports would cost Iraq $3.7 
billion per year
816
.  
 
By January 2012, with Iraq still only processing an estimated 450mmcfd (a similar 
amount to the volume processed in 2003) and with flaring over 1.9 bcf/d, more details 
emerged. SGC director Ali Hussein Khudhier noted the 600 mmcf  LNG terminal 
would cost around $3 billion, while the BGC would start processing 50 million cubic 
feet a day by the end of the year.
817
  As mentioned, the reason for the relatively low 
amount of processed gas in 2012, according to Ali Khudair, was IOCs demanding low 
pressure at the North Rumaila degassing station, forcing BGC to rent compressors. 
Nonetheless, processing by BGC had increased to 250 million scf/d by June 2013.
818
 
Therefore, after much delay, May 2013 saw the official launch of the project, although 
Shell noted a number of projects were already underway to increase capacity from 400 
mscf, including “the new power plant at the Khor Al Zubair gas plant, compressor 
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stations in North Rumaila, as well as leasing compressors to reduce gas flaring in the 
Zubair field.”819. Peter Van Rijs, supply chain manager for Shell in the MENA region 
also confirmed that compressor stations had been a bottleneck to progress.
820
 
 
5.3.3 Commercial and Legal Structure 
 
The legislation that the BGC was incorporated under, as a mixed liability company was 
The Companies Law No 21 of 1997, in addition to Law no 22 of 1997 on State 
Companies.
821
 The structure and commercial operations are as follows: 
 
 51% owned by South Gas Company (SGC) 
 44% by Shell and 5% by Mitsubishi 
 
And the Key objectives: 
 
 South Gas Company takes raw gas from the South Oil Company 
 South Gas Company sells raw gas to Basra Gas Company 
 Basra Gas Company sells LPG and Condensates to the South Gas Company for 
local market 
 Basra Gas Company sells LNG and Condensate through SOMO, coordinated by 
a Joint Marketing Committee 
 Basra Gas Company sells LNG to Shell through SOMO from first phase of LNG 
project.
822
 
 
5.3.4 BGC Policy Analysis  
 
Problems with the BGC and its development can be divided into political and technical. 
The first issue relates to the nature of the discussions between Shell and the Ministry of 
Oil and the South Gas Company, which as noted, produced accusations of a lack of 
transparency and an attempted monopoly. This contributed to lengthy debates in 
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parliament over the legality of the Joint Venture, delaying implementation of initial 
rehabilitation of gas infrastructure, and prolonging the wasteful high levels of flaring.  
 
Technical problems relate to the targets envisaged when the project was conceived, and 
the failure to foresee how a fall in oil prices could impact oil production and 
subsequently associated gas production, potentially threatening the economic viability 
of the project. For example, the production plateaus negotiated under the 2009 
Technical Service Contracts have been continually revised down from an initial high of 
13.5 million, which would have produced 8.5 bcf/d of gas.
823
  As of 2015, the 
production plateau had been revised down to 4.5 mbpd, with an estimated associated 
gas output of 3.1 bcf/d, based on Gas Oil Ratios (GOR.)
824
 
 
Wood Mackenzie note the risk of conflict between IOCs involved at the four supergiant 
southern fields and BGC, since they receive no compensation from gas sent to SGC, 
and also may want to use the gas for re-injection, particularly in light of delays to the 
Common Seawater Supply Facility (CSSF) water injection project, now known as the 
Integrated South project. By early 2016, the company were suggesting these conflicts 
were no longer a barrier to the growth of the project. BGC Managing Director Simon 
Daman Willems claimed the project was on target to process far more than the 600 
mscfd output in February 2016. He also noted,  
 
“Around 70 per cent of the electricity generated in Basrah province last year and 
60 to 70 per cent of the all the LPG consumed in Iraq is produced from the 
project, in addition to a substantial amount of barrels of condensate.”825 
 
Willems noted however, that elements of expanding the project had been put on hold 
until oil prices recovered. If Iraq is able to increase oil production in 2017, perhaps 
through a scaled down water injection project in the south, this will mean that 
associated gas will increase, while processing will possibly be constrained by reduced 
investment, leading to a potentially higher percentage of flared gas.  
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In March 2016, BGC announced that frozen investment amounted to $2 billion that was 
intended for a plant to treat liquid gas, according to Deputy Chief Executive Officer Ali 
Salman Majeed.
826
 BGC also announced that the production target for 2 bscfd had been 
moved back a year to 2018, but that Condensate and LPG exports were planned for that 
year, which occurred over the spring. As noted, revenues from these shipments have not 
gone to the Iraqi government, as originally planned, although it is notable that southern 
Iraq is now self -sufficient in LPG, thanks to the project. 
 
In conclusion, greater transparency in the negotiations with foreign companies is 
essential in any future mega projects, to ensure politicians and public stakeholders have 
the chance to assess terms of contracts, and to build public trust and avoid unnecessary 
political conflict. Secondly, projects should be planned on conservative long term price 
forecasts, factoring in local market dynamics. For example, Iraq subsidizes gas for 
domestic consumption and the fertilizer industry, while fertilizer product is also 
subsidized. While associated gas involves little cost to extract, there is no incentive for 
IOCs to invest in vital infrastructure when the domestic market price is artificially low, 
meaning that gas is another area Iraq must focus on for subsidy reduction, especially in 
the low price environment. 
 
In the following Chapter, the problems of Iraq’s Federal and Regional institutions will 
be examined in more detail with regard to the price collapse of 2014, which exposed 
many of the underlying problems in the way Iraq’s oil and gas industry has been 
structured and the inherent vulnerability of the system to price shocks.  
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Chapter 6: Iraq’s Oil Revenue and 2014 Price Collapse 
 
Chapter 5 examined three case studies of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, the Kurdish Ministry 
of Natural Resources and, as an example of an Iraqi led Joint Venture, the Basra Gas 
Company, taking into account inherent institutional weaknesses in these organizations 
as they have struggled with the transition from autocratic to democratic and meritocratic 
governance.  
 
Problems identified were typical of these experienced by resource dependent economies 
such as Nigeria and Russia, examined in chapter 4, including an overall lack of 
transparency and poor financial planning in the energy sector (in both cases).
827
 Sassoon 
suggests reasons for corruption and lack of institutional capacity in Iraq’s energy sector 
include long term brain drain, due to the Saddam Hussein regime and poor security after 
2003, coupled with the sudden influx of revenues and reconstruction funds, which 
allowed corruption to flourish as auditing capability became overwhelmed.
828
 This 
chapter will examine Iraq’s acute dependence on oil revenue and the effects of failed (or 
never implemented) diversification strategies as the oil price collapsed through 2014 
and beyond. Lack of national level planning and diversification has negatively impacted 
investment requirements in Iraq needed to upgrade refining and pipeline capacity, as 
well as other vital infrastructure needed to increase output. 
 
Institutional problems, and their attendant corruption and preference for opaque revenue 
management has in turn impacted Iraq’s ability to pay IOCs and sustain work programs 
in line with ambitious production targets. For Iraq, Sassoon also compares the growth of 
corruption post 2003 with the experience of Russia after Communism, a comparison 
that Smith also makes when he notes, 
 
“It is already difficult for Western energy firms to make business decisions in 
the former Soviet area, due to the deeply rooted lack of transparency in Russian, 
Ukrainian, and Central Asian commercial dealings and to an absence of 
impartial court systems to enforce internationally recognized contracts between 
business firms.”829 
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This has hindered the significant investment demands of the Russian energy sector to 
attract enough foreign investment to fully exploit declining fields. Likewise, Akinrele 
examines how the Nigerian energy sector has resisted attempts to improve transparency, 
and both authors argue this resistance is intentional, protecting corrupt networks within 
government.
830
 As in Iraq, Nigeria experienced sustained high levels of government 
corruption, with 60,000 “ghost workers” being discovered in 2016 as the government 
sought to reform institutions and save money. 
831
 
 
Lack of revenue oversight has had a highly damaging effect on these countries during 
the resource boom between 2010 and 2014, with prices averaging $105 per barrel, 
which encouraged high government expenditure and optimistic forecasts that this trend 
could continue, with Russia basing its 2015 budget on $100 oil
832833
 and Nigeria 
expecting $77.50 average oil prices for its 2015 budget.
834
 By mid-2015 the average oil 
price forecast for Brent crude for the year was $58.
835
  
 
Likewise, welfare spending in Russia increased unsustainably during the resource 
boom, as Conolly notes, “Defence spending increased after years of savage cuts. Social 
welfare spending rose dramatically. The state bureaucracy ballooned in size.”836 In 
Nigeria, Baunsgaard also notes how government spending increases sharply during 
resource booms.
837
 In Iraq, the continuation of this pattern of sustained high spending 
has led to a fiscal crisis in 2015-16. 
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As in Nigeria and Russia, where Nigeria has struggled to overcome the legacy of 
dictatorship during its democratic transition, with elite led politics still prevalent 
838
 and 
Russia has struggled to reform a “large and pervasive” post-Soviet state which still 
dominates the energy sector,
839
 Iraq has struggled to reform government institutions. 
Meritocracy in institutions is subordinate to political connections of government 
employees, as Kubba notes.
840
 This has left the government unprepared to deal with a 
host of challenges, but carried the Illusion of sustainability under high oil prices.  
 
In Chapter 3, literature was reviewed that highlighted political hiring of workers, in 
particular Gunter and Dodge who have charted the rise in state driven employment in 
Iraq. This correlates to the work of Ali and Elbadawi who suggest a large resource base 
in Middle East countries is linked to high public sector employment
841
 and Conte and 
Huque who note that many public sectors in developing countries are characterised by 
inefficiency and corruption.
842
 Karl notes that developing countries with a large 
resource base, even when attempting to spend on economic diversification, have a 
tendency to overspend, spend inefficiently with little oversight, in part because there is 
minimal tax collection capability, what he calls “no tax and spend.”843 
 
The normalization of profligacy is also explained by Ascher who notes that developing 
economies can lose fiscal control in the event of high revenue windfalls, a situation that 
became severe in Iraq, and continued even as oil prices fell through 2009.
844
 For 
example, Gunter notes how even as oil prices fell 30% during the 2009 financial crisis, 
Iraqi government spending rose by the same level.
845
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At the same time, with the size of the state expanding and an ever increasing number of 
workers dependent on the funds of politically controlled ministries, it became harder for 
the state to implement spending cuts, delaying measures to resolve the fiscal crisis as oil 
prices fell through 2014 when Iraq’s fiscal break-even price reached $104.846 Through 
that year, government spending again increased, rising 26% compared to 2013, a similar 
level to the rise seen during the 2009 crash.
847
 As in Russia and Nigeria, Iraq has been 
consistently over optimistic about the forecast oil price, again hindering urgent reforms, 
with $60 per barrel calculated for the 2015 budget, and $46 expected in 2016, while oil 
actually reached a low of $59 in 2014
848
 and was as low as $27 in 2016, meaning Iraq’s 
budget was far below operational. Mitra and Krause suggest that resource booms 
increase government optimism about available funds leading to poor planning, which 
would apply in the case of Russia, Nigeria and Iraq.
849
  
 
In Iraq, optimism has characterised government projections, failing to take into account 
the risk of sudden falls in the price of oil. As an example, the Central Bank of Iraq 
forecast that per capita income would be $10,000 by 2015,
850
 based on the oil price 
remaining high and assuming that optimistic (and totally discredited) Ministry of Oil 
production forecasts of 12 million barrels a day by 2017 were correct.
851
 Since 2011 
saw around $70 billion in oil revenues between January and September, the GNI per 
capita forecast may have seen warranted. By 2014 however, per capita income was 
around $6000 and the oil production target had been revised to a still optimistic 9 
million barrels a day by the end of the decade.
852
 
853
 The latter target now stands at 6 
million bpd. 
854
 (Note, where per capita income is referred to in this thesis, the author is 
aware it does not take into account inequality, however it has been used as a guide and 
is frequently referenced by analysis cited in this text.) 
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 If the forecast of $10,000 per capita income had been correct, Iraq’s standard of living 
would have been transformed, possibly spurring the creation of improved financial 
services and allowing funds for more entrepreneurs to begin business, in spite of the 
difficulty of starting companies in Iraq. It is logical that such optimism therefore 
delayed measures to accelerate investment in Iraq and deliver improved public services. 
By 2014, 250,000 Iraqis entered the labour market each year, with little prospect of 
employment.
855
 
 
Another deterrent to urgent reforms has been the risk of public opposition to measures 
to reduce energy subsidies, points covered in relation to Russia, Nigeria and the UAE in 
chapter 4. In Iraq, electricity tariffs were changed to help poor families, setting a 
maximum of 1000 MW free usage per month for low income families, however, Gunter 
points out that this is more electricity than the average US family household would use 
in a year, with more income to spend on energy intensive appliances.
856
 
 
Another challenge Iraq faces in trying to react to the price collapse is restructuring 
ministries, which are according to reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction auditing team, dominated by political patronage when hiring workers.
857
 
This has led to highly inflated payrolls, with around 70% of the budget devoted to 
public servant salaries, eroding the ability of the government to invest in vital services 
such as education and health 
858
 and increasing oil revenue dependence to the point 
where Iraq had become (according to the IMF) the most oil revenue dependent nation in 
the Middle East.
859
 Mass government employment has created a situation where 
estimates vary as to how many people are employed by the state, with Cordesman 
estimating 3.5 million
860
 while some estimates by 2016 were as high as 7 million out of 
a workforce of around 8 million.
861
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Given that access to oil revenues is critical for political power and the power to employ 
tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of loyalists, the struggle for oil 
revenues has led to inefficient hiring policies, with an adviser to Haidar al-Abadi 
suggesting that some government workers worked for an average of 15 minutes work a 
day.
862
 Oversight over hiring practices is also evidently deficient, as noted in the case of 
Nigeria in Chapter 4 where political control of hiring led to payroll fraud and the 
employment of over 60,000 “ghost workers” in government.863  
 
This has been a persistent problem in Baghdad, where in 2011 the Ministry of Justice 
estimated that 50,000 government employees had falsified qualifications
864
 while 
according to a study by the UN, many ministry employees were not selected on the 
basis of any qualifications.
865
 While these revelations caused political controversy, by 
2015 the problem was apparently ongoing in at least some parts of government, with 
50,000 “ghost soldiers” found on payrolls at the Ministry of Defence, while the Ministry 
of Interior complained of similar issues. 
866
 While PM Haidar al-Abadi made the 
elimination of payroll fraud a centrepiece of his reform efforts, by 2016 Foreign 
Minister Hoshyar Zebari was estimating that there may have been around 30,000 ghost 
soldiers still in the ranks of the MoD.
867
 
 
High levels of government inefficiency have subsequently depleted available funds to 
invest in vital infrastructure, including the Al Faw port mega project, which is intended 
to increase Iraq’s capacity to import and export goods, capacity which is currently 
insufficient as Iraq’s population grows at 1.8% per annum. 868 By one estimate, Iraq 
would need an oil price of $80 and an average of 3.3 million barrels a day in exports to 
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maintain 2014 levels of infrastructure investment, meaning many projects such as Al 
Faw urgently need foreign investors, or face closure.
869
 
 
Since Iraq forecast a higher oil price for the 2016 budget therefore, the shortfall for 
maintaining an operational budget has been as high as $2.5 billion in 2016. More 
concerning, Gunter estimated that Iraq would need $70 per barrel in order to meet basic 
government functions,
870
 while Basra’s oil sold (due to discount for market share) at 
$21 in January 2016. As in Nigeria and Russia, this forced Iraq to drain currency 
reserves while negotiating with the IMF, World Bank and other lenders.  
 
This in turn jeopardised Iraq’s ability to pay for vital imports of foodstuffs and fuel that 
are either subsidised or distributed to poorer citizens through the Public Distribution 
System (PDS). In 2013, the Central Bank of Iraq’s foreign-currency reserves stood at 
$78 billion, falling to $59 billion in 2015 and by May 2016, $43 billion, with estimates 
of available funds over the summer of 2016 thought to be minimal, with the government 
only saved from a “fiscal cliff” by the authorization of significant IMF and World Bank 
lending.
871
 Despite these loans, Iraq’s deficit widened through 2015 and 2016, reaching 
8% of GDP in 2015 and 25% of GDP in 2016, with much pressure to spend going on 
defence as well as public sector wages, due to the battle against the Islamic State, 
although the loans, and moderate increases in oil exports and the price of oil managed to 
reduce the deficit forecast for 2016 to 20%.  
 
This has forced the Abadi government’s reform program to examine the State Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) sector of Iraq, which employs over half a million people. SOEs, many 
of which were established under the Baath regime, generally have not exported products 
but served domestic demand, and in the case of some factories, such as the Thi Qar 
cable factory, exclusively serve government demand.
872
 Therefore, in 2003, the CPA 
decided that 120 of these firms would be privatised, but plans were abandoned due to 
Iraqi public opposition and deteriorating security, which deterred foreign investors.
873
 
By 2012, the number of SOEs targeted for reform, employing 630,000 Iraqis, was given 
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as “180 plus,” suggesting the number of these companies actually rose, and by 2016 a 
more specific figure of 176 was given by a government official. 
874
 This suggests some 
SOEs are being targeted for reform, while others are being considered to be left to fail 
since they drain funds as “employment schemes.” The loss of some SOEs would likely 
be necessary if Iraq is to reduce the burden of public sector salaries and move salary 
expenditure to investment, since according to one account, SOEs have taken $11 billion 
in government money since 2003 but have made “no profit,” as one consultant 
remarked, 
 
“Over-employment in these companies ranges from 30% to 50% so you can 
imagine that when they come to be transferred into private ownership this will 
cause social issues with unemployment. They will need state benefits and 
training to find new jobs. It will be very difficult but the government must 
provide an essential safety net.”875  
 
Problematically, even the latter challenge, of gradually transitioning SOE workers to 
retirement or training has significant costs and some form of compensation will likely 
be demanded by all those who are made unemployed.  
 
Unemployment, already a persistent problem in Iraq, has risen since the oil price 
collapse as SOEs have been unable to pay salaries, as oil revenues are diverted to 
defence to fight the self-declared Islamic State. Highlighting the relationship between 
the oil price and available funds for public sector salaries, protests were occurring at 
SOE factories in Kut and Hillah over delayed wages through the summer of 2014, 
before the steep drop in prices, although prices were already declining.
876
 Looney 
highlights how the SOE model under Saddam Hussein was likely to endure in Iraq post 
2003, noting, 
 
 “the Baathist economic model provided the government bureaucracy with a 
pragmatic, albeit doctrinaire framework for setting prices for many goods, 
controlling the country's vast oil resources, running nearly two hundred state-
owned enterprises, and dominating most aspects of the economy.”877 
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A decade after regime change, the UNDP estimated public sector employment at over 4 
million, with many males in the work force serving in the police or armed forces. 
However, while the Iraqi government is burdened paying wages to failing companies, 
another problematic area is industrial energy subsidies, which have distorted the 
investment environment.  
 
Estimates of fuel subsidies in Iraq are as high as 14% of GDP in 2011, and as much as 
$10 billion per year in 2015.
878
 These subsidies make it difficult for SOEs and investors 
in Joint Ventures with SOEs to know the “bottom line” of these firms since they face 
few difficulties when operating wastefully due to cheap or free energy.  Highlighting 
government and public sensitivity to the removal of subsidies, one government official 
in 2015 denied that subsidies would be removed under conditions of an IMF loan 
agreement. 
879
 This may appear justified in light of civil unrest in Iraq, since previous 
attempts to increase energy prices have led to public protests, particularly considering 
that many Iraqis express dissatisfaction with public services. Subsequently, Iraq has 
resisted removing subsidies despite removing them from the budget in 2007, only to 
keep implicit subsidies by lowering the price of fuels refined within Iraq, while 
domestic power plants have paid far less than international price for fuel. 
880
 
 
This creates yet more inefficiency in the energy value chain, firstly because low prices 
have encouraged smuggling networks and fuel theft by government officials with access 
to large fuel allocations, with one estimate of the cost to Iraq’s economy at $4 billion in 
2005, with as much as 30% of fuel imported and refined being smuggled out of the 
country and sold at regional market prices.
881
 One report noted how, since fuel was 
subsidized at 3 cents per litre, imported fuel was stolen, as well as fuel refined in Iraq, 
describing how, 
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“A 9000 gallon tanker truck carried fuel officially worth around $250. But the 
same fuel was worth around a dollar a gallon on the black market. Consequently, 
according to a report done for the oil industry, even after paying $500 for 
protection money or police bribes and $800 for the truck driver, a smuggler 
could make $7,450 bringing in fuel from Jordan and Syria.”882 
 
Secondly, as Iraq’s population grows, the outlay for these imports also grows, eroding 
exports and revenues. For example, in 2005 the cost of fuel imports was estimated to be 
$6 billion, while in 2016 this had risen to $10 billion, in part driven by increased 
consumption as per capita income rose.
883
 Likewise, in 2015 the IMF estimated that if 
Iraq raised the price of fuel at the pump to 80% of the import price, $2.5 billion would 
be saved, although the IMF noted this would have to be examined carefully to avoid 
public opposition.
884
 
 
Until such measures can be implemented, Iraq’s fuel import outlays and high domestic 
demand will continue to pressure the country’s limited refining capacity, which requires 
significant investment, estimated in 2008 at 10 billion dollars, but likely far higher since 
the loss of the 400,000 bpd Baiji refinery, which was destroyed during fighting in 2014. 
For example, the Karbala refinery project alone was priced at $6.5 billion, but was 
delayed in 2016 due to financial pressures.
885
 When the Baiji refinery was destroyed, 
fuel shortages affected most of Northern Iraq.
886
 
 
Other problems have affected the refinery sector, such as continually revised but 
difficult investment terms for investors, which have delayed bidding rounds for the 
300,000 BPD Nasiriyah refinery, which is planned to be connected to the oilfield of the 
same name. However, the Nasiriyah Integrated Project, the terms of which were first 
offered in 2008, has been delayed until 2013, when bidding was indefinitely postponed, 
ostensibly due to lack of interest. 
887
 
 
With delays in making feasibility studies and problems attracting investors, Iraq will 
now not have enough refining capacity to meet domestic demand until at least 2020, but 
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this assumes the delayed Karbala refinery will be completed on time and that the 
planned Maysan refinery will also be complete, and in the latter case accusations of 
corruption may delay the $6 billion project, with two Iraqi oil experts claiming the 
company contracted for the work, Satarem, has no experience in refining.
888
 More 
recently, sources apparently close to the project have claimed that the Swiss-Chinese 
Satarem Corporation behind the Maysan project is partly backed by CNPC, but the 
fraud accusations point to the dangers of a lack of transparency in the sector.
889
 Until the 
new refineries are complete therefore, Iraq faces a 200,000 bpd deficit of refined fuel.
890
 
As of September 2016, a new Minister of Oil, Jabar al-Luaibi, entered talks with a 
number of officials to develop new refining capacity at four new greenfield sites, but 
this approach has been called into question given the failure to attract new investment 
over 9 years since Iraq passed and then continually revised investment terms under the 
Refinery Act of 2007.
891
 
 
These economic inefficiencies further jeopardise the future of the energy sector. As 
noted, sums of $10 billion a year for fuel subsidies, as well as losses of hundreds of 
millions of dollars for flared gas, could be sufficient to fund either new refining capacity 
or vital infrastructure projects to maintain pressure and output in aging giant oil fields.  
 
Aside from this lack of funding, much of which has been spent on fuelling inefficient 
power stations with oil which could have been refined or exported, or allowing cheap 
fuel which, according to some studies, helps wealthier families who consume more, 
rather than the poor which subsidies are intended to protect, Iraq has also struggled to 
pay IOCs following the price collapse.  Payments to IOCs have also been jeopardised 
by Iraq’s surging war expenditures, which amounted to almost 20% of GDP in 2015.892  
 
Nonetheless, Iraq has succeeded in raising exports between 2014 and 2015 despite some 
field registering declines as capital expenditure reductions took effect. In February 
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2014, Iraq managed to export 2.8 mbpd and reached exports of 3.06 mbpd in August 
2015, 
893
 an increase of over half a million barrels compared to 2014. Exports were 
increasing through 2016, although a number of experts noted the likelihood that if Iraq 
faced continued problems paying IOCs, a lack of investment would see output decline 
by as much as 10% per year, a potentially catastrophic amount.
894
 Of particular concern 
to Iraq is the Common Seawater Supply Facility, which is a water injection project 
needed to maintain pressure in Iraq’s five giant southern fields which account for two 
thirds of Iraqi production.
895
 
 
The lack of available funds for such a vital project has called into question Iraq’s 
Technical Service Contracts, which stipulate that Iraq must pay the IOC investment 
costs within one Quarter at a fixed per barrel fee. This arrangement saw the government 
accrue massive revenues at times of high prices, but has strained finances following the 
2014 price collapse. Iraq’s payments to IOCs subsequently fell behind some time in 
2014, reaching a debt of $8 billion by the start of 2015 and another $9 billion at the start 
of 2016. 
896
 
 
After the oil price collapse, Iraq responded to this growing financial crisis by writing a 
letter to IOCs warning of a grave financial crisis and a threat to the stability of the state, 
asking the companies to slash spending requests for 2015. IOCs duly did so, with 
Lukoil cutting expenditure to $2.1 billion from $2.3 billion, BP cutting costs to $3.25 
billion from $3.50 billion, and Shell suggesting a reduction to $1.5 billion from $2.4 
billion. Exxon Mobil meanwhile, announced that investment would remain at $1.8 
billion.
897
 The effect of these expenditure reductions were not seen for sometime, 
although Gazprombank projected that Lukoil would not begin any new work in 2015,
898
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while Italy’s ENI announced that there would be a decline in production through 
2016.
899
 
 
Iraq also changed contracts to allow payments to IOCs in shipments in oil, to minimise 
the build-up of debt, with BP being an early beneficiary of this arrangement, which 
allowed Baghdad to maintain payments such as public sector salaries but of course 
eroded revenues.
900
 Furthermore, because of the severity of a 45% price collapse, 
payments of oil to IOCs doubled.
901
 To an extent, the strategy worked in that debt to 
IOCs was gradually paid off with around $2 billion in debt outstanding to IOCs by 
March 2016, meaning that Iraq had successfully paid off almost $15 billion in debt. 
 
These payments amount to almost $5 billion more than the maximum estimated funds 
required to complete the Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP) which is required to 
inject around 1.5 barrels of water to extract one barrel of oil from southern fields, on 
average.
902
 The absence of the project, which was supposed to have been completed by 
2015 meant that IOCs negotiated with the Iraqi government to upgrade the old Qarmat 
Ali water treatment facility near Rumaila to provide them with around 300,000 barrels a 
day of water, while some IOCs rely on the “Third River” drainage canal, which takes 
agricultural run-off from the rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates.
903904
 
 
This is far short of the originally planned 12.5 million bpd of seawater required for Iraq 
to hit its target of 6 million bpd production by 2020, in an original plan for 270 
kilometres of pipeline, suggesting that initial declines in some fields through 2015 and 
2016 may be a sign of more serious problems. By 2014, the CSSP was planned to 
deliver 7 million bpd of treated seawater, already a significant reduction, while other 
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figures for available water still fall far short of this. Even before projected declines in 
2016, Lukoil, Shell and CNPC all revised production targets down by hundreds of 
thousands of barrels in the absence of the facility. 
905
 
 
Subsequently, Iraq went into talks in 2016 with Exxon to return to the project, an 
unlikely prospect following interviews with those close to the matter. Iraq had 
previously expelled Exxon from work on the project, following the company's deals 
with the KRG, which Baghdad declared illegal. 
906
 Another IOC approached has been 
PetroChina, with Bin Umar and Ratawi being offered for development in conjunction 
with the new CSSP deal. Both fields hold almost 9 billion barrels of oil.
907
 However, 
since talks are ongoing, the FEED for the project has not yet been completed by 
contractor Parsons, suggesting more delays are to be expected.
908
 
 
Faced with these problems, the government of Iraq has sought to again renegotiate 
contracts with a particular focus on remuneration and extending terms for IOCs, with 
some suggesting new contracts would more resemble PSAs, which proved highly 
controversial in the Iraqi parliament in 2009.
909
 Aware of this controversy, the Oil 
Ministry stated that any new contract would not bear relation to a PSA, and has also 
suggested Iraq’s stake in projects could be expanded to 25pc.910 Previously, the 
government stake had been revised down in most contracts to only 5pc in 2013, because 
IOCs were not happy with per barrel cost recovery fees.
911
 
 
Despite facing political uncertainty following protests in the spring of 2016 that saw 
thousands of protesters enter the Iraqi Parliament and political deadlock that left the 
government without an Oil Minister, the Ministry of Oil continued negotiations with 
IOCs and asked them to increase output by 500,000 bpd for 2016. Within the call for 
this increase in output are stipulations that new contracts must have greater local content 
provisions.
912
 The call for raised output caused some IOCs to unofficially express 
concern about the Ministry’s approach, which was based on the suggestion that higher 
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output would produce more oil to pay IOCs, although one un-named IOC official 
apparently remarked, “we are not a bank” in reference to this proposal.913 
 
As noted in Chapter 5 however, Iraq’s pursuit of oil production targets above 5 million 
barrels a day risk putting downward pressure on prices and, given the significant 
investment required, could prove self-defeating, as Fadhil al Chalabi and Frank Gunter 
have noted, covered in Chapter 3. At the same time, a reduction of output could stabilise 
global prices, but at the expense of Iraq’s market share if Saudi Arabia and Russia were 
to maintain high rates of production beyond 2017, since Iraq has previously contributed 
to price reductions through rapid output. For example, in August 2016, a brief rally in 
the price of oil ended with the announcement that extra Iraqi production was coming on 
line from Kirkuk (although other data points such as falling Chinese demand were cited 
as reasons for the fall).
914
  
 
Output decline was not looking as rapid as the projected 10% fall after 2016 however, 
as by summer 2016 Iraq had secured a $5.4 billion IMF loan, having already borrowed 
$1.25 from the IMF and $1.7 billion from the World Bank in 2015.
915
 These initial 
loans were part of an emergency fund raising drive from the government, which 
included a $566 million loan from Germany in early 2016, $2.7 billion loan from the 
U.S to purchase weapons to fight IS,
916
 and a bond issuance, which was eventually 
dropped because the bonds were not attractive enough for buyers, who demanded too 
high a yield. With the IMF loan of spring 2016, Iraq agreed to a monitoring program 
which, if effectively implemented, should reduce energy subsidies, but again risks 
raising political pressure on Haidar al-Abadi’s struggling government.  
 
One stipulation of the IMF loan was that it would be used to pay off IOC debt, and this 
appeared to have the desired effect of restoring IOC confidence, with a target of 
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September 2016 to pay off debt to IOCs and a promise not to accrue more debt beyond 
summer 2016.
917
 Tellingly, while IOCs outlined investment plans for southern Iraq in 
2016, these were lower than the revised investment plans noted earlier for 2015, which 
had already been reduced. Shell for example, had cut investment to just $742 million, a 
reduction of almost half from 2015 plans, while Lukoil reduced spending similarly, 
going from a planned $2.5 billion in investments for 2015 to $1.08 billion and BP 
announcing deeper cuts from $3.5 billion to $1.8 billion.  
 
Prolonging negotiations and contractual uncertainty comes with another risk for Iraq, 
and this is that neighbouring Iran may ramp up exports following the lifting of 
sanctions, effectively winning foreign investment that may have gone to Iraq. This 
would depend on Iraq asking for too unattractive terms for new contracts while, at the 
same time Iran would have to offer highly attractive terms for its new “Iran Petroleum 
Contract” model, which replaces the “buy back” contract.  
 
Another problem that has seen billions of dollars’ worth of waste in Iraq’s energy value 
chain is the flaring of associated gas, which is covered in the case study on the Basra 
Gas Company in Chapter 5. Iraq devised a national plan with Shell in 2005 to capture 
associated gas from oil wells, based in part on plans to do the same that were devised in 
the 1980s. 
918
  
 
However, a series of political disputes, arising largely from the secretive negotiations 
between the Ministry of Oil and Shell, and questions over the anticompetitive nature of 
the deal caused a number of delays in the project, in addition to disputes between Shell 
and the South Gas Company, and disputes with IOCs who were required under their 
contracts to supply associated gas the SGC for treatment. The aim of the project was to 
eliminate flaring by 2015, but this has been delayed to 2022.
919
 Because of the political 
disputes, some gas treatment technical studies were not awarded until the spring of 
2014, and the target beyond 2020 means that IEA predictions that Iraq could lose a total 
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of $70 billion to flaring could be correct.
920
 BGC have suggested the lost gas from 
flaring throughout Iraq could power a total of 15 million homes, if utilized.
921
 
 
Despite these delays, Iraq sent some gas to the national grid in early 2016, allowing for 
300 MW of power to be generated for Basra.
922
 However, until further work is 
complete, Iraq has chosen to import gas from Iran, to the value of approximately $3.7 
billion a year, according to Iranian sources.
923
 Other problems with BGC have related to 
funds owed, or problems Iraq has experienced in paying contractually stipulated costs. 
This means that, although shipments of condensate and LPG began in 2016, the 
revenues from these shipments have not gone to the Iraqi government, as originally 
planned, although it is notable that southern Iraq is now self -sufficient in LPG, thanks 
to the project.
924
  
 
Nonetheless, Ali Khudair, former director of the South Gas Company has estimated that 
flaring stands at 1000 million cubic feet a day (1000 mcf/d) of gas, with the Ministry of 
Oil estimating a similar level of captured gas. Other estimates have been higher for both 
flared and produced gas, based on statements by an Iraqi oil official, at 1800 mcf/d 
being flared out of 2600 mcf/d production.
925
 
 
The Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) has also had problems with the gas 
sector, but these have been related to contractual disputes rather than infrastructural and 
political challenges, as with the case of the BGC. In 2007, Dana Gas, a Sharjah based 
consortium, signed an agreement with the KRI to supply gas to power stations from the 
Khor Mor gas field and the Chemchemal field to power stations in the KRI, with future 
exports planned.
926
 In 2009, Dana Gas formed Pearl Petroleum with Austria’s OMV and 
MOL of Hungary, but while the utilization of gas for electricity proved to be a success 
                                               
920
 John Lee, “Iraq has lost billions from gas flaring,” Iraq Business News February 16
th
 2016. Accessed 
August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2015/02/16/iraq-has-lost-billions-from-gas-flaring/ 
921
 Basra Gas Company. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.basrahgas.com/a-wasted-resource-today 
922
 IEA, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” April 28, Accessed August 2
nd
 2016  
http://www.iberglobal.com/files/2016/iraK_eia.pdf 
923
 “Iran to start gas exports to Iraq in a month: official.” Iran Daily 23
rd
 May 2016 accessed August 2
nd
 
2016. 
https://www.google.co.uk/search?espv=2&q=iraq+gas+imports+from+iran+3.7+billion&oq=iraq+gas+impor
ts+from+iran+3.7+billion&gs_l=serp.3...21508.22828.0.23088.4.4.0.0.0.0.87.297.4.4.0....0...1c.1.64.serp..0
.0.0.u5WTDqkxmxs 
924
 Khalid al Ansary, “Iraq Slows Natural Gas Output as Oil Slump Squeezes Spending,” Bloomberg March 
30
th
 2016. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-29/iraq-slowing-
natural-gas-output-as-cheaper-oil-squeezes-spending 
925
 Saadallah al Fathi, “Iraqi claims that have no basis in fact,” Gulf News 17
th
 April 2016 accessed 25
th
 
August 2016. http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/iraqi-claims-that-have-no-basis-in-facts-1.1714115 
926
 Luay al Khatteeb,”The Geopolitics of Natural Gas Natural Gas in the Republic of Iraq” (Harvard Belfer 
Center, Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for Energy Studies 2013.) 
230 
 
for the KRI, a legal dispute between the Pearl Petroleum Consortium and the KRG over 
the right to sell shares in the Khor Mor project, as well as payment disputes, has cost the 
Kurds $1.98 billion.
927
 
 
The lawsuit has been one of a number of serious setbacks for the KRI’s attempt at 
developing an independent energy sector. Firstly, the KRI has suffered many of the 
problems described at the start of this chapter, including loss of fiscal control, mass 
public sector employment and political disputes over oil revenues that have delayed 
efficient planning and led to the politicised hiring of ministry staff.  
 
The KRI has as much as 70% of its workforce employed by the regional government, 
which has led to chronic over-employment in ministries, a similar situation to Arab 
Iraq.
928
 According to the US State Department in 2008 for example, the KRG’s 
agriculture ministry employed over 6 times the number of staff in the equivalent 
organization in California, which had 2000 employees to the KRI’s 13,000 despite the 
fact that California has over 7 times the population of the KRI, or 38 million people.
929
 
 
Since the oil price collapse, this situation has called into question hopes that oil 
revenues from independent exports may be able to financially sustain the KRI, placing 
greater political pressure on the ruling KDP, who have been accused of having 
autocratic tendencies in reports by Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights 
Watch.
930
  
 
Disgruntlement at the ruling KDP has resulted in renewed political conflict and social 
unrest in the KRI, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Change Movement 
(Gorran) having repeatedly objected to the KDP holding onto the presidency position, 
which (according to the Kurdish constitution) should have been passed on in 2013.
931
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Until increased political tension following the KDP’s refusal to give up the presidency, 
high oil revenues from federal government transfers had cemented the KRI’s political 
alliance of KDP and PUK, the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan.
932
 This 
changed in January 2014 following a dispute over exports, when Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki’s government decided to cut federal transfers, plunging the region into 
instantaneous financial crisis.
933
 
 
Severe financial pressure following the budget cut off and the price collapse through 
2014 did not appear to deter the KDP’s leader Massoud Barzani from pursuing 
independent exports in the hope that revenues would make the KRI financially viable, 
aiming for 1 million bpd independent exports by 2017.
934
  
 
This ambition suffered a significant setback when two of the largest producing oil fields 
in the region had their reserves downgraded. Genel Energy, which operates the  Taq Taq 
oil field, lost 44% of its value, or  $1 billion USD when the field’s recoverable oil was 
re-assessed, which followed the downgrading of Barda Rash oilfield in January 2015, 
which caused its operator Afren to go bankrupt.
935
 
 
These developments have led some to suggest that the KRI’s proclaimed 70 billion 
barrels reserves may be more than 10 times less, perhaps as low as 7 bbl. and 3.8 bbl of 
discovered contingent resources.
936
 This has added to an overall sense of risk for IOCs 
entering the KRI, where once PSAs offered were seen as favourable to the TSCs offered 
by Baghdad. Already, there had been tension between the KRI and oil companies 
following the budget dispute with Baghdad, which caused Kurdish debt to IOCs to build 
even before the oil price collapse. Following on from corruption allegations against 
MNR for alleged insider dealings with DNO, the Dana Gas dispute and Baghdad issued 
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lawsuits against KRI exports, investors will be far more wary of entering the KRI 
energy market.  
 
As with Arab Iraq, the KRI is also forced to discount its oil on the international market, 
and in several cases has been forced to disguise shipments, with buyers also being 
threatened by Baghdad with lawsuits.
937
 A combination of selling discounted oil and the 
oil price collapse has led to the KRI being short of hundreds of millions of dollars per 
month, leading the government to take emergency austerity measures as strikes, sit ins 
and protests erupted into violence in October 2015, raising fears that intra-Kurdish 
violence could return. 
938
 As the KRI took measures to pay IOCs on time (despite debts) 
further setbacks hit the region when the main Kurdish export pipeline was knocked off 
line by an explosion, removing 600,000 bpd of exports in an attack blamed on the 
Kurdish militant PKK, who are targeting the KDP’s close relationship with Turkey.939 
Following the resultant drop in exports, Gulf Keystone suffered such serous financial 
losses as to become insolvent, since the small IOC was already struggling from delayed 
payments from the KRG.
940
 
 
These negative financial developments in the KRI have not only heightened tension 
between the Kurdish political parties, but also heightened tension between Baghdad and 
Erbil, since in the Summer of 2014 Kurdish Peshmerga forces seized a number of 
oilfields in the Kirkuk formation, Bai Hassan, and Jambur.
941
  This was met with 
immediate condemnation from Baghdad, who saw the move as exploiting the advance 
of the self-declared Islamic State for territorial gain. Despite this condemnation, and 
warnings from the Ministry of Oil, the KRG later connected the Avanah Dome of the 
Kirkuk field, which is linked by pipeline to Bai Hassan, to the Khurmala oilfield, 
effectively giving it control of oil previously managed by the North Oil Company.  
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At several fields, the Federal North Oil Company then re-injected oil into reservoirs, 
rather than allow it to be exported by the Kurds to Ceyhan in Turkey, but exports began 
again in August 2016 under a deal designed ostensibly to prevent reservoir damage 
from re-injection and extract gas.
942
 Given the emotive nature of the issue of ownership 
of Kirkuk and its oilfields however, it remains to be seen how long such an arrangement 
can last, considering the previous four failed revenue and exports deals discussed in the 
previous chapter. To conclude, the extent to which both the KRI and Baghdad had made 
themselves heavily dependent on oil revenues to ensure ongoing political support 
through a bloated public sector, has heightened political tension between Baghdad and 
Erbil since the oil price collapse, and heightened the risk of renewed conflict. This has 
greatly increased the need for clearer legislation on revenue sharing and exports, not 
only between Iraq and its one region (the KRI) but also between Iraq and provinces 
such as Basra.   
 
The next chapter will examine in detail the implications for these policy oversights in 
Iraq in relation to the experiences of the four federalised countries studied (which will 
now be cross examined), to find the weakest parts of Iraq’s energy strategy and how a 
new strategy could synthesize the interests of the private and public sectors, in a way 
that would be broadly politically acceptable to the Iraqi political class, given the 
tendency of Iraqi politicians and the public to favour public ownership of resources. 
Key themes that have now been established are separation of regulator and regulated 
entities, transparency and coordination among government agencies, in addition to clear 
legislation that follows the democratically ratified constitution.  Essentially, a new 
strategic framework would follow the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, which calls for a 
modern private investment environment that also provides maximum benefit to the Iraqi 
people, similar to the UAE’s Article 23.  
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Chapter-7: Restructuring Iraq’s Energy Sector Analysis 
 
The case studies outlined in preceding chapters illustrate the importance of clear 
constitutional guidance regarding the development of natural resources. Even in 
countries with a high per capita income and ethnic and political homogeneity (Canada, 
UAE) with decades of relative stability to develop petroleum policy, problems 
developing national level policy have been unavoidable. Global market forces and 
changing geopolitics change petroleum dynamics within countries, creating new debates 
about revenue disbursement and taxation, as much as the natural decline of old fields or 
unexpected discoveries can create new political problems. To take two examples from 
this study, this has been illustrated by the long dispute that led to the Atlantic Accords 
in Canada, where new offshore discoveries led to multi-decade legal conflict, and in the 
UAE, wasteful energy subsidies that have increased the Emirates' need to import natural 
gas from Qatar to cover an extremely high per capita energy consumption.  
 
In these countries, laws have been implemented to cover new challenges such as rights 
to offshore oil and gas in Canada and the conservation of the environment in the UAE. 
In the UAE, the environment is not mentioned in relation to oil and gas in the 1973 
UAE Federal Constitution, but covered under legislation passed in 1999,
943
 while there 
is no constitutional basis for the Atlantic Accords, since the federal government is 
supposed to have jurisdiction over offshore discoveries.
944
  
 
In Iraq, the delayed Federal Oil and Gas Law (FOGL) is the most important law to 
regulate and manage the petroleum sector. The second most important delayed law is 
the Federal Revenue Sharing/Distribution bill. The delay in the enactment of the FOGL 
has led to federal and regional contracts being concluded with no strategic framework as 
mandated by the Constitution in articles (111 – 112). This resulted in conflicts between 
the federal and regional governments, and unilateral action by the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq. As in Iraq, the examples of Russia and Nigeria illustrate the challenges of devising 
strategy when there is a weak or non-existent legal framework for government 
interaction with the energy sector, potentially leading to inefficiency and state 
corruption, as Shkaeva writes, “as soon as oil revenues increase in a state with fuzzy 
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institutional arrangements, political actors will have incentives to “capture” oil revenues 
rather than invest in other sectors.”945 
 
Subsequently, the review in preceding chapters of Iraq’s oil and gas and power sector 
since 2003 points to a number of inbuilt inefficiencies stemming from direct ministerial 
interference in day to day oil and gas operations and the politicised allocation of fuel to 
SOEs at prices far below market value, resulting in fuel smuggling and a culture of 
corruption and waste. Iraq’s federal oil ministry has retained the ability to unilaterally 
prepare contractual terms it deems best for Iraq, but noted as economically inefficient 
by a number of observers including Ghandi and Lin Anaz and Muttitt as well as 
described as suboptimal for IOC investment (for example, see Nakhle.)
946
 
 
Likewise, a lack of politically neutral technocratic oversight of the ministry and its 
involvement in oilfield operations has led to a growth in bureaucracy, to include slow 
ministerial approval processes for essential but relatively small operations, which has 
slowed contractor work at the giant Rumaila and Zubair oilfields, among others. This 
led to a representative of ENI saying that the ministry’s bureaucracy was “the most 
complex they had seen in the world,” an issue covered in the Ministry case study.947 The 
political use of contracts as bargaining chips with IOCs has delayed major projects (in 
the case of Exxon’s removal from CSSP) and a lack of transparency regarding 
contractual negotiations at ministry level, in the case of the Basra Gas Company. This 
overall lack of consultation regarding major contracts is interpreted by some as a 
violation of current Iraqi law, still in effect since 1967, and has subsequently eroded 
political and public trust in IOC investment.
948
 
 
The ability of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, and the Kurdish Ministry of Natural Resources 
to negotiate contract terms in secret and finalise the terms of energy projects without 
reference to parliament suggests an overarching lack of democratic checks and balances 
on the industry. This is a similar situation to two of the countries reviewed, Russia and 
Nigeria.  
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7.1 Cross Examining International Examples 
 
Both Nigeria and Russia, in the absence of a comprehensive regulatory framework, have 
suffered high levels of economic inefficiency in energy operations. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, Russia has lost tens, possibly hundreds of billions through mismanagement 
at Gazprom, and now faces possible output decline through lack of IOCs investment, 
while Nigeria has seen IOCs deterred by regulatory uncertainty or forced to undertake 
illegal and non-transparent business activities.
949
 
 
In contrast, Canada has a clearly delineated regulatory regime, although it has still faced 
challenges, with the National Energy Board providing regulatory oversight of energy 
transport infrastructure at the national level across provincial boundaries and local 
regulators overseeing IOCs activity within provinces.  
 
Constitutionally, the high degree of provincial control and private sector control over 
hydrocarbon resources in Canada has been a mitigating factor in disputes between the 
central government and the provinces. For example, a 2013 a poll found 87% of 
Canadians viewed the oil industry as “economically important” to Canada950 while a 
2015 poll of Albertans found the majority to be more concerned with expanding the oil 
industry than fighting climate change. 
951
 
 
This contrasts with unfavourable views of a centrally controlled oil industry in Basra, 
where a 2010 poll found that 71% of residents felt Iraq was going “in the wrong 
direction” suggesting dissatisfaction with the main income stream for the province.952 
By contrast, the KRG, with a high level of control over how oil revenues were spent and 
a degree of autonomy over oil operations, had a generally favourable view of the 
region's economic and political progress, according to a late 2010 poll.
953
 While it may 
be problematic to make direct comparisons between different polls in Alberta, Basra 
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and the KRG, it is interesting that the overall satisfaction of these oil dependent 
provinces is significantly higher where there is a strongly federal arrangement. 
 
In Alberta, regulators have been merged, with the Energy Resources Conservation 
Board merging with Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development to 
form the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER.) AER oversees activity at 60,000 oil and gas 
facilities in Alberta and operates with relative independence from the provincial 
government.  
 
AER centralises a number of government functions, coordinating with IOCs as the sole 
regulating body (and therefore reducing “red tape”) and coordinating with the Alberta 
government’s environmental ministry, ESRD. As an example, the ministry passed the 
Natural Resources Conservation Board Act, which reviews projects that may affect 
water resources in the province, therefore AER coordinate with ESRD on environmental 
assessments of energy projects.
954
 
 
This arrangement, if replicated in Iraq, would potentially clarify confusion as to which 
agency, the Ministry of Oil or Environment, would take a lead role in formulating best 
environmental policy and coordinating with IOCs in the event of an oil spill, confusion 
which persisted in late 2011 in Basra following a pipeline leak.
955
 Similar lack of clarity 
and regulatory overlap exists in Nigeria, as identified by Adekunle.
956
 
 
New legislation could clarify the exact standards IOCs and operators are supposed to 
uphold. Currently, Article 41.1 of the 2009 TSCs calls for IOCs to apply the “best 
international petroleum industry practices” but it would perhaps be beneficial to outline 
exactly what standards these
957
 should be, if only to clarify this to Iraqi policymakers. 
For example, the World Bank’s Equator Principles are generally regarded as describing 
a high standard of environmental protection in the extractive industry. 
958
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This is of critical importance to Iraq, already suffering a high level of pollution and 
water stress.
959
 In Canada, there have been concerns about the Athabasca River, since 
IOCs take 539 million cubic metres for tar sands extraction, leading one study to note 
the river faces “acute ecosystem stress.”960 One poll in 2006 suggested 55% of Albertan 
residents favoured government imposed regulations on how much water was taken from 
the river.
961
 In highly populated southern Iraq, the absence of a water injection project 
for the five giant southern fields (CSSP) led IOCs to ask the government of Iraq to 
extract 100,000bpd of “very high quality” water from the Garraf river for injection, 
although this water is irrigation run off rather than freshwater.
962
  
 
With conflicting roles and increasing water shortage, it is likely that the Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Water Resources and Ministry of Oil in Iraq will come into 
more conflict in future. Centralising regulators into one body could help this. Currently, 
the 2009 TSC imposes a maximum fine in the region of $20,000 for environmental 
damage in the event of an accident, an extremely small fraction of the $18.7 billion fine 
levied at BP following the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.
963
 
 
Iraq is not alone in this absence of strong regulatory framework, and from the case 
studies covered in Chapter 4, it is arguable that Russia and Nigeria have been affected 
more severely by political interference in the energy sector, a problem that may have 
been mitigated by legislation clearly limiting direct political control of energy matters.  
 
For example, Vladimir Milos, former Russian Deputy Energy Minister, has argued that 
Russia has pursued a policy of “active and arbitrary use of regulatory powers (taxation, 
environmental protection) in order to create market advantages to state-affiliated 
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companies” and is guilty of a “failure to separate regulatory functions and economic 
interests of the Government.”964 Krysiek supports this view, noting how the Russian 
government could not challenge “intractable” PSAs and was forced to 
 
 “employ a variety of regulatory tactics against Kharyaga, Sakhalin-1 and 
Sakhalin-2 to extract concessions from the operators and increase the 
government’s control over the projects. The nature of the Russian regulatory 
environment is such that the investor and the state are locked in a fundamentally 
confrontational relationship.”965 
 
NOCs have also been used as a political tool. Victor describes Gazprom’s use by the 
government to support wasteful subsidies, noting this policy “reflects Gazprom’s insular 
history as a Soviet ministry and the fact that political control over the firm is rooted in 
the Kremlin rather than in production of gas (and now oil).”966 
 
Monaghan also notes that Russia has seen such strong political control over the Ministry 
of Energy that no clear strategy has ever been developed to maximise the economic 
returns of the sector. Describing differences between ministries over levels of 
production, environmental issues or withdrawals from the stability fund, Monaghan 
outlines what he calls “incoherence” and, “a lack of over-all strategic planning for the 
development of the Russian energy sector in terms of who will achieve what aims, with 
what resources and in what timeframe.”967 
 
The consequences of this policy incoherence have been extremely damaging for the 
sector and emphasise the importance of limiting Energy/ Oil Ministries to policy 
proposals, regulatory oversight and international treaty negotiation (eg. OPEC quotas, 
Kyoto targets) and keeping NOCs limited to commercial operations.  
 
Milos and Kuchins argue that the absence of effective, politically neutral oversight is so 
damaging that,  
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“Most of the important corruption is not between business and regulators, but 
between the state and state-owned or parastatal enterprises. Management has 
neither efficiency nor development on its priority list.” 968 
 
Milos’ assertions are supported by Coburn and Danchenko, who argue Russian energy 
policy is “short termist” and “fragmented.”969 Heinrich argues that strong Russian state 
intervention in the sector, in particular the habit of the Putin government to appoint 
“cronies” as heads of major state owned energy corporations and put high level 
government officials on the boards of state energy firms has led to serious problems 
with corruption.
970
 A number of reports quote an estimate by the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics that suggests while Gazprom announced profits of $46 billion 
in 2011, as much as $40 billion had been lost due to “corruption and inefficiency.”971 
Nemtsov and Milov suggest this figure may be as high as $80 billion during Putin’s 
second term. Such a high level of inefficiency is regarded by many observers to be the 
result of political cronyism. Rickards notes how the appointment of Alexei Miller may 
have been purely political, since Miller had less than 3 years’ experience in the energy 
sector when he was appointed to a cabinet position as Deputy Minister, and later CEO 
of Gazprom.
972
 Khvostonova argues that this inexperience manifested itself in a failure 
to spot new energy trends.  
 
As an example, Khvostonova notes how in 2011, Miller famously said that “shale gas is 
a well-planned propaganda campaign, similar to those for global warming or biofuels” 
despite 138 bcm being produced in Europe at the time.
973
 The positioning of a political 
loyalist to a powerful role in the energy sector, despite having little or no experience in 
energy echoes the appointment of Hussein al-Shahristani by Nouri al-Maliki to various 
roles including Minister of Oil and Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs. 
Summarising Gazprom’s many failings, Khvostonova quotes Russian energy analyst 
Aleksashenko, who notes,  
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“No company performed as badly as Gazprom. No one managed to lose more 
than one half of its value (53 percent). Not even BP, which had to deal with the 
largest catastrophe in the Mexican Gulf that cost the company more than $20 
billion in fines only. Not even Surgutneftegaz, whose ownership structure 
remains a mystery to many analysts and whose quality of corporate management 
is the lowest of the low. Not even ENI and Total, which are controlled by their 
countries’ governments. Every company has a much better stocks dynamic than 
that of our ‘national treasure.’ 974 
 
Aside from Gazprom’s failings as what Bos calls a “nationalised political weapon,” 
other companies of Russia’s energy sector have also suffered from strong state 
intervention.
975
 According to a leaked US State Department cable, Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Sechin, who then virtually ran the energy sector, ordered Slavneft to 
cancel an order of foreign equipment, which was described by a member of Slavneft’s 
board as “clearly superior” to the Russian equipment on offer. In the same document, 
the board member describes “inbuilt inefficiencies and government influence” slowing 
down the sector. He goes on to note, these inefficiencies are  
 
“so huge that it would take a very long time to modernize the Russian oil and 
gas sector. For example, a well that would take 10 days to drill in Canada would 
take 20 days to drill in Russia. He said moving a drilling rig from one site to 
another, a process that might take 7 or 8 hours in Canada, takes 28 days in 
Russia.” 976 
 
The board member then notes, “multiply that by hundreds or thousands and you can 
start to imagine the costs to the economy.”977 
 
This echoes the situation in Nigeria (and Iraq, as mentioned) where government entities 
are perceived as being behind international standards regarding bureaucracy. According 
to interviews conducted by Thurber, Emelife and Heller an official from an IOC in 
Nigeria claimed contracts for relatively small operations were often approved in 12-18 
months, compared to a 3-4 month average in the rest of the world, while low approval 
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thresholds for over 85% of contracts led to a slow sign-off process, a similar complaint 
made by ENI in Iraq.
978
 
 
A noted in Chapter 4, Nigeria has had a more damaging experience than Russia with 
direct political control of the energy sector and a Ministry of Oil that directly controls 
the NOC. Unlike Russia however, Nigeria has made modest progress developing a new 
law, the Petroleum Industries Bill (PIB) which has been held up by political 
disagreements.  
 
According to the NNPC, decoupling of the regulator and the regulated within the state 
owned energy apparatus is vital, with the company noting, “at the heart of the PIB is the 
separation between policy, regulation and monitoring and commercial operations.”979 
This would be achieved with the creation of a regulator by the name of the “Asset 
Management Company” which would oversee transfer of revenues from NNPC to the 
government (a highly contentious issue due to missing funds) and also oversee 
government funds going to JVs managed by NNPC, which would be “partly privatized” 
to increase efficiency and accountability. 
980
 
  
This is clearly needed, as noted in Chapter 4. Revenue Watch International ranked 
NNPC the world’s least transparent extractive organization in 2011, and a series of 
allegations against the company in 2012 claimed that $6.8 billion of fuel imports had 
been fabricated, and that as much as $20 billion had not been passed from the company 
to the Ministry of Finance.
981
 Government interests have in turn been accused of 
“tapping” revenues before they are sent to the state, with an independent audit in 2012 
noting how NNPC funds were used for a presidential helicopter worth $14 million, had 
lent $106 million to the state electricity company and $124 million to a coastal security 
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force, which were described as “informal” loans, leading one analyst to suggest NNPC 
had become in part a “slush fund” for government. 982 
 
Similarly, Aslund also describes Gazprom as a “slush fund” for the Russian 
government,
983
 and Transparency International ranked Gazprom as the 7th least 
transparent organization in the world.
984
 Likewise, NNPCs potential benefit to the 
Nigerian state has been significantly reduced, as Thurber, Emelife and Heller note, 
 
“NNPC functions well as an instrument of patronage. Each additional 
transaction generated by its profuse bureaucracy provides an opportunity for 
well-connected individuals to profit by being the gatekeepers whose approval 
must be secured, especially in contracting processes. NNPC’s role as distributor 
of licenses for export of crude oil and import of refined products also helps 
make it a locus for patronage activities. Indeed, the implicit government goal for 
the oil sector appears to be the maximization of patronage opportunities.”985 
 
Therefore, Nigeria and Russia serve as examples of weak regulatory systems that allow 
a high level of political control and interference in NOC activity. As noted, Nigeria 
already has an understanding of the need for a strong regulatory framework that would 
lessen political control of the NOC, which would be partly privatised if the PIB is 
passed.  
 
Russia is also aware of the problems of having weak regulations over the sector, and its 
Energy Strategy 2030 calls for  
 
“setting up a base for stable and progressive development of the energy sector, 
including establishing a coherent and approved legal and regulatory framework,” 
while also envisioning how “direct state participation in the energy sector will 
gradually dwindle and be replaced by various forms of state private partnership 
particularly in construction and modernization of energy infrastructure and 
development of innovations.”986 
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Likewise, Iraq is also coming to an understanding of the problems associated with 
having MoO regulate and involve itself in Iraqi National Oil Company operations, but a 
debate on the re-organizing the energy sector needs to be re-vitalised after it fell from 
national priorities after the June 2014 ISIS offensive. As of 2016, ISIS are retreating in 
many parts of Iraq and the government are re-focusing on economic challenges. A 
number of think tanks and consultancies including Raymond James, Pipper Jaffray and 
NAMEA, predict the oil price may continue to rise through 2017 above and beyond $70 
or higher, therefore it is imperative that Iraq acts to re-organize its energy sector.
987
 This 
would involve the reconstituting INOC, the limiting of the role of MoO to one of 
regulator with no involvement in commercial operations of INOC or its subsidiaries, the 
abolishing of price controls on fuel (subsidies) which have caused market distortions in 
Nigeria, (with artificially low oil and gas prices) Russia (with low gas prices) and have 
slowed the development of the refining sector in Iraq, amid many other problems. 
Nakhle describes the importance of re-organizing the sector: 
 
“Policy makers will need to develop appropriate institutions with clearly defined 
relationships which separate for example, the aspirations of the NOC, regulation 
of the Industry and fiscal administration. In other words, there should be a 
comprehensible separation of power and clearly defined roles between the NOC, 
the regulator (Ministry of Petroleum) and the tax collector (Ministry of 
Finance).”988 
 
The creation of an energy ministry to merge similar portfolios could also help efficiency 
in the energy value chain between entities at the Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Electricity 
and Ministry of Industry and Minerals, which are currently often in conflict. 
 
Merging ministries related to power and energy is a common phenomenon in countries 
attempting to increase government efficiency. In May 2016, Saudi Arabia announced 
the merger of the Ministry of Electricity with the Ministry of Oil, with one Saudi 
official noting, “"In order for the restructuring to succeed, accountability and 
responsibility has to be concentrated in the same office. This is the reason for assigning 
all those sectors in one ministry." 
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Other nations have been quicker to re-organize government in this way, with the UAE’s 
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan merging the Ministry of Oil with the Ministry of 
Electricity and Water before his death in 2004.
990
 Nonetheless, in this case the Supreme 
Petroleum Council retained greater authority than the newly created energy ministry 
over the oil and gas sector. The 2004 mergers also came at a time when the UAE was 
planning greater private sector involvement in the water and electricity sectors and the 
replacement of underperforming ministers with technocrats.
991
 
 
According to Butt by the end of the 1990s the UAE already had a significantly 
integrated energy and water sector and was seen as a leader regionally in utilising gas, 
with ADNOC CEO Yusif Omair bin Yusif noting in 1999 how, 
 
“Abu Dhabi’s main future gas policy is to develop gas resources to meet 
growing domestic demand, giving priority to generating water and electricity, 
supply of gas to new industries, petrochemical projects and any re-injection 
needs.”992 
 
Butt details Abu Dhabi’s use of general utility plants, for example a 500 MW of 
electricity plant and water treatment plant are co-located with the Ruwais oil refinery, 
with the water plant producing 8 mn gallons. ADNOC awarded the contract for this 
work, worth $600 million, to international firm ABB Group. Butt goes on to describe 
how the UAE were early leaders in the field of utilizing gas, with the Abu Dhabi Gas 
Liquefaction Company launched in 1977. By the turn of the century, ADNOC was 
working in Abu Dhabi on ethane and ethylene plants with Borealis (a consortium of 
Statoil and OMV in a majority ADNOC owned JV). Meanwhile, Ruwais Fertilizers 
Industries Ltd had been producing fertilizer since 1984, an ADNOC majority owned 
consortium with TotalFina Elf.
993
 With such a highly integrated energy sector even 
before the ministry merger, one would expect a globally leading energy sector in terms 
of efficiency. This is not the case according to Jasmi, Al Abd, Saif et al who identify a 
number of problems within the sector related to subsidies, which were still being phased 
out as of 2016. 
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Noting that subsidies have led to wasteful practices with energy, and the highest per 
capita energy use in the world, and considering the UAE’s dependence on gas for over 
90% of power generation, the authors point to mounting problems, including a widening 
supply deficit due to gas imports from Qatar. Outlining factors for this, they note,  
 
“The NG supply-demand deficit is attributed to a number of factors such as: (a) 
26% of local production has to be re-injected for enhanced oil recovery, (b) 
long-term export contracts and (c) local NG consist of high level of sulfur which 
makes it less economically feasible when compared to imports.”994 
 
The authors also note that, combined with high energy usage and a rapidly rising 
population, this could pose a challenge to the UAE, although at the time of writing the 
Emirates had managed to reduce subsidies. The authors note however, that despite the 
high level of integration in the sector, value chain interventions could still find more 
efficiencies. Taking two examples, they study 58 oil rigs that occasionally still flare gas 
and do not receive electricity from the national grid, noting that this gas could be 
utilised for electricity generation and save costs on generator fuel for operators, and that 
natural gas fired plants, which consume 50% of the UAE’s natural gas, could use 
Advanced Gas Path technology for efficiency. Such strategies inevitably benefit from 
merged ministries and co-located gas and electricity officials, therefore it is likely a 
similar arrangement could yield benefits for Iraq, which has many gas fired power 
stations.
995
 
 
7.2 Cross Examining with INES 
 
It is worth noting here that the Integrated National Energy Strategy (INES) for Iraq 
written in 2013 in coordination with the World Bank recognises that every part of the 
energy sector “depends for its own advancement on advances in the others” and calls for 
“continual coordination among Ministries.” While INES does not suggest merging 
ministries, instead suggesting a nonspecific “reorganizing” of the sector, it recognized 
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the value of linked industries and linked energy sectors. This understanding could be the 
basis for merging Iraq’s energy, power and industry ministries. INES notes, 
 
“Six industries in Iraq fall into the category of linked industries: petrochemicals, 
fertilizers, steel, aluminum, cement, and bricks. Each of these industries 
consumes large quantities of energy in the form of power or heating fuel for its 
production processes, and two of these industries (petrochemicals and fertilizers) 
require large quantities of natural gas components as feedstock for their 
products. Each of these industries provides a foundation for multiple secondary 
industries.” 996 
 
But as outlined a number of times in this thesis, one of the downfalls of this strategy 
was an ambitious production target, in the case of INES 9 million bpd by 2020, which 
would, as noted, most likely cause a price collapse and undermine investment. This 
target, announced in tandem with the announcement of INES, is immediately 
contradicted in the document itself, which notes that long term production targets 
should consider “world market dynamics.” 997 
 
This failure to observe what experts such as Gunter and Chalabi have noted as likely 
price collapse also impacts other elements of INES, which would bring the problem 
back to conflict between the Ministries of Oil and Electricity over fuel allocations. Like 
many GOI predictions, INES optimistically foresees the elimination of flaring through a 
gas master plan that is perfectly executed; in other words, according to INES, flaring is 
eliminated by 2016, and gas for power stations will be ample. If gas isn’t always 
available, INES notes that new power stations--a total of 40 to be built, can also run on 
fuel oil.
998
 Nowhere does INES consider that flaring reduction targets might be missed, 
and the old arguments over fuel for power stations, its volume and quality, could re-
start, causing more government paralysis and arguments over who is responsible for 
blackouts. In fact, these arguments have become more heated as Iraq strives to export as 
much oil as possible to make up for collapsed oil revenues.  
 
Equally problematic is the call in INES for $620 billion investment in energy to 2030, 
only 15% of which is to come from the private sector “primarily in refineries and linked 
industries.” The problem with this projection is that it includes very little reference to 
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subsidies, which have been an ongoing constraint in attracting foreign investors to the 
refinery sector. INES notes, “indirect subsidization of energy pricing through non-
economic pricing should be gradually phased out.” But unless this is a priority, other 
goals of INES will be undermined.  
 
As an example, INES calls for the construction of new, large scale rather than smaller 
refineries, or the upgrading of older refineries. This of course required attractive 
investment terms, but making model contracts attractive enough has been an ongoing 
problem, as evidenced by the repeatedly delayed bidding rounds for the 300,000 bpd 
Nasiriyah refinery.  
 
This is a pressing problem because Iraq needs to expand its refining capacity, which has 
fallen from 750 kb/d to 450 kbd/d since the destruction of the Baiji refinery, to over 
1400 kb/d (according to INES) as the population expands. The IEA noted in 2012 that,  
 
“In order to provide the margins that could justify these projects, potential 
investors have indicated that they favour larger complexes than those proposed 
by the government and freedom to export petroleum products (given that oil 
product prices on the domestic market remain subsidised).”999 
 
Speaking to Iraq Energy Institute in 2016, former Iraqi Oil Minister Thamir al-Ghadban 
noted how INES was never implemented, and remarked that MoO has gone on to 
develop older refineries and smaller refineries, in defiance of INES’ recommendations. 
Summarising many of the planning problems related to the bureaucracy of MoO, 
Ghadban notes,  
 
“I believe we have very serious problem in the refining industry, the country 
will continue to depend on fuel imports for many years to come. The only 
concrete project in sight is the Karbala 140 kb/d refinery. Various upgrade 
projects in Dora and Basrah refineries are ongoing but at a slow pace because 
they are capital intensive. The industry itself is heavily subsided, crude oil feed 
is supplied at upstream production cost and the sector is overcrowded with 
employees to provide jobs for Iraqis. Not to forget the old technology of all the 
present refineries. A dramatic policy revision is needed; to start with, such 
revision has been laid down in INES but there was no will and determination to 
implement.”1000 
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Therefore, regarding ministry coordination and merging ministries, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that lack of political will to implement the plans of INES, 
which focus heavily on the creation of groups to coordinate ministry cooperation, rather 
than unifying ministries, is due to the lack of a petroleum policy framework authorised 
by the Council of Representatives. INES recognises this, noting a requirement for “an 
oversight framework at the highest levels of government to ensure that the right 
economic and managerial resources are applied.”1001 
 
Based upon the case studies and factors specific to Iraq, key points of a proposed 
petroleum policy framework for Iraq are outlined in the following and final chapter. 
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Chapter-8: Conclusion - Proposed Energy Policy Framework 
 
8.1 Prerequisites for a Petroleum Policy Framework 
 
From a review of the case studies, three main recommendations can be outlined for the 
reorganization of the energy sector in Iraq. These are: 
 
1. Separation of Powers between the Ministry of Energy (or Oil) and the NOC, 
whereby the Ministry of Oil’s role is limited to proposing petroleum policies, laws 
and plans, preparing regulations and issuing instructions for the implementation of 
petroleum policies. These would then be submitted to the long awaited Federal Oil 
and Gas Council for approval. Additionally, the Oil Ministry would monitor and 
supervise petroleum operations in light of relevant legislations, contractual terms 
and adopted international standards. 
 
2. Merging of Ministries. The Iraqi Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Industries & Minerals 
and the Ministry of Electricity should be merged into one portfolio: the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources (MENR). Each entity within MENR would be 
assigned a Deputy Minister, a part of whose responsibility would be to ensure there 
is an aligned vision and plan across sectors. Additionally, within the MENR there 
would be a deputy for Industries and Minerals, whose job it would be to oversee 
feedstock allocations to fertilizer, petrochemicals and cement plants, among other 
energy intensive industries where Iraq could gain a competitive advantage through 
affordable energy. A Deputy Minister for Electricity would help harmonise power 
needs of IOCs and the national grid, and play a role in overseeing gas allocations to 
power stations and integrating Iraq’s Gas Master Plan and other plans into a single 
MENR strategy. A Deputy Minister for Upstream would coordinate with a Deputy 
Minister for Environment, who would coordinate with other deputies to ensure 
environmental regulations were being upheld, and a Deputy for Downstream oil 
projects would oversee supply/demand and infrastructure. Currently, there is very 
little coordination, and each ministry defines different strategic visions, resulting in 
conflict. For example, in 2006, the US State Department reported internally that the 
Iraqi Ministry of Oil was developing a “National Energy Strategy” while the 
Ministry of Electricity was developing a separate “Energy Master Plan” despite 
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ongoing arguments over diesel and heavy fuel oil allocations, with Shahristani 
reportedly “worried” that MOE would demand diesel instead of HFO.1002 Similarly, 
in 2012, the Ministry of Electricity announced a 5 year plan to boost power 
generation, in part by bringing more gas to the national grid.
1003
 Five months later, 
there was a public row between both ministries over fuel allocations to power 
plants. 
 
3. These recommendations should be codified into an overarching petroleum policy 
framework, which will be outlined at the end of this chapter. 
Iraq must re-focus on an overarching hydrocarbon law that will govern revenue 
distribution and regional and provincial rights to develop hydrocarbon resources.  
 
Failure to do so will result in more ad hoc arrangements and an increasingly difficult 
environment for creating a national energy strategy, as different provinces will be 
granted different arrangements outside of any constitutional authority, as had occurred 
in Russia and Nigeria. Continuing ad hoc arrangements, such as the short-lived revenue 
and export deals between Baghdad and the KRI discussed in previous chapters, carry 
the risk of permanent deadlock over hydrocarbon resources, since provinces such as 
Basra and Anbar are extremely unlikely to want to remain in a federal arrangement that 
is “asymmetrical” in other words, regional power is distributed unevenly.  
 
One legal dispute, such as the July 2014 Ministry of Oil of the Republic of Iraq v. 
Ministry of Natural Resources of Kurdistan Regional Governorate of Iraq et al, settled 
in a U.S. District Court, in Texas (in favour of Iraq) has been damaging to Baghdad--
Erbil relations. This came at a time of heightened tension over disputed areas, that has 
since become violent, although only briefly.
1004
 At the same time, Basra has moved in 
the direction of negotiating oil contracts unilaterally in 2015 and has a history of oil 
worker union action, so the possibility of what J. Comaroff calls “lawfare” whereby 
lawsuits are used to hinder certain government or subnational government efforts, 
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becomes a reality that could threaten efficient strategies that would benefit all of 
Iraq.
1005
 
8.2 The Proposed Framework 
 
The federal regulatory board headed by the relevant cabinet members and producing 
provincial authorities must be formed and mandated by a federal law. The entity is to be 
known as the Federal Energy Council (FEC), and it should be supported by an advisory 
body to coordinate activities. The aim of this is to create a coherent and efficient value 
chain to maximise output from the electricity sector, petroleum sector, and minerals and 
linked industries such as cement, fertiliser and petrochemicals, boosting economic 
diversification where Iraq has a competitive edge due to low energy costs for energy 
intensive industry. This latter advisory organization shall be the Bureau of Independent 
Advisers. 
 
The new Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) will have a well-defined 
role whereby it cannot intervene in daily operations of state owned enterprises in any 
sector and is limited to proposing general petroleum policies, planning and regulations. 
 
Within MENR, there shall be a well-defined decoupling of the regulator and regulated 
bodies in the energy related cabinet portfolios, with the intention to eliminate conflict of 
interest. Having all state-owned operators of national oil and gas companies, power 
generation stations, industrial public companies as accountable entities, separate from 
their traditional ministries of Oil, Electricity and Industries should limit politicized 
contracting and over hiring. This decision making power should be ring fenced within 
the technocratic oversight of the operator. The companies must have their own separate 
board of directors and an independent budget, while being regulated by their respective 
ministries. A law would be required to initiate the decoupling process between 
ministries and national operators. In the event that the government decides to merge 
ministries, a law would be required for this process. 
 
MENR should have 5 main functional sub-entities led by 5 deputies for the minister: 
Upstream, Midstream, Downstream, Power and Industries. MENR is to have a unified 
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service directorate managed by Director Generals reporting to the minister with a dotted 
line reporting to the 5 sub-entities. The directorates to include experts in law, finance, 
licensing, research and development and human resources. An Inspector General’s 
office should be positioned under the Federal Energy Council (or the Federal Oil & Gas 
Council, in case the merger is not implemented) to independently inspect the 
performance of all relevant portfolios. To avoid conflict of interest, the inspector will 
not report to the minister.  
 
A law is required to initiate the merger of the three main components (oil, electricity, 
industry) and this law should also include the terms of the decoupling law mentioned to 
fast-track the legal formation and bypass institutional bureaucracies. Such a plan will fit 
well with the economic and institutional reforms called for in the Iraqi Federal 
Constitution of 2005. It will also strengthen Iraq’s financial position in relation to 
World Bank and IMF requirements for sovereign loans, debt management and mega 
project financing. 
 
The FEC should include federal and regional regulators of oil and gas producing entities 
and will not include operator representation. Three independent advisors should sit on 
its boards (covering legal issues, economic strategy and policy). A further seat should 
be allocated for an independent inspectorate at the federal level. The FEC members (or 
the FOGC in case that there is no ministry merger) should include the federal portfolios 
of energy (or oil, electricity and industries in case that there is no merger), as well as 
finance, and the Central Bank. Regional members should include representatives of the 
MNR of the KRG, and provincial representatives of producing provinces with 150kb/d 
oil equivalent capacity in upstream, downstream and/or power generation. This would 
incentivize provinces where production is marginal, to aim for the status of producing 
province, effectively creating the aspiration to strengthen Iraqi federalism.  
  
Polices and plans made by MENR would be submitted to the FEC for approval. MENR 
would also have a regulatory role, to ensure operations in power and petroleum sectors 
are supported with relevant legislation, international standards and approved fiscal 
regimes. The intention would be to ensure that regulations across sectors were 
harmonized, and one desirable effect would be to have each component of MENR being 
aware of other activity within the MENR, securing maximum transparency. 
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MENR would propose to the FEC a comprehensive plan for oil and gas exploration 
across Iraq in consultation with other competent bodies, and work with the FEC to 
create model Exploration, Development and Production contracts. MENR would also 
have a role auditing license holders, in addition to oversight by other competent bodies. 
Lastly, MENR would negotiate international agreements pertaining to trade and 
investment, and in the case of OPEC, quotas. In this capacity, it would represent Iraq in 
international forums. 
 
FEC shall formulate federal plans and policies for the Exploration and Development of 
Fields and export infrastructure and set standards for negotiations with IOCs and NOCs, 
including qualification criteria for bidding and contractual design, in such a way as to 
maximise economic efficiency, or in the terms of the constitution provide “the highest 
benefit to the Iraqi people.”  
 
Criteria for qualifying companies to bid would be publicly available, as would 
information on contract winning companies explaining why the bid was won. This 
would aim to allay controversy in parliament and civil society regarding contracts with 
IOCs and service companies, as happened in the case of the Basra Gas Company, 
during the formation of which Shell were accused of acting as a monopoly, and the 
Maysan oil refinery case, where observers were left uncertain as to whether the winning 
bidder, Satarem, had experience in refining, since there was no public information on 
the company. 
1006
 Amendments to existing contracts would also be studied by the FEC, 
as well as the exploration of new reserves and future contract design. 
 
8.3. The Federal Energy Council 
 
The FEC’s role will help coordinating the role of all its members to ensure energy 
sectors support and harmonise toward national level strategies, in respect of national 
laws and international standards. In oil and gas, the FEC will ensure that power sector, 
industrial mega projects and petroleum field development plans in contract areas are in 
line with national targets, again with reference to local demand and global market 
conditions, forecasts and the avoidance of mismanagement. 
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A FEC shall be established to comprise the following members: 
 
1. Chairman: The Prime Minister of Federal Iraq, 
2. Vice Chairman: Minister of MENR, 
3. Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 
4. One representative from each producing region or province, 
5. Three Advisors on Technical, Economic and Legal competencies 
The three FEC Advisors shall be of Iraqi nationals and to be nominated by the federal 
parliament and endorsed by the absolute majority of the members of the House. 
 
The FEC shall meet to discuss power, industry and petroleum policies, plans, model 
contracts once a quarter and will vote on decisions which will require a two-thirds 
majority to pass. Disagreement about functions of the FEC will also be decided upon by 
a vote requiring a simple majority. 
 
An early task of the FEC shall be to decide who operates export outlets and manages 
pipelines across Iraq, which shall have a set timeline for decision. Assisting all of the 
decisions described here, the Bureau of Independent Advisers (represented by the three 
endorsed members by Parliament) will provide recommendations on the optimum 
interventions in the energy value chain. Staffing the advisory bureau will be Iraqi and 
foreign experts, again chosen by a two-thirds majority of the members of the FEC, to 
work in that capacity for a fixed period. 
 
8.4 The Implementation and Transition Strategy 
 
The legislative reform process is key to ensuring a smooth transition from the legacy of 
centralism to federal implementation. The challenge therefore remains the adoption of 
the federal draft laws of hydrocarbon, reconstitution of INOC and revenue sharing 
compiled by the Energy Committee of Iraq’s Federal Parliament in August 2011. The 
three drafts underwent rigorous review and achieved a large degree of consensus among 
competing parties and political factions in Iraq. However, to table the draft laws for the 
first reading, a political majority should be required to avoid future attempts to derail 
256 
 
implementation. The passing of the three drafts will pave the ground for a successful 
FEC and a sustainable framework policy. 
 
Subject to the passing of the pending federal laws and the implementation of the 
prerequisites stated at the beginning of this chapter, the FEC shall issue bylaws to 
facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the relevant federal energy laws and 
assess the scope of exceptions within Iraqi federal law, for special cases. 
 
Regarding petroleum contracts concluded by the competent bodies of the FEC prior to 
the enactment of the hydrocarbon law, the formation of the FEC shall be reviewed by a 
joint committee comprising the Minister of MENR, the Minister of the Kurdistan 
Region and the Chairmen of the Energy Committees of the Federal and Regional 
Parliaments. The joint committee should be assisted by the FEC Advisors, and the 
process of review and endorsement should not exceed more than six months from the 
first meeting. 
8.5 Further Research 
 
This research could be used as model to serve post conflict MENA countries affected by 
the Arab Spring such as Syria, Yemen, Libya and other states that hold natural 
resources and share similar geopolitical conditions to Iraq. Such countries may require 
the adoption of a federal setting, decentralisation of power and resource sharing to 
achieve stability and long term peace.  
 
Many of these nations have either experienced violent regime change, or are classed as 
fragile states with competing tribal, ethnic or religious groups, distributed across areas 
with a large disparity in the geographic location of natural resources and access to 
export corridors. For such nations, there has often been a long history of autocratic 
governance which has sought to capture resource rents and use them for political 
purposes, heightening historic grievances; therefore, notions of transparency, revenue 
sharing and technocratic oversight of economic sectors are new concepts.  
 
Undoubtedly, these transitional states may experiment with different types of federalism 
and power sharing arrangements. Reactionary nationalist forces and local grievances, as 
well as deep rooted attachment to socialist models of economic development will likely 
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prove difficult hurdles for these societies to overcome. Nonetheless, the creation of 
policy frameworks such as the one proposed in this thesis can provide a starting block 
for the aim of non-violent transition in these conflict prone societies.  
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Figure 24: KRG’s PSA Model (MNR) 
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NCS: Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
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NNOC: Nigeria National Oil Company. 
NNPC: Nigeria National Petroleum Company. 
NOC: North Oil Company (Iraq.) 
NOCs: National Oil Companies 
OPEC: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PDVSA: Petróleos de Venezuela SA. 
PPP: Public Private Partnership 
PSA: Production Sharing Agreement 
PSC: Production Service Contract. 
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SHF: Saskatchewan Heritage Fund. 
SOC: South Oil Company (Iraq.) 
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SOMO: State Organization for the Marketing of Oil (Iraq.) 
SWF: Sovereign Wealth Fund. 
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UAE: United Arab Emirates 
UN: United Nations 
USA: United States of America 
WB: World Bank 
  
273 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Abu Zeed, Adnan,“Iraqi workers protest for wage payment” Al Monitor June 10, 2015, 
accessed August 2
nd
 2016.  http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/iraq-
industrial-sector-financial-collapse.html 
 
Abul Failat, Yanal, “The Iraqi Federal Oil and Gas Law 2011: Exploration, Exploitation 
and Expropriation,” IELR, 4: (2013) 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson, “Why Nations Fail,” (New York: Profile 
Books,  
2011) 
 
Adam Marzec, Darius, “The new Iraq: Resolving public and private obligations 
incurred under Saddam Hussein’s rule in the context of international arbitration,” 
Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (2006) 
 
Adebola Ogunleye, Taiwo “A Legal Analysis of Production Sharing Contract 
Arrangements in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry,” Journal of Energy Technologies and 
Policy, 5, 8, International Knowledge sharing platform, 2015)  
 
ADEKUNLE, AMID D. “The Effect of Multiple Regulatory Regimes on the Nigerian 
Petroleum Industry,” International In-house Counsel Journal Vol. 1, No. 2, January 
2008 
 
Adelman, Morris,“OPEC at High Noon: 1974-1981.” (Research paper, MIT Center for 
Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Massachusetts, 1992.) 
 
Adrash, Kadhim, “Iraq revises its oil reserves to 150 billion barrels.” Bloomberg April 
10th 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-
10/iraq-revises-its-oil-reserves-to-150-billion-barrels 
 
Adunbi, Omolade, “Oil Wealth and Insurgency in Nigeria,” (Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 2015) 
 
Aga, Chiegeonu, “Nigeria: State by State,” Nigeria Book of Records, (2009) 
 
Ahmadov, Anar and Farid Guliyev, “Tackling the resource curse: The role of 
democracy in achieving sustainable development in resource-rich countries,” 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2016) 
 
Ahmadov. Anar Kamil, “A Conditional Theory of the ‘Political Resource Curse:’ Oil, 
Autocrats, and Strategic Contexts,” (Diss. London School of Economics)  
 
Aizhu, Chen and Florence Tan, “Russia overtakes Saudi Arabia for second time in 
China crude supply,” October 21st 2015. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/china-oil-russia-idUKL3N12K3KA20151021 
 
Akingbule, Gbenga,“Nigeria Central Bank Drops Foreign Exchange Peg,” The Wall 
Street Journal, June 15th 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
274 
 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nigeria-central-bank-drops-foreign-exchange-peg-
1466004204 
Akinrele, Adedolapo, “Transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas industry” World 
Energy Law and Business Journal April 2014. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
 
Ako, Rhuks, “Environmental Justice in Developing Countries: Perspectives from Africa 
and Asia Pacific,” (New York: Routledge, 2013) 
 
Al Ansari, Khalid, “Iraq’s Kurds bypass state for oil exports to tighten control,” 
Bloomberg July 15th 2016.  Accessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/iraq-s-kurdish-region-
exporting-550-600k-b-d-oil-of-own-output 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/iraq-s-kurdish-region-exporting-
550-600k-b-d-oil-of-own-output 
 
Al Fathi, Saadallah, “IRAQ’S NEW OIL MINISTER MAKES THE RIGHT NOISES” 
GULF NEWS September 4
th
 2016. Accessed August 2
nd
 
2016.http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/iraq-s-new-oil-minister-makes-the-right-
noises-1.1890405 
 
AL JASMI,  MAJID AND YOUSIF AL ABD, OMAR SAIF, AHMED KIANI, STEVE 
GRIFFITHS AND SAMEH EL KHATIB, “Economic Evaluation of Efficiency 
Enhancement Interventions in UAE Energy Value Chain” in “Recent Advances on 
Environmental and Life Science” (Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, 2014) 
180-188 
 
Al Khatteeb, Luay and Adnan al Janabi, “The need for cooperation between producers 
and consumers,” Iraq Energy Institute, 10th of August, 2012, Accessed July 16th 2016 
http://iraqenergy.org/home/articles_details.php?id=32 
 
Al- Khatteeb, Luay, Iraq’s economic reform for 2016,”The Oil and Gas Year 2015 
 
Al-Khatteeb, Luay,”The Geopolitics of Natural Gas Natural Gas in the Republic of 
Iraq” (Harvard Belfer Center, Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for Energy 
Studies 2013.) 
 
Al Sadoun , Abdulwahab “How diversification will drive the UAE through times of low 
oil prices,” The National  March 31st 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016.  
 
Al-Ali, Nadje and Nicola Pratt, “What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation 
of Iraq,” Berkely: University of California Press, 2009) 
 
Al-Ansari, Khalid, “Iraq Slows Natural Gas Output as Oil Slump Squeezes Spending,” 
Bloomberg March 30
th
 2016. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-29/iraq-slowing-natural-gas-output-
as-cheaper-oil-squeezes-spending 
 
Al-Chalabi, Fadhil, Oil Policies, Oil Myths: Analysis and Memoirs of an OPEC Insider 
(London, 2010):92 
 
Alfred, Charlotte,“How Cheap Oil Handicaps Nigeria’s Fight Against Boko Haram,” 
The Huffington Post, 2nd of December 2015. Accessed July 16th 
275 
 
2016.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/oil-nigeria-boko-
haram_us_56be78c7e4b08ffac1256afe 
 
Ali, Omer and Ibrahim Elbadawi, “The Political Economy of Public Sector Employment 
in Resource Dependent Countries” Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series, 
673, 2012 
 
AlKadri, Raad, Fareed Mohamedi, “World Oil Markets and the Invasion of Iraq,” 
Middle East Research Vol. 33 (2003) 
 
AlKadri, Raad. “Oil and the question of federalism in Iraq,” International Affairs, 86 
(2010) 
 
Al-Khatteeb, Luay,  “Gulf oil economies must wake up or face decades of decline” 
Brookings Institution, August 14
th
 2015 accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/gulf-oil-economies-must-wake-up-or-face-
decades-of-decline/ 
 
Al-Khatteeb, Luay, “Iraq’s Economic Reform for 2016” Brookings Institute, December 
13
th
 2013. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iraqs-
economic-reform-for-2016/ 
 
Allawi, Ali A., “The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace” (Yale: 
Yale University Press, 2007) 
 
Alston, Lee J. and Marcus André Melo, “Bernardo Brazil in Transition: Beliefs, 
Leadership, and Institutional Change” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) 
Al-Timimi, Aymenn Jawad,“Iraq in Crisis,” Rubin Centre August 29th 2011. Accessed 
August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/08/iraq-in-crisis/ 
 
Al-Wazzan, Saleem, “Basra’s mighty petrodollar,” Niqash, 13th March 2014. Accessed 
July 16th 2016. http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/economy/3398/ 
 
Ambrose, Jillian, “BP heads to Siberia with $300m Rosneft oil venture,” The 
Telegraph, 17th June 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/06/17/bp-heads-to-siberia-with-300m-
rosneft-oil-venture/ 
 
Anaz, Ghanim, “Iraq: Oil and gas in the 21st century,” (Nottingham: Nottingham 
University press, 2012) 
 
Anaz, Ghanim, “Iraq: Oil and gas in the 21st century,” (Nottingham: Nottingham 
University press, 2012) 
 
Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield, “Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict 
and Compromise” (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) :9 
 
Anderson, P and H Bernard, “Energy Shocks and the demand for energy,” (Research 
paper, Bank for International Settlements, Basle, 1991.) 
 
Andrew Rosser, “The political economy of the resource curse,” Institute of 
Development  
276 
 
Studies Working Paper 268. 
 
Anthony Chastko, Paul, Developing Alberta's Oil Sands: From Karl Clark to Kyoto 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004) 
Arango, Tim, “Iraqi Government and Kurds Reach Deal to Share Oil Revenues,” The 
New York Times. December 2nd 2014. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
 
Armaroli, Nicola and Vincenzo Balzani, “Powering Planet Earth: Energy Solutions for 
the Future,” Weinheim, Wiley VCH, 2013)  
 
Aslund, Anders, “Gazprom: Challenged giant I need of reform.” In “Russia after the 
global economic crisis,” (Massachusetts: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2010.), 152 
 
Åslund, Anders,“Why Has Russia’s Economic Transformation Been So Arduous?” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace” Paper prepared for the Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 28-30, 1999. 
 
Australian Government Productivity Commission, “Review on the regulatory burden on 
the upstream oil and gas sector,” (April 2009.) 
 
Ayatse, Felicia, and Isaac Iorhen, “THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC 
POLITICS AND ITS IMPACTS ON POST COLONIAL GOVERNANCE IN 
NIGERIA” European Scientific Journal 9, 17 (2013) 
 
Bajpai, Prableen, “The World’s Top Oil Producers,” Investopia October 7th 2014 
Accessed July 16th 2016. http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-
trading/100714/worlds-top-oil-producers.asp 
 
Bala Gbogo, Elisha, “Nigeria Oil contracts review adds to industry uncertainty,” 
Bloomberg October 8th 2015. Acessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-08/nigeria-offshore-contracts-
review-adds-to-industry-uncertainty 
 
Bankes, Nigel, “Canada” Upstream Law and Regulation. Upstream Law and 
Regulation, (London: Globe Business Publishing, 2013) 
 
Barkan, Joel D. and Alex Gboyega, “State and Local Governance in Nigeria”. The 
World Bank, August 2nd 2002. 
 
Baunsgaard, Thomas, “Fiscal Policy in Nigeria: Any Role for Rules?” IMF working 
paper 03/155 (International Monetary Fund, 2003) 
 
Beehner, Lionel and Greg Bruno, “Why Iraqis Cannot Agree on an Oil Law,” Council 
on Foreign Relations, February 22nd 2008. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/why-iraqis-cannot-agree-oil-law/p13298 
 
Bierman, Stephen and Elena Mazneva, “Russia’s Effort to Limit Pollution Is Going Up 
in Smoke” Bloomberg, July 1st 2015. Accessed july 16th 2016. 
 
Birdsall, Nancy and Arvind Subramanian, “Saving Iraq from its oil,” Foreign Affairs, 
July/ August 2004 Issue.  
277 
 
 
Boersma, Tim and Steve Griffiths, “Reforming Energy Subsidies: Initial Lessons from 
the United Arab Emirates,” Masdar Institute of Science and Technology (2016) 
Böhme, Dimo, “EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions? : A Focus 
on the natural gas sector,” (Diss, University of Potsdam, 2011)  
 
Bowen, James, “Saudi Arabia’s New Oil Strategy could backfire,” The National 
Interest, 8th of July 2016. Accessed July 16th 
2016http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-bold-new-oil-strategy-could-
backfire-16515 
 
Bradfield, Michael, “An Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for Self-Reliance,” 
Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 3,4 (1977) 
 
Brelsford, Robert, “Iraq lets contract for Karbala refinery,” Oil and Gas Journal 25th 
June 2016, accessed August 2nd 2016 http://www.ogj.com/articles/2015/06/iraq-lets-
contract-for karbala-refinery.html 
 
Brock, Joe, “Nigeria state oil firm gives government informal loans: audit Reuters July 
16
th
 2012. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-nnpc-debts-
idUSBRE86F0DF20120716 
 
Brownsey, Keith, “Canadian Federal Energy Policy” (New York: Routledge, 2011) 
 
Brunnschweiler, Christa and Erwin Bulte, “Natural resources and violent conflict: 
Resource abundance, dependence and the onset of civil wars.” Center for Economic 
Research ETH Zurich Working Paper 08/78 (Zurich 2012)  
 
Butt, Gerald, “Oil and Gas in the UAE,” from “United Arab Emirates: A new 
perspective,” Eds. Ibrahim al Abed, Peter Hellyer, (New York: Trident, 2001) 
 
Butt, Gerald,“Oil and Gas in the UAE,” from “United Arab Emirates: A new 
perspective,” Eds. Ibrahim al Abed, Peter Hellyer, (New York: Trident, 2001) 
 
Carpenter, Ami C., “Community Resilience to Sectarian Violence in Baghdad” (New 
York: Springer, 2014) 
 
Carter, Angela V. “Cursed by Oil? Institutions and Environmental Impacts in Alberta’s 
Tar Sands.” (Diss: Cornell University, 2007.)   
 
Casiraghi, L., “Gulf Keystone Creditors to Take Control Following Oil Slump,” 
Rigzone, 14
th
 of July 2016, accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
 
Chakraborty, Debjit, “Russia deepens ties to India with Siberian Oil field sales,” 
Bloomberg, March 16th 2016, Accessed July 16th 
2016.“http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-16/rosneft-signs-pact-with-
indian-companies-to-sell-stake-in-fields 
 
Chang, Sue, “Weak oil prices deplete Russia’s sovereign-wealth fund,” Marketwatch” 
October 27th 2015. Accessed July 16th 2016.  
 
278 
 
Chazan, Guy, “Baghdad bureaucracy stymies BP’s ambitions” The Financial Times 
Febrary 23
rd
 2014. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. https://next.ft.com/content/f1b5ce40-9af1-
11e3-946b-00144feab7de 
 
Chebankova, Elena, “Russia’s Federal Relations: Putin's Reforms and Management of 
the Regions” (New York: Routledge, 2010) 
 
Chulov, Martin, “Post war Iraq: ‘everybody is corrupt, including me,” The Guardian 
19
th
 February 2016 accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/19/post-war-iraq-corruption-oil-prices-
revenues 
 
Clandinin, Jean andJanice Huber, “Narrative Inquiry, in “International encyclopedia of 
education,” eds.Penelope Peterson, Eva Baker and Barry McGaw (Elsevier: New York, 
2010) 
 
Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian, “Basra, Southern Iraq and the Gulf: Challenges and 
Connections,” (London School of Economics, 2012) 
 
Coles, Isabel, “Uncertainty reigns in Iraqi Kurdistan as president's mandate expires,” 
Reuters August 20
th
 2015, accessed August 2
nd
 2016.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-kurds-presidency-idUSKCN0QP1V620150820 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, “On economic causes of civil war,” Oxford Economic 
Papers,50, 4 (1998) 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefler, “Greed and grievance in civil war.” (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
 
Comaroff  J. L., (2001). "Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword,". Law & 
Society Inquiry 26: 306. 
 
Conteh, Charles, Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, “Public Sector Reforms in Developing 
Countries: Paradoxes and Practices,” (New York: Routledge, 2012) 
 
Cordesman, Anthony and Sam Khazai, Iraq in Crisis, (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2014), 322  
 
Cunningham, Nick, “Is A Russian, OPEC Production Cut In The Making? January 25th 
2016, accessed July 16th 2016. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Is-A-Russian-
OPEC-Production-Cut-In-The-Making.html 
 
Cunningham, Nick, “Oil Prices Could Surge As This Country Fails To Meet Production 
Targets” Oilprice September 17th 2015. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Oil-
Prices-Could-Surge-As-This-Country-Fails-To-Meet-Production-Targets.html 
 
Cunningham, Nick, “Wave of Violence Causes Nigerian Oil Output to Fall to 20 Year 
low,” Oilprice .com 10th of May 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Wave-Of-Violence-Causes-Nigerian-Oil-
Output-To-Fall-To-20-Year-Lows.html 
 
279 
 
Danilovich, Alex, “Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds: Learning to Live Together” (New 
York: Routledge, 2014) 
 
De Souza, Mike, “Majority of oil sands ownership and profits are foreign, says 
analysis,” Financial Post 10th of May 2012. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://business.financialpost.com/news/majority-of-oil-sands-ownership-and-profits-are-
foreign-says-analysis 
 
Desveaux, James A. “Designing Bureaucracies: Institutional Capacity and Large-scale 
Problem Solving,” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) 
 
Deyholos, Ron, and David Cuschieri, “Canada,” in “Oil & Gas: A Comparative Guide 
to the Regulation of Oil and Gas Projects” (London: European Lawyer Reference 
Series, 2012) 
 
Di John, Jonathan, “CONCEPTUALISING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF  
FAILED STATES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Crisis States 
Research Paper Working Paper No. 25 (LSE, 2008)  
 
Di John, Jonathan, “The ‘Resource Curse’: Theory and Evidence,” (Elcano Royal 
Institute, 2010) 
 
Dipaola, Anthony,“Abu Dhabi missing 2017 target for oil-output capacity boost” 6th of 
Febrary 2016, accessed July 16th 2016. http://www.worldoil.com/news/2015/6/02/abu-
dhabi-missing-2017-target-for-oil-output-capacity-boost 
 
Dodge, Toby, “From War to a new Authoritarianism,” (New York: Routledge, 2012) 
Kindle Edition 
 
Doern, Bruce G. and Monica Gattinger, “Power Switch: Energy Regulatory 
Governance in the Twenty-first Century” (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003) 
 
Driver, Anna , “U.S. to seize $100 million of Iraqi Kurdish oil in tanker off Texas,” 
Reuters July 29
th
 2015. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
iraq-kurdishoil-idUSKBN0FY0KX20140729 
 
Du Plooy, G. M., “Introduction to Communication,” (Rustica: Cape Town, 1997) 
 
Durotoye , Adeolu “The MINT Countries as Emerging Economic Power Bloc: 
Prospects and Challenges,”IISTE Journal 4, 15, 2014 
 
El Gamal, Rania, “BP says taking more oil from Iraq as payment” Reuters April 20th 
2015 accessed Aug 2
nd
 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bp-iraq-oil-
idUSKBN0NB1CF20150420 
 
El Gamal, Rania, “Iranian officials revive ghost of oil deals disliked by majors”, 
Reuters 4th of July 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016.http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-
oil-contracts-idUKKCN0ZK1RY 
 
Elass, Jareer and Amy Myers Jaffe, “Iraq Oi Potential and Implications for global oil 
markets and OPEC politics,” James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2011 
280 
 
 
EL-Azhary, M. S., “The Iran-Iraq War, A Historical, Economic and Political 
Analysis.” (New York: Routledge, 1984.):44 
 
El-Katiri, Laura, “Energy Sustainability in the Gulf States: The Why and the How.” 
(Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2013.) 
Farnejad, Hooman, “How competitive are the Iranian Buyback contracts in comparison 
to production sharing fiscal systems?”(Diss. University of Dundee, 2008. 
 
Favennec, Jean-Pierre,“The Geopolitics of Energy” (Paris: Editions Technip, 2011) 
 
Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 
Identity,” International Organization 54 (2000) 
 
Federal Council Representatives of Iraq, “the Hydrocarbon Draft Law”, 2007 
 
Federal Council Representatives of Iraq, “the Hydrocarbon Draft Law”, 2011 
 
Federal Council Representatives of Iraq, “the Revenue Sharing Draft Law”, 2011 
 
Federal Council Representatives of Iraq, “the Iraq National Oil Company Draft Law”, 
2011 
 
Feehan, Jim, “Canada’s Equalization Strategy: Peering inside the black box.” University 
of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Papers, 7, 24 (2014)   
 
Fenton Krysiek, Timothy, “Agreements from Another Era Production Sharing 
Agreements in Putin’s Russia 2000-2007” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working 
paper 34. (Oxford, 2007.) 
 
Findlay, J Peter, “The Future of the Canadian Oil Sands” Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies WPM-64 (Oxford, 2016) 
 
Findlay, Peter, “The Future of the Canadian Oil Sands,” OIES PAPER: WPM 64  
(Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2016) 
 
Fisher, Barry D.“The Role of the National Energy Board in Controlling the Export of 
Natural Gas from Canada,”Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 9,3 1971. 
 
Fossum, John Erik, “Oil, the State, and Federalism: The Rise and Demise of Petro-
Canada as a statist impulse,” (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 
 
Freeman, Alan, “The question nobody asks: What if Alberta oil doesn't have a future?” 
ipolitics February 24th 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://ipolitics.ca/2016/02/24/its-the-question-nobody-dares-ask-what-if-alberta-oil-
doesnt-have-a-future/ 
 
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index 2015, Accessed July 16th 2016, Available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/17/fragile-states-2015-islamic-state-ebola-ukraine-
russia-ferguson/  
 
Gaffey, Conor, “Nigeria Removes Fuel Subsidies, prompts mixed reactions.” 5th of  
281 
 
December 2015, accessed July 16th 2016.http://europe.newsweek.com/nigeria-removes-
fuel-subsidy-prompts-mixed-reactions-459159 
 
Gaffey, Conor, The key issues for IMF chief Christine Lagarde in Nigeria ,” 1st of May 
2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. http://europe.newsweek.com/four-issues-christine-
lagarde-nigeria-agenda-411912 
 
Gaidar, Yegor, “The Soviet Collapse,” (paper presented at AEI on November 13, 2006.) 
 
Gately, Dermot, “Lessons from the 1986 oil price collapse,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 2 (1986) 
 
Garcia, Mhairi Main, “UAE,” from “The International comparative legal guide to oil 
and gas regulation.” (London: Global Legal Group, 2013.) 
 
George, Libby, “Nigeria’s NNPC fights for oil cargoes as revenues squeeze bites,” 
April 18th 2016, Accessed July 16th 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-oil-
idUSL5N17L3CK 
Gerson, Jen, “Riley’s last ride: A Calgary western-wear institution falls victim to the oil 
slump” The National Post, 22ns August 2016. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/the-last-cowboy-outfit-in-calgary 
 
Gilbert, Daniel and Sarah Kent. July 2
nd
 2015. BP Agrees to Pay $18.7 Billion to Settle 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-agrees-to-pay-18-7-billion-to-settle-deepwater-horizon-
oil-spill-claims-1435842739 
 
Giovannetti, Justin, “Alberta braces for longest economic slump since 1980s,” The 
Globe and Mail February 24th 2016, accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/alberta/alberta-ndp-confirms-provinces-
recession-to-last-into-2016/article28877029/ 
 
Goode, Paul J. “The Decline of Regionalism in Putin's Russia: Boundary Issues”  (New 
York: Routledge, 2011) 
 
Gorst, Isabel, “Putin appoints Rosneft ally to Sakhalin,” The Financial Times, August 
7th, 2007. Accessed July 16th 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/c8f78216-451f-11dc-
82f5-0000779fd2ac 
 
Graber, Daniel,“Eni expands capacity in Iraqi oil” March 3rd 2016 Accessed August 2nd 
2016. http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2016/03/03/Eni-expands-
capacity-in-Iraqi-oil/9791457011054/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-
Industry/2016/03/03/Eni-expands-capacity-in-Iraqi-oil/9791457011054/ 
 
Gray, Matthew, “A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf” 
Occasional Paper No. 7 ( Georgetown, 2011.) 
 
Greeley, Brendan,“Economic Addiction: Emerging economies worldwide struggle to 
end budget-busting subsidies” Bloomberg March 14th 2014 accessed August 2nd 2016. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-13/why-fuel-subsidies-in-
developing-nations-are-an-economic-addiction 
 
282 
 
Gregory, Paul, “Confused survey says two Russian energy giants top Google and Apple 
in corporate transparency.” Forbes, November 23rd 2014. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/11/24/confused-survey-says-
two-russian-energy-giants-top-google-and-apple-in-corporate-
transparency/#201278f72247 
 
Gunter, Frank, “Challenges Facing the Reconstruction of Iraq’s Infrastructure.” 
(Research paper: Lehigh University, 2013) 
 
Gunter, Frank, “The Political Economy of Iraq: Restoring Balance in a Post-Conflict 
Society,” (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 
 
Habeeb, William M., “The Middle East in Turmoil: Conflict, Revolution, and Change,” 
(Greenwood: Oxford) 
 
Hahn, Gordon, “Putin's Federal Reforms: Reintegrating Russia's Legal Space or 
Upsetting the Metastability of Russia's Asymmetrical Federalism.” Demokratizatsiya, 
9,4 (2001) 
Hanson, Stephanie, “Nigeria’s Creaky Political System,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
April 12th 2007, Accessed July 16th 2016. http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigerias-creaky-
political-system/p13079 
 
Harding, Katherine, “Alberta to cut ‘prosperity bonus’ cheques.”   September. 13th, 
2005 The Globe and Mail September 13th, 2005. 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/alberta-to-cut-prosperity-bonus-
cheques/article4120632/ 
 
Hassan Ali, Kathem, “Associated Petroleum Gas management in the south of 
Iraq,”(Diss: Mid Sweden University, 2014) http://www.diva-
portal.se/smash/get/diva2:768346/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
 
Havro  Gøril, and Javier Santiso, “Benefiting the Resource Rich: How Can International 
Development Policy Help Tame the Resource Curse?” Institute of Development Studies 
IDS working paper 355 (2011) 
 
Heinrich, Andreas, Under the Kremlin's Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the 
Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security? Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60, 
No. 9 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008) 
 
Henderson, James, “ International Partnerships in Russia’s Oil and Gas Industry, “ 
Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme Meeting Summary 27th March 2014 
 
Henderson, James, “The Strategic Implications of Russia’s Eastern Oil Resources,” 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies WPM 41  (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, 2011)   
 
Henderson, James, Alastair Ferguson, “International Partnerships in Russia’s Oil and 
Gas Industry,”Russia and Eurasia Programme Meeting Summary March 27th 2014, 
Accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/2014032
7RussiaOilGas.pdf 
 
283 
 
Hill, Fiona and Florence Fee, “Fueling the Future: The Prospects for Russian Oil and 
Gas” Demokratizatsiya 10,4 (Autumn 2002) 
Hinshaw, Drew, Nigeria's Oil Revenue Faces an Accounting The Wall Street Journal 
April 11
th
 2014 Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304026304579449260323592916 
 
Hironaka, Ann, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the 
Perpetuation of Civil War, (Harvard University Press, 2005) 
 
Holden, Steinar, “Avoiding the resource curse the case of Norway,”Energy Policy, 63 
(2013) 
 
Hou, Zhenbo and Jodie Keane, Jane Kennan and Dirk Willem te Velde, “The oil price 
shock of 2014.” ODI Working Paper 215, March 2015. 
Human Rights Watch: Reversing the Arabization of Kirkuk (2004) 
Hunter, Tina, “It's time: Petroleum policy change for sustainable development in the 
Australian offshore upstream petroleum sector,” Journal of applied law and policy 
(2009) :31-54 
 
Hvozdyk, Lyudmyla and Valerie Mercer-Blackman, “What determines investment in 
the oil sector?” Cambridge University and Inter-American Development Bank. IDP 
Working Paper Series IDP-WP-209 
 
Ibukun, Yinka, “Boko Haram's Cost to Nigeria's Borno: $1 Billion And Rising” 
Bloomberg, September 9th 2015. Accessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-09/boko-haram-s-cost-to-
nigeria-s-borno-1-billion-and-rising 
 
IImi, Atsushi, “Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the 
Rest of the World,”IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 4, 54 (2007) 
 
Iledare, Wumi and Rotimi Suberu, “Nigeria” from “Oil and  gas in federal systems,” 
ed. George Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Integrated National Energy Strategy of Iraq, 2010-2030. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.iier.org/i/uploadedfiles/publication/real/1371283063_150613Summaryofthe
FinalReport(IntegratedNationalEnergyStrategy(INES)forIraq).pdf 
 
International Business Publications “Libya Oil and Gas Exploration Laws and 
Regulation Handbook,”(Washington:  International Business Publications, 2013): 67 
International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook,” (Paris, 2014) 
 
International Monetary Fund Nigeria: 2002 Article IV Consultation 2003) 
 
Iraq Energy Institute interview with Thamir al Ghadban for an overview of these many 
challenges. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.iraqenergy.org/news/?detailof=7668&content=Exclusive-Interview-with-
Al-Ghadhban-on-Iraq%27s-Oil-&-Gas-Sector 
 
Iraq: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 15/236 (August 2015) 
 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait-International Response.”Keesing's Record of World Events, 36 
(1990) 
284 
 
 
Istrabadi, Feisal Amin, “A Constitution Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on Iraq 
's Failed Constitutional Process,” Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 87 (2009) 
 
Jan Osmańczyk, Edmund, Anthony Mango, “Encyclopedia of the United Nations and 
International Agreements: Vol 4:T to Z” (London: Taylor and Francis, 2003): 2288 
Jensen, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon, “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in 
Africa,” Comparative Political Studies 37; (2004) 
 
Johnson, Keith, ”Striking Pipeline, Kurdish Militants Deal Blow to Fellow Kurds,” 
Foreign Policy, 30
th
 July 2016. Accessed 2
nd
 August 2016. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/30/kurdish-militants-strike-pipeline-deal-blow-to-
fellow-kurds/ 
 
Jones, Sally, “BP Talks with Libya on Giant Gas Acreage Falter -Officials,” Rigzone, 
9th of March 2007. Accessed 16th of July 
2016.http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/42345/BP_Talks_with_Libya_on_Giant_
Gas_Acreage_Falter_Officials 
 
Joseph Sassoon, “Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 
 
Kalin, Stephen, “Iraq signs IMF monitoring program, to draw on FX reserves” January 
12
th
 2016. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-imf-
idUSKCN0UQ2J020160112 
 
Kalin, Stephen, Kirkuk oil flow resumed to extract gas, avoid field damage - Iraq 
Reuters August 23
rd
 2016. Accessed August 25
th
 2016. 
PMhttp://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil-pipeline-turkey-idUSKCN10Y1UU 
 
Kami, Aseel  “Iraq electricity minister resigns over power deals” Reuters April 18th 
2011. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-electricity-minister-
idUSL5E7JI30220110818 
Kane, Sean and Joost R. Hiltermann and Raad Alkadiri The National Interest 118 
(March/April 2012) 
 
Kanovsky, Eliyahu, “Who’s really over a barrel?” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2003) 
 
Karpukhin, Sergei, “Russia's Putin says $50 per barrel oil in 2016 budget 'too 
optimistic'” 17th of December 2015, accessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/17/russias-putin-says-50-per-barrel-oil-in-2016-
budget-too-optimistic.html 
 
Kennedy, Charles, “Low oil prices hitting real estate in UAE,” May 5th 2016, accessed 
July 16th 2016. http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Low-Oil-Prices-Hitting-
Real-Estate-in-UAE.html 
 
Kennedy, Charles, “Nigeria’s Oil production in free fall after more attacks,” May 30th 
2016, Accessed July 16th 2016.http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Nigerias-Oil-
Production-In-Free-Fall-After-More-Attacks.html 
 
285 
 
Kennedy, Ryan, “Nationalization of the Oil Sector: A Political Economy Perspective,” 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual 
Conference "Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition,”) 
 
Kent, Simon, “Kurdish Regional Government fights reform battle,” Iraq Business News 
December 24
th
 2015, accessed August 2
nd
 2016 http://www.iraq-
businessnews.com/2015/12/24/kurdish-regional-government-fights-reform-battle/ 
 
Kesselman, Mark and Joel Krieger, William A. Joseph Introduction to Comparative 
Politics, Brief Edition (Boston: Wadsworth 2010) 
 
Khadduri, Walid, “Electricity shortage costs Iraqi economy $40 billion a year, Al 
Monitor September 24th 2013, Accessed July 16th 2016. ”http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/09/iraq-oil-energy-crisis.html 
 
Khvostunova, Olga “How Gazprom Snoozed through the “Shale Gas Revolution” 
Institute of Modern Russia 5
Th
 of Febraury 2013. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://imrussia.org/en/economy/382-how-gazprom-snoozed-through-the-shale-gas-
revolution 
 
Knights, Michael,  “Bringing Iraq's 'Ghost' Forces Back to Life” The Washington 
Institute December 10
th
 2014 Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/bringing-iraqs-ghost-forces-
back-to-life 
 
Knights, Michael,  “Making the Iraqi Revenue-Generating Deal Work,” 
Korsunskaya, Darya, “Russian finance minister warns on spending as crisis deepens” 
Reuters January 14
th
 2014. Accessed August 3
rd
 2016. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-crisis-idUSKBN0KN0Q620150114 
 
Kramer, Andrew, “Russia Cuts Gas, and Europe Shivers,” The New York Times January 
6th 2009, accessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/europe/07gazprom.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 
 
Krishnan, Barani “Oil Down as Rally Snaps on Rising Crude, China Fuel Exports” 
Reuters, August 22, 2016 Accessed August 25
th
 2016. 
https://www.bing.com/search?q=oil+down+as+rally+snaps+on+rising+crude%2C+chin
a+fuel+exports&form=EDGNTC&qs=PF&cvid=cbce6e60feba4244b76d4f37c41aa762
&pq=oil+down+as+rally+snaps+on+rising+crude%2C+china+fuel+exports 
 
Krugel, Lauren, “Oilsands Losing Money On Every Barrel, Yet Have No Choice But 
To Produce: Analyst,” The Huffington Post 13th of January 2016, Accessed July 16th 
2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/01/13/oilsands-losing-
money_n_8969094.html 
 
Kuzu, Daniela and Danaa Nantogmah, “The Oil Economy and the Resource Curse 
Syndrome:  Can Ghana make a difference?”(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin 2010) 
 
L. Ross, Michael, “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” 
Journal of Peace Research, 41, 3 (London: Sage, 2004) 
 
286 
 
Laherrere, Jean H, “The end of cheap oil,” The Scientific American, 1998 
 
Lee, John, “Iraq sets up Dhi Qar oil company,” Iraq Business News January 8th 2016. 
Accessed July 16th 2016.http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2016/01/08/iraq-sets-up-
dhi-qar-oil-company/ 
 
Lee, Julian, “Forget the Saudis, Nigeria’s the big oil worry,” Bloomberg, May 16th 
2016 Accessed uly 16th 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-05-
15/nigeria-s-a-bigger-worry-for-oil-than-saudi-arabia 
 
Lergo, Tunga, “Deconstructing Ethnic Politics: The Emergence of a Fourth Force in 
Nigerian Political Discourse,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 
1,15, 2011 
 
Leslie, Peter M., Canada: The State of the Federation, 1986 (Kingston: Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1985.), 
 
Locke, Wade and Paul Hobson “An Examination of the Interaction Between Natural 
Resource Revenues and Equalization Payments” “Institute for Research on Public 
Policy,” IRPP Working Paper Series no. 2004-10 
 
Lockhart, Paul G.,“Geopolitics, Borders, and Federalism: Challenges for Post-War 
Iraq,” Diss. Western Kentucky University, 2014.) 
 
Logan, Joseph, “The Quality of Justice: Failings of Iraq's Central Criminal Court,” 
Human Rights Watch (2008): 19 
 
Looney, Robert, “A Return to Baathist Economics? Escaping Vicious Circles in Iraq” 
Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 7 Center for Strategic Insights July 2007 
 
Louise Aartun, Anne, “The Political Economy of The United Arab Emirates,” (Diss: 
University of Oslo, 2002)   
 
Lucus, Edward, “The New Cold War, (London: Bloomsbury, 2009) 
 
Luft, Gal “How Much oil does Iraq have?” Brookings Institution, May 12th 2003. 
Accessed July 16th 2016.https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-much-oil-does-iraq-
have/  
 
Lynn Karl, Terry, “The Political Challenge of Escaping the Resource Curse: The Case 
for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract” in Escaping the resource curse” (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2007) 
 
Magnowski, Daniel, “Nigerian Economic Growth Slows on Oil Industry’s Contraction,”  
Bloomberg. May 13, 2015. Accessed july 16th 2016.  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-13/nigeria-1q-gdp-grows-3-96-y-y-
natl-bureau-of-statistics-says 
 
Marcel, Valérie, “Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas 
Producers,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs (2013) 
 
287 
 
Martin and Subramanian “Addressing the Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria. 
IMF Working Paper, July 2003, Washington DC: IMF. 
 
Martin, Ivan and Phillip Whittaker, “Government Take in Upstream Oil and Gas.” 
Boston Consulting Group. December 9th 2015) Accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/energy-environment-government-
take-upstream-oil-gas/ 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Jameson Boex, “Russia's Transition to a New 
Federalism,” (Washington: The World Bank Institute, 2001) 
 
Mccarthy, Sean, “Albertans want expansion of oil industry, poll shows.” The Globe and 
Mail May 18
th
 2015. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-
on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/albertans-want-expansion-of-oil-
industry-poll-shows/article24478580/ 
 
Mcdowell, Angus, “Saudi shake-up rolls on with big reshuffle of economic posts,” 
Reuters Sunday, May 8
th
 2016. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-reshuffle-idUSKCN0XY0DX 
 
McEneaney, Kyle, “How Iraq's Economy Can Turn Itself Around Foreign Affairs April 
19
th
 2016 accessed August 2
nd
 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2016-
04-19/reforming-baghdad 
 
Mcsheely, William, “Female economy minister represents first for UAE.” The 
Financial Times. Accessed July 16
th
 2016.  
MEES, 24th April, 2000. 
 
Menon, Anoop,“Parsons to design $10bn Iraq seawater supply project,” Febrary 9th 
2015, accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://meconstructionnews.com/8468/parsons-to-
design-10bn-iraq-seawater-supply-project 
 
Milke, Mark,  “Equalization, Ontario, and the politics of division,” Fraser Research 
Bulletin January 2014 Accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/equalization-ontario-and-the-politics-
of-division.pdf 
 
Miller, Christian T, “Blood Money: Wasted billions, lost lives and corporate greed in 
Iraq.” (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2006) 
 
Miller, Christian T. “Blood Money: Wasted billions, lost lives and corporate greed in 
Iraq.” (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2006) 
 
Mills, Robin, “Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics” Oxford 
Institute of Energy Studies Working Paper 63. (Oxford, 2016) 
 
Milov, Vladimir, “The role of Russia in the European energy security,” Institute of 
Energy Policy, Russia. Hearings at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament Brussels, February 28th, 2007 
 
Milov, Vladimir, and  Andrew Kuchins, How Sustainable is Russia's Future as an 
Energy Superpower? Carnegie India March 16
th
 2006. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
288 
 
http://carnegieindia.org/2006/03/16/how-sustainable-is-russia-s-future-as-energy-
superpower 
 
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, “Energy Strategy of Russia for the period 
up to 2030.” 
 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Syria. Available at 
http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/447/ Accessed July 16th 2016 
 
Mohsen, Majida, “Iraq has no plans to lift fuel subsidies-govt adviser” Reuters Zawya 
14
th
 Decemer 2015 Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
https://www.zawya.com/story/Iraq_has_no_plans_to_lift_fuel_subsidiesgovt_adviser-
ZAWYA20151214052212/ 
 
Monaghan, Andrew, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: A Political Idea Lacking a 
Strategy?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7, 2 (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 275–288 
 
Moore, Pete and Christopher Parker , “The War Economy of Iraq” Middle East 
Research Institute Issue 243 Vol. 37 Summer 2007. 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer243/war-economy-iraq 
 
Morton, Ted and Meridith Mcdonald, “The siren song of economic diversification: 
Alberta’s Legacy of Loss” SPP Research Paper No. 8-13. (2015). 
 
Moss, Todd, “The Governor’s Solution: How Alaska’s Oil Dividend Could Work in Iraq 
and Other Oil-Rich Countries,” Center for Global Development, (Washington DC, 
2013) 
 
Mousa Jiyad , Ahmed, “Iraq” in Upstream Law and Regulation, (London: Globe 
Business Publishing, 2013) 
 
Mousa Jiyad, Ahmed, “Doubt surrounds Satarem Missan refinery deal.” Iraq Business 
News December 17
th
 2013, accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://www.iraq-
businessnews.com/2013/12/17/doubt-surrounds-satarem-missan-refinery-deal/ 
 
Mustapha, Abdul Raufu, “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public 
Sector in Nigeria,” Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper 
Number 24 (United Nations,2006 ) 
 
Muttitt, Greg, Fuel on the fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq. (London:The Bodley 
Head, 2011) 
 
Nadejda Makarova, Victor, “Gazprom: Gas Giant Under Strain.” Working Paper 71. 
(Stanford, 2007.) 
 
Nakhle, Carole “Iraq’s Oil future: Finding the right framework.” Surrey Energy 
Economics  
Centre (University of Surrey, 2008)  
 
289 
 
Natali, Denise, “Iraq’s oil brinkmanship” Al Monitor, January 14th 2016, Accessed july 
16th 2-016. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/krg-baghdad-iraq-oil-
maliki-barzani.html 
 
Natali, Denise, “Stalemate, not statehood, for Kurdistan,” Lawfare Blog. November 1st 
2015. Accessed July 16th 2016. https://www.lawfareblog.com/stalemate-not-statehood-
iraqi-kurdistan 
 
Natali, Denise, “The myth of a tripartite Iraq,” Al Monitor June 23, 2016. Accessed July 
16th 216. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/iraq-myth-tripartite-
sunni-shia-kurd-stability-isis.html 
 
Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Responding to the Challenge of Corruption in 
Resource-Rich Countries,” (2015) 
 
Neuman, William, “Social Research Methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches,” 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon) 
 
Newnham, Randall, “Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy resources as a foreign 
policy tool,”Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol.2, 2 (2011) 
 
 No author listed. “Chechen official puts death toll for 2 wars at up to 160,000<” The 
New York Times August 16th 2005. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/world/europe/chechen-official-puts-death-toll-for-
2-wars-at-up-to-160000.html 
 
No author listed. “Iran: Another Crisis for the Shah,” Time Magazine, Nov. 13th, 1978 
 
No author listed. “Libya’s Civil War: An Oily Mess” The Economist. April 9th 2015. 
Accessed July 16th 2016.http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21648054-negotiations-fail-progress-one-side-tries-grab-oil-revenue-oily 
 
No author listed. Abysmal Licensing Round Result in Algeria Confirms Energy Sector 
Malaise,” IHS Markits 18th of March 2011. Accessed 16th July 2016. 
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?ID=1065929211 
No author listed. The fight over letting foreigners into Iran’s oilfields.” The Economist, 
July 12th 2001. 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/ 
Accessed July 16th 2016 
 
Nwokeji, Ugo, “The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the Development of 
the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry,” James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
University (2007.) 
 
O’Sullivan, Meghan L., Iraqi Politics and Implications for Oil and Energy,” Harvard 
Belfer Centre, 2011 
 
Obi, Cyril, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-
related Conflict,” Africa Development, 34, 2009 
 
290 
 
Obi, Cyril, “Nigeria’s post military transition is not a day job,” E-International 
Relations December 2008 Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.e-
ir.info/2008/12/01/nigeria%E2%80%99s-post-military-transition-
%E2%80%9Cdemocracy-is-not-a-day%E2%80%99s-job%E2%80%9D/ 
 
Ogundipe, Samuel, “Buhari govt ‘dragging feet’ on Petroleum Industry Bill—Dogara,”  
Premium Times. July 19th, 2016 Accessed July 25th 2016. 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/207154-buhari-govt-dragging-feet-
petroleum-industry-bill-dogara.html 
 
Onuah, Felix, “Nigeria makes first 2015 contribution to sovereign wealth fund” Reuters, 
Nov 19th, 2015, Accessed july 16th 2016.  http://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-
economy-idUSL8N13E5AB20151119 
 
Onyeisi, Romanus, Okolie and Ochei C. Monday, An Examination of Nigerian Fiscal 
Federalism and Its Impact on Revenue Generation for Economic Development. 2, 12, 
2014 
 
OPEC, “World Oil Outlook,” (Paris, 2014) 
 
OPEC: Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2015. 
 
Openoil: Libya,2011 
 
Otiotio, Denis, Gas Flaring Regulation in the oil and gas industry,” “A Comparative 
Analysis of Nigeria and Texas Regulations Tulsa University (2013.) 
 
Ovcharova, Anna, “Russia” Upstream Law and Regulation, (London: Globe Business 
Publishing, 2013) 
 
Pamuk, Humeyra, “Iraqi oil output plans overambitious – executives,” Reuters October 
13
th
 2010. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-oil-plans-
idUSLDE69C1IE20101013 
 
Pant, Himani, “Russia’s Economy in 2016,” The Diplomat, May 11th 2016, accessed 
July 16th 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/russias-economy-in-2016/ 
 
Pascal, Elizabeth, “Defining Russian Federalism” (Westport: Praeger, 2003) 
 
Payne, Julia, “Stalled Nigerian oil law broken up, new draft splits state giant,” Reuters. 
May 25th 2015. Accessed July 16th 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-oil-
lawmaking-idUSKBN0TQ27R20151207 
 
Payne, Julia, “UPDATE 2-Oil price plunge forces Nigeria to slash 2015 growth 
forecast” Reuters December 17th 2014. Accessed August 2nd 2016. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-economy-idUSL6N0U12OO20141217 
 
Peterson, J, “The future of federalism in the United Arab Emirates,” In “Crosscurrents 
in the Gulf: Arab Regional, and Global Interests (London: Routledge, 1988) 
 
291 
 
Pleming, Sue, “Gaddafi says looking at Oil firm Nationalization,” Reuters January 21st 
2009. Accessed July 16th 2009. http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessproind-us-libya-
gaddafi-oil-idUKTRE50K61F20090121 
 
Plourde, Andre, “Oil and gas in the Canadian federation,” Paper presented at the 
“Canadian-United States Energy Issues after Copenhagen,” May 28th 2010, 
Northwestern University, Illinois.  
 
Plourde, Andre, “Oil and gas in the Canadian federation,” Paper presented at the 
“Canadian-United States Energy Issues after Copenhagen,” May 28th 2010, 
Northwestern University, Illinois. 
 
Poelzer, Greg, “What Crisis? Global Lessons from Norway for Managing Energy-Based 
Economies,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute (2015) 
 
Pratt, Larry, “Energy: The Roots of National Policy” Studies in Political Economy, 7, 
(1982) 
 
Radon, Jenik, “The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts: License-Concession Agreements, 
Joint Ventures, and Production-sharing Agreements,” in Covering Oil: A reporter's 
guide to energy and development” Ed. Svetlana Tsallik et al (New York: Open Society 
Institute, 2005) 61.  
 
Rascoet , Angelina, “Kuwait, U.A.E. Happy With Market Strategy: OPEC Reality 
Check,” June 5th 2015, Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-04/kuwait-u-a-e-happy-with-market-
strategy-opec-reality-check 
 
Rascoet , Angelina, Oil states need price jump to balance budget” Bloomberg 30th of 
November 2015. Accessed 16th July 2016. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-30/oil-states-need-price-jump-to-
balance-budget-opec-reality-check 
 
Rasheed, Ahmed “Oil companies offer to cut 2015 spending in Iraq” Reuters March 12th 
2015 accessed August 2
nd
 2016. http://uk.reuters.com/article/iraq-oil-contracts-
idUKL5N0WE4OJ20150312 
 
Razzouk, Nayla, “Iraq’s Oil Output Climbs to Record as South Escapes Fighting” 
Bloomberg August 12
th
 2015, accessed August 2
nd
 
2016.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-12/iraq-boosts-oil-output-to-
all-time-high-in-july-iea-says 
 
Reynolds, Douglas B. and Marek Kolodzie, “Former Soviet Union Oil Production and 
GDP Decline: Granger Causality and the Multi-Cycle Hubbert Curve,”Energy 
Economics, 30 (2008) 
 
Rickards, James, “Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis” (New York: 
Penguin, 2011) 
 
Ricklefs, Norman, Mukdad al-Jabbari, Robert Tollast, “Rivers of Babylon: Iraq’s Water 
Crisis and what Turkey should do.” August 23rd 2015. Accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-08-23/rivers-babylon 
292 
 
 
Rieger, René, “Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations: Diplomacy and Mediation in Conflict 
Resolution,” (New York: Routledge, 2016.): Section 2.3.2. 
 
Rizk Khoury, Dina, “Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance,” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
Rotberg, Robert I.,“Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges,”(London: 
Lynne Riener, 2004) 
 
Rotberg, Robert, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs July/ August 
2002 
 
Rotberg, Robert, “Nigeria; Elections and Continuing Challenges,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, Council Special Report 27, April 2007) 
 
Rubin, Barry, “The Middle East: A Guide to Politics, Economics, Society and Culture,” 
(New York; Routledge, 2012) , 127 
 
Ruhayem, Rami, “Iraq struggles to solve electricity crisis.” BBC News. 12th of April 
2013. Accessed July 16
th
 2016.  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
22093992 
 
Rutledge, Ian, “The Sakhalin II PSA – a Production ‘Non-Sharing’ Agreement.” 
Sheffield Energy & Resources Information Services (SERIS) 2014 November 2004 
Accessed July 16th 2016 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/sakhalin_psa.pdf 
Saadallah al Fathi, “THE FARCE THAT GOES FOR REFINERY PROJECTS IN IRAQ”  
http://gulfnews.com/business/analysis/the-farce-that-goes-for-refinery-projects-in-iraq-
1.1707584 
 
Sachs, Susan, “Hussein’s Regime Skimmed Billions from Aid Program,” The New York 
Times, February 9th 2004. Accessed July 16th 
2016.http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/29/world/hussein-s-regime-skimmed-billions-
from-aid-program.html?_r=0 
 
Salaheddin, Sinan, Iraq eyes 29% boost in oil production in 2014” USA Today June 12th 
2013 Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/12/iraq-targets-45-million-
barrels-2014/2415427/ 
 
Sandbu, Martin,“The Iraqi who saved Norway from its oil,” The Financial Times, 
August 29th 2009. Accessed July 16th 2009 https://www.ft.com/content/99680a04-
92a0-11de-b63b-00144feabdc0 
 
Sanzillo, Tom and Lorne Stockman, Deborah Rogers, Hannah McKinnon, Elizabeth 
Bast, and Steve Kretzmann, “Material Risks: How public accountability is slowing tar 
sands development,” Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) 
2014. 
 
Sassoon, Joseph, “Oil prices and economic management” Paper presented at the 15th 
MEEA conference, Doha, March 26
th
, 2016. 
293 
 
 
Scarborough, Harry, “Knowledge management in practice: An exploratory case study,” 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 11 
 
Shabafrouz, Miriam, “Oil and the Eruption of the Algerian Civil War: A Context-
sensitive Analysis of the Ambivalent Impact of Resource Abundance,” German Institute 
of Global and Area Studies, Working Papers, 118 (2010)  
 
Shkaeva,  Natlalia, “The resource curse magnitude in federal states,” (Diss: Central 
European University, Budapest, 2014.) 
 
Simpson, Adam, “A crash course in Iraq’s electoral politics,” Atlantic Council, April 
21st 2014 . Accessed July 16th 2016 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-crash-course-in-iraq-s-electoral-
politics 
 
Skibiak, Nicholas,  “Political and legal obstacles in Iraq” Middle East Institute April 
26
th
 2010. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. http://www.mei.edu/content/political-and-legal-
obstacles-iraq 
 
Sky, Emma, “The Unravelling,” (New York: Atlantic, 2016) 
 
Smith, Benjamin “Measuring the Resource Curse: Revisiting the Politics of Oil 
Wealth,” (University of Florida, 2011.) 
 
Smith, Keith C., “Lack of Transparency in Russian Energy Trade” CENTER FOR 
STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, July 2010 
Socor, Vladimir, “Hungarian MOL Takes Steps to Keep Production License in Russia,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 6 
Soto, Raimundo, Ilam Haouas, “Has the UAE escaped the resource curse?” Economic 
Research forum Working Paper 278 Economic Research Forum, 2012 
 
Sovacool, Benjamin K. and Michael H. Dworkin, “Global Energy Justice” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014.) 
 
Sproull, Nicholas, “Handbook of research methods: A guide for practitioners and 
students in the social sciences,” (New York: Scarecrow.) 
 
Stepan, Alfred, “Federalism and Democracy:Beyond the U.S. Model,”Journal of 
Democracy 10.4 (1999) 
 
Stevens, Paul and Glada Lahn, Jaakko Kooroshy, “The Resource Curse Revisited,” 
(Chatham House, 2015) 
 
Stratfor, “Special Report: Iran's Oil Smuggling Network in Iraq,” 30th January 2016. 
Accessed July 16th 2012. https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/special-report-
irans-oil-smuggling-network-iraq 
 
Tan, Florence, “OPEC price war in Asia intensifies as oil falls below $50” Reuters 
Monday January 12th 2015.Acessed July 16th 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crude-asia-idUSKBN0KL0VJ20150112 
294 
 
 
Taylor, Jeffrey, “Worse than Iraq? Nigeria's president and onetime hope for a stable 
future is leading his country toward implosion—and possible U.S. military 
intervention,” The Atlantic, April 2006 issue.  
 
Tencer, Daniel, “Has the National Energy Board been ‘captured by industry?’ The 
Huffington Post, 5th November 2014 Accessed July 16th 2016. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/11/05/regulatory-capture-national-energy-
board_n_6108628.html 
The 1985 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord,” The Newfoundland and Labrador  
Heritage Website http://www.heritage.nf.ca/about/index.php 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005 
 
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act,” William & Mary Environmental Law and 
Policy Review 3 (1976) 
 
The World Bank: “Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership,” Accessed July 16th 
2016http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/gasflaringreduction 
 
Theam Choy, Looi, “The Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Methodology: 
Comparison and Complimentary between Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches,” 
IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science 19, (2014) 
 
Thurber, Mark and David Hults, “Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The effect of 
administrative design on oil sector performance.” Energy Policy, 39, 9 (2011) 
 
THURBER, MARK C. AND IFEYINWA M. EMELIFE, AND PATRICK R.P. 
HELLER “NNPC AND NIGERIA’S OIL PATRONAGE ECOSYSTEM” Stanford 
Working Paper on Sustainable Development no.95 (Stanford, 2010.) 
 
Toner, Glen, Leslie A. Pal and Michael Prince, “Policy: From Ideas to Implementation,” 
(Montreal: Kingston University Press, 2010) 
 
Torrance, Michael, “Canada: Equator Principles Banks: The New Global Regulators,” 
Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP Mondaq June 15
th
 2014. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/323474/Environmental+Law/Equator+Principles+Ba
nks+The+New+Global+Regulators 
 
Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2015 
 
Treisman, Daniel, “Oil and democracy in Russia,” (Diss, University of California, 
2010.) 
 
Tsado Gana, Aaron and Samuel G. Egwu, Federalism in Africa: Framing the national 
question, Volume 1 (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2003) 
 
Tuohy, Carolyn “Policy Politics Canada,” (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1992) 
 
Tzu, Sun, “The Art of War” Translated by Lionel Giles. (Berkley Publishing Group: 
New York, 2009 
295 
 
 
U.S Energy Administration Agency: Iraq is the second leading contributor to global 
liquids supply,” (2016) 
 
U.S State Department Cable, “CABINET RESHUFFLE ENHANCES STABILITY 
AHEAD OF LEADERSHIP TRANSITION,” November 2nd 2004. Accessed July 16th 
2016. Available at Wikileaks. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUDHABI3955_a.html 
 
U.S State Department Cable, available at Wikileaks. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD3309_a.html 
 
Uche, Chibuike, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" The Journal of 
African  
History, 49, 1 
 
Upadhyay, Rakesh,  “Is Raymond James’ $80 Oil Realistic?” Oilprice June 30th 2016. 
Accessed July 16
th
 2016.  http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Is-Raymond-
James-80-oil-realistic.html 
 
Upstream Law and Regulations, Pereira and Talus, 2013   
 
US State Department cable, “TNK-BP HAS BRIGHT FUTURE,” 14th September 2009. 
Accessed July 16
th
 2016. Available at Wikileaks. 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0909/S00135/cablegate-embassy-moscow.htm 
Valerie Marcel, “Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East,” 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press) 
 
Vásquez, Patricia I. ,“Argentina’s Oil and Gas Sector: Coordinated Federalism and The 
Rule of Law,” Wilson Center (2016) 
 
Victor, David G. and David R. Hults, Mark C. Thurber, “Oil and Governance: State-
Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 
 
Vidala, Vijaykumar, “Oil price will average less in 2015: Reuters poll” Reuters 30th of 
Jan 2015 accessed August 2
nd
 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-prices-
idUSKBN0L31AX20150130 
 
Visser, Reidar, “Is Iraq Headed for Complete Disintegration?” Historae.org blog. 27th 
June 2013, accessed July 16th 2016. 
https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2013/06/27/provincial-powers-law-revisions-
elections-results-for-anbar-and-nineveh-is-iraq-headed-for-complete-disintegration/ 
 
Visser, Reidar, “Nonsense of Congress on Federalism in Iraq,” Historiae.org, 13 
December 2007 Accessed 16th July 2016. http://www.historiae.org/congress.asp 
 
Vivoda, Vlado, “The rise of state-firm bargaining in the 2000s,” in “The Political 
Economy of Natural Resources and Development: From neoliberalism to resource 
nationalism” eds Paul  
 
A. Haslam, Pablo Heidrich. (Routledge: New York, 2016.) 
296 
 
Volcker, Paul et al, “Independent Inquiry into the United Nations Oil for Food 
Programme,” (October 27th 2005) 
 
Wardani, Salma E, “Reopening Libya’s oil ports is newly unified NOC’s top priority,” 
Bloomberg 11th July 2016, Accessed July 16th 2016 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-11/reopening-libya-oil-ports-is-
newly-unified-noc-s-top-priority 
 
Warner,Andrew M. and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Growth,”(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5398, 1995) 
 
Wasty, Sulaiman S., “Private Sector Development in Iraq: Continuing Constraints” 
Middle East Institute July 26
th
 2012. Accessed August 2
nd
 2016. 
http://www.mei.edu/content/private-sector-development-iraq-continuing-constraints 
 
Watts, Michael, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the 
Niger Delta” Review of African Political Economy,” 34, 114. (2007) 
 
West, Johnny, “Iraq’s last window.” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 
266, September 2011. 
 
Williams, Nia, “At $22, three quarters of oilsands production is underwater and losing 
up to $3 on every barrel,” Financial Post  December 17th 2015 accessed July 16th 
2016.  
 
Williams, Phil, “Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq” (U.S 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2009) 
Williams, Selina, Russian Oil: Output grows as prospects sink” The Wall Street Journal 
24th January 2016. Accessed 16th July 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-oil-
output-grows-as-prospects-shrink-1453685744 
 
Wing, Joel, “A History Of Oil Smuggling In Iraq,” Musings on Iraq, August 17th 2010. 
Accessed July 16th 2016. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2010/08/history-of-oil-
smuggling-in-iraq.html 
 
Wing, Joel, “Basra Federal Region Plan Fails,”Musings on Iraq, January 23rd 2009. 
Accessed July 16th 2009. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/basra-federal-
region-plan-fails.html 
 
Wing, Joel, “Does Iraq suffer from the resource curse?” December 11th 2012. Acessed 
July 16th 2016.http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/does-iraq-suffer-from-oil-
curse.html 
 
Wing, Joel, June 2010 Poll Finds Iraqis Have Mixed Views About Their Country 
Musings on Iraq October 6
th
 2010. Accessed July 16
th
 2016. 
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/june-2010-poll-finds-iraqis-have-
mixed.html 
 
Woynillowicz, Dan and Chris Severson-Baker, “The Environmental Implications of 
Canada’s Oil Sands Rush,” (Alberta: The Pembina Institute, 2005) 
 
297 
 
Yeates, J. Lanier and Paul E. Comeaux, N. Stepha: Kinsella, “The Russian Constitution 
of 1993: Provisions of Interest to the Energy Industry.”  Russian Oil & Gas Guide 4, 2, 
April 1995 
 
Yin, Robert K., “Case Study Research,”(London: SAGE, 2003) 
Zedalis, Rex, “The Legal Dimensions of Oil and Gas in Iraq,”  (Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press, 2009) 
 
Zhdannikov, Dmitry,  “How Kurdistan bypassed Baghdad and sold oil on global 
markets,” 17th November 2015, accessed August 2nd 2016. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-kurdistan-oil-idUKKCN0T61HL20151117 
 
Ziegler, Charles E. “The History of Russia,” (Greenwood: London, 1999) 
 
Zubarevich, Natalia, “Russian elections and relations between the centre and the 
regions,” from “Russia: Insights from a Changing Country,”(Institute for Security 
Studies, 2012) 
 
 
